Thank you, everybody, for joining us. 45th TD Healthcare Conference. My name is Ryan Langston. I'm the Senior Analyst covering healthcare facilities managed care. Very happy to have Brandon Sim. He's the President and Chief Executive Officer of Astrana Health. Very quickly, Astrana Health is a leading physician-centric, technology-driven, risk-bearing healthcare entity. Astrana operates an integrated health delivery platform, enables providers to participate in value-based care arrangements, over one million value-based care lives. Brandon, thanks for being here.
Of course. Thanks for having me.
Awesome. Easy place to start. Obviously, just reported last week. Maybe kind of remind us a couple of the key points to get you to that $170 million-$190 million EBITDA range for 2025 and maybe any other building blocks to the guidance. That'd be helpful.
Yeah, sure. As a reminder, we put up just over $2 billion of revenue for 2024, as well as around 17% growth on the EBITDA line to around $170, just over $170 million. The guide for 2025 was $2.5-$2.7 billion of revenue. As you mentioned, the $170-$190 on the bottom line. There are a couple of different building blocks in the review. $170-$190 is a conservative initial guide, given some of the macro and policy uncertainty that exists around Medicaid today, as well as our upcoming planned acquisition and close of Prospect Health. The $170-$190 does not contemplate any contribution from Prospect. That is entirely core business alone. It does contemplate around $15 million worth of investments, G&A investments, and investments in integration that we are incurring as a result of Prospect.
All the cost has been absorbed and expensed. None of the benefit for the Prospect deal. As a reminder, the Prospect deal is expected to bring in around $1.2 billion of revenue and around $81 million of adjusted EBITDA. That is backed up by some of the audited financials that we recently received around the Prospect Health business. Some of the key--I'm sorry.
No, go ahead.
Yeah, I was just going to get to some of the key kind of levers and drivers for upside relative to the $180 midpoint. Again, the $180 includes—and we published a new presentation on our website this morning with a bridge between $170 and $180—but includes around $7 million of net MLR impact due to rate acuity mismatch. This is primarily driven by Medicaid, rather. It also includes, as I mentioned earlier, the incremental integration investments and investments in operational efficiencies, which should pay off in 2026 to the tune of around $10 million of G&A efficiencies. Upside levers include any kind of resolution on Medicaid, renegotiation of rates, quicker movement to full risk on both Medicaid and Medicare Advantage. Of note, our Medicare Advantage trend has been quite stable. Last year was in the low single digits in the 4% range.
This year we are anticipating the same, and Medicare reimbursement is actually improving to around 4%. That is actually business that is now stabilized from an MLR perspective, and we expect that to continue to grow in profitability given the favorable 2026 initial MA rate notice. There are a couple of tailwinds that could exist in terms of contract renegotiations, faster move to risk, and anything obviously that has to do with Prospect closing ahead of time or synergies being realized earlier than expected would be upside to that number as well.
I think a portion of that, which we'll get into in a second, is CHS, right?
Right.
Okay.
Right. There is around $8 million in the bridge of new market improvements that include CHS. That includes our state of Nevada getting to break even anytime now, probably next month. It includes Texas being break even. It includes the remainder of the improvement from CHS as well, getting to break even and slightly profitable this year.
Great. We'll get to 2027 in a second, but maybe kind of we touch on CHS, but maybe walk us through how you think about getting that asset now you've had it for a few months, four or five. How to think about getting that asset to profitability maybe in 2026 or beyond?
Yeah. We actually anticipate CHS to hit profitability this year. It's quite a scaled presence across nine or ten states. It's here up in the Northeast in Connecticut. They've got a bit in New York and New Jersey. There's a presence down in the Southeast in Georgia, where we recently signed a new client in PHL, Provider Health Link. They've got members in Texas as well as in New Mexico. It's quite a large presence. We split that into North and South, and the effort this year is really around increasing density in each of those markets. Making the investments necessary to get to the 10,000 Medicare Advantage equivalent mark, which is around $100 million of underwritten premiums in each market, so that we have the scale necessary to justify the operational investment necessary.
