Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Russia Ukraine update conference call of Raiffeisen Bank International. Today's conference is being recorded. At this time, I'd like to turn the conference over to Mr. Johann Strobl, Chief Executive Officer. Please go ahead, sir.
Thank you very much. Good evening or good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It's not so long ago that we had a call, but since then the situation in Ukraine and Russia has changed dramatically. You probably, and for sure, follow all the events, what's ongoing in the country, on the ground, in Europe, all over the world. I think it still deserves a special focus on our activities in these two countries, and I assume you will have many questions as well. What we want to do, we meaning Hannes Mösenbacher and myself, that we give you a short update on what's going on in the country, in the countries. Then also give you a reminder and more details on our activities and our exposure in the two countries and also the recent developments.
Then, of course, we. It's unavoidable that we also talk a little bit about sanctions and how we see it also. We assume that you are well aware still. I think it's worth to have also spend a few minutes on this. Then, of course, we will be open to your questions. If we now move to the overview picture. When talking about the two banks, let me start with the operations of the two banks. Of course, the situation is very, very different between the two countries. In Ukraine, there is fighting developing every day in different areas. You probably have the map in your mind or you constantly look it up, so you have an idea what it means.
What we try is, as banking is a substantial infrastructure, critical infrastructure, we try to keep the bank operating as good as possible. When I mean as good as possible, then we're talking about the basic services for customers. Of course, this is to a large extent for private individuals to do their daily banking, to get access to cash. For the companies, it's also to provide cash to their customers and to their employees especially. I think I can say that we are doing very well, like other banks as well. But I think our people do an exceptional job. It's the case that every day and changing even within the day, we have to adjust the opening hours.
We have to open and close branches also during the day. The majority of the branches is in operation and are working. What, of course, we try is to convince the people and also their customers and also the retailers that they accept also digital money, the cards. 'Cause you can imagine in areas where fighting is ongoing or transports are driven by military and then cash transport is not that easy and so it might be that in one or the other bank you also might see branches, I want to say. You might experience the one or the other day shortages, and then we try to refill as quick as possible.
When talking about digital and IT, I think here the biggest concern is as the conflict is rather in the east and in the south and more and more coming from the north to Kiev, that we try to relocate some of our IT operational centers and some of the staff to other areas, so that in case of damages, and of course, this can be that one of the IT centers might be hit as well, we still can operate. I mean, since the pandemic, of course, people are used to work also from home. This makes it, if I can say so, in the country possible to keep the operations going as it is.
The National Bank of Ukraine has imposed a couple of restrictions on cash withdrawals, also on FX limits. They also have forbidden withdrawals for Russian citizens. Of course, like in any country, we have to obey these regulations. This is the status in Ukraine. When talking about Russia, the situation, of course, is very different as in Russia it's more about how to deal with the new developments in the recent days with the impact of the sanctions. You have also seen that Russia has taken a couple of measures, and they have to be understood and heavily discussed and then to be adjusted.
As I explained now, it's more to keep the operations and it's not about new lending. In these days, there is no new lending in the countries. I mean, there always will be exceptional cases where there is a need or a specific situation. On a broad base, you should not expect that lending is ongoing. Of course, one never knows in which direction the further developments will be. Probably it's also not a surprise that uncommitted lines are canceled. Of course, given the difficulties in the country, in Ukraine, it's probably also not a surprise that we offered payment holidays to our retail customers for the next two months so that they can focus on their daily life and on their safety.
Moving to the next slide. This is the introduction or the reminder to Russia. What you see here is probably some information, what you might consider when thinking about very bad scenarios. Of course, what we have is an equity, just as a reminder, equity and other capitals, like AT1 or so, of EUR 2.4 billion. The bank is self-funded, so there is no parent funding. In addition to this, the bank has a loan portfolio to customers of EUR 11.6 billion, which is a little bit more than 11% from the group loan portfolio. The total capital in Russia is 13.6%, whereas the capital requirement is 11.5%.
I did say that Russia is self-funded, and you see it on the ratios that liquidity situation is very, very good. You also can see that, and you remember that throughout the difficult years the resilience to negative developments of the Russian bank was always very strong. Throughout all the years, we had an ROE of above 20%, which is always a good sign when you're in a difficult situation. As I said, I do it together with Hannes, so I hand over to Hannes, and he will talk about the exposure.
Good afternoon also from my side, and thanks for participating. Now, let me give you some details on the portfolio, and this slide is well-known to you. Just to remind you that the biggest part of the portfolio is anyway in local currencies. 95% of revenues are being generated in Russia. I'm now with the fourth bullet talking about our Russian exposure cross-border. This is the exposure being booked at head office with the country of residence, Russia. It has a very short maturity and running off quickly. As we have shared with you that we have already in 2019 and in 2021, we have in total built provisions of EUR 60 million to cover respective sanctions.
I was sharing with you last time that we have a hedge position being set up at EUR 1.4 billion. What is very important for me to emphasize here, after now this detail on sanctions language over the weekend and every day coming in new sanctions, currently only 1% of our total exposure is directly affected by these sanctions. We have a portfolio 99%, which is not affected. If I would now go to the left part of the of this presentation, you can see that we are locally serving retail clients and corporate clients. What you can see on the right-hand side of this pie chart is what, of course, you would also expect as usual banking operation to manage your liquidity. You have some exposure to the Russian sovereign.
Of course, the local central bank is, for us, an important counterpart to manage our local liquidity. You can also see that we are exposed to the local stock exchange and other foreign FIs. Johann, back to you on Ukraine.
Thank you, Hannes. I mean, you know the bank, it's different in dimension. It's our equity. Here, please be aware the total equity of the bank is of course much higher. You know that we have minorities and we have with EBRD a big co-shareholder. This is only our part. This is the EUR 320 million of equity, what we have. Again, the bank is very, very liquid and well-funded locally, so there is no parent funding from Vienna. The loan portfolio is EUR 2.2 billion, which is 2.2% of the group loan portfolio. Its capitalization of the bank is 13.7%, whereas the local capital requirement is 10%.
You see the LCR, this is an enormous high number. I hand back to Hannes.
Thank you. Also here, maybe some details. As we always have shared with you that currently, retail lending is done only in local currency. I know that some of you may remember maybe even using the 2014 scenario as a reference, but what is this time extremely different is that this time, retail lending only took place in local currency. If you look at the total distribution of financing, 80% is being done in local currency. Consistent, of course, with the mentioned LCR, we are extremely liquid, having 65% of a loan-to-deposit ratio. Also here, I was sharing with you on the fourth bullet by the year-end presentation that we already have allocated some EUR 25 million of provisions given the current geopolitical risks, what we have faced with the year-end. Johann.
