Over to you.
Hello, everybody. This is Michael. Welcome to our First Quarter briefing for the Lion Health Science. You've heard the presentation by Piyush and Sok Hui at the media briefing, so we can go straight to Q&A. Serena, can you open the line for questions?
Sure. Thank you so much. We will now begin the question and answer segment. If you have any questions for our speakers today, you may press zero followed by one on your telephone keypad now. Once again, that will be zero followed by one on your telephone keypad now. We'll just give that a few more seconds to raise their questions. Once again, audience, if you have any questions, that will be zero followed by one on your telephone keypad.
Maybe no questions.
We have the first question. It's Eugene from Moody's. Over to you.
Hi, Eugene here from Moody's. Thank you for the call. I just have two questions, one on asset quality and the other one on liquidity. First of all, can you give us a sense of your stage two loans? I mean, we've seen many global banks recording quite significant increases there, so maybe some color there on stage two. Then on liquidity, the big surge in deposits, I understand it's the corporate deposits flowing into DBS, but where did you guys deploy those deposits? Because when I look at your HQLA amounts, those are weighted amounts, there's not a huge change in those HQLA. Can you help us understand where it's deployed on the asset side? Those are the two questions. Thank you.
Thanks, Eugene. For the stage two, I presume you're referring to the expected credit loss. We have set aside substantial amounts, SGD 700 million this quarter. They come from two components. We have not changed the way we do our ECL methodology. We use a credit cycle index to guide how much we need to put on. On top of that, we look at cases that might need to be downgraded into stage two. On top of that, we add a stress component, which we think are not well factored into the model. For this quarter, the steep increase came from the third component, which means we stressed it a lot more and we took the additional reserves into management overlay. That's how we build up the stage two expected credit loss.
Does that answer your question?
Yes, that's great. Thank you so much. That's great. The SGD 700 million ECL, that's clear. But what would be the gross amount of stage two loans in terms of staging? I know you guys don't disclose it, but maybe in terms of change, the magnitude of changes, any color would be great. Thank you.
Actually, it's a hard thing to do because to remember how the staging actually works. It works in the phases of migration and ACRR, which works on reported financials. It always tends to be a lagging indicator. You use judgments on top of that to see which names have got downgraded and how do you take a forward-looking view to downgrade names, and then a macroeconomic variable view. On top of that, we still have to make a judgment call because in many cases the regulators are encouraging us to look through the short term impact of the COVID as we think about migrations and moving to stage two. It's a lot of moving parts. Therefore, I think the better way to think about it is are we providing enough?
And as Chng Sok Hui pointed out, our models came up with a smaller number. We just bumped in a much bigger overlay on top of that just to make sure that we're providing enough to cater for any future potential moves to stage two over time.
Thank you, Piyush.
Sorry, do you have further questions on the stage two provisioning?
No, thank you so much. Maybe on the liquidity.
Okay. No, your other question was where do we deploy a lot of the surplus liquidity since the HQLA didn't change very much. We actually think that some of these could be transient funds as well, so we do not lock them into sort of bonds. High quality liquid assets under the LCR definition by Basel are all sort of government securities, bond instruments. We take different levels of haircuts. It's SGD 92 billion. That hasn't moved in this quarter compared to the last quarter. A lot of these deposits find their way into sort of short term lending for placement back with the MAS.
By the way, just a correction. A large part, about over SGD 30 billion, the big chunk of it is consumer as well, about SGD 10 billion growth in our consumer deposits, not just corporate. As Sok Hui said, a large part of our surpluses we just placed with the MAS. We make a positive return on the money we place with the MAS. Obviously, it's NIM decreases.
Thank you so much.
Thank you. Next in queue, we have Robert from Citi. Over to you.
Sure. Thanks very much for the very detailed presentations. Three questions if I could. One is, within this credit cost guidance of SGD 3 billion-SGD 5 billion, what is your projection or the implied projection for where NPLs will go to? NPLs went up obviously this quarter, but not very much, and it was very much one single loan. So in a broad sense, where will your peak NPL ratio or NPL level be? The second question is, taking out all the short-term issues about liquidity stress, et cetera, where do you think the terminal NIM will end up, be it later this year or early next year, assuming a full repricing of rates at the back to, you know, and I'm assuming here that the Fed doesn't raise rates for some time.
