Hello, good afternoon or good morning if you are in North America or good evening if you are in Asia, and welcome for our Investors Day, I would say today and tomorrow. This, the first day, is a special one. As we've done last year, it will be dedicated to share with you the vision that TotalEnergies has of the energy landscape and with our publication today of our TotalEnergies Energy Outlook 2021. As you know, this session is special as it is open not only to investors, but we have also some media who will follow us this afternoon. As you know, since we met last year, we changed our name to TotalEnergies. We changed our logo. We have reaffirmed a clear strategy to build a multi-energy company.
That's why we think it's important that we contribute as a responsible player to the debate around energy, the energy transition, and climate change. This year, we have taken a new initiative, which is not only to update, and you will see there is quite an update because this energy world is moving quickly, to update our TotalEnergies Energy Outlook 2021. We have also taken another initiative, which is to publish a new report about the energy landscape, which is a report written in collaboration with Capgemini and Colette Lewiner, an energy expert well-known in France. In order to describe, I would say, the worldwide energy system. The energy debate is quite complex. Primary energy, secondary energy, supply, demand, many possibilities, and the more we go into the transition, the more we open different options for this evolution of the energy system.
Through this report, we hope to contribute, I would say, to install the debate about the future of energy on solid basis. Helle will introduce you to this report, which will be available to you on our internet site in French today, in English tomorrow. You will be able to learn all what you want to know about the energy by reading this report. I'm sure there will be so many questions about it, but it's, I think, a strong contribution so that we can have this debate on solid basis. The second report that we are publishing today, you begin to be accustomed to that. It's the third year that we publish it. It's the TotalEnergies Energy Outlook 2021, where if you follow us quickly, we have two scenarios, Momentum and Rupture.
The Momentum being, I would say, as Helle will explain you, in line with the, I would say, the policies which are published and committed by the various countries around the planet. Since last year, of course, a number of countries declared their ambition to get to net-zero by 2050 or 2060. The Rupture scenario is a scenario with fitting in line, I would say, meeting the target of the Paris Agreement to have a temperature elevation well below two degrees compared to pre-industrial era. I will leave the floor to Helle now, and I hope that you will enjoy this presentation. It's a little long, so you will learn a lot, but Helle will do it with its dedication and passion.
After that, we'll have a Q&A session where we will first take the questions from the investors and then the question of the media. For the media, just let be clear, we'll answer today, it's not a press conference on any topics. It's a session which is dedicated to share with you the vision of TotalEnergies for energy landscape, the present and the future. Questions should be concentrated on this topic. Before, to give the floor to Helle, of course, like in all session with TotalEnergies, we would like to introduce this meeting through a safety moment.
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Good afternoon, everyone, or good morning if you're in the U.S. or elsewhere. Again, a very warm welcome. We're going to start this afternoon with some highlights from the energy landscape. As Patrick told you, the idea behind the energy landscape is to share some facts and data about the current energy sector so as to set the stage for the ongoing energy transition. Sharing knowledge and insights. We're covering simple stuff and quite complex matters. My charts this afternoon are not at all a summary of this handbook. If you are interested, again, don't hesitate, go to our website and download it since it is available in both English and French. By way of an introduction, this is our shared sustainable energy challenge. Number one , ensuring a reliable, affordable, accessible energy supply for a growing world population.
Number two, protecting the planet and its inhabitants from the adverse effect of greenhouse gas emissions and their impact on climate change. Now, why is that a challenge? Well, because by all considerations, the world population is widely expected to grow to 10 billion people 30 years from now, up from roughly 8 billion people today. As you can see on this chart to the right, the world GDP and energy demand have grown over the last 50 years, more or less in sync with population growth. Carbon emissions linked to energy that are showed in the little gray boxes also to the right, these emissions have gone up also from 15 gigatons in 2000, sorry, 1970, to 33 gigatons in 2019. We cannot continue like that. Our societies must find a way to reconcile population growth and prosperity with a massive reduction in CO2 emissions.
Starting now with energy supply. Energy supply is generally split into three families. Primary energy, meaning energy resources available from nature, that's at the bottom of the chart here. Secondary energies requiring some form of man-made transformation, refined oil products, for instance, or power. Finally, energy for final use, the top of the chart here, which is broken down to the kind of things we do with the available energy. Not everybody knows this, you all do. 80% of the world's energy supply still relies on greenhouse gas emitting fossil fuel resources. This dependence is not sustainable. We must increase the share of other sources of energy. One highlight we wanted to share with you all relates to energy value chains. How we are moving from primary energy to secondary energy and then to final end use.
What you see here is exactly that moving from left to right. We are showing two examples of two energy value chains. At the top, two example for electricity. Electricity made from the sun, photovoltaic, and electricity made from gas via the liquefied natural gas value chain. To the bottom, we're showing two chains for hydrogen. Hydrogen made from natural gas, which is gray hydrogen, and green hydrogen, which is made from renewables, renewable power. I know the chart is crowded. Don't worry if you're interested by this topic, again, there's much more on it in the full report. In both cases, for similar end use, the number of transformation steps is very variable. You can see that at least from the crowded chart.
The longer the production chains, the greater the potential losses, and therefore the cost. On the other hand, some of the longer value chains emit much less greenhouse gases. There is a trade-off here. As an example, green hydrogen to the bottom of the chart is much better in terms of emissions than gray hydrogen. There's virtually no emissions when you do green hydrogen. The value chain yield today is very low, meaning that it's costly, and therefore, green hydrogen is not at all consumer-ready at scale today. Innovation in these kind of production value chains is going to be extremely important going forward. Another chart building on exactly the same idea. Here you see the performance yields of three kinds of vehicles, broken down between the efficiency at the full production level and at the level of the engine or battery, the so-called tank-to-wheel efficiency.
The overall efficiency of a given chain is simply the multiplication of one by the other. What the chart shows is that the thermal cars, the internal combustion engine cars that the world uses today, are in fact highly inefficient, and that's primarily due to the internal combustion engine. The overall efficiencies you can see is only 20%. The current hydrogen-based fuel cells, and that's to the bottom of the chart, those cars are not very efficient either. 22% overall. On the other hand, battery-based electrical cars in the middle of the chart, you can see that they are extremely efficient at 73%. That's one good reason to push for EV car adoption. We avoid energy losses. In fact, electrification is a major trend in the energy sector, and not only in transport. Decarbonization is underway, and electricity is a main enabler.
This again, therefore, implies that power must come from low carbon sources. Indeed, low carbon electricity is at the core of numerous net-zero carbon emission-oriented policies around the world. That's for the good news. What the chart here also wants to convey is that the less exciting news is that it takes time. Solar and wind electricity have increased close to 10% per annum over the last 30 years. They still only represent roughly 10% of the overall global power mix. We have a long way to go still, and actually we need to accelerate. The magnitude of change that is needed varies country by country, as you can see to the right, because the starting point, meaning today's electricity mix country by country, is very different.
One word on power systems, again, this is a crowded chart, I know, and go to the full report if you want to really understand the messages. There is one key thing to remember, which is not too complicated, and that is that power generation and power consumption must be balanced at any point in time. To the right, today's power systems are built upon schedulable and manageable power capacities that come online to match demand, knowing that demand varies intraday, intra-season, and so on. These capacities are known as base loads, and they are always running, intermediate loads and peak loads. The massive introduction of intermittent renewables, meaning solar and wind, has a systemic impact on network balances because by definition, these renewable energies are not as predictable and reliable as other sources of power. Our power systems need to adapt for that.
Going forward, mitigation will come from building more storage capacity, building or maintaining intermediate and peak load capacities, and also from working with customers on demand response. Let's be clear. Today, we can't power a hospital with wind and solar electricity. They must be complemented by some form of firm power, reliable and predictable power. Gas can play that role, as was recently decided in California, for instance. To wrap up on energy supply, the chart here summarizes the main characteristics to consider when we compare energy. We all do that all the time, but not always on a solid basis. We've listed here seven key dimensions to consider, and I'll read them because it's important.
Energy density, energy availability or abundance, energy predictability or reliability, the impact on the electricity networks, other forms of externalities, typically emissions, both CO2 and methane, for instance, corrective measures that can help on the negative externalities, technology maturity. For illustrative purposes, we've, in the columns here, tried to compare oil, natural gas, and intermittent renewables against solar and wind. The takeaway is that comparison are not at all straightforward. As you can see, these different energies score differently on each of the seven criteria. We have not added cost on the table, because if you want to do a good job on cost, you have to put a price on emissions, on carbon and methane on one side, and on the negative impacts on the networks, electricity networks, on the other side.
There's much more to be said on this topic of comparing energies, and again, if you're interested, we've dedicated a full chapter to that in the report. Just one other comment. Footprint of different energies is also to be considered. The footprint is linked to the density of the energies and to their engineering characteristics, which in the end boils down to plant production yield. It's illustrated here in terms of square metres of land needed to power 100 W flat TV screen. You don't see oil on the chart because it's not really a good way to use oil to produce power. Hydro, of course, is a little specific because it's not at all modular.
What you can see here that for the same amount of power, the land use required for wind or solar is way bigger than the square metre needed for a coal power plant, a nuclear power plant, or a gas power plant. This is a way of showing why there are acceptability issues linked to wind and solar. Not everywhere, but in Europe, for instance, it is a mounting issue that has to be overcome. Now a few words on energy demand. Where does it come from? I think we all know this. Energy is central to human life. We use energy every day to move around, to make stuff in the industry, to heat and cool buildings and homes, to put the lights on, and more and more and importantly, to communicate.
When energy is plentiful, its consumption mix tends to vary according to end use. This is illustrated to the right for countries in the OECD. Specializing energies according to the end use for which they are the most efficient, so optimizing usage and mix, is one of the levers for a successful energy transition. Of course, that comment is not relevant if all the energy you have comes from traditional biomass, for instance. What you see here now is the evolution of energy demand over the last 20 years per geography, contrasting the evolution of energy demand in developed countries, OECD, and non-OECD countries. The obvious thing is that energy demand is growing very fast in non-OECD countries, and it is virtually flat and is probably going to be down in the future in the more developed countries.