Thank you, Hannes. Now I would quickly move through the many sanctions, and we have tried to structure it somehow. What you have is this is a number of people is increasing almost every day. What we have is asset freezes and travel restrictions. Here I can say that the three big ones, U.S., Europe and U.K. are aligned with only little differences in the time when they come and in the people. Overall, we can say restrictions for individuals for traveling and an asset freeze for them. This is like members of the Duma International Security Council, so-called Russian oligarchs, and their controlled interests. There are now further asset freezes.
When going to the next one, to the economic part of it, then here it's as of today, mainly the restriction of export of dual-use goods, high-tech goods, semiconductors, computers, telecoms. We know about Nord Stream 2. We know about restrictions on exports to oil refinery material, aircraft, aviation equipment, and tourism services. These are the recent ones. The Russian airspace, you are aware of it, is closed. We see cultural and sporting restrictions.
If we move to the next slide, then I think what's important because of our business is that we have the central bank, we have the sovereign liquidity. I mean, the biggest impact was the asset freeze on the foreign exchange reserves and the ban to raise sovereign debt. We have Russian banks where the primary and secondary market access for Europeans is restricted. We have the asset freezes. I think I do not have to read through it. You probably all are aware of it. I think what's currently very limiting for payment transactions is that individuals and legal entities are only allowed to have or we can accept deposits only in the amount of EUR 100,000.
If I move to the last slide, what we can say is that these transactions are permanently extended and sharpened, so it's really difficult to implement it every night. I think what we can say is that they really far-reaching and maybe Hannes then would add a couple of things as well. Of course, two things which are more operational. The one is, some of you are interested how we are dealing with supervisors. You are aware that we are directly supervised by ECB. We have regular talks with the joint supervisory team, which have staff members from ECB and the national supervisors. Of course, we have our permanent talks with our people.
Looking at this uncertain situation, we today made a decision in the board, and I think you have seen it maybe already as an ad hoc that we say this dividend proposal, what we wanted.
To get approved in the shareholder meeting end of this month, we will change these proposals. What we say is during this time of uncertainty, we will propose that we immediately do not pay a dividend, but we keep it as a potential dividend and see how the development over the next couple of months will be. Hopefully, it comes down. Hopefully, dust settles. We then of course will understand what the impact on our CET1 ratio is and hopefully we then in a much clearer environment can pay this dividend. As of today, we will propose to the shareholder meeting to postpone this dividend. The procedure how this works, you are well aware of it. Now we would be ready for your questions. Thank you for listening.
Thank you, gentlemen. Ladies and gentlemen, we may now start the Q&A session. If you wish to ask a question today, you will need to press the star one on your telephone keypad. Please ensure that the mute function on your telephone is turned off, or we will not receive your signal. Once again, if you wish to ask a question, you will need to Press Star 1. If for any reason you need to remove yourself from the queue, you can do so by Pressing Star 2. We'll pause for a brief moment in order to allow the queue to assemble. Our first question comes from Izabel Dobreva with Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead.
Hello. Thank you very much for hosting this call. It is extremely helpful. I have a few questions, but let me try to condense them into just a few. Firstly, I wanted to ask you about how we should think about the bear case here. Could you talk us through how we should think about the hypothetical worst case scenario and the absolute impact on capital? I know you've disclosed the EUR 2.7 billion of equity. In your mind, is that the absolute amount that you could lose? What is the interplay between the RWA and also the FX hedge of EUR 1.4 billion? How much of an offset does that give?
Of course, on top of that, what are your expectations around the cross-border exposure that you have and how we should incorporate that into the impact? My second question is, what are your expectations regarding access to the central bank? Here, the question is really twofold. If we compare to 2014 playbook, would you expect to have access to any central bank support measures should the need arise? You know, capital liquidity support. Would you have the same access as domestic banks? More broadly, how does the current situation compare to 2014, financially in your mind?
Well, Izabel, if I shall start. Last time, I have been asked by one of your fellow colleagues what would be the worst case scenario? I was answering and saying, "Well, if people will face harm," and unfortunately we had this, but I'm now focusing on the economic and financial consequences, what you have asked for. Yes, I think the starting point, as we also have shared with our slides is, and this is for me what is very important. This is a stylized scenario because we have locally a very strong portfolio. What we always have shared with you, with you as the financial community is that we are selecting very carefully. You can also now see it in our portfolio presentation that we have done a very careful selection and that we have a very strong portfolio.
You also can see it over with the risk costs we had shared with you over time for this portfolio. For me it's important, you know, that we are not just focusing on the worst case scenario, but I'm happy to talk you through. Yes, you're right. It's this EUR 2.4 billion of equity, what we have discussed. You could also add in the worst case scenario, the EUR 600 million I was sharing with you on the cross-border exposure. What is important is that we have this EUR 1.4 billion of hedge volume in place. Where you would have currently a mark to market of some EUR 300 million-EUR 400 million of positive mark to market already on this hedge.
You could immediately deduct this one and also of course the risk provisions, what we have built to this. When talking about the worst case, do not forget at the same time we also would of course lose the RWAs. If you would go to our presentation, which we were sharing with the market, on the second of February, and you look at page 51, you can see that we had some EUR 12 billion of RWAs. Meaning that in this worst-case perception, as you were asking for, we have currently, by the end of the year, EUR 11.8 billion of Common Equity Tier 1 after deduction. In your worst case question, you have to deduct this 2.7.
You would add back some EUR 400 million plus the risk provisions, what we have built would lead you to somewhere around EUR 9.5-9.6 billion. At the same time, you would deduct from the EUR 89 billion of risk-weighted assets, you would deduct the EUR 12 billion, leading you to the EUR 77 billion. The calculus, what this would then mean in terms of CET1, you can do on your own. This, I think, would be for me, the worst-case scenario. For me, this is a stylized scenario, but you have asked for, and this would be our thinking, Johann.
Yeah, thank you. Let me add to some of your other questions and maybe still add where Hannes is. I would not even call it a scenario. I would say if you have to, I don't know what in a reverse stress or whatever you do, what can happen? I think it's important to emphasize that the bank is very strong from the underlying business and of course with a new ruble rate, the.
Then probably also if one have to assume that the macro development will be a recession, then of course it will increase also the risk costs and yeah, there, as I said, before, you should not expect in these days a loan growth. Some of the elements what might have been used in modeling a very bright future for the bank do not hold anymore. As I said, the position is very good. I think we are, if this is the question, if I should understand it, this bank is a Russian bank under Russian regulations.