Then the third question, if I may, how much further unrealized mark-to-market gains do you have within your bond portfolio? I'm assuming that you will continue to realize those gains in the next one, two quarters if it's possible. Those are the three questions. Thank you.
Let me answer the second and third question and leave for Sok Hui to see if she has the answer to the NPL question. Your second question was on NIM. I think the easiest way to think about it is when Fed went to zero last, our NIMs bottomed out in the low 1.50s%. Therefore, that's a comparable thing to look at, right? The portfolio hasn't changed substantively, so that's where we could bottom out. There is one dimension to that which could give us some cushion, and that's really part of the answer to your third question, which is that in the last three years, we've been building our overlay positions to build some duration and build yield into our book, which accounts for a lot of the investment security portfolio that we have.
Now that portfolio is quite nicely in the money. It's obviously well over $1 billion in the money, even after the gains we've taken. There you've got to make the trade-off. Do you recognize and harvest some of the gains in the quarter, in which case it decreases to NIM going forward, or do you hold that book and let it flow through NIM and interest income in future periods? That's the judgment call that you have to make. They're two sides of the same coin, frankly. I'm not sure we have an actual projection of the NPL, for you, Robert, so maybe we can get back to you offline.
Okay. Thank you. Just to one quick follow-up on what you said, obviously there's a decision between do you harvest gains now, fatten the NIMs or do you hold on? Is there a rule of thumb that would be obvious? For example, if your gains on a particular security is worth the next three years of interest income, do you just take it anyway? Is there some sort of rule of thumb around that?
First of all, we're guided by accounting as well. A large part of our book we buy and hold to collect, and there are rules around what you can sell in that part of the portfolio. That's something that we look at. Second, we are obviously bound, guided by our own liquidity considerations, what we want to keep in some of these assets, and not. But third, there is a level of judgment. When rates just collapsed so massively in the first quarter, and the ten-year, et cetera, came down to levels which we just thought are considerable, it just made sense to book the gains that you could. When rates went back up after that, it gives you an opportunity to go back and rebuild some positions. We do take a view. There is no rule of thumb or guidance around that.
Okay, thank you.
Thank you. Next in queue we have Aakash Rawat from UBS. Please go ahead.
Hi, this is Akash from UBS. Thanks so much for this call and the presentation so far. I have three questions. The first one is related to property again, specifically to REITs. Could you know, give us some color on what is the exposure to REITs and how are you thinking about commercial REITs in particular? When I look at the presentation, it's not part of the eight industries. Is that. I'm just thinking like in the future if we have lower vacancies for the commercial REITs, who might potentially be getting forbearance from you as well, and if property prices could collapse on the back of it or even go down on the back of it, would you need to top up potentially?
No, I don't have the answer to what our exposure to commercial REITs is. Let me just address it from the same basis that we've done a stress test across the rest of our portfolio as well. I just don't have the numbers for every industry and every stress that we've done handy on me. In REIT, for example, I do know that they have taken some very stressed assumption on the REIT cash flow, et cetera, to figure out who could get into trouble and what we might have to do. I just don't have the numbers on me on it.
Okay. The second question I had is on the RWA inflation. How should we think about that, through the rest of the year and next year potentially? What impact would that have on your CET1 other than the usual things?
We factored in some assessment of what total RWA migration could result in and the impact that could have on our CET1. You know our CET1 today, we're running at 13.9, and we said that we could get to the bottom end of our operating range. That affects effectively our growth in RWA. Some of it will be new loans, but a large part of that is affected by the migration we expect over the next.
That increases, credit migration and the dividends that you're potentially gonna pay over the next couple of years. That takes you to the lower end of your range then.
Correct. If you go back to our earnings capacity, right? Last year, our profits before tax was about SGD 8 billion, right? If you need to assume some stress on that over the next couple of years, and then you know, knock off another SGD 5 billion or SGD 4 billion for cost of credit, and then you knock off what we pay for dividends, you still have some money left over.