1 billion people today do not have access to electricity, and for a lot of the non-OECD countries, access to energy is simply a prerequisite for their development. People are not equal when it comes to energy. The chart here shows the 2018 consumption per capita in megawatt-hours. What you can see is that Saudi per capita consumption is very close to the one of the U.S. France is behind, but then much, much higher than India or Kenya, for instance. This energy consumption level is a direct function of energy access and of living standards. Hence the need for a just and inclusive transition, meaning enabling the energy demand per capita to go up in non-OECD countries while we decarbonize. Given that energy consumption varies region by region, countries are not equal either when it comes to emissions.
To the left here, you see the top seven countries or regions in terms of emissions in one given year. In this case, it's 2019. China is first, followed by the U.S., European Union, and then comes India, Russia, Japan, and Germany. Not really surprising, of course, when you factor in population sizes. To the right, we are showing the same ranking, but in terms of emissions per capita. This data is a little less well-known. I will let you review it, and you may be surprised. Now the much more important picture, which is a comparison of the 10 largest CO2 emitters worldwide over the last 40 years, since 1971, so a little more than 40 years. That's in cumulative tons of CO2.
Close to half of those cumulative tons come from us in the Western world, 25 from the U.S., 22 from the European Union. Developed countries have thrived without any constraint on greenhouse gas emissions. Developing and emerging countries will need help to grow without following that same path. This is the top of the agenda of the upcoming COP26. It also takes us back to where I started our shared sustainable energy challenge. We all have a role to play for a successful transition, and we know what to do, which is summarized on the chart here. Avoid emissions, reduce them, compensate them, meaning compensate residual emissions when everything has been done to limit them to the strict minimum level via avoiding and reducing.
The fourth driver, which is innovation. All these drivers are effectively at play in the modeling work that we have done in our Energy Outlook. Now I propose that we switch to the 2021 Energy Outlook from TotalEnergies. Moving on to the outlook. As a reminder, our Energy Outlook only focuses on energy demand and looks at how this demand may evolve over the next 30 years, so out to 2050. Last year, the European Green Deal was one of the highlights of our outlook. As Patrick began to explain, this year, one key modeling driver is that many more countries have joined the net zero race with carbon neutrality pledges for 2050, sometimes 2060, which is great news for all of us, of course. We assume that these pledges will be delivered, and we have accounted for that, therefore, in our 2020 Energy Outlook.
Like last year, we've modeled two demand forecast scenarios to 2050 with two really completely different methodologies. Momentum is a forward-looking scenario based upon the decarbonization strategies of the net-zero 50 countries, and that's what I'm going to call the countries that have pledges to reach carbon neutrality net by 2050. They are shown on the map in green to the left. Momentum also takes into account China's goal or ambition to reach net-zero by 2060, and this is why it's only partially green on the map to the left. For all other countries, Momentum considers their announced pledges and nationally defined contributions. Momentum, because of these assumptions, goes way beyond a business as usual scenario and results in a 2.2-2.4 degrees increase in temperatures by 2100. The second scenario, Rupture, has been built with a backcasting approach using the IPCC emission scenarios.
It has 66% probability of it being a well below 2 degree. Rupture is a template for what needs to happen to be in a well below 2 degree world instead of a 2.2 or 2.5 degree world. We've added to that at the very end of my presentation, a sensitivity on the additional efforts required to reach 1.5. Elaborating a bit on this framework, the key assumptions for Momentum include a complete Internal Combustion Engine sales ban by 2035 in all the net-zero 50 countries, and that's a major assumption. When we say Internal Combustion Engine sales ban, it applies both to light-duty vehicles and to heavy-duty vehicles, meaning trucks. It also assumes a global acceleration of the transport revolution revolving around electrification and increased penetration of hydrogen and hydrogen-based e-fuels.
It assumes a broad electrification also of end use in industry and in the residential and commercial sector, which I will call ResCom. All of which creates a massive feedback loop on additional power demand and therefore a need for many more renewables. Beyond that, Momentum assumes a widespread use of natural gas as a transition fuel, especially in power and industry, much more than in transport, and we have much less gas in that transport segment than last year, for instance. Gas is also used as feedstock for blue hydrogen. On plastics, we've modeled a ban on single-use plastic, SUP, by 2040 for the net-zero 50 countries in China, and we've also increased recycling rates versus last year. China reaches 60% decarbonization by 2050, and its emission peaks somewhere in the middle of the year 2020. The macro backdrop for Momentum is shown to the left here.
It is 3% GDP growth per annum until 2050, and it results in a 0.5% growth per annum for energy demand. In Rupture, GDP is unchanged, but energy only grows at 0.3% per annum, which helps reach the well below two degree target. The important difference of Rupture versus similar well below two degree scenarios is that energy demand is up and not down. I insist on that. Other than that, to go from Momentum to Rupture, the key drivers are the extension to all developing and emerging countries of the decarbonization policies and technologies implemented in the net-zero 50 countries. This raises, of course, the question of how do you do that and who pays? Meaning, are the richer countries ready to fund the energy transition beyond their borders?
The next chart elaborates on that question, talking about population growth and need for energy in developing countries, but we've already covered that in the energy landscape, so I will skip it. How to curb emissions. To curb greenhouse gas emissions, we need to know where they come from. Acting on energy is paramount because as shown on this chart, more than 2/3 of global greenhouse gases, meaning CO2, methane, and so on, they are energy-related. To the right, you see the breakdown of energy-related CO2 emissions. Transport and power sectors are the main contributors, and therefore top priority sectors to decarbonize. This is what we've done in our modeling work. How do we decarbonize? How to be on this energy transition pathway, allowing for more energy on one hand, and less emissions on the other hand.
The common themes and takeaways from our both scenarios are listed here, and I'll read them quickly. It is that we have more energy, so growing energy demand in both scenarios. Oil plateaus before 2030 and then declines. Gas remains a key enabler of the energy transition, especially in power and industry, and also for blue hydrogen, as I said. Liquids and gases become greener and greener through decarbonization. Electrification is absolutely key, and actually, we've modeled a pretty radical electrification, including in the transport sector, and therefore, there's also going to be an increasing need for storage. As we electrify, we need to electrify on low or no carbon, and therefore, renewables play a key role in both scenarios. We have increased our outlooks for hydrogen, and the penetration is much higher than last year, both in industry and in transport.
Finally, and you know this, we believe that carbon sinks, be they man-made through carbon capture and storage or nature-based, NBS, carbon sinks are absolutely mandatory for the net-zero journey. The next chart here shows what you would call the key decarbonization drivers from our model per sector final demand, and then we've also added power to the very right. We've listed a number of decarbonization drivers and tried to qualify how important they are, so their impact level as being either low, medium, or high. This impact level has been assessed in terms of technical and economic maturity of each driver, and also its readiness to be deployed. I'm not going to cover everything, but just if we go by column quickly, what do we have? What you see is that energy efficiency and recycling are major drivers for industry.
In transport, if I only to mention one driver, it's clearly electrification. For the residential and commercial sector, ResCom, electrification and energy efficiency are key contributors. Finally, for power, the two most important drivers are switching away from coal to gas, adding in CCS if possible, and increasing solar and wind deployments together with storage to mitigate the impact of these intermittent renewables. We've also summarized the key modeling assumptions, our two scenarios, because we did that last year. It was something some of you really liked. You have that chart again. I'm not going to comment it, and we've actually covered most of what it says in here. Now I'm going to move to Momentum. I'll cover three themes. The key energy transition levers, those that are listed here. What's going on in transport, what about clean hydrogen, and what about related huge power demand?
Secondly, I'll show you some charts wrapping up Momentum. Then I'll zoom in on the net-zero 50 countries, because I think that's really important. The units are in petajoule per day. I hope you're familiar with conversions. Otherwise, the energy landscape gives you the right formulas. Starting with electrification in transport. Here you see the evolution of energy consumption, the light-duty vehicle segment that actually accounts for roughly half of the CO2 emissions of the transport sector today. The thermal car and trucks sales ban in 2035 in the net-zero 50 countries accelerates EV and fuel cell penetration. In this segment, those technologies reach 67% globally by 2050. That is actually 100% in the net-zero 50 countries and 90% in China.
You can see to the right the substitution of oil. Sorry, to the left, the substitution of oil is not so spectacular in 2030, but then really accelerates after 2030 and becomes pretty impressive by 2050 since oil falls below 50% of the light-duty energy mix. For heavy-duty trucks, close to 30% of today's transport emissions. Both electrification and hydrogen-based fuels contribute to the decarbonization. This scenario, if you go back to last year, is very different from what we had in 2020. Clean hydrogen-based solution here refer to both fuel cell and e-fuels, meaning green hydrogen combined with carbon molecules. To the right, you see the decarbonization traffic assumptions that we've used.
This is in kilometers per year for the two subsegments of urban heavy duty and long-haul heavy duty. The degree of decarbonization is not at all the same, is much higher in 2050 for the urban trucks than for the long-haul trucks, and the energy mix is not the same either, as you can see. Moving on to aviation and shipping, respectively, 13% and 10% of transport emissions. The main message is that the jury is still out on which low-carbon fuel options will eventually prevail in those markets. In aviation, it will be difficult to do without liquid fuels in the coming years due to density needs and storage constraints. Our scenario here assumes penetration of biofuel and hydrogen-based fuels, so again, e-fuels combining green hydrogen and carbon.
In the marine sector, LNG moving to bio-LNG will be part of the mix for a while, together with some biofuels and probably a lot of fuels derived from clean hydrogen, including e-methanol and e-ammonia. That was for transport. Now, our second accelerating decarbonization driver, which is clean hydrogen. I already started covering that, of course, as I spoke about transport. Here you see to the left the overall use of clean hydrogen per sector in 2050 and 2030 contrasted with today. This picture is also very different from what we had last year. In 2050, the use of clean hydrogen is four times bigger than today, knowing, of course, that today we have no clean hydrogen, and the hydrogen we have is gray, so it is emitting CO2.
In other words, hydrogen stops being a tiny niche market and sees demand picking up in all sectors, especially in transport and in industry. Also to the left, we show the split between green and blue hydrogen, and that's roughly two-thirds and one-thirds. Blue hydrogen helps kick off the market at scale, pushes up demand for natural gas, as shown here, and requires roughly 1 gigaton of CCS. To the right, what's the impact of green hydrogen? Well, we are highlighting the massive need for future power linked to green hydrogen production. Green hydrogen makes up close to 15% of power demand in 2050. If we add in transport and its electrification, roughly 25% of 2050 power demand comes from sources of demand that do not exist today.