I expect that the bank, like any other bank, has access to ruble liquidity if required. As Hannes showed before, it's very well funded and this is the starting point for all negative scenarios. I think it's also we're not the big bank. I think we are still in the top 10. In normal terms, you would also argue that with around EUR 15 billion of deposits, then this is a reasonably serious bank and a very good bank. Here I would expect that the bank is treated in a way like another Russian bank by the central bank.
Thank you. Our next question is by Gabor Kemeny with Autonomous Research. Please go ahead.
Hello, thank you for this call. Can I just follow up on the worst-case numbers Hannes just mentioned? Were you saying EUR 2.5 billion of potential losses in Russia and on the other hand, EUR 12 billion of RWA? Where is the numbers or would you like to suggest anything else?
No, Gabor. That's not the case. As one has to say, in a worst-case scenario, I think the bank in Russia still could make a profit. This is my assumption. I don't know how bad a recession has to be that this bank goes into the negative. We have not seen this over the years. I have mentioned the numbers. There is no scenario where you say I mean, you can always construct one, but given the macro scenarios one might use, you won't see it in the negative. What Hannes was referring and sometimes people ask, "Might it be possible that you lose the bank?" Then I say, "I don't think so.
I don't think so. Only then, if asked what would then be the impact if you lose, for whatever reason, the bank, and you can do this calculation for any other country as well, then these were the numbers what Hannes was referring to. There is no idea, no error that the bank in Russia will make a loss, will make a loss at all. Hannes might add to the potential risk cost.
Gabor, I have seen your research where you were playing around with the 1989 scenario. I think, I have seen that you were playing around with a haircut of 60% to the asset side. I believe what is a big difference is that at this time also there was a lot of cross-border financing and a lot of dollar financing. If you look at our numbers, and at this question will anyway come, so I take it now
If you look at our bank, and we have introduced the bank clearly to you and saying, well, we have EUR 11 billion of loan outstanding with our clients. You could say, well, we have an expected loss of somewhere around 100-150 million euros. As said, the portfolio is a very clean one, is a very strong one with a very low probability of default and with very good corporates in terms of credit metrics. Usually what you can see in this, I would now take the relation to 2014, is that you could see a multiple of the expected loss for those countries which are in a war-like situation, what we unfortunately now face in Ukraine between around five times.
You know, then of course, you could add, as Johann said, and if you think about Russia, is that the multiple could go up to three times versus the expected loss. What is the reason why we would see this maybe a little bit longer and a little bit more pronounced over time? Because of course, the sanction will need a certain period of time that they bite and eat into the corporate balance sheet and P&L. So this would be for me, given this current environment, my credit risk-wise, my worst-case number.
Understood. Thank you. If we just come back to that scenario when you lose the RWA. Under what conditions might it be possible? I mean, I guess this would be the walk away scenario we are talking about. Is this something stipulated in your current resolution plan submitted to the regulators? If you talk a bit about this scenario.
No, Gabor, one can have any scenario built. I don't see that we have to walk away. Walk away means that we find reasons, and I have nothing in my thoughts which would lead to a walk away. As I said, I do not expect retaliation from whoever in Russia. I think this is a well-respected bank, Russian bank with an, of course, Austrian international shareholder. I have no indication, no assumption that this happened and therefore there is. I don't think that there is a. We need to think about the walk away scenario.
As Hannes said, if asked worst, and then this is probably not economic, but something else, 'cause again, economically it was shared. He said 3 times the PD. Of course, the last year was a good one. Probably this is not the normal PD, but Hannes could also share the PD with you, what we have in this portfolio. To make it clear, I think in these days, also with some news today that we intend to walk away or so, for me it's very important that all of you understand, we are not walking away.
That's very clear. Thank you. Just one other question. On the Institutional Protection Scheme, the Raiffeisen IPS. Can you help us understand under what conditions could you draw the funds from this IPS? I believe you mentioned around EUR 800 million accumulated, so EUR 800 million accumulated in the IPS. When could Raiffeisen draw these funds?
Indeed, the fund is about to be 800. I think what you ask now is the conditions. We would have to drop with our capital, and it's in our presentation. It's the slide 35 where the big elements are developed. What would need to happen is that we drop to a level where one might say now they need a CET1 support. Which is not necessarily a trigger, so there is some flexibility. As Hannes said, with the scenarios one might have, again, I haven't seen in our bank a scenario where we would need the IPS.
Right, it's EUR 800, whereas around EUR 400 are paid in by us. This of course is the first source anyhow.
Thank you. Just to confirm, would you be able to draw potentially the full EUR 800? You mentioned a drop in the capital ratios. Like, would this mean a drop to your CET1 ratio of 10.4%?
Look, it's always the specific situation that one would have to look at. Of course, if there is the need, then this is the idea of the IPS. It's always about the capital, is of course the, let's say, bottleneck in a very difficult situation. Once again, it's available to all the members. I don't think that we will have a scenario where we need it. Yeah, it's there.
Okay. Thank you.
Thank you. Our next question comes from Máté Nemes with UBS.
Thank you. Good afternoon, and thank you for hosting the call and making yourself available. I had a couple of questions. Firstly, can I ask you to perhaps discuss some of the indirect exposures to Russia and Ukraine? So, not direct exposures to the countries, but anything you know related to interbank or Eurozone or other operating country corporates which might have an outsized exposure, sales or other exposure to Russia, Ukraine, maybe also Belarus. That would be very helpful. Secondly, the Russian sovereign exposures, are these effectively government bonds? And, are these fair value to OCI or held to maturity? If you could clarify the accounting treatment of these. Lastly, can you comment on the committed credit lines?
Have you seen a number of corporates in Russia or Ukraine drawing on these in the last couple of days or couple of weeks? If you could discuss what's been happening on that front. Thank you.
Well, on the first, Máté, question, I'm not perfectly sure if I got your question right, but I give it a try. The way I understand it is I was talking about this cross-border exposure. I was talking about financing, is it trade finance or is it financing provided across border from Vienna to Russia? Now you're asking, well, but what is also the other exposure we could have with Russian entities across Europe? If I'm looking here, and of course you're right, you know, there are some Russian entities which have their trading hub here in Switzerland and Germany or elsewhere. On the corporate side, we have real financing, some EUR 299 million.
If I think about the financial institutions, we're talking about loans, this is EUR 32 million. All numbers I was sharing with you is by the end of the year. If you were thinking about this indirect Russian exposure, if not, then please clarify later on. The second one is, you know, on the sovereign exposure. Yes, this is sovereign bond mainly. As I was indicating, this is a typical banking book position. You could say it's being used as a liquidity instrument for repos with the central bank, and it's currently held to collect.
Thank you.