Understood. Thanks. Just third one would be similar to the question at hand. If you assume that, you know, credit remains at zero for a while, means go back down to the levels that they were in 2012-2014. Your ROE in that period was roughly 12% on average through those years. Is that a fair number to look at for in a couple of years time where you can get back to after your credit loss timelines?
I don't remember. ROE numbers used to be, however, if I remember, closer to 11, but whatever it was, yes, because, you know, underlying business is quite robust. Of course, in the short term, we think ROE will be back there. It depends on how much write-offs you have to take in the next year or two. I think, let's call it the 11%-12% range of sustainable ROE, I think we have, even without the interest rate upwards.
Right. Thank you. I guess very quickly the last one. If you compare the credit cost outlook with the GFC
My finance people just told me that 11 was what our ROE used to be. That's what we should be looking at.
Okay, thank you, sir. Just lastly, very quickly. You've compared your credit cost outlook with the SARS and the GFC period, and if you look back at those periods, the elevated credit cost pretty much lasted through three years. You know, for SARS you had like, I think a 50-60 basis point level for three years. The GFC, you had on average 70 basis point three years. This time around, is that a risk as well that there's a, you know, 70 basis point average for the next two years spills over into 2022 as well?
Yeah, it could be. The reason I use two years only because I couldn't figure how much we see this year. The reason for that is the moratorium and government packages, right? You don't know what will really filter through this year and what will just be sort of bunched together. The only reason I took a two-year view, not that I'm suggesting that, you know, we won't have elevated costs. Of course, we'll have elevated costs in third year, but I do think they'll be much lower. If you look at even the past things, the costs they elevated for two, three years, they start normalizing. I think that's what we'll see.
Thank you. Okay, understood. Thank you very much. I'm out of here.
Thank you. Next in queue we have David from Aletheia Capital . Over to you.
Yeah. Good morning, and thank you for the presentation and the guidance. I just had two questions really. One is on the NIM and volumes, and the second would be on the credit cost. I guess just on the NIM and the volumes, obviously, we appreciate your guidance on the margin pressure that will come through from all these rate cuts. I mean, I guess from post-GFC, the way you were able to manage that was to grow volumes very strongly as you built up new businesses like transaction banking, probably took some market share from the, you know, developed market banks.
I guess to what extent do you hope that this kind of playbook still works, this crisis round so that you can use some volume growth to offset some of the margin pressure and then can actually still see some NII growth? I guess that's the first question. Second question is just on the credit costs. I guess you're talking about 80 to 110 basis points related credit costs for the next two years. I guess you've really taken in absolute terms about 30 basis points of that in Q1. For the next 1.75 years, you're sort of talking about 40-ish type basis points annual credit cost.
Is that a fair read into what your assumptions for the next year and a half or so will be? Thank you.
Well, on the first question, I think part of the answer depends on what happens to the macroeconomic outlook, right? As you correctly said, after 2009, we grew very strongly, but there is also, you know, in an era where Asia was growing very strongly. The China stimulus, China growth, et cetera. We got some extraordinary growth. Partly it depends on what is the, you know, world after the pandemic, what kind of macro growth environment do you have. But second, the business part of the question, I'm still very confident on our capacity to continue to grow market share. If you look at the last decade, and certainly the last five years, it's been marked by our ability to grow share, not only in Singapore, but around the region in several product categories.
If anything, I think prices of this sort give you an opportunity to build share positions. Which is why, you know, as long as you're resilient, as long as you sort of are willing to support your customers, as long as you leverage your product capabilities well, I think you should be able to continue to grow market share position. The short answer is, yes, I think there are opportunities to that. I'd like to point out that, you know, given the nature of banking, it's so fragmented that our market shares are minuscule. Even transaction banking, though we've grown a lot, if you have to ask our cash market share, it's in the low single digits by and large. The opportunity space is large from that standpoint.
From the cost of credit, actually, the range we've given is from 80-130 basis points, not 110, overall range over this period. You want to answer that?
I think so hypothetically, because we said it's 130 basis points over 2 years, and if you take say 65 basis points each year under stress conditions, then we would sort of try and build up SGD 2.5 billion in the first year. I mean, hypothetically, that's how you would sort of build a lot more in GP and then release it when you see SPs are materializing. That's one way to look at it.