In terms of growth in power demand between today and the next 30 years, hydrogen and transport represent roughly 45% of the increase. In Momentum, the overall power demand is up some 2.5% per annum over the next 30 years. What about power generation to accommodate for this increase in demand? Generation more than doubles by 2050, with solar and wind making up 85% of new capacities. Gas is the only fossil fuel to grow in the power mix due to its key role in coping with intermittency and demand seasonality. To the right, you see our assumptions in terms of GW of solar and wind. The capacities are multiplied by 10 in 30 years. The share dedicated to the production of green hydrogen is higher than today's solar and wind capacity. It's massive.
In addition to base load capacities, an estimated 1,500 GW of battery-based storage will be needed in 2050 to ensure firm power delivery. Green hydrogen can also do the job or help do the job as electricity storage. Moving now on to the summary of Momentum. Here are the main decarbonization highlights of Momentum through now. First, total final consumption. Total final consumption grows steadily at 1.5% per annum. You see the mix to the left. The messages are, one, electrification. Power becomes the number one source of final energy in the early 2040. Two, mix diversification. Decarbonization entails many more choices and adoption of low-carbon solutions. Three, decrease in oil demand. Oil is down because of everything we said related to transport and due to the single-use plastic bans and recycling of plastics.
The sector to the right, you see that the sector final demand that decarbonizes fastest is transport, and that is also a high-emitting sector. Power is not there because it's not considered a sector final demand, in case you wonder. We've seen the growth in power and renewables, but what about oil and gas? The chart here is in BCM to the left for gas and in million barrels per day to the right for oil. In Momentum, natural gas demand grows roughly 1% per annum. This CAGR is driven by power and industry and blue hydrogen. For oil, demand peaks in this decade with a decline of 1.9% after 2030. We added that number to the chart here because we'd like to just remind everyone that this decline is well below the natural decline of existing oil fields.
It stands more at - 3% or - 4% per annum. Oil ends up at the level of 64 million barrels per day in 2050 in Momentum. Final chart on Momentum. Here is a wrap-up in terms of primary energy demand and CO2 emissions decline. The net-zero 50 countries do take us a long way when it comes to decarbonization, and again, it leads to a world in a 2.2.5-degree scenario. On the other hand, today's net-zero pledges are insufficient to reach global carbon neutrality. We need many more countries to join in, which is one of the key topics, again, for COP26. In Momentum, the residual CO2 emissions stand at 24 gigatons, and that's net of 3 gigatons of CCS. Let's take a closer look at these net-zero 50 countries.
I think it's really important to show how they play a pioneering role in adoption of low-carbon energy solutions. They are modeled the same way in Momentum and in Rupture, since they are net-zero in both scenarios. These countries, as shown on the chart here, represent ±10% of the world population. Their share in global GDP goes down over the next 30 years from 41%-28%, and their share in global energy demand drops from roughly 1/3 to 20%. That's, in fact, why their net-zero strategies are both absolutely critical to fight climate change and far from being enough. Here is a total primary energy demand evolution in these net-zero countries. We are talking about OECD countries, so energy demand is down by 0.9% per annum, helped by energy efficiency and deep electrification.
This contained energy demand in these OECD countries leaves room for economic development and improvement in living standards in the rest of the world. The primary energy mix is highly diversified, as you can see to the left, with gas keeping its role. I'll come back to that. The share of fossil fuels goes from the 80% of today that we talked about in the landscape to 33% in 2050. Coal is out. Moving to the transport sector. The net-zero 50 countries are at the forefront of the so-called transport revolution. With the internal combustion engine sales banned in 2035, the fuel mix is, of course, evolving extremely rapidly, even by 2030. Oil, as you can see on the chart here, is almost gone in that transport segment in 2050.
The steep penetration of alternative fuels is also visible to the left. Alternative fuels means power and H2-based fuels, fuel cells, and e-fuels. You can see here how that penetration is very different between all of the worldwide countries in Momentum and just the net-zero 50 countries that are shown to the right. Now we come to power demand. Electrification is massive in all sectors, reaching 45% of end-user demand in the net-zero 50 countries, way above Momentum, which stands globally at 30%. Green hydrogen and transport make up close to 40% of power demand in 2050. That's versus 25% in Momentum. 80% of new power demand is linked to these two sectors, so transport and green hydrogen. Again, that's what it says to the right. I will move on and talk about the consequences for power generation.
The resulting picture is a huge increase, of course, in solar and wind capacities that make up 60% of the power mix in 2050 versus 48% for the whole world in Momentum. An important assumption that we've used is that the U.S. and European power grids are almost carbon-free by 2035, in line with the stated government goals. The grid stability and resilience is maintained thanks to gas with CCS, nuclear, hydro, and batteries. Coming to gas's demand in the net-zero 50 countries. As you know, we firmly believe that gas has a pivotal role to play in the next decades as a reliable and affordable transition fuel that will become greener and greener. This certainly applies to the net-zero 50 countries also, at least for four reasons. There is plenty of coal to substitute in these countries.
The power grid needs a base load fuel, given the high penetration of solar and wind that we've just discussed in the power networks. Gas is going greener and greener in these countries. Then gas is also needed to produce blue hydrogen. In the scenario we have here, 50% of gas's energy is green, including biogas and blue hydrogen and so on. Half of the remaining natural gas is abated via CCS, and that's used mainly in the power sector and in the industry. Overall, three-quarters of gases are decarbonized in the net zero 50 countries in 2050. The chart here summarizes then the CO2 emissions pathway for Momentum, and look to the right here, and for the net zero 50 countries. The contrast is stark, of course.
We've assumed 2 gigatons of CCS in the net-zero 50 countries out of the total 3 gigatons for the whole world in Momentum. The net-zero 50 countries also lead the way in deploying and using CCS technology. Carbon pricing is one of the market signals in those countries that can and will enable that. As you can see to the left now, CCS begins to play a visible role after 2030, and that's the pale shaded areas on the chart. To get rid of the residual 1 gigaton of emissions by 2050 will require nature-based solutions or a breakthrough in other technologies to remove carbon, such as direct air capture, for instance. That's all I had to say on Momentum and the net-zero countries embedded in Momentum that are also modeled in Rupture, so I will now move to Rupture.
By construction, Rupture is a well below 2 degrees scenario, assuming somehow that the whole world follows suit on the decarbonization implementation plans of the net-zero 50 countries. I will start with total final consumption, and then I will move forward sector by sector, and end with primary energy demand. Here comes Rupture's total final consumption. Rupture assumes an even faster worldwide electrification than in Momentum. Power becomes the number one source of end-use energy by the mid-2030s and not in the early 2040s. Its share in the overall mix is much higher than all the fossil fuels combined by 2050, roughly 40% versus 30%. The three contributions in the final consumption mix of hydrogen-based energy, bioenergy, and natural gas. These three contributions end up being very similar, as you can also see on the chart.
To the right, you see how transport and industry experiences massive drop in their CO2 emissions. Residential and commercial is only slightly behind. That's for total final consumption. The chart here contrasts power demand in Rupture with Momentum and with today. Rupture relies on a power sector that is 2.5x bigger in 2050 than it is today. It requires 20% more power than in Momentum. Electricity for green hydrogen, and you can see it on the bar charts here, contribute roughly 20% of power demand in 2050. That's 50% more than in Momentum. The associated need for wind and solar, to the right, is staggering.
Every year between now and 2050, every year over the next 30 years, the world has to add all of the existing installed solar capacity or all of the existing installed wind capacity because those two bases are actually very close. This will also require, of course, massive storage solution, again, be they battery-based or green hydrogen or some other new technology that will be invented. The resulting power mix comes very close in Rupture to the one we talked about for the net-zero 50 countries. Here again, we're talking about the whole world. You see to the right how the power sector intensity goes down, how the carbon intensity, sorry, goes down. It's already almost half in Momentum, and it comes close to zero in Rupture. Solar and wind to the left represent 100% of the global net increase in power by 2050.
Achieving this effectively means removing capacity, changing the mix, and therefore effectively means rebuilding entirely the world's power systems over the next 30 years. The chart here summarizes the contribution of clean hydrogen to this well below 2-degree world. The main use of clean hydrogen is in transport and industry for such industries such as steel, pet chems, cement, and so on. Total clean hydrogen demand exceeds 400 million tons in 2050, and two-thirds of that is green. Honestly, the orders of magnitude of power and gas needed to achieve this amount of clean hydrogen 30 years from now, these orders of magnitude are very difficult to apprehend, I think. We've tried to give you some benchmarks in the charts here. Electrolysis capacity, that would require 2.5x the current solar and wind capacities.
In terms of power needed for clean hydrogen, we're talking about the current power demand of China and the E.U. 27 countries, and so on and so forth. I'll let you read the details. Of course, scaling up hydrogen at this level also assumes that we can cost-effectively scale up electrolysis on one hand and CCS on the other hand for blue hydrogen. Zooming in now on the final demand per sector, I'll go a little fast, just hit the headlines. In transport, Rupture assumes that the ongoing transport revolution in the net-zero 50 countries in China extends to the rest of the world. Non-oil alternative fuels reach more than 50% of penetration in all the sub-segments that are listed to the right here. Both in light vehicles fleet, of course, but also in heavy duty and in aviation and in marine.
Biofuels helps decarbonize the remaining liquids, so the remaining use of oil. In industry, deep decarbonization actually hinges on multiple avenues. They're all listed to the left here. Coal to gas switch substitution and switching whenever possible, and then gas to electricity, switching to hydrogen whenever that is feasible, massive CCS deployments, and recycling both of new materials and of scrap materials. Sorry, only of scrap, but also of plastics. The winning recipe is clearly a combination of all these alternatives when it comes to industry. To the right, we focus on pet chems and the related oil demand, which is down 40% in 2050 versus today in Rupture, and down 20% already in Momentum due to the recycling assumptions and to the fact that in Rupture, we have a worldwide single-use plastics ban going on.
In the residential and commercial sector, final demand is almost flat, as you can see here, between now and 2050. How is that? Well, it's thanks to the strong energy efficiency gains, building refurbishment, and new standards for new appliances, such as lighting, cooling, heating, and so on. The ResCom electrification ends up very high at more than 60% in Rupture due to the link between urbanization and electrification, and that's shown to the right. There is a massive trend going on in the world to increase urbanization, that helps drive electrification in the residential and commercial sector. Effectively, a lot of power in the ResCom sector on one hand, and flat demand linked to efficiency and standards on appliances and building. In fact, decarbonization in this area is a less a technical challenge than a socioeconomic challenge.