On the committed lines, Máté, just to add what you have asked here, of course, you know, we have seen clients who were willing to extend, but these were not extremely demanding on the committed line on the Russian side, on the Ukrainian side. Yes, of course, we have seen it, but it was not too pronounced.
Understood. That's helpful. Just going back on my first question, thank you for the answers to those. I was wondering actually if you had credit exposures to corporates, large or mid-sized, perhaps based in some of the other operating countries, Slovakia, Hungary, any of the other countries, Czechia perhaps, which have significant sales exposure to Russia that might impact their cash flows or in any other way their credit quality.
Oh, I got it. Well, this is currently, you know, to see how the, you know, maybe to also check some numbers here. The total economic interaction last year and this year on the goods being delivered from Russia to the remaining world is some EUR 300 billion. I don't have yet the statistic in front of myself, but we would have it somewhere to see also the economic interrelation between the different countries and Russia. Then we could look how much our counterparts are being affected by this one. I see now your question, but unfortunately, I cannot directly answer what is the interdependency between a Slovakian company and in Russia.
If I think about off the top of my head, the top corporates where each country
I would not have an immediate one off the top of my head, but here I would rather prefer if colleagues from Investor Relations could follow up with this question and being precise.
Thank you, Hannes. I appreciate it.
Thank you. Thank you, Máté.
Thank you. We'll take our next question from Alan Sherbourne with Société Générale.
Thanks for your time today. Most appreciated. Could you talk a little bit about your understanding of the sanctions that are being applied to some of the Russian banks in terms of exclusion from SWIFT, for example, and whether you they will get a potentially collateral damage from that. Is it something that you find will help you do more business? Is it a big challenge to your systems? Could you just perhaps try and give us from the inside out a view of what you think the impact and in terms of how you will do business because of what's happening to other banks will be impacted. I guess the same question.
I mean, I noticed today, I think Visa and Mastercard have withdrawn from a lot of banks in Russia. How does that impact you in terms of your domestic business on a day-to-day basis? Because you know, one feels that politicians are saying that you know, taking a bank out of SWIFT effectively you know, paralyzes it. I mean, from a banker's perspective, looking at other banks in the market, how do you see that? That would be interesting and helpful to know.
Yeah, Alan. Thank you. I think let me start with your general one which runs through all of it. Business opportunities, this is not the time for business opportunities. I think in these days, everyone is rather focused on dealing with all these new regulatory sanctions, which are permanently coming, and trying to get the payments done. As I tried to explain in my introduction, where we currently feel the biggest pain is that yeah, to get an idea to deal with this regulation that you are not allowed to take deposits from Russian private individuals and legal entities, also banks on the one hand, but on the other hand, do all the transactions.
I think for the system, it's always painful if one is excluded from the SWIFT, of course. I think within Russia, what I hear is that the local system works. It's more the international. In the international, I have already explained the limitations. I understand that at least as of now, the SWIFT will be kept open at least for a couple of banks to keep the trade flow going. We'll see what this is. Yeah, I think currently the challenge rather comes from the other restrictions what I explained. I think it simply takes time to adjust.
I of course, if the full country will come off from the SWIFT then, probably challenging the payments, channeling the payments might be as well difficult. It depends on the sanctions. This is a risk for any trade that the world would have then with Russia.
Máté, if I can come back still to the question from Máté, because the team is doing an awesome job here supporting us. When sharing the EUR 600 million of cross-border business, the way how we do the assessment is that we include to this cross-border exposure all those companies where the revenue stream is dependent on with a percentage of more than 50%. All those companies which are exposed with a revenue stream 50% plus towards Russia, they would be included in the EUR 600 million. This is the question you raised, Máté.
Thank you. Our next question comes from Hadia Hachard with Allianz Global Investors.
Thank you for the call. I have a question about the AT1 4.2 given what happened on dividend.
My recent information is, but I don't know if this will change, that coupons are banned and so not only dividends, but this is not fully confirmed.
Okay.
Our AT1. Yeah, wait. My team is correcting me and the question is, are you talking about our AT1 or the Russian one?
No, theee-
The RBI.
31. RBI, yeah. Exactly.
RBI is 31. Now, this we will pay as of
Will be paid.
As of today, this is what I can say is we will pay. Yes.
Okay. Thank you very much.
Thank you. We'll take our next question from Mehmet Sevim with JP Morgan.
Good evening. Thanks very much indeed for the opportunity. I have just a couple of questions, please. First of all, has the way you look at your geographic footprint changed fundamentally in the last few weeks? I know you're not walking away, and we know Russia has a strong franchise, and you've been operating in the country for many, many years. When the dust settles, hopefully, you know, will you see a need to look at your geographic footprint and rethink, if necessary, after all, what's happened so far?
Yeah. I think I can state, and you have seen this in the many discussions, that we regularly look at the geographic footprint and that we are ready to adjust. In this specific situation, of course, it really needs that the dust settles. Of course, we always have to understand do we have a reasonable role in a country where we are active in? I think what you can see so far, I could say also we are comparatively small bank to the larger Russian ones. I think we still had a reasonable position, and we had a good service to offer. Only when the dust settles, one can say, is this still the case or has it or will it change dramatically?
I think it's too early here, but it's not specific. Of course, what we will see is we don't know 'cause the dust, as you rightfully said, the dust is still there and one does not know where the sanctions will lead to and what it would in the mid to long term mean for a bank like ours. I mean, the starting point in this difficult time is a good one, I would say. We'll see, but too early to say. Yeah.
Yeah. Absolutely. That's very helpful. Thanks very much. Maybe related to this, do you think the role that you're playing in Russia as a Western financial institution can change? You know, I understand the position of RBI, but essentially, would you play a different role in a year's time or so as a Western financial institution in Russia, and what role could that be?
Yeah. If you look at the numbers what we have, then we can say it's primarily a bank that services a huge number of private individuals. We are moving into the corporate mid-sized business, and we have with large corps a relatively small exposure, which is not a surprise for you as we are small compared to the size of these companies. I think it's very difficult to say in this environment what the role of a foreign bank in the future can be. Basically, as I say, this is. I don't think that. Hannes have mentioned it.
If we talk about the currently sanctioned exposure, this is not our business, what we are in. This is important to say. When we talk about private banking, one should not think about the deep pockets. These are usually in the big centers. These are wealthy individuals which want to have also another relationship outside with a bank with some Western style whatsoever. I. The big portion of the bank is a local one, and it's. Frankly, I don't know if the country will change significantly and over which period of time.
Okay. That's also very helpful. Thanks very much. One final question, if I may. Have you had any conversations with the local regulator, the Austrian regulator, in the last week or so? If so, is there anything to flag from those conversations?
We had many, and of course, they get an update. We use the same numbers then we present to you. We have. I would say there. It's a different audience, but it's about an update on the situation as we do it today.