As a reminder, the $100 million we typically guide to for a new market is assuming around a 10% gross margin blended across all lines of business. That covers the approximately $10 million in gross profit needed to offset the operational investments made in standing up the new market.
On that asset, is there sort of a just longer term, maybe a terminal margin you think that business has? Is it sort of lower, same as consolidated pre-CHS? Just maybe some thoughts on sort of long term, what that business could look like eventually.
Yeah. We anticipate that business to be at scale at the 3%-5% EBITDA margin range, inclusive of all costs and shared savings generated back to the providers. It's a slightly lower margin than the whole co because of the large MSSP and ACO REACH books of business, but it does have Medicare Advantage, commercial, and Medicaid contracts as well that we're working to expand. We think 3%-5% is a reasonable range. We're guiding to around $350 million-$400 million of revenue for 2025. Obviously, not generating 3%-5% yet, but we do think our previous guidance was that at least $10 million would be generated by 2027, and we think that number is probably on the conservative end.
You also obviously entered some new markets, not just with CHS. You've had some smaller, I'll call them smaller acquisitions in 2024. Maybe just kind of give us an update there how those sort of books of business are running at this point.
Sure. Yeah. We spent around $10 million entering a few new markets, doing a couple of partnerships with different entities. We entered Arizona, for example, in partnership with an Anchor Physician Group in Phoenix. We entered Hawaii with a partnership with an Anchor Physician Group there. We started building clinics in partnership with Anthem Blue Cross, which is the Elevance subsidiary in California, where we have co-branded clinics that say Astrana and Elevance or Anthem Blue Cross on them. We are working together to grow membership, primarily in the commercial and exchange membership for Anthem. We also entered into a partnership with an EHR company named Elation to provide a full set of services to our physicians to enable their independence. It is often very costly for doctors to pay for an Epic or even an Athena or a Cerner on their own.
It can run thousands of dollars a month. We entered an agreement where we're purchasing discounted licenses, giving them to providers that are key to our network for little to no cost or little to no profit that is supporting them in the technology integrations and ensuring that they have all the quality care gaps and the risk adjustment items in the EHR directly for use and that we can get the charge so that we can submit everything on their behalf to the payers and to CMS. All those, as I mentioned, represented around a $10 million drag to 2024 EBITDA. Those are now going forward embedded into the market P&L, so you won't see that drag going forward. It'll just be part of the profitability of the market. We are seeing solid progress on profitability in those markets too.
It is really Texas and Nevada, which have been around for, in Nevada's case, just over two years. In Texas's case, maybe a year and a half that we're really getting to profitability this year.
You know, 2025 guidance is a little bit lower than maybe I think us or the street kind of thought, but you did reiterate your 2027 EBITDA target. I think it's $350 million plus. That would be inclusive of Prospect, obviously, closing. Between, let's just say, midpoint of 2025, assuming that's where you land, what's the bridge from 2025 to 2027, and why are you so confident still at this point that we can hit that target?
Right, right. We actually just published that bridge in detail on our investor website. There's a slide kind of bridging from 2024 to 2025, as well as 2025 to 2027. In short, and I'm going to round the numbers here, around $100 million of that is Prospect plus anticipated synergies. Synergies are pretty light that we've assumed to get to the $350. Again, we think the $350 is a conservative guide. It's an at-least guide. We have around $12 million of synergies baked into the Prospect 2027 number, as well as around a 7% CAGR in EBITDA from 2025 to 2027 in that Prospect number. That's around $100 million of it going from $180 million to $350 million. The remaining $70 million is a combination of G&A efficiencies, core business membership growth, movement to risk, and around $20 million in there of improvement in new markets.
That would be improvement in Nevada, Texas, Hawaii, Arizona, Georgia, and then some of the other Northeast states from CHS.