Okay. Many, many thanks.
In a way, if you do that, then you'll be like 60 over basis points each year.
Okay. Thank you.
For both specific and general, because we are looking at it in aggregate, so we build up ahead of time. That gives us the opportunity to release it if we see specific provisions building up.
Okay. Thank you.
Thank you. Next, we have Kevin from Bernstein. Please go ahead.
Hi, good morning. three questions from me, please. The first is, Piyush, on the aviation side, could you share your thinking around the collateral value to the dollar, given that at this particular point in time, and perhaps even into next year, there won't be huge demand for aircraft? What kind of collateral assumptions are you making? Number two is a simple one, given all that's been asked already. This SGD 700 million GP, just wanna get a sense of the gut feel of how adequate that will be given the SME segment, corporate segment numbers that you presented. Lastly, wage costs are +4% up in for this quarter. Does that specifically include government measures like wage subsidies? How do we look at this number going forward into the next few quarters?
Should we be able to do more, or pretty much it'll be the same at this level? Thank you.
On the aircraft, even as I pointed out, one big part of our assumption is that there will be government support packages. We're not relying entirely on aircraft collateral. We have done that. We've gone and figured out now the nature of the aircraft collateral depends on the actual aircraft that you're financing. If you have a narrow-bodied aircraft that has got a lot more resiliency in the thin market, some of the wide-bodied ones are a lot more difficult to sell at this point in time. Nevertheless, there's buyers for aircraft even today. The large leasing companies are actually quite well-capitalized and gone online. I had conversations with a couple of global CEOs.
They're quite happy to actually go and purchase and wholesale aircraft at the right value, the right price. In our assessment of this thing, I think the team has actually taken some assessment of which aircraft we have, what we are financing, what the collateral value is. It has also taken the underlying assumption that if you're a national flag carrier, you will be bailed out. That's why I call it one of the favorites in our assessment and assumptions. On GP, I don't believe 700 will be sufficient. That's why we've given indicative guidance for what we think cost of credit could be. We have the capacity to keep building GP over time. As Sok Hui just said, our intent is to try and keep building up our GP provisions ahead of SP. That doesn't still mean that we will take it all in one quarter.
Maybe, Piyush, just to the point, we had operating profit before allowances, just to recap, of SGD 2.5 billion this quarter. Even if there, if we see some slowdowns in the revenue side, and we think it may be a shade lower, SGD 2.5 billion is a huge amount, right? For us to be able to afford to set aside more provisions in the quarters ahead.
Your best guess is the 700, your answer to the gut feel is that the SGD 700 is what you can best anticipate as what's needed now, and you will do more later if that's necessary.
No, I think what you're hearing from us is that we will continue to do more, that, you know, we will continue to build it over time because it'll be hard to say what might be necessary next year.
Okay. Thanks.
The third question, we've not taken any of the wage credits or government subsidies in the first quarter. This is our actual expense base. As some of those government measures come through, that'll obviously help us on the expense line. That's part of our consideration when we say that we can hold expenses line.
Thank you.
Thank you. Next in queue, we have Harsh Modi from JP Morgan. Please go ahead.
Hi. Thank you. A couple of questions. One is, in this contingency build of SGD 500 billion of expected loss, what is your unemployment assumption and how does this number change with the change in unemployment number? Not going to the final, that's one. Second, why not DRP this quarter? Even with the 0% discount, it would have allowed you to provide some leeway in case, at some point in time you needed to increase the discount or the team not-
Sorry, can I follow the question? Can you state.
Sorry. The first one. Yeah, the second question or first one, I'll just repeat that, unemployment assumption, how does that change.
I understood that question. What's the second question?
Second one on DRP. Why not put DRP in place or scrip in place even with a zero discount in first quarter as it would have allowed you a bit more leeway as time goes by? Any thoughts around that? Final one, over the next 12, 18 months, very likely you will get some very interesting deals. Strategically, what are the gaps that you have? I know early days, but in the next, let's say, 24 months, what would be your dream come true kind of deals which you would be very keen to do at the time scale?