Excellent. Thanks very much for all the helpful comments.
Thank you. We'll take our next question from Lee Street with Citigroup London.
Hello. Thanks for doing the call, and thank you very much for taking my questions. I have three, please. As it relates to your RUB 1.4 billion ruble hedge, just given the restrictions on trading rubles and depending on who your counterparty is, can you just give us a comfort that you'll actually be able to crystallize the gain on that hedge? Secondly, you're very clear that you're not walking away from Russia, but if, you know, if you were to take losses or capital requirements to change, would you actually be willing to inject fresh capital into the Russian entity, obviously given those restrictions on getting capital out at the moment? Finally, the EUR 600 million Russia exposure in the head office you referred to.
Can you just confirm that's directly comparable to the EUR 1.6 billion that you disclosed on the second of February, and there's no other exposures within the sort of GCM markets and that business? That would be my three questions. Thank you.
Well, Lee, thanks for the question and giving us the possibility to be even more clear. The hedging is being done with international, well-recognized counterparties and it's on an NDF basis. These are very, very professional ones. We have daily margining, so I would not see any reasons for not crystallizing the profit. Can I have again the question, colleagues, number three? The other one would be the EUR 600 million versus the 1.6. Yes, sir. I
Listening to you also to the many questions which came in, then maybe we misguided you with this EUR 1.6 billion because, yeah, you would have also a lot of committed lines included, which of course we would maybe not allow in these circumstances to be included. You have some other positions. The 1.6 was the exposure default pre-CCF meaning for any credit conversion. You have to include also of course what do we have as a collateral, what is the cash component. For me, the economic exposure is the 600, and I gave you the details how these EUR 600 million are being composed.
For that EUR 600 million is a net number. Is that fair to say? Not the gross.
This is then a net number, because we would then deduct collateral in cash. Yes, indeed.
Okay. Could we get the gross at all, please?
The gross, as I said, would be this 1.6.
Okay.
That's the reason why we have now shared this EUR 600 with you. Please bear also in mind, what is important for me, Lee, when you're looking at the numbers, and I gave you the details, is also what is then being really allocated to Russia. Because, you know, we're taking all of the Russian companies which may act not in Russia. The real direct exposure is, as I said, the EUR 260 million, if we talk about loans and if we talk about contingencies on the corporate of EUR 48 million. As I said, you know, if you have a repo transaction, for instance, which is nicely collateralized, this was included in this EUR 1.6 billion.
Okay. Then finally, on the willingness to inject fresh capital into Russia, if that was to become an eventuality.
Yeah. Look, Hannes and I have tried to explain that we don't have any scenario where this should occur, you know. When we think about what they are earning and how the development is and what the worst case of risk cost is. Talking about something which is out of any scenario, I don't know how I would discuss. Thank you.
Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. That's great. That's really helpful. Thank you.
Thank you. We'll take our next question from Riccardo Rovere with Mediobanca.
Thanks for taking my question. The first one is probably for Hannes, and I get back to what I asked right at, you know, when you released the numbers. I was a bit cut off when you were explaining what in your view is the worst case scenario. I will kindly ask you to go again through all the numbers and calculations that you made, let's say 30 minutes ago, right at the beginning of the Q&A session of this call. The second question I have is, we maybe eventually can understand a little bit the impact of sanctions on corporations, as on Russian corporations. It's a bit more complicated to understand the impact of sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Russia.
Would you be in the position to explain how if that has any impact on you or in general on banks dealing with the Russian Central Bank? Any your opinion here would be really appreciated. Any color you could share with us. Thank you.
Riccardo, thank you for the question. My way of thinking when thinking about this worst case, and I was using the multiples of expected loss, and I will do it very slowly because this is very important to me. If I would start with page 3 of our presentation, which we have shared today with you can see that we have provided loans to customer in the total amount of EUR 11.6 billion. Over the last years, you have seen that we have risk costs somewhere around EUR 100 million. For the sake of easiness, let me make it an expected loss of EUR 150 million, okay?
What we have seen is, or what we believe, given our very strong portfolio and the very low exposure towards the directly sanctioned counterparts, is that we could see a multiple of these expected loss times three. This would be for me in Russia, the worst-case scenario. Just to do the math and finish the math, what Johann was indicating, you know that we have our country in Russian business model, which can earn EUR 400 million or EUR 500 million. That's the reason why we are confident and why we are sharing our thinking here on this, that this scenario have to be so harsh that you would bite into the P&L.
The second one, if we would now move on in thinking about Ukraine, and, you know, I know that this is the call with the financial community, but please bear in mind also the big issues, the emotional issues, what they have currently locally. Also here we can do the same story. We have a portfolio of EUR 2.2 billion. We have currently somewhere an expected loss of EUR 22 -EUR 30 million. What we have seen out of 2014 is that, but 2014, as I said, is maybe a bad guidance because there we had still a lot of foreign currency loans.
What we can see is that you then have to use a multiple of 5-7 towards this expected loss if you come into the same situation as we see it now in Ukraine. This would lead us somewhere around EUR 150-210 million on the risk cost side. This is what is currently our thinking. As we also were sharing, and this is important, is that we had this capital hedge in place, which I have explained just previously, this EUR 1.4 billion. We also have allocated, Riccardo, and you are closely following our organization. We have added these risk provisions already in the 2021 numbers ending. There are some mitigation things also in place.
This would be my talking you through this worst-case scenario. Of course, you know, you can always employ even more demanding stylized scenarios, but this would be the best what we can share with you at this point of time. Johann.
Yeah, when talking about sanctions on CBR, I think the impact is mainly what you see on the market. We as RBI or other entities, of course, we never were in the league to deal directly with CBR. I think the impact what you see is the impact on the market. Intervention or not intervention, we have seen the key rate, we have seen the measures they have taken. I think I cannot add so much on this because within Russia, it's, I mean, like in any other country, the central bank adjusts itself, and this is happening.
What I sense is that the FX trading is not as liquid as it has been in the past. Probably the liquidity is rather provided from the exports which are coming in still strongly and this is the source for it. Of course, the measures what the Russians have taken on foreign investors this of course in these days limits the demand for foreign currency in Russia.
Right. Okay. Thank you. Thanks for that. There's anybody else or any one of us, I think. Just to get back, if I may, one second to Hannes. What you have just described to me is RBI continuing to operate in Russia. I perfectly understand you don't see the scenario in which RBI walks away from Russia. If that had to happen, just for the sake of imagining it, the maximum, what would happen is you lose all the equity, the EUR 2.4 billion in equity plus AT1s and so on, but you would also give away all the risk-weighted assets, all the liabilities too. Do I understand it correctly that, you know, your risk-weighted assets would fall by roughly EUR 12 billion or so? Is that correct to say?