On that, you know, some folks I think have just looked at the maybe execution risk with you have your legacy business, then you took on CHS and sort of, I'll say, fairly quickly after that, taking on Prospect. Let's assume it closes. You know, the size of that deal kind of caught some folks by surprise. It has a hospital in it. I think you've laid out the industrial logic very soundly. What's the latest sort of internally, if you would, on sort of further M&A? Are we sort of done maybe with big deals now at this point and you got two sort of large groups to integrate? How do we think about the future of sort of M&A for Astrana over the next maybe one to two years?
Sure. I think in the next 12 months, you're not going to see anything large. I would say nothing over $50 million-$100 million. Certainly not $100 million, probably not even $50 million. Most likely will be nothing. We're very focused on integrating what we have, but again, we also have a high degree of confidence in integrating that asset. It's an asset that we know really well. We've known them for decades. We know the management team well. CEO is a former Humana CEO of California. He's going to be coming over with us. We know the management team well. We know the employees well. It's funny, if you look on LinkedIn, there are really only three or maybe four large entities in Southern California that are in the space. There's us, there's Optum, there's Prospect, and there's Heritage, another private company.
There are really only four places to work if you're in the delegated managed care environment on the provider side. You'll see a bunch of people, former employees of ours that are at Prospect. You'll see a bunch of former Prospect employees that are with us. Their Chief Accounting Officer is with us. Their SVP of Operations is with us. Their Head of Integrations is with us. We have a lot of familiarity with that business, and we have, again, we have a high degree of confidence that we can integrate it. Of course, the proof will be in the pudding as we close the deal and put up the numbers, but we've done a lot of diligence and we're confident. That being said, we understand that there have to be a couple of quarters of execution before we have the mandate to grow inorganically again.
We're going to put on the brakes, but focus on execution, but we have a high degree of confidence in that execution.
I think you said for Prospect, you have the audited financials now. If I remember right, it was $93 million or $94 million of adjusted EBITDA. You target $81 million, give or take, once you close the deal. Maybe help us sort of understand the deltas between those two. Of course, cost trend gets and rates and all of that, but just maybe sort of the bridge between that delta.
Sure. Yeah. We have received audited financials from BDO, which is their auditor, for just the assets inside the transaction perimeter. I want to make it very clear that the audited financials are for the things that we're actually buying, which I think was in doubt in terms of the parent entity declaring Chapter 11. The things that we are buying, the medical groups, the risk-bearing entities, and the one hospital, which we would own free and clear, separate of any reason, there's no CLD spec transaction on that hospital, are generating, according to the auditors, around $94 million in the calendar year of 2024. That's on around $1.2 billion, just over $1.2 billion of revenue for that time period.
We guided at the time of close, and we're guiding again, that 81 is a more appropriate number, just given our analysis of the adjustments that were made in that 94 number, things that maybe we wouldn't have allowed as we report and because of certain cost trend items around Medicaid primarily. We think 81 is still a good base upon which to go off of. They've got about a quarter of their business in Medicaid, which is similar to us. On a net basis, we think kind of 81 is a more appropriate number that can grow in the high single digits and that we can extract at least $12 million of synergy from.
One thing I think that piqued my interest when you announced this was the Acute Care Hospital, right? Sort of an interesting Kaiser-esque, if you will, sort of combination of assets. How do you think about running an acute care hospital? It's not something you've historically done. I think the management team comes over, but some would just say, why do you need the hospital? What's the industrial logic and what gives you the sort of sense that you can actually run that business effectively, just not really having much of a history with it?
Right, right. I'll start by saying a few things. The first is that according to public financials, which are filed with the state of California, given the nature of the hospital, it's doing less than $100 million of revenue every year. Around 40% of its admits are Prospect members, and around 70% of the Prospect members live within a 30-mi radius of the hospital. The idea really is that, one, it's not a material part of the business, less than $100 million out of $1.2 billion. EBITDA contributions are on break-even, so not a meaningful contributor at all from an EBITDA perspective.