The first question, we've got different unemployment rate assumptions in Singapore and Hong Kong, which is a big book. The Singapore unemployment rate assumption, if I remember last, is about 4%, and the Hong Kong unemployment rate assumption is in the five end of this range. I'm telling you off the top of my head, I think it's about 5.6, if I remember the number.
Scrip dividend.
Yeah.
Yeah. You're asking, why didn't we activate the scrip dividend this quarter? We'll give it some further consideration. At this point in time, we think our shares are undervalued, so it's not the best time to sort of take on additional shares. Certainly we will evaluate the situation and as we go into the next quarter.
Your third question was?
On M&A, if any kind of deals you get if you want to.
You know, frankly, till we know what the extent of the ravages of the pandemic are and how bad is bad, it would be a little foolhardy to go and do a deal. I'm mindful of the fact that, you know, Jamie Dimon often says that he wished he hadn't done the Bear Stearns deal at least when he did. He should have done it a year later. You know, it's I think premature to think about that right now. Fundamentally, we haven't changed our approach to saying it'll have to be in the markets that are relevant to us, it'll have to be stuff that we think we can manage and absorb. All the criteria that we talked about before would still apply.
Got it. Thank you.
Thank you. Our next question, we have Nicholas from Credit Suisse. Please go ahead.
Hi. Just had a couple of questions. Firstly, just in terms of the thinking on the dividend, I know that the guidance is to kind of try to maintain it as stable as possible. If we're looking at, you know, CET1 not dipping significantly below the comfortable range, is there a kind of payout ratio that essentially, I mean, it could go as high as even, like, 95% or 100% kind of payout ratio? How should we look at those kind of limitations? The other question I had was just on the commercial property loans that you have, what the LTV levels are like?
As you know, we normally haven't really thought of payout ratios because that's not a guiding concept when we think about dividends. If you want indicator, I'd say payout ratio is in the 70s range, 70%-80% range we could live with. Again, this is just off the back of the envelope because you don't really. We're not normally guided by payout ratio thinking of, let's say, I'm sure we've got enough capacity to even go beyond 100% and pay from retained earnings. Our principal guide is therefore more stability of the dividend more than a payout ratio.
The commercial property LTV, I think I don't have the number at hand, but I will tell you from memory, and I think it'll be more on the fact that the bulk of our lending book on the commercial side, LTVs are around 60% level.
Okay, great. Thank you.
Thank you. Next in queue, we have Jayden from Macquarie. Please go ahead.
Thank you. Thanks a lot to you and team for the very detailed presentation and remarks. Much appreciated. I have three questions. The first is just to follow up on risk-weighted assets. If you look at risk-weighted asset density, we're still well below where we were, you know, back in GFC or previous cycles. If you just think about drift on the existing portfolio, any thoughts on how much it could go up and sort of what timeframe? And then the second question, which is somewhat related, is that how much pricing power do you think the bank does have, in terms of credit spreads?
If there is a pickup in credit risk, how much additional margin on the loan side do you think will be possible to pick up, just to reflect that? My third question, which is unrelated, is just on the CASA ratio. I didn't see it in the presentation. You mentioned you've had strong flows from corporates. I assume that that's sitting in CASA accounts, but if you could just confirm. Thanks.
On the RWA migration.
I guess on the RWA, there are a few factors, right? This quarter, for example, you will see that the decline would come from market related kind of factors. Whatever that is marked down from the bonds and equity portfolio during the quarter, that capital CET1 will take a hit because it goes through the fair value reserves. Counterparty credit risk RWA will also increase during this quarter. As market conditions normalize, I think you can see some of it potentially flowing back. The other drivers of RWA would really be the loan growth. If customers are drawing down from committed lines, actually most of the capital, 75% would already have been set aside in previous periods. We're talking about sort of additional credit facilities that will add to the RWA.
The other big driver of RWA would potentially also be the migration. As the sort of client profile worsens for some of these companies, I think RWA will also increase. Depending on the situation and when we expect to see more migration next year than this year after the moratorium period. In terms of this quarter, you also see the RWA increase from translation effects. Because our portfolio is actually hedged, we don't actually suffer from translation effects.