Riccardo, let's make it simple. If we walk away, then like always, when you walk away, you leave a bank behind, 'cause this is what we say when we walk away. Then the question is, will we get anything for a very good bank which we leave behind? Is it that you assume you get EUR 1? Is it assumed that you get much more and then you deduct whatever you assume what one would get from EUR 2.4 billion, no? 'Cause usually if you talk to someone who is interested in your bank, then you talk of course about the equity, the AT1 and all these things. Yeah, if-
Yeah.
Whatever you have between EUR 1 and EUR 2.4, the difference is the loss.
Right. Okay. The EUR 1.4 billion hedging, would it have any impact in all of that?
The hedge is, as Hannes explained, the hedge is in the head office, 'cause of course, there is no need for the Russian colleagues to hedge their own equity. It's here. Independent of what happens to the bank, the transactions are there. Of course, there might be a time when we don't need the hedges anymore. But this is, I do not want to get too plain. Yeah, the hedges are here in Vienna.
Just so sorry to insist.
as Hannes said, with international counterparts.
Right. The impact for RBI in Vienna on the capital would be. Let's assume you walk away for zero, okay? Just for the sake of putting some, maybe stupid, but some numbers. You lose the 2.4%, but you have a hedge in place. The hedge would, let's say, balance, but an offset, but smoothen the impact. Do I get it right? In Vienna.
Yes. You are right.
Okay.
The-
Okay.
The hedge as it's then not anymore needed as a hedge, you dissolve it and wherever the ruble, euro then is or dollar is, this is then a smoother. Yes, indeed.
Right. Okay. The gain that I imagine as one of my previous colleagues mentioned, the gain you probably are carrying on this hedge would smoothen the impact on the EUR 2.4 billion on the equity side.
Yes.
Okay. Sorry about that. Thanks.
Don't worry. Transparency and being clear is a high value.
Thank you. We'll now take our next question from Andrea Marcellone with BNP Exane.
Good evening. 2 questions. The first one is on the cross-border exposure. Can I ask you to put back up the slide again? Because I couldn't take it down, and we actually don't have it. It's not in PDF, it's just on the web. But my specific question is the difference between EUR 1.6 that you gave us earlier in the month and the EUR 600 million you're talking about all collateral? If it is all collateral, is the collateral sitting outside of Russia? The second question is on the increase in interest rates in Russia to 20%. Of course, there will be some impact on provisions due to affordability, not the main driver, probably.
Are there any implications, positive or negative, for your revenues? Whether it's NII or trading losses, if you can comment on that as well.
Andrea, I will take the first question on the EUR 1.6 billion. Yes, indeed, you are right. There was a rather big repo transaction done with Western counterparts, so with counterparts being domiciled not in Russia, but of course, having maybe some shareholders in Russia. The collateral which we accept is also having no Russian collateral. This is one of the biggest differences between the 1.6 I was sharing with you and the 600.
If you had to.
Okay.
The collateral. The collateral is not sitting in Russia, so you can get your hands on it.
No, not at all. The collateral would sit with an international custodian. It would not.
Okay.
Being in Russia, so you cannot walk away from the collateral. When addressing your other question, what is the impact from this rate hike. One might say overall, as you rightfully said, it might be, of course, for some customers, painful. I mean, here we have to be aware that different to other countries, private individuals have fixed-rate loans. For them, at least till the maturity they are where they are, and it does not add to their pain. This is, I mean, the corporates usually are probably, one might say, depending on what they are doing. For those exporters, however painful the FX rate is overall.
I mean, for some, it might a little bit reduce the shock. In terms of balance sheet structure, so therefore one might say not so much in terms of bonds. As Hannes said before, around 80% is hold to collect. Here that's not a valuation impact now. If you talk about others, then it's about EUR 10-15 million loss, what you would expect from this position.
Thank you.
Thank you. We'll take our next question from Jack Janicki with Morgan Stanley.
Hello, good afternoon. I have two questions. The first one is again on your AT-1s that are outstanding. Of course, you stated you're not paying an equity dividend and that's your decision. Do you envisage any scenario where you might decide not to pay an AT-1 coupon? By this would be management discretion or in fact the supervisor requesting that the AT-1 coupon is not paid. I have a second question after that.
Yeah. I think it's clear it's the management discretion, but I don't have any scenario, and I have many on the table, as Hannes described, where we currently have it in the plan not to pay the coupon.
Right. You have no scenarios on the table where you don't pay a coupon? Sorry, was that what you just said?
Right. That's what I said.
Okay, great. Just as a follow-up on the AT1s. You have an AT1 that's callable. First call date in December of this year. Do you have any thoughts on the likelihood of call of that AT1?
No, I mean, it's the old tradition that we only talk about it when we have made the decision. Sorry for that.
Okay. Understood. No problem. The second question, it was really coming back to the kind of long-term strategy in Russia. You know, I appreciate that recent events, of course, were not anticipated when, you know, most recently contemplating the bank strategy. Purely from an ESG perspective and investors' focus on that, what are your thoughts about maintaining a presence in Russia longer term? I appreciate it's a good, clean, profitable bank, but just purely from the ESG angle here. Thank you.
Yeah. Look, I think that the way we presented the bank, but thank you for the question. This gives me another opportunity. It follows our strict rules within the group. The customers which we serve is fully compliant with our S&T requirements. The E of course is something what we will develop over time, as of course the energy is an important part in the country, and we are in the process of adjusting it, so this might change our portfolio. I mean, as I said, if we find
If we are challenged in some areas, what I can't see then we would have to adjust the pace. I think, please forgive me that at this point in time it's I can't look forward what the future situation will be. I mean, currently we serve 4 million customers, which are Russian customers.
Okay. It's something that you-
Very, very basic people
Yeah, I guess.
Like always. This is what I want to confirm.
Yeah.
We run through all the countries, and we see the developments in all the countries. If the situation is difficult in the country for maybe also reasons that you have in mind, then we-
Mm.
We restrict our business there. We avoid areas which would be in conflict with this. Of course, now there is this big political thing. If you look at the. This has to be
evaluated what consequences this will have, of course. Here, please, be patient. This will come at every now and then, of course, as we do. If I look at the portfolio as we had it before this problem started, I can say this is a clean portfolio, and we applied all the requirements what we have throughout the group, and which are applicable in all the countries, everywhere. Here, I would say the starting point is a clean one. If now for whatever reason there are substantial changes, then we will adjust, and we will adhere to our principles.
Okay. Understood. I guess if investors decide for themselves about investing in RBI, considering the circumstances, then you would listen to that and potentially take action if you felt you needed to.