Very often, if I talk about households, those families whose homes need most refurbishing for energy efficiency purposes can hardly afford it. This is true in non-OECD countries, but it's equally true in many households in our own OECD countries. Coming to the world gases demand in Rupture. In our scenario, a well below 2 degree world still uses gases energies. The three main sectors being to the left, power gen, industry, and production of blue hydrogen. If you see to the right, more than half of all the gases demand is satisfied via green gases, hydrogen, biomethane, CCS-abated natural gas. We see a massive push on clean gases in Rupture with this huge advantage, of course, that gas can reuse the existing infrastructure that is available worldwide for natural gas.
In the same way, liquid fuels are also much greener in Rupture, as shown on the chart here. Rupture entails a massive adoption of sustainable liquid fuels in all transport sectors, as we already discussed. The sustainable liquid fuels reach 30% of liquids demand in 2050, and you can see that to the left. In Rupture, oil demand ends up at roughly 40 million barrels per day in 2050, and the chart here is in fact in millions of barrels per day. Finally, here is a global primary energy mix in Rupture, reconciling greening the energy systems with sustainable growth for all. The mix is even more diversified than in Momentum, as you can see to the left. I will let you read the details. In terms of CO2 emissions, Rupture ends up with approximately 8 gigatons of residual emissions after taking into account 7 gigatons of CCS.
Compared to Momentum, if you look to the right, 70% of the cumulative abatements required over the next 30 years come out of Asia. This is what you can see again. You can see the impact of decarbonizing China, India, and other Asian countries, and then the rest of the world. As for net zero 50 countries, residual emissions in Rupture will have to be abated via either nature-based solutions or via innovations in carbon removal technologies. This is all I had to say on Rupture, and now I have two final charts on the sensitivity we did, moving from a well below 2-degree world to a 1.5% world. We've done that via sensitivity, once again, on Rupture, and we've called it Rupture+ . To make a long story short, assuming that there is a worldwide ban now on internal combustion engine sales as of 2035.
If we assume that, it removes 14 million barrels of oil demand in 2050 and reduces the emissions of CO2 by 2 gigatons. Rupture+, also assumes an increase in CCS from 7 gigatons to 8 gigatons. With that, global residual emissions, they fall below 5 gigatons in 2050, which makes this Rupture+ scenario consistent with a 1.5 degree temperature increase in 2100. The real message is that moving from Rupture to Rupture+, meeting this 1.5 target, requires another step change in energy supply and demand driven by regulation, technology and behaviors. Just because you were probably going to ask anyway, my last page here shows the total primary energy demand in a 1.5 degree world. We've contrasted Rupture+ with the IEA Net Zero emission scenario that was published back in May.
Keep in mind again, very importantly, that energy demand continues to grow in Rupture+, which is not the case in the IEA net zero emission scenario. To the right, you can see that oil demand ends up being very similar in Rupture+ and in the net zero emission scenario in 2050. You can also see the trajectory to get there is very different. This concludes my presentation. We are now ready to open up for Q&A. I would first, however, like to extend a very warm, big thank you to every colleague in TotalEnergies that helped put together this energies outlook. You've done a great job. Thank you very much to all of you. I would also like to add, as you're aware, that we consider the ongoing energy transition and the related investments as an opportunity for a multi-energy company like ourselves.
We have the skills and competencies, the financial strength and the global reach to grow profitably in a lower carbon energy market. We'll hear more about that tomorrow. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Helle, for this performance, I must say. In 55 minutes to present these two studies and comprehensive studies with key messages about our energy system and the potential future of them. I think it's remarkable. I am sure that we will have some questions about these presentations. Once again, Helle made this performance to summarize the key messages for this presentation. She did not describe the full content of each slide, otherwise, I think would be another 50 minutes there. It was a key message were there. All that material will be available to all of you on our internet sites. They are already, I think, on the internet sites during this presentation by people there. Now I think I will open the floor to the Q&A session, and we are ready to take Helle mainly, and me if I can assist the questions now.
The first question comes from line of Jon Rigby from UBS. Please ask your question.
Thank you, Helle. Thank you, Patrick. I have two questions. The first is, what are we supposed to do with these scenarios? It seems to me is that Rupture seems highly improbable, and Momentum seems incredibly tough. With the best will in the world, it would seem to me that success over the next 20 or 30 years will be to deliver Momentum. Does that sort of accord with your thinking? If it does, is how do you set company strategy against that? It seems to me is that sort of setting a normative outlook, sort of back casting from an outcome isn't necessarily the best way of setting total strategy. The second question, just, did you do any work on the cost differential, so the capital investment, the delta between, let's say a business as usual, then Momentum, then Rupture?
We get some idea about what has to happen in dollars and cents terms over the next 30 years, in terms of these outcomes. Thank you.
Okay, Jon. I will help Helle. As she spoke a lot, I will begin to answer, and she can complement. I think for us, these type of scenarios, first of all, we have, as a company, I remind you, the ambition to get to net zero. We subscribe to the Paris target, which is to work for a world which would be well below two degree. First comment. Second comment, which is important for more for our strategy point of view is what are the key trends, I would say, which are described either on Momentum or in Rupture, I would say.
The question to which scenario will be really implemented and where the world will go is not only the matter of a company which supply energy, it's mainly as it was explained by Helle, a matter of demand, driving the demand, which is a sum in fact of more policies and change of behaviors and customer demand. It's a global society, which must reinvent the energy. It's not so easy. Having said that, what are the trends? I think there is a key trend, which is electrification. I would say the first word, obviously, it's electrification. You can understand that when TotalEnergies has decided to submit to its shareholders that we are implementing a strategy, which is to build an electricity, a power business within the company is fully supported by this trend.
We see the growth in the energy coming, I would say, from electricity, mainly as it was explained by Helle, by renewables, solar and wind. One of the lesson, I think, for me on one, when I read all these studies, is that when people speak today about hydrogen and clean hydrogen, either blue or probably green, I think this study is the first document that have really a comprehensive vision of what is the impact of producing green hydrogen, clean hydrogen at a large scale on the power demand. Because at the end, green hydrogen is a matter fundamentally of renewable energy plus water electrolysis providing this green hydrogen. You have seen the impact. I think there are a few charts where you perfectly see the additional demand for renewable electricity.
This, by the way, makes me very comfortable when I have some questions from you, and I am sure tomorrow it will come back. Are you not too ambitious to reach to another 100 GW? What will be, how do you produce all this renewable electricity? In fact, the demand for renewable electricity, for renewables is huge if we want to reach such a world. It is comfort from my perspective in terms of strategy. It gives a strong comfort to this decision that we will allocate capital in a large way, around 25%, to growing renewable production. There is room for many competition. Let's be clear. It is not competition. There is room there for many producers and investors. That is the second comment, I would say. We can also see, in these scenarios, I would say that there is a very strong impact on the electric mobility trend.
Which is quite new, in fact. I think, in fact, it's this world, it's moving a lot. As you've seen, we have announced on Friday some important agreement with Mercedes-Benz about our battery business together with Stellantis. We have just doubled the size of this JV, even more than doubled the size of the JV. There is therefore a huge acceleration on the, I would say, the electrification of mobility. That's for light vehicles, as Helle told you, this idea that the ICE ban by 2035, which seems to be odd. Europe is at, I would say, at the forefront of it. In fact, we can observe that if we don't generalize this type of approach, that's true that the challenge will be tough if we want to reach the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
I must say, by the way, that it's 2035. It's not 2025. Why do I say that? In fact, you have a real impact on the oil demand, which of course is for us important. Not immediately. These technologies have an impact on the oil demand beyond 2035, which means that that's another lesson of all this scenario, is that Momentum maintains, you have, I think, in oil production by 2050, around 60 million barrel per day. In Rupture, it's 40, and in Rupture+, it's 25. Which means that's important, for only, I would say, 0.7 or less than one degree of increase of the temperature between 1.5 and 2.4, you have a spread of what will be the landscape, the consumption of demand in 2050 between 25 billion barrel and 60.
There is quite a lot of uncertainties about all that, which also for us is why we, as you know, our strategy is to find the right balance between maintaining our activity in hydrocarbons because we consider that our mission is also to deliver to the people who today use these energies, to meet their demand in oil and gas. At the same time, to grow and to accelerate in these renewables and power electricity. That gives us a comfort. This is where we diverge from the IEA scenario, by the way, because in 2030, as we now don't see where the decrease of oil demand would come in the next 10 years, again, the ICE ban is beyond 2030, then that means that we need to continue to produce and invest in these hydrocarbons. The recent events on hydrocarbons price, I think, support that vision.
That's, I would say, the key lessons, and that's for me, and that's why we are looking to that. Of course, it also make us thinking that we need now, within TotalEnergies, and when I speak about hydrogen, again, it's a question of renewables. All what we are doing today to be able to manage in a large way with renewable energies will be very important for us to develop our company tomorrow in clean and green hydrogen. The cost differential. I had a question, like you, Jon, from my teams. To be honest with you, we came with some figures, but Helle and I have decided not to provide them today. I promise you that next year we'll have them. We need to work hard on it.
We need to be sure that there are many assumptions on that, in particular, of course, at which Momentum it will decrease, because you can imagine, like we've seen in solar industry, with scaling up some new energies, you have a decrease of cost. All that is difficult to factor in, but what I'm sure is that we need at least to invest EUR 1 trillion per year if we want to be on the trajectory. Last year, we did not invest EUR 1 trillion per year in these energies. Oil and gas plus solar and wind, it was more around, I think, EUR 700 billion-EUR 800 billion.
Yes.
That means that we need to increase more the investments in energy in the coming years if we want to have a chance on the trajectory. By the way, in our strategy, we continue to invest and we have the willingness to continue to grow our production of energy. Of course, growing more to decarbonize energy. Jon, I will ask you on your specific question about the CapEx differential between the scenarios, I promise you that we'll come back to you next year.
I can give an answer on the delta.
Helle wants to do it.
I can give you an answer on the delta, Jon, but not on the absolute amount.
Helle, give the answer.