I just want the flip to that. In addition to that, though, we talked about our RWA in the last year compared to now. One of the differences that over the decade, we've actually improved our modeling capabilities a lot. Our risk density has improved quite significantly over this period. It's been in the high sixties. It's now in the high fifties. We still have some opportunity around that. There was one large book, which is a private bank wealth book, which is currently on the verge of being approved for model distinct. If that happens, that will give us a lot of RWA relief as well. That will make up for some of the migration that could happen.
Just a side point. As we entered the last crisis, bilateral netting arrangements had not been put in place. Since then, I think it has become more optimal as we recognize the effects of bilateral netting as well.
There's one other reason.
Yeah, that.
For example, pricing power. I mentioned, alluded to that before. I said our NIM has held up with all of these things, as you can imagine, the last two months, our pricing power has improved quite considerably. We've been able to price up for credit for everybody, including the best names at this point in time. Now how much pricing power stays, obviously it depends on competitive intensity as you go forward. If you look at history, I would think that for the bulk of this year, we will continue to have pricing power. If, as Chng Sok Hui alluded to before, if some banks withdraw or some banks decide to be more conservative, that should still give you some more pricing power.
Whether it carries into the medium term is anybody's guess. For the time being, yes, there's no question we'll be able to price up across the board. The third question was on CASA ratio. Actually, interestingly, the money that we got over this period were a mix. We got consumer CASA of about SGD 6 billion or SGD 7 billion altogether that went straight into CASA. On the corporate side, all of it was not CASA. Some of it was in short-term fixed deposits, which they put money and it keep rolling over as well. Which is why we Sok Hui earlier said that when people have these transient you know two-week fixed deposits roll over, we think that money might not be sticky. We don't actually put it to work. We just take it and we sit with them, yeah.
Okay. Thank you. What was the CASA ratio, if I may ask, if you put all that together?
It was a little change. It was around 58%. The inflows on nominal terms, fixed deposits rose SGD 18 billion, and the CASA rose SGD 21 billion.
Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you so much for taking my question.
Thank you. Next, we have Nick from Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead.
Hi. Thank you very much for taking my question. A couple of questions, actually. First, just to follow up a little more on the RWAs. I heard your Sok Hui, on how you expect that movement to take place over the next 9 months or so. But you know, in your presentation, Piyush you spoke about you don't have the CET1 to dip significantly below 12.5%, which I guess would imply sort of 10% or so on RWA if everything else is broadly stable. I'm just trying to work out how much of that is credit migration expectation and how much is volume. If that comment about below 12.5% is conservative or a realistic expectation. Then I have another question on ECL.
In our projections, the reason we went with CET1 is because there's a lot of moving parts with this. In our projections, you can get to a CET1 number of shade over 12%, right? It gives you from currently 14%- 12%. That's about 2 percentage points erosion in CET1. That would be about a 15% growth. Anything else given, that would be a roughly 15% growth in RWA. At the same time, as I said, there's some efficiencies in RWA, and there's some opportunities which also come from the market risk and so on. There are moving parts, and you put all of that together.
Okay. Perfect. Thank you. On ECL, have you thought about it in terms of geography? I'm just interested about that SGD 0.7 billion, the overlay or whatever it is. Is there a geographic split to that?
No, I don't think there is.
The large part of our ECL is taken through sort of like I said, there are three parts. The larger part is the third component, which is really sort of a management overlay under stress conditions that we actually hold it at the center. We don't actually pass it out to all the locations.
Okay. I mean, if I'm to think about that in terms of your loan book split, I mean, am I assuming the bulk of that would be sort of corporate lens or corporate that is booked out of Singapore and very small amounts in other regions, especially Hong Kong, I was thinking.
That's right. Actually, you can make out from the split of our loan bookings in our performance summary, right? Singapore is a chunk, but we're fairly diversified. We actually have bookings in the U.S., in the U.K., in Australia, Hong Kong. A lot of the Chinese exposures are booked in Hong Kong. They're actually quite broadly spread.
Okay. All right. Thank you very much.
Next, we have Krishna from Jefferies. Over to you.