Thank you for sharing your thoughts on it. No, I don't think that you expect that I comment on that, but we are aware of what's going on around the world, and what people are thinking. I mean, one statement should be allowed. We are not an investor who goes in and out in a listed company with a very liquid stock. Whatever expectations one have, this should be always considered. We have strict ESG principles.
Okay. Thank you very much.
Thank you. Our next question comes from Diego Silva with P Squared.
Hi. Thanks so much for taking my questions. I think a lot of them have already been covered by other people. One thing I wanted to ask you. I think you said you were gonna look it up, was on the EUR 1.6 billion. Could you please break it down between. My understanding is that there are three components there. There are the gross loans that you've given. There are the loans that are lines but aren't drawn, and then there are the repos. Would you be able to break it down, the EUR 1.6 billion, between what's repo, what's uncommitted loans, and what are drawn loans?
Well, let's see if in this swift manner I can serve what you are asking for. The 1.6, we're including some EUR 700 million-EUR 800 million of repos. Okay?
Okay.
I have to work on now with the EUR 800 million. What I was sharing with you is, you know, that the loans to customers would be some EUR 500 million. I was splitting up this EUR 500 million in country, which is EUR 216 million, and which is, you know, to counterparties which are linked to Russia but having not the residence of risk to Russia, which is EUR 299 million. Eight hundred in total, five hundred then on the corporate side, and I was splitting up the EUR 500 million for you, how much is in the country and how much is out of the country. We have the contingencies.
We have contingencies of EUR 240 million on the corporate side. This is very, very low cross-border, which would be EUR 48 million, and the remaining part would be towards counterparts which are related to Russia, but the transaction does not go directly to Russia. This is EUR 193 million. All these numbers, please bear in mind, are numbers by the end of the year. Of course, we do continuous transactions, or we have done continuous transactions with them, meaning is it trade finance, is it any other thing? Now you could think, well, the risk officer is not capable to do the calculation because now we have 500 plus the 240, and we would need to explain also the 60s I was mentioning to you.
Here numbers do of course fit, because as I was sharing with you on the financial institution side, by the end of the year, it was EUR 34 million to Russian institutions from Vienna to Russia and to counterparts which are not being located in Russia, but related to Russia, EUR 32 million. This is very detailed how our total cross-border exposure is looking like. Hopefully this helps. There are no further details, sir.
Makes a lot of sense, and I got it. I'm assuming this includes, so for example, if you have exposure to one of the Russian banks' operations in Europe, but to the European operation that would be included in these numbers, correct?
Yes, indeed. This would be included in these numbers.
Perfect. My other question is related to the amounts that you've mentioned in loans to sanctioned entities. Am I correct in assuming that those amounts are all included in these corporates? I mean, are actually those amounts in the corporate or are those amounts in Russia, in the Russian exposure of the Russian bank?
These are the exposures in total when looking at, I'm referring to page 3 of our presentation. This 1% is referring to this EUR 22.9 billion. As you know, there have been FIs being sanctioned and corporates, and our exposure totally to the FIs is anyway very limited. This is how this 1% of sanctioned exposure would be calculated.
Understood. Thank you. The last question I wanted to ask you is in regard to your exposures to Belarus and to Ukraine, do you have a similar offset in the shape of a currency hedge?
Only very limited because as you know the exposure, the currency pairs on the RUB and EUR are not so liquid. That was also one of the considerations why we have used the EUR more extensively.
Perfect. Actually, sorry. I have actually one more. My last question is just in terms of other, all the exposures that you have to Russian government bonds, Russian corporate bonds or Russian equity, so any capital markets exposure, is that all included inside of the Russian bank or is there any element of this at the corporate as well?
I have to tell you, I think what my colleagues are now writing to me is that there is only very minor exposure out of Vienna to the sanctions. The majority part of the exposure I was sharing with you comes from our local entity. As I said, you know, if you look at the relation, 1% of the total exposure after this huge sanctions bill which was issued over the last couple of days is also demonstrating how selectively we have been in our portfolio composition.
Thank you. Sorry. Could you just answer the question in terms of the capital markets exposure? Is all your exposure to corporate bonds, government bonds and equities of Russian companies all in the Russian entity or do you have some capital markets exposure as well to the corporate?
It's as I said, it is very minor out of Vienna and everything else is locally. It could come from capital markets, but it could also come from a classically, banking business, meaning loan business.
Thank you. We'll take our next question from Bill Holmes with ANZ Bank.
Hi, thank you. Noting that your Russian subsidiary is one of your larger banks and on RBI's parent-only statements, your investments in subsidiaries are larger than your capital base, so you have double leverage. What would be the effect on RBI on an unconsolidated basis, in a suspended or significantly reduced dividend situation from your Russian subsidiary?
I mean this, what you say is, what is the impact now in, with the dividend ban or what would be necessary in a negative development in the country that the Russian bank is going a loss or so? I'm not sure if I
So
No.
If I look at your parent-only financial statements, the income that you get from your dividends, well, your investments in subsidiaries on the assets of the parent only are greater than your equity, so you have double leverage. In effect, part of what pays your debt is the income stream from dividends. If the income from dividends from your Russian bank were to be cut or suspended, what effect would that have on the parent only's ability to pay its dividends or to pay its interest?
Of course. We can pay the interest without the Russian dividends. I mean, there is a significant business here as well, of course, yeah.
Okay. It's just, yeah, it's just that the fact when you've got. There is a double leverage effect, and this is your largest subsidiary. Okay. That was my question. Thank you.
Thank you. We'll take our next question from Kai Oberhausen with JP Morgan.
Yeah, thanks for taking my question. I just wanted to follow up on Mehmet's question. Your decision to suspend the dividend for now and potentially pay later. Can you just run through the process of that decision? Has that decision been influenced by a local or ECB regulator? In what context has this decision been made? Is there thinking about a buffer requirement for you to pay that? We clearly know your minimum Tier 1 target. We know your MDA. Can you just put this a little bit more in context of your capital positioning as well as the process of the decision? Thank you.
Yeah. Thank you. First, there was no influence from ECB on that decision. Second, there is no concern, the buffer requirement or whatsoever. Third, what we said is in these days we have scenarios, of course, and there could be that we drop at this point in time below the 13%. As the situation is unclear and not wanting to drop below the 13% without having used the potential dividend. That's the idea. We assume that throughout the next couple of months, I hope, the situation gets clear again.