Roughly today, I would say 30% more investments in Rupture than in Momentum, but what we're struggling with is making sure we have a solid basis for what's the amount we're talking about here. Patrick's $1 billion per annum is probably a good proxy at this stage for Momentum. Add 20% or 30% or 40% for Rupture. The difficulty is, of course, how you allow for cost decrease and scaling up of new technologies over the next 30 years. When you put a number of that, you get a lot of uncertainty. This is why we chose not to choose the numbers in USD. The order of magnitude, if you want to go from one scenario to the other again, would be, my guess is 30%. Okay.
That's very good. $100 or $200 or $300 billion and you're talking real money, right?
Yeah, at least EUR 300.
Yeah, at least.
So that means that compared-
30, 40
to what we've done last year, it's almost globally doubling what we've done, what has been done.
Again, Jon, this is only what we're talking about here, oil and gas investments and renewable power and some storage and some CCS. We are not costing energy efficiency or refurbishing of homes. We are not adding in power transmission and distribution costs or increasing the capacities global scale. We're not good at that. Okay. We are being humble.
I forgot.
I like your question, Jon, because if I may just add to everything Patrick said, I think we are humble, and we don't say that we know what the future looks like, but the message is also, we are ready to take whatever comes as an opportunity. To leverage that opportunity, we need to explore possible scenarios. Honestly, when we decided very early after last year, in the fall of last year, to model this thermal car and trucks ban in the net-zero countries by 2035, there had not been all these OEM announcements that came later, out of the GMs in the U.S. and so on.
We were not following existing announcements, we were just playing with assumptions and, for ourselves, trying to understand what does this mean for the world, for certain geographies, those geographies where we are more present, of course, more Europe than the U.S., if we talk about selling oil or EV charging points. What impact might it have for our strategy? We use it as one way of informing investment decisions, as Patrick said. I think these scenarios are very important, actually. Of course, I'm convinced, otherwise we wouldn't do it.
Okay. Thank you, Helle. The next question maybe.
Thank you. The next question comes from the line of Lydia Rainforth from Barclays. Please ask your question.
Thank you and good afternoon. Thanks, Helle, as ever for a great presentation. Two questions, if I could. The first one was coming back to hydrogen, and clearly that plays a more important role this year than last year. I'm not sure I really understand what it is that's changed that. Is that related to policy at the government side, or is it on the ventures that you're doing, that you're suddenly finding a lot more demand for that than you might have done a year ago? The second question was about energy chains, and you spent a little bit of time earlier on talking about that. Do you think enough of those chains exist in practice and whether that's the hydrogen or the renewable electricity, that there is enough of those chains to actually get things to the marketplace at the moment? Thanks.
I'll start with the last one. On energy chains, and you were specifically, Lydia, asking about green hydrogen chains, the answer is no. We are still very early stage, and we are still piloting on a global scale on these green hydrogen production chains. One element which is new between last year and this year is that there are many more pilots and there are many more projects being announced on a global scale out of the Middle East, in the U.S., in Asia, and of course in Europe. Europe already had it last year with the Green Deal. I'm trying answering both questions at the same time. There's bigger momentum for hydrogen today than there was a year ago. There's been a change of administration in the U.S.
There have been these net-zero pledges out of countries who have very few resources at home, like Japan. There are all kinds of ideas around, as I try to explain, you can use green hydrogen and then create derivative liquid fuels or other forms of fuels from green hydrogen, combining with carbon to e-fuels, sustainable liquid fuels for aviation, but also moving to ammonia or moving to methanol in shipping. We have increased the forecast for hydrogen demand by, I think it's 100 million tons versus last year. One third more, if you want, which is substantial. We have also decreased the gas demand in some of the transport sectors where hydrogen-derived fuels may pick up. Again, shipping would be an example.
Yeah. May I add, I think the hydrogen, as you know, there are two main roles, and I think which led us to introduce it in a larger way. That's true, it's partly at the detriment of natural gas, in fact, in our scenario. I know that last year all scenarios were quite gassy, I would say. This year, we use more, I would say, decarbonized gas, rather than just gassy. Why? Clearly about hydrogen, everybody agrees that it will be one vector for how to abate six industrial segments, like cement, steel, et cetera. We see. It's not enough.
I think when you think to transportation, for the future of transportation, the more we look to trucks, heavy duties, to shipping, to sustainable aviation fuels, we clearly see some space there for going to, I would say, some form of liquids, either synthetic fuels, e-methanol or e-ammonia. We see that without this type of fuels will be difficult to reach, I would say, the Paris targets. Where does it come from? It comes fundamentally from renewable, from hydrogen. I think it was this trend, we observe that. By the way, we contribute, we participate. As you know, part of the strategy is to work together with customers. We have some teams of TotalEnergies who are deeply involved today, in works with the shipping industry, with the aviations. We just announced this morning a new strategic partnership with Safran in the aviation industry.
We are strong partner of the Maersk Research Center for marine fuels. We learn. We learn with them. We evaluate different alternatives, and we have more and more the conviction. We work also with the truck heavy duties, truck manufacturers, where we see a trend where electricity on one side could occupy quite a large space when you go really to long distance, long-haul heavy duties, then something like hydrogen should be a position. We see more space for that. Having said that, we still have to work out because we perfectly know that the cost of green hydrogen is not today in line with expectation of customers. There is there, we have to work on it.
The challenge for all of us will be, can we really scale down the cost of green hydrogen by being able to produce this at a massive scale? This is what we will target as TotalEnergies. Again, one key driver will be, obviously, the capacity to drive down the cost of renewable energy, of clean energy by making that at a very large scale, large way. Yes, hydrogen has a larger role, because it's the results of evolutions of, I would say, of what we share with some of our big customers as conviction that we'll need to drive in that direction. Key challenge-
Can-
Yeah. That's, I think, the answer.
Yeah, I would like to add just one thing. If you go back to the chart I showed from the energy landscape, of course, if we talk about green hydrogen, we talk about renewables. If it's land-based renewables, you have this issue of land use and the amount of square metres or miles that you need to create the renewable power for the green hydrogen. It can be done offshore, it can be done outside of the borders of a hydrogen-consuming country. We don't share all the details of the model, but Lydia, I can tell you that in our modeling this year, in Europe with the Green Deal and the consumption of hydrogen that we've modeled in Europe, roughly half of it is imported. Okay. If we do scale up hydrogen massively, it doesn't necessarily mean that all of it will be produced locally.
There may be new trade flows linked to hydrogen also.
Okay, next question.
Thank you. The next question comes from line of Paul Cheng from Scotiabank. Please ask your question.
Thank you. Good morning. Patrick and Helle, there are two question, please. I think whether it's a Momentum or Rupture, the electrification and substantial increase of the alternative energy, solar, wind, is really the key theme. In order for that to work, I think the other bottleneck or the key is the battery storage. You need to increase dramatically. When we're looking at the building of the battery storage, they are quite polluted, quite dirty. Also, how should we look at from a disposal of those old battery? Are we potentially then actually creating another monster problem from an environmental standpoint by trying to solve the CO2 issue? How should TotalEnergies and the world should looking at from that aspect? The second question is on your chart on the EV battery car, the efficiency, say, 73%. I just want to get clarification.
Is that including from the actual creation of the electricity? Because the battery efficiency is high, but the electricity transmission from the power plant to actually get charged to the battery could see a lot of emission loss, transmission loss in power, particularly given the alternative energy source, their footprint is so high so that they are probably far away from the population center. Just want to know what that 73% really mean. Thank you.
I will leave the second question to Helle. The first one. I think Helle insisted that one of the, I think, for us, the key limitation to the increase in renewable solar and wind is more a matter of footprint, of space, I would say. Before TotalEnergies was looking for scarce resource underground. Now we are looking to scarce resource.
Above surface
above surface. It's a new challenge for us. It's not exactly the same skills, but we need to have. Frankly, I think it's really, we need one question we have asked and will ask, which is to translate all these capacities into the square kilometers. Just to be able to have the idea of what it means. That's why I think, by the way, that less like Helle said just before, the Green Deal obviously will be possible only if we are ready, of course, in Europe to import from abroad, because I think we don't have enough space to build all these renewable capacities on the continent. Coming back to your question about batteries. Batteries, in fact, it's not only batteries. When you develop electricity and renewable, intermittent renewable, it's a matter of energy storage.
It's not only battery is one way to do it, but there are other ways to store energy, and by the way, hydrogen may be one of them. You could imagine to store into hydrogen and then to transport hydrogen and for networks and then delivering it. There are other options. It is true, what your question is very true about, recycling of batteries. As you know, TotalEnergies is involved through Saft. We have a battery company, and now we are establishing a new company called ACC with Stellantis and Mercedes-Benz, Daimler, for batteries for EVs. This is obviously one of the key issue that we are looking, not only the upstream of the management of all the, I would say, raw materials, but what do we do after that with the batteries?
There are some idea about second life of batteries and trying to extend them in order to continue to store energies, by the way. It's obviously something which is very important to look to the life cycle analysis of these batteries. Europe is taking, by the way, some regulations about it. It's a smart way, by the way, to oblige the competitors to have the same standards, not only if you want to sell batteries in Europe, to accept the same standards instead of global recycling and life cycle analysis of it. There is a problem. There is an issue, by the way. Each time, it's not specific to batteries. There was a debate recently about the wind farms and the capacity to recycle these.
The blades.
The blades.
Yes.
Siemens has just announced recently that they are able to build blades which will be fully recycled.
Yes.
So I think, yes-
Has Vestas.
Vestas, yes. I should have not Some wind farm blade manufacturers announced that. I think, yes, true, we are obliged to invent a new way to find energy, so we create new problems. Like always, if there was a perfect solution, we would have found it. We should not overestimate it. I think it's not the limitation in the battery. The battery, the issue is more the cost of all that. It's not super efficient, what we do today in terms of capacity to store. We have still, I think it's one of the sector where clearly we'll have to innovate solid state and other ways to store to battery.
I think we are today with I'm absolutely convinced that these lithium-ion technologies that we use today are not at all the final stage, including, by the way, the type of metals that we include in these batteries. We are working a lot on different chemistry in order, in fact, to try to avoid and to reduce the potential disposal issues by selecting the right chemistry at the entry of the problem.
Yeah, I'll go quick, Paul. I believe the answer to your second question is yes, I'm ready to take it offline because I want to be sure I understand what you call full cycle so that we talk about the same things here. We can follow up on that after the online meeting.
The EV battery efficiency question will be handled by Helle and Paul together. Thank you. Next question.
Thank you. The next question comes from the line of Irene Himona from Societe Generale. Please ask your question.