Yeah. Hi, thank you, Piyush, and Sok Hui for the call. Just couple of questions from my side. On your loan growth of non-trade corporate loan of 5%, if you exclude the various commitment, committed facility drawdowns, how much is the growth and which sectors is driving? Is it primarily infrastructure loan, sort of ESG sort of loans? That's my first question. The second question is if you have for the April month on your network, what kind of payments are you seeing across, you know, some of the real estate peers are able to say that they are able to collect 90% of the rent. I mean, in terms of your payment volume, have you noticed like month-on-month or year-on-year, what kind of differences are there? And if you can share that. Those will be the two bits from me. Thank you very much.
Krishna, on the first one, out of our SGD 10 billion, about two-thirds of it, one-third related to about SGD 3 billion or so was committed, revolver drawdowns and so on. About SGD 7 billion was the residual. A lot of that, the biggest chunk of that was real estate and property. That included actually projects we are financing, development projects, couple of privatization deals and so on. Our second big chunk I talked about was TMT, so telecom, media, technology financing. We did a data center. We did some financing of large technology producers who are changing and gearing and shifting. We did some deal financing. There was still some closing of acquisitions and privatizations and so on. Actually very broadly diversified, that SGD 6 billion-7 billion.
If you look at the second quarter, we're beginning to see a pickup of some more of the restructuring kind of deals. I referred earlier to the Singapore Airlines deal. As you know, we announced a bridge financing for that deal over several months before the convertible bond takeoff. That starts coming in, and other such deals as well. It's actually quite broad-based. On the second question, no, I mean, we don't have the data. We've not started tracking. I just told you our total payment volumes are holding up. The actual values, like how much our clients are collecting by this thing, we won't know. It's an interesting thing. I'm sure the right people might be able to figure it out, but with everything else going on, it's not something we've had the opportunity to share.
Okay. Okay, thank you. No, because one of your Australian peer gave some numbers there, so I was just wondering. No worries. Thank you very much for your reply.
Thank you. We will take one last question. We have Robert from Citi. Over to you.
Thanks again. Just a couple of follow-ups. First of all, on that oil trader exposure that everybody knows about, could you give a sense of how much you were able to offset? So if your dollar exposure was $100, how much were you able to offset in terms of collateral or recoverable value? So I'm assuming you didn't take the whole value. There must have been some recovery that you assumed. Related to that, there are clearly some other headline-worthy exposures in that bracket, oil traders, commodity exposures that they're also running into difficulties and also including some frauds. I'm just wondering if you can comment on how your overall exposures look there and what you might be still on your watchlist.
The final one is, you know, with the moratorium as it progresses, where do you think the low point is for your LCR and NSFR, you know, as you obviously absorb more of that liquidity? Thanks.
On the first one, it's a very tough one, Robert. That thing got announced two weeks after the end of the quarter, so April 17th, 18th . All we could do to actually recognize it into NPL and book some provisions against it. As you know, the banks are right now trying to go in and investigate and understand what is salvageable. Now, there are three or four different sources of value, but it's not clear how much there is. They obviously have trading positions. There's some value in those positions. There's some oil and rental. There are some receivables from a lot of counterparties who owe them money. But it will take a little bit of time to get their hands around all that and say how much is actually recoverable.
In this instance, we just put some substantial provisions around it without actually being able to get any real insight into how much is the value we can set off. As we get into the second quarter, therefore, it is possible that we might have to top up provisions. It's possible we've taken enough. We don't know just yet. To your second question, which is, we really don't have any other at this point in time, given commodity exposure, you know, fraud, et cetera, which is on our shortlist. At least none that I know of, or which is in my sight. Your third question, LCR, NSFR on the moratoriums, or give any sense? The moratorium impacted because the a ctually what happens with the moratorium in terms of actual physical amount of money that doesn't come in, it's not that much.
About half a billion dollars of payments due this year, which won't come into us. It doesn't really move the needle too much from that standpoint. We accrue it, but half a billion from a cash flow standpoint is not that material.
Okay, thank you.
Yeah. I would say no material impact.
All right. Thank you. Thank you for joining us. We'll see you next quarter.
All right. Thank you everybody.
Okay, thank you.
Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes today's conference call. Thank you for your participation.