That's what we hope, 'cause this would mean then hopefully ending the fighting and the decision-making then would be that you're aware it needs the shareholder meeting to decide on it. Anyhow, it's just a proposal what we're now making to the shareholder meeting on the thirty-first of March. If this is accepted as we propose, and if everything goes fine as we hope, then, assuming that we have a good idea of where we are, then in Q3 we could call an extraordinary shareholder meeting with just this one agenda point where we explain why we then believe that the CET1 ratio is fine, and then we could pay out this 1.15.
If we need to adjust it, then we could also adjust it.
You're clearly thinking 13% as a hard number rather than MDA plus a buffer, which a lot of people talk about 250, which gets you roughly to 13% anyways. May I just ask how you're thinking long-term about this number?
Look, it's not a hard number, but it's a very strong guidance. Hard number would mean that by all means, we would not accept a drop in one quarter below the 13%. That's not the case. If for whatever reason we drop one or maybe two consecutive quarters below this 13%, that would be acceptable. This is not something what we would need, what we want to have over a longer period of time.
Thank you. We'll take our next question from Tobias Lukesch with Kepler Cheuvreux.
Yes, thank you for taking also my question. I would like to come back to the Forex hedge again, please. Could you give a bit more detail maybe on what the variation margins are? Are these daily? And also on the CCP, basically, you're using a I think you already mentioned that it's a kind of international and safe, but maybe you just could name, you know, where this collateral is basically posted. Secondly, you mentioned on the alternatives to Swift, basically, could you maybe again touch a bit on the business setup that is now, well, RBI Russia is now faced with. I'm still struggling a bit to really understand what it means for intergroup business at the end of the day.
Lastly, is there also a possibility to be working with CIPS banks in a way? How do we have to look at this maybe from a kind of a Russian perspective? Lastly, on Ukraine, I mean, less looking at Russia and Belarus, but looking at the Ukraine and with people crossing borders, basically. I think there's very low visibility with regards to the loans, the assets you have there, what potential loss ratios are. Potentially everything is possible, as you mentioned in scenarios. I was just wondering, I mean, if it wouldn't be very prudent to take very, very high loss assumptions here. I think we know from history that in war times, banks were close to being closed down, basically.
I was just wondering if it's not a reason for you to say we have to implement a huge general provision for the Ukrainian business. Thank you.
Well, Tobias, if I may start with the question one, and then I would follow up with the question three. So yes, sir, these are international investment banks where we have a Credit Support Annex, and we do have a daily margining, and the margin calls are with us. So this is the short story, what you would expect from a professional international bank participating on an ISDA basis with CSA. The third question regarding Ukraine. Yes, you're right or you might be right. I don't know. This is a tectonic move, what we have seen and nobody have thought about in the beginning of February. What we have done is we looked in the history and looking what is a reasonable multiple when talking about multiples towards the expected loss.
I was sharing here my way of thinking with you that, of course, depending on the collateral damage, depending on the length of the war, depending on what are the next steps. You see that I have a lot of conditions. Of course, those regions which are now heavily impacted and where you would see a high damage indeed, you could see a higher multiple than I was sharing with you. Please bear also in mind, you know, that we have the western part of Ukraine. I think the best what we can do at this period of time is to deploy this multiple of 5-7 times. If it's then 8 or 9 times, I don't know.
This is where our current way of thinking would go with this 5-7 times as a multiple from the risk cost. This is not yet the Q1 call, but of course, rest assured, you know, that as you know, RBI Group, we always have thought and opened up our mind in sharing them with the market and with the community how we come to certain provisions. We also need to see how things do evolve, and not making any stupid decisions. This would be my way of thinking. I was sharing this 5-7 times with you.
We have to see which region, which collateral, what is the length of the situation and which part of the portfolio then is more impacted, the retail and/or the corporate, in the end. As I said, my way of thinking currently would be a multiple of 5-7 times on the expected loss.
If I have to take your question on what is the impact on SWIFT suspension of Russian banks, I think for an outsider, it's really difficult. When talking to with experts, then one can say that that's really. That it's really difficult and one has also to look at the wording of the restrictions, what other options are possible. The Russian banks in Russia, and I think this is what we have to keep in mind. Russia has built a system which, to my knowledge, is working. Within Russia there is something available. Internationally it's more difficult, but Hannes can add more flavor to that.
Well, Tobias, I would again come back on the Ukrainian story again. You know there's one more additional thought which is important. We can currently experience that there is a huge support from the international community towards Ukraine. Of course, you also could think and potentially assume that if this ugly situation stops, that there would also be still big support by the IMF, by the Europeans and by many other institutions. If this support is then also being delivered, loss rates may come in even smaller. I think this is one important thought when thinking about the current situation. As I said, you know, ranges are broad and of course you're right, but at the same time we see currently a huge willingness internationally to support also Ukraine.
Thank you.
Thank-
Thank you. We'll take our final question from Hugo Cruz with KBW.
Thank you very much. Two questions. When you talk about the EUR 1.4 billion hedge, that EUR 1.4 billion, what does that mean exactly? Is that, the value of the capital when it was hedged in Q4? Is it the value today, what you will receive today from your counterparty if you were to close the hedge? That for me would be very important if you could clarify that. Less important, what's the amount of equity that you have in your, Belarus business? You know, like you gave a number for Russia and Ukraine, if you could give that for Belarus as well. Thank you.
The 1.4 billion euros of hedge volume in notional, you know, those who have followed closely to us know that we always had a certain hedging volume in place and rolling over. We have increased this hedging volume substantially already in Q4 and even more so when it comes to the first days in January. So if you would like to look up the cross rate, what is the stepping in cross rate, it's well below what you can see as of today. So the average would be somewhere around between Q3, Q4 cross rates and what we have seen in the first couple of weeks when it comes to in January, then this 1.4 billion euros have been established.
Equity in Belarus is EUR 383 million. We have some minorities locally.
That equity, how much is the minorities as a percentage?
12%.
I'm sorry. I feel perhaps I'm a bit slow. With the hedge, you know, the EUR 1.4 billion. Okay, that's a notional. Arguably you got into that contract in January. In reality, I should look at how much the euro moved against the ruble and apply that, you know, that move on EUR 1.4 billion notional. That would be roughly the amount of cash you would receive from your counterparty. Is that how I should think about it?
Well, that's the way you would normally use it, but since it's being done on a forward basis, you could also include the interest rate moves. You would take not the spot price only, you would also take the forward pricing included it because you have the FX component and the interest rate component, and it's done on FX forward basis.
Okay, clear. Thank you.
Dear colleagues, it was a very big interest today. Thank you for the many questions what you have and your interest in the bank and I assume we hear you soon in another call. Till then, I wish you all the best. Stay healthy. Have a good evening. Thank you.
Goodbye.
We will now conclude today's conference call. Thank you for your participation, and you may now disconnect.