Thank you. Good afternoon. Thank you for a very rich presentation. I have two questions, please. First, our energy has become much more expensive, not just on the oil side, but importantly on natural gas. We have record high prices just ahead of winter. There's been a relative lack of recent LNG FIDs. Should we be somewhat concerned? Are you concerned about the affordability of this transition for the consumer, even in the rich countries, especially as we need to rely on gas as a transition fuel? Then secondly, I realize you presented two demand scenarios today for the transition, not supply. Should we be concerned about the availability of the critical minerals required to effect the transition to all these clean energy technologies? Thank you.
There again, I will leave the second questions to Helle. That's the easy one. I'm not sure we have the whole answer. In fact, we need to make this cycle going up. We are reading a lot about this question, so I try to understand it. It's a little like the cost and the CapEx. We need to actually cycle fully the scenario down to the primary demand for metal, I think. Again, that's moving part. I understand your question mark, and I can tell you, by the way, it's part when we work in the battery domain, that's part of the things that we have decided to better understand, in particular for this JV that we have with ACC.
How far should we go upstream in terms of management and controlling, I would say, future costs of the supply and what could be critical or not? On the first one, I think it's more, I would say, a short-term issue, I think. Irene, you know perfectly better than me because, or as much as me, that there is a lot of volatility in the energy markets. I think it's very clear that, so today we experience, I would say, like in many, not only in energy, by the way, in a lot of commodities, there is a strong stress on many supply chain and after the big decrease last year, a strong increase. Globally speaking, I think this global system of the world that we have built during 30 years is not really designed to accommodate such big growth.
We see some stress, logistics, increase, I would say, sudden increase of demand, which is difficult to cope. It create, of course, some inefficiencies and some stress on some markets. The natural gas today is very high. At least, I mean, the spot market, let me be clear. Most of the gas markets are not sold on spot. It's not true. Most of the gas market is sold on long-term contracts, and they are not reached the $25 per million BTU, et cetera. It's really spots. It's not good, by the way. I'm not sure it will last. Of course, it's quite remarkable because it's summertime. The question more fundamentally that you have asked for me is, and you know that I'm trying to repeat it regularly in different conferences as a wake-up call to all the policy makers. There is no miracle.
We speak about huge amount of investment. We speak about trillions and trillions of dollars. I don't see people could think that we'll be able to invest all these trillion dollarsto change fundamentally our energy system without an impact at the end of the customers. Even if we amortize these investments on 20 years, that's a lot of new investments, more than what we do normally in the previous years. If you invest more somewhere, it will have to be reflected in the cost to the customers. There is no reason not to. I don't know why people don't want to accept it. That's, of course, for governments, for policy makers, that's a major question. A major question, which is, how do you compensate it for, in particular, the low income revenues? I think that's obvious.
I think this question today, maybe it's spectacular the way it's on their desk, this year. Maybe we are not expecting it. I'm very humble, none of us, I think, in the industry, were expecting such increase of price at the beginning of the year. We were all planning with $40, $50 low gas prices. Suddenly we see this disruption. That's very clear that I think there is no way to make this transition if the governments are serious about the Paris Agreement without really putting on the table some clear schemes with whom they will compensate for low incomes people, maybe not only them, by the way, the impact of this transition. If you take taxation on CO2, it's very good to put a CO2 pricing, and they have to do it, if you want to influence the behavior of customers.
This amount of money must be given back to the consumers. In order for them to find, must be given back in a smart way, helping them to change their behaviors of consumptions and to reward the ones who are, I would say, more diligent than the other ones. I think that's something, and I'm sure the citizens will not accept to pay more for CO2 or more for energies if they have a feeling that it's going just to finance the global deficits of other countries. That will not work. This is a key question, and that might be, I think, in the implementation, including in a developed continent like Europe, I think it's probably the key obstacle to the Fit for 55. You have seen the reaction of the countries.
The Commission has put on the table a very comprehensive scheme, which honestly, we subscribe to it.
The problem now immediately for all governments is how do we make it really pragmatically, how do we implement it? This question of affordability is becoming, it's not only of natural gas, it's true for oil. By the way, it's true for electricity. You've seen the price of electricity has been more than double in Europe. That's a key question for all this transition, and I think it's quite good by the way that it comes on the table just before COP26 because it's a matter, of course, the emerging countries have their own debate about how do we finance, for us, the increase of, I would say, necessity of more demand for energy to get people out of poverty and to elevate their living standards.
In our own countries, developed countries or net-zero countries, we will have this key question, which is, how do we make a just transition? That, I think a just transition should not be only a motto. It will have to become real, because that is a matter of money now. The second one about, do you have other elements of
It's a good question, Irene. Of course we are looking at it. Recycling is part of the answer. Moving to new metals or new minerals is part of the answer. We have a good window, I think, of understanding at least the questions through Saft and through everything we now do in batteries, including in the ACC JV. We're looking at it. I would say that there is an opportunity linked to the fact that until recently, demand was not so high. There are, I would say, resources available that have not been put at work. There are mines and mining and critical materials resources a little bit everywhere in the world, in Africa and Latin America, even in Canada. Of course, in countries like Asia.
We first have to really map the supply, which is probably bigger than what people have thought. Then we have to look at the balances between supply and demand. We're working on it.
It's a moving target, because I observe the way that our Saft or indeed people are changing the content on some of these critical elements.
Back to what you said on changing the chemistry.
It's changing the chemistry and, we told them, be careful to cobalt, and then we diminish a lot of cobalt content.
Yes.
I think that's where it's complex, because there are some fundamental elements, but there are also others which are more.
There are options.
moving targets.
As you said also, Patrick, the battery technologies are going to change anyway.
Yeah.
Moving to solid state and then, after solid state. It's an excellent question and it's a fascinating topic.
Next question, please.
Thank you. The next question comes to line of Michele Della Vigna from Goldman Sachs. Please ask your question.
Thank you very much for the comprehensive presentation. My question really has to do with bioenergy, which plays a major part in your scenarios, but to be fair, also in several other net-zero scenarios, especially for aviation and for shipping. I was wondering how confident you feel that the raw material will be there to fuel such a substantial growth there without really competing on the other side with the role of nature-based solutions and also without the key role of agriculture to supply food for a growing global population. Thank you.
Very good question, Michele. It's a very good question for me. It's why, by the way, we have probably increased as well in our scenario, what I call the hydrogen-based liquids. Either with the fuel, synthetic fuels. It's very true. Maybe our own experience. We have suffered a little. I will come back on it with our, the palm oil, and I think it's not only the end, the soybean tomorrow, I think, in Europe. My view is that, and you also know that in our industry, we have invested a lot of money, like other players, to try to make what we call the 2G, second generation biofuels, to become a reality without a lot of success, to be honest. In my view, there will be, of course, I would say the biofuels are immediately available.
We can begin to make, for example, sustainable aviation fuels with biofuels. Either with first generation or even what I call some wasted animal fats or used cooking oil. There will be a limit to that, obviously, in this type of feedstock, which is quite limited, in fact, on the planet. I agree with you that the competition with agriculture and, will be also a limit to the first generation biofuels. It depends, of course, on the sensitivity of the continent, but what happened in Europe, I think will spread out. This is why, again, yes, it's part and we will develop that. I think it's for maybe a transition. A transition between oil today to integrate some of these biofuels, biodiesel within oil to reach there on a 1, 2, 5%, 10% in order to support the first decarbonization steps of the aviation, for example.
Beyond it, I'm absolutely convinced we'll need to have other technologies like, synthetic fuels. Otherwise, we'll get to u se a limit that you are proposing, which is a limit of In fact, again, by the way, it's a matter of space allocation and land allocation, land competition.
People will have to get their food before to get their energy from the food. I know this is different, by the way, I observe that, for example, in North America, this debate today seems to be not as strong as in Europe. I think it will raise. We see that as, yes, an investment to be done, but we need also to invest in the next generation of synthetic fuels.
I think, Michele, that what Patrick just said is exactly what is reflected in our two scenarios. There is a room for bioenergy, but it's capped, if you want to say it like that. We have, again, Patrick explained it, we've really significantly increased the H2-derived sustainable fuels for that reason, because the other competition, of course, is with biodiversity. If you talk about land use, you also run into biodiversity.
The question will be, are we able to really develop these 2G technologies? Honestly, and I've shared that with most of my peers, we invested, and unfortunately, yes, it works at a small scale, but a very large scale, we see some limitations to make it commercially.
It may come, of course, over the next 30 years. Yeah.
Let's wait and see.
We are not there yet, for sure.
Okay. The next question?
Thank you. The next question comes from line of Anish Kapadia from Palissy Advisors. Please ask your question.
Good afternoon. Thanks very much for the interesting presentation. I had one quick question and a more detailed one. The first one was around your assumptions of 3% GDP growth with just 0.5% energy growth. I was just wondering, is there a risk to that in terms of GDP growth if energy is only growing at 0.5% per annum, and your thoughts around that? Then just going into a bit more detail, there was some very large numbers in the presentation when you look longer term, such as 1,500 GW of batteries required. I really wanted to dig a bit more into the work you've done on the feasibility of getting to some of these numbers, just given that some of these things are going to have quite large second-order effects and maybe unintended consequences.
By this, I mean, some of the things you've touched on, like metals for batteries, but also water usage for electrolyzers, grids being able to cope with the higher electricity demand and gas networks being able to take hydrogen or even finding enough space for renewables and biofuels. Just wondering if you've looked into these effects, the constraints, and does actually that create somewhat of an investment opportunity for Total in some of these secondary areas? Thanks.
I will let Helle answering to the two questions. Just one comment. It's clear that honestly, the more I'm reading these scenarios, the more I think that we are willing to reinvent the world, and that there are many unexpected consequences. What we built for these scenarios is something that we see it, but there are many of them. Space is land, and land management is an issue. Water is an issue. It's very difficult to be able to evaluate the whole consequences. I think that's part of the difficulty, I think, by the way, also for policymakers, which is that the planning of this transition is tough because we are describing something which is not here today, which is at a pilot stage. To extrapolate it is not easy.
By the way, I would insist that is why we recommend, globally speaking, to governments to think to what means transition. Transition means step by step. It does not mean that suddenly we'll be able to change the world in a night. Step by step, because we need to be able to monitor this transition as well, including these unexpected consequences. I will let Helle coming back on the assumption of GDP.
Yeah.
On this issue as well for batteries.
Thank you, Anish, and thanks, Patrick. Is there a risk to that assumption? I would say yes, because I cannot guarantee you what the GDP growth of the world will be every year over the next 30 years, by definition. Humbly, we're looking at what the Oxford Institute and other big macroeconomic think tanks say about future growth. We have lowered the GDP assumption a little bit from last year. We had 3.3 last year. We've taken three this year because we got some feedback that maybe 3.3 was high. If you go back to the landscape, we had a chart showing that energy demand has been up globally by 1.8% over the last 20 years, driven by non-OECD. Honestly, I don't think that the 0.5 energy demand growth assumption is high. I think it's low.
It does factor in also the energy efficiency increases that we have outlined in the model. Globally, it's not a forecast, it's an assumption in a model, but the 0.5 growth per annum in energy demand, if anything, looks low. On the batteries, I would say nothing to add to what Patrick just discussed. Yes, there are lots of unintended consequences of follow-on impacts of this whole transition. We talked about recycling. We talked about land use. We talked about competition for food. I think Patrick said, as we use new energies, there'll be new problems coming up, and that's a fact. I'd be happy to discuss this with you. Yes, there are consequences from moving from oil to power and then using more power and more solar and wind, needing the firm power capacities to stabilize the grids.
That's what makes it interesting also and full of opportunities.
Yes, two additional comments on that one. First, about the GDP assumption. 3% is a little lower than last year, but the net-zero scenario from IEA is around 2.8%. There is not much difference. I think it's important because, I think when we speak about just transition, again, we must think that it's also a matter from somewhere being able to make this transition. We were discussing with Irene before about the population of our developed countries.
Yeah.
You have billions of people in this planet who want to, again, have higher living standards. These ones, in our assumption, I think we have.
This is a path.
There is a growth of 3.4% in the last No. They have grown at 3.4% in the last 20 years. They need it. They need this growth.
Yeah
if they want, really, because this transition will not be done against the populations of all these emerging countries. That's not possible. This is, again, how do we find the balance? The concept that we can read today in some articles in the Western world, that we could lower the growth in order to meet the Paris Agreement, I think will really raise a lot of issues in many countries. I don't see the way to tell to this population, "Sorry for you. You will have to stay underdeveloped during many, many years because we are not taking enough action." That's the point.
And that's-
The second one.
Yeah.
Sorry. Yes, you said, are there other opportunities there beyond, when we speak about batteries, are there secondary grid and all that, and connecting EVs to make on grids? I think that this is interesting technologies, but for TotalEnergies, let's first, I would say, develop in the, I would say, the primary business. Let's be a renewable producer at scale in a profitable way.
Yeah. Focus.
Focus. There will be additional ways to drive value out of this renewable or battery business. Let's be first professional. My message here is more, we want to be good in as a renewable producer, a battery producer. Beyond it, I'm sure that if we master in a profitable and professional way these technologies, we will be able to add additional values from power to grid and all these concepts, which are interesting on the paper. Let's first develop the mass EVs before to speak about the power to grid with EVs. Otherwise, it's a question to follow that at the R&D level. Not yet. Opportunities will come. You're right, Anish.
I just wanted to add one thing, listening to you, Patrick, Anish, which is that the other thing which is easy to do, but we on purpose stayed away from, is just throw into the model a lot of energy efficiency increases over the next 10 years. That, again, can completely change the profile of energy demand if you suddenly assume by some magic that energy efficiency can double from today until 2030, right? We've tried to model assumptions that are aggressive, showing a real need to change what's going on and be on this transition path, but not throwing in completely unrealistic assumptions either.
Yeah. Knowing that, obviously, we are quite ambitious on this one, huh?
Yeah.
I know, and this probably the scenarios of TotalEnergies has one key difference compared to others. We have energy demands which continue to grow.
in 2050 compared to today. Most of the scenarios of which are today published, in order to cope with the Paris Agreement, consider that the energy demand.
Yeah
will diminish despite the rising population on the planet. We did not take that into account, Despite that, the average energy efficiency on the planet in the last 30 years, I think something like 1.5%, What we have put in the scenario is 2.5%. Yes, we have been ambitious on it.
Very.
As mankind, we have not been able to do more than 1.5%, as a general trend, for 30 years when I read the papers. We have added one point. One point, when you combine that with the growth of population, gives you a higher demand, and not a lower demand. If you add two points, yes, it's easy. The model you will be on the Paris targets, but probably it's absolutely unachievable unless something happens, which I do not know, and I don't know what could happen. With COVID, Our generation has to be ready to see some unexpected events. Okay, so that's a point about energy efficiency. Again, by the way, it's always a key message from is the first mission for all of us is to avoid emissions, which means being more efficient.
We have taken into account 2.5% instead of 1.5. Again, it's a strong challenge for everybody if we want to achieve it. Next question.
Thank you. The next question comes to line of Christopher Kuplent from Bank of America. Please ask your question.
Hello. Thank you for your presentation and time. Just hopefully two quick ones. I was interested in whether you're using this new outlook, and you've referred to quite a few interesting changes compared to last year, in shaping your views and assumptions embedded in your long-term planning. I think you were up to now using a EUR 40 per ton CO2 price for your project deliberations. If you could, explain whether there is a direct link here between this study and your thoughts as they evolve and the long-term commodity price assumptions that you're using, for running the business. Secondly, briefly, if that's possible, just wondered, Patrick and Helle, what do you think is the main difference here between your Rupture scenario and the most recent Net Zero by 2050 scenario that the IEA published?
Perhaps less about, I think you've been quite clear, the inputs and the underlying assumptions, but behind the messaging. Where do you think are the main differences here? Thank you.
I will take both questions.
The first one, clearly, as you know, we were using 40, but we are asking our teams to run $100 per ton as from 2030. In fact, you will see tomorrow in my presentation that it's no more an alternative, an option to $100. It becomes a key base scenario. It's $40 per ton, increasing to $100 per ton from 2030. By the way, I think it's consistent with the ambition of Total to get to net-zero. With $100 per ton, I think we are covering most of the technologies we need, with assumption. I will come back on it. To commodity price, I will come back on it. Now, you will see a $50 per barrel scenario. Again, it's very volatile.
We should stop changing the assumption because of the short-term, because it's a matter of planning CapEx, expenditures and, what happened to our companies in the last six years since I'm CEO, not because I'm CEO, but I can tell you that it's better to plan on a, I would say base in a stable assumption rather than changing regularly. The second one is, I think Helle show you. In fact, you have to compare Rupture+ because IEA Net Zero scenario was willing to cope with 1.5 degrees. This is what we call one Rupture+ because I would say, what are the differences? There are some similarities first. A lot of electricity. Both scenarios are very much more electricity. Power is key and renewable. We converge on the scenario of amount of renewables.
The production by 2050 requirement for oil, I think is 24 million barrels per day on one side, 26 on the other side. That means that the landing point for oil is the same. There is more gas, I think, in the scenario from TotalEnergies than in the one of IEA. The main difference, as Helle on the last slide she shown, explain you, is a trajectory between today, where the demand for oil is around 100 million barrels per day, little less this year, and 2025. The main difference is that in our scenario, by 2030, we still have something like, we decrease by 10%, I think compared to the IEA, which decreased by 30%.
Honestly, reducing the oil demand to 70 million barrel per day, by 2030 compared to 100, we don't know how this decrease could happen, where the demand will be erased, in fact, in 10 years. Again, if we took the assumption that, the ICE ban in Europe represent 15 million barrel per day, if it was on oil net-zero 2025, it's coming in 2035, not in 2030, not in 2025. That's the key difference. Of course, this has a main consequence of one of the spectacular conclusion, which has been ruined by some of the IEA scenario, which is to say, you must stop investing in oil and gas new investments because yes, it's true, by the way.
If the demand is only 70 million barrel per day in 10 years, which means a decrease of 3% per year, no need to invest much for the next 10 years in new projects. It's not the supply will create demand. It's not true. If the demand is still 90 million like we anticipate by 2030 and not 70, and that we produce only 70, the price will be at the roof and more than at the roof. Maybe it's a good scenario for TotalEnergies and its shareholders. I'm not sure it's a good scenario for all the customers and citizens of the planet.
That's why. To be clear, as Helle reminded you, and you know that very well, Christopher, I think that our normal audit is, if we do not invest, we have a natural decline of 3%-4%, and then we'll have a lack of supply. According to our trajectory, by 2030, we are more around 90 million, and that means that we need to continue to invest in some oil and gas fields if we want to meet the demand. Again, the question in this transition is not to think that we can change the pattern demand by constraining the supply. If we just do that, we'll have a huge spike in the price and a huge social instability on this planet. We cannot do it like that. We need to monitor the transition smoothly and taking into account.
We need also to work hard in order to substitute as quick as possible some oil demand from some customers. We in TotalEnergies assigned this mission to our teams. When we can do that, we do it, and is why we work with many of our customers now. Next question.
Thank you.
Thank you. The next question comes to line of Jean-Luc Romain from CIC Market Solutions. Please ask your question.
My question on energy intensity was answered. Thank you very much. The remaining question I have is, how do you believe that such a massive increase in investment could come in the next 10 to 15 years? That was EUR 300 billion-EUR 400 billion a year that would be needed in a Rupture scenario compared to the Momentum scenario?
The question was about CapEx increase between the scenarios. Please answer.
No. Sorry, I want to make sure we understood the question because the line was not so good. Was the question about the incremental investments needed in Rupture versus Momentum?
Yeah.
Yes, that's very impressive, and I was wondering how that could happen, to have such a massive increase.
You need much more renewables and much more electrolyzers. In fact, this going from, as Helle show you, in that you have to substitute an additional 20 million barrel oil per day. The substitution of, I would say, one scenario, one pattern of supply by the others will require much more CapEx in order to be able to deliver the same energy. I think it's just a matter, because we go from, I will say, the energy landscape presentation by Helle. You go from energies which are super efficient. Let's be clear. Today, with oil, gas at certain level, we have the most efficient way to produce energy in terms of cost per kilo. Not in terms of CO2, for sure, but in terms of cost per kilo.
Of density, huh?
Of density.
Yeah.
The CapEx to produce one joule of energy when it comes from oil is much more efficient than when it comes from alternative energies like renewables, et cetera. That's this famous chart where you can really look at it. This density, if you want the same amount of energy, at it's less dense, you will just have to invest much more. It's just a matter, and again, it's just a matter of, yes, it's true that we have drive down the cost of solar and wind a lot. At the end of the day, in terms of density of energy that we get, it's not the same. If you need to transform your solar electricity into a synthetic fuel, combining that with CO2, making a transformation, all that costs money. It's that required investment.
It's why it's not so easy to go from one to the other. Yes. If you look more specifically, I have one comment from one person of my team, which is sending me a message, so I can share with you. When you look to the power demand on one side, the Momentum is something like globally 7,500 terawatt-hour, and in the Rupture, it's 11,500. You know it's an increase of almost 50% of power demand. This have to be invested. Okay, Jean-Luc, next question.
Thank you very much. The next question comes to line of Jason Gabelman from Cowen. Please ask your question.
Hey, good afternoon. Thanks for the presentation. First, it seems like the pace of growth in hydrogen is probably the biggest change from last year looking out to 2050. If we focus on changes versus last year's outlook to the mix out to 2030, what would you say is the biggest change in the outlook, focusing on that 10-year period? Has that resulted in changes into what TotalEnergies is doing in terms of their strategy. The second question, you alluded a handful of times to COP 26. What do you think is the potential most material outcome from that conference as it relates to TotalEnergies' strategy? What should we be looking for? Thanks.
The next 10 years, the big changes, no, I think it's just a confirmation of the acceleration of electricity.
Yeah.
Helle, you have an idea?
It wouldn't be major, Jason.
Oh.
I would say, as Patrick said earlier, we have put a little less natural gas into some transport sub-segments and put a little more beginning of e-fuels instead. Honestly, it doesn't have a major impact over the next 10 years. You'd need to go between 2030 and 2050.
Yeah, you are right. Maybe within TotalEnergies we are more looking today to, I would say, e-mobility, we think for the next 10 years. To invest more in e-mobility than we have some question marks strategically in terms of what will be the use of natural gas as an alternative vector for transportation.
If I may share with you, we think that this one we need to monitor carefully the investments in this part. Yes, there are. It could be really a transition. On the other side, spending more on what I say, e-mobility, either through a charging network, charging points.
or through batteries, by the way. That's more, I would say, for the next 10 years, one of the changes which could affect us.
It's not massive. Yeah.
It's marginal compared to what we had in mind.
26, I will maybe surprise you. I think what we would expect from COP 26 is probably some clarity about this Article 6. If we want to be serious about net zero in the future, we need to understand the way that all these, I would say, carbon credits markets will work. How do you evaluate the fact that you invest in one country compared to another place? I think it's urgent to have a clear framework. We know it's not easy, but I think, speaking about net zero, if we don't have a clear understanding of the way that all these, even if it's.
Voluntary offset.
voluntary offset will work.
Carbon credits and offsets.
How it works.
Yes.
We have a clear, and I would say, ethical way.
Robust framework.
Robust one. Ethical way to manage that will limit some investments, which might be very efficient in terms of, I mean, elimination of some emissions. That, for me, it's an important point. I know that Mark Carney and others are working on it.
I hope they will be able to convince government to progress for this part. There is no way to reach carbon neutrality without having to be able to optimize economically for the planet our investments in order to be more efficient in terms of carbon credit. I would say that's something which could have an influence on the way we work.
Right.
Next question.
Thank you. The next question comes to line of Jason Kenney from Santander. Please ask your question.
Oh, hi. Thanks. Helle, Patrick, good to speak to you. I was wondering about the future of global hydrogen markets and the connectivity of exporting countries of green hydrogen or other hydrogen, versus importing. The preferred shipping technologies you think that could be developed over time. I'm conscious that we have a global ammonia market today, but it is toxic. Pressured vessels for hydrogen require massive infrastructure investment for pressurization and decompressing in different places. They're also point to point. There is fast-growing research into solid state hydrogen systems, which could prove disruptive over time and potentially scale up quite rapidly 2020, 2030 onwards. I'm just wondering how you see global hydrogen markets and connectivity of hydrogen volumes, in the 2030, 2050 timeframe. Thanks.
It's an excellent question. I think it's a reason why some companies are speaking about methanol, by the way, e-methanols and/or e-ammonia. I agree with you, ammonia is toxic. I perfectly agree. By the way, it's not obvious at all when you ship ammonia, if you can use ammonia, of course. The reverse reaction to go from ammonia to hydrogen is not at all a technology which is today, I would say, controlled.
It's not mature at all.
it does not work at all. We have to work hard. Methanol is one of another way to ship, I would say, some hydrogen and there is a lot of infrastructure already. Your question is very true about global H2 markets. We have nothing today. It's not easy technology. The liquefaction point, as you know, is much lower than for natural gas. It raise a lot of issues and a lot of investments. I agree that this question for me is not fully addressed today. By the way, the projects that which we are looking, and I will not disclose the projects today and neither tomorrow, but we are working on some projects, are, to be sincere with you, more looking to ammonia at the end rather than H2 for the logistics.
To establish markets is better, maybe a nice way to do it before to go and to go to the whole logistics of it. Good question, Jason, and still we are there at a level of We need to dig because it's not so easy. Okay, next question.
Thank you. We have no more analyst questions. Therefore, we will move to a journalist question. The next question and final question comes from line of Sarah White from Reuters. Please ask your question.
First before-
Hi there.
Yes, Sarah, we'll take your question. Okay, please.
Okay, thanks. I'm the last one, right? Okay. I was just curious, I wanted to go back to something because you mentioned that in Europe, there were limitations when it comes to solar and wind projects in terms of footprint, in terms of space. Could you talk a bit about also the local opposition to some projects? I'm just wondering if you think that's actually really a problem, particularly in France. What can you actually do to try and overcome it? Can this actually affect your overall forecasts? Then if you don't mind, I did want to ask a second thing. You said the world still needs fossil fuels and transition fuels.
With that in mind, do you think that there's any kind of broader lessons that we can take from the fuel shortages and disruptions that we see in the U.K. for the years to come as well? Thank you.
The problem is not only in France, I think. By the way, you have issues with communities because it's a question, again, of land use. In fact, you have competition for use, and you have people. It's not only in France, by the way. We observe exactly the same problem in Germany, in Italy, by the way, and we begin to observe it in Spain as well. I think the reality is that Europe is, I would say, is a humanized civilization. We have a density of population which compared to many other countries like the U.S. or Australia, for example.
China
We are much more dense. I'm not surprised, and it's why I was insisting that it's a question of scarcity above surface from renewables. That has to be taken into account. I read, there was an interesting study which has been published in Italy by the Ambrosetti Foundation, which tried to translate the target that the European Commission has assigned by 2030, 40% of renewable in our mix. They made a study of how long could it take to get through all the administrative process to build such capacities. The answer in this study by Ambrosetti is not 2030, but 2043. There is a message there to policymakers, I think to everybody. I think that's very good, this exercise.
I mean, this willingness of Europe to go for 55% by 2050, 2030, sorry, because it raised many issues. It puts the people in front of the reality. How do we do that? If, yes, if we want to reach 40% of renewable in our mix, we need to build massive renewable for the next 10 years, and we need to have the land, and we'll need to have the administrative process going through. That's true that in our democracies, which is good, that makes raised questions. I think there is only way to think to that, which will oblige governments to plan properly. Like, I think the French Government begins to think to that. We need to make some planning. To do the planning properly, you need to put people around the table and not to antagonize people.
If you let just people going, if it's a jungle, it will not work. That's true. Let's be clear, for our strategy of TotalEnergies, this is one advantage of our company is that when we think renewable, we think on a worldwide basis. I will come back on that concept tomorrow. Yes, we have an ambition in Europe, but we are looking to other geographies where maybe this question of space and land use is less, I would say, critical, but in Europe. That's, I would say, a very good question, and I don't have all the answers. We will work, but we will not solve it alone, the energy producers. We'll have to solve it together with the society and policymakers and, of course, the citizen representatives. I mean, the second question. Yes, it's true, Sarah.
You know, the planet today is working with fossil fuels. 80% of the energy of this planet is fossil fuels. That's the reality of the planet. It was true in 2010, it's still true in 2020. I think we decreased the fossil fuels share by 1% in 10 years. That's all about, again, antagonizing energies once again the others and some players against the others will not be the solution. The energy transition, the important word is transition. Transition mean finding the right way to accommodate the present and the future. I'm convinced that we'll not be able to build these decarbonized futures against this present and the energy of the present. It's not possible. People will not accept. Look, it's not because of CO2, it's because of COVID that suddenly we have diminished investment last year, very uncertainties or less investments.
Suddenly a lot of demand, which by the way, is not bad. I mean, this increase of natural gas somewhere is coming from Asia, from China, fundamentally. Why? Because there are policies there which incentivize some producers, some energy consumers to use natural gas rather than coal. Fundamentally, it's coming also from a policy to control CO2 emissions. On which the Chinese government, despite what we said, is taking actions. You have more demand for natural gas. The increase of LNG demand by China in 2021 compared with 2019 is +35%. Of course, this is a type of increase which cannot be absorbed easily if you don't continue to invest. That has an influence on all these. The lesson is that we need to monitor smoothly the transition by investing more and more in renewables and decarbonized energies.
At the same time, we need to maintain a certain level of investment in the energies that we are using today. This shift for customers, and this is by the way, exactly the fundamentals of the strategy of TotalEnergies that I will describe tomorrow. As it is the last question, it gives me the perfect conclusion to this sequence today. Thank you for all of you for your attendance. I know it was a very rich and dense presentation, but thank you Helle, and thank you to all the teams who contributed to the quality of this presentation. It raised many question from you, very interesting one. We don't have all the answers. We try to share with you a lot of them, or what we think, and we continue to learn.
It's why I consider that it's very important in a company like TotalEnergies with the, I would say, because we are involved in these energy markets and more and more involved in many of these markets. We have some understandings. We don't say you we have the truth, we have different scenarios. There is no we are humble. I think it's important that we contribute to the debate. That's our objective today, because this debate is key for us, not only as a company, but key for all of us as member of the society. Again, I thank you for your attention. Tomorrow, after these markets, these potentially markets presentation, we'll come back to what TotalEnergies will implement as a strategy for the next five and 10 years.
Thank you this afternoon and hope to answer to more questions again tomorrow afternoon at 2:00 P.M. for the Strategy and Outlook Presentation.