We really view it as more of a cost sink, so to speak, that allows us to better take care of the members in the ecosystem and prevents them from potentially using or seeking out higher cost of care sites, such as some of the University of California system, which has been acquiring a lot of assets, hospitals specifically in that county, in Orange County, where a lot of the Prospect members are, where Prospect is headquartered. We viewed it not as a profit-making arm of the business, but more, can we get our patients in quicker? Can we have our hospitalists embedded in that hospital? Can we implement the care and quality programs that we want in a way that we can control, given the density of the patients around that hospital?
The management team is coming with the deal. Is that fair?
That's right. Yeah. We're also effectuating a full separation, obviously, of the hospital IT and EHR, EMR systems from the parent co of the hospitals. There's no concern that the ongoing hospital would be interlinked with the Chapter 11 declaring hospital entity in any way.
Okay. You might have just said it, but the fact that they had filed Chapter 11 does not have anything to do with the close or with closing that business?
I would say, if anything, it probably accelerates the close relative to prior events, given that the bankruptcy courts are very economically motivated to accept the $745 million that are coming their way. There are not a lot of the alternative really is to then pick it apart piece by piece and do an auction, find stocking horses for everyone. Is that going to add up to $745 million? Probably not. It's a lot more headache and legal work. Bankruptcy courts are very excited about it. Regulatory bodies in California, I don't want to jinx it, but are very excited about it as well, given that they would much rather a proven entity that has been operating in California for over three decades profitably with a good track record of patient quality and satisfaction own the business rather than the business being torn apart to be sold in an auction.
Regulatory bodies are excited. Payers are excited because they have one entity that they can work with all throughout California. We would now have coverage from San Francisco to Central California in the Agricultural Valley, down to Los Angeles, down all the way to San Diego and the Mexican border. We would have a network that covers almost all of where people live in California. That allows payers to really work with us as a legitimate option against other entities that they may work with today, like an Optum or Heritage, for example.
Sure. Maybe switch gears. On the sort of the regulatory political front, I mean, you guys are obviously in most business lines, MA, ACO REACH, Medicaid, of course, commercial. Just in the sort of the frame, you know, a lot of investor inbounds we get is what's the impact, right? Especially with Medicaid. Obviously, there's a lot of news with Medicaid cuts potentially. Where do you think Astrana sits in that continuum? Because you're in so many lines of business, is it just too difficult to kind of parse it out? Just any general thoughts on kind of the news flow and where you think you sit sort of on a risk arc trajectory?
Yeah. Just to level set, on a pro forma basis between us and Prospect, and it's very similar to just the standalone business as well. Our revenue splits are not really that different. The business is around 60-65% Medicare, around a quarter CAID, and around 10-15% commercial. That's kind of where the revenue comes from today. I think on Medicare, we're, as I mentioned before, kind of incrementally positive on the new administration. Initial rate seems to be positive. We'll see what the final rate comes out with in April. Dr. Oz and the incoming administration have been positive about Medicare Advantage in the past. I would also remember that the ACO REACH program, or the predecessor of it, which was the direct contracting program, was the former Trump era innovation as well from CMS and CMMI.
That came about during Trump's first time in office, including even opportunities to expand the direct contracting entity program to what they called the geographic direct contracting entity program, which would have assigned Medicare fee-for-service members into ACOs at an even broader scale. I think the push for increased risk-bearing to provider groups is still there. I think it thematically fits with the themes of cost-cutting, fraud, waste, and abuse removal that DOJ and other government entities have been talking about. For example, ACOs recently were the ones that detected and caught the catheter fraud events that saved hundreds of millions of dollars for CMS because we were the ones that had noticed anomalous kind of fraud because we're responsible for it.
When provider groups are responsible for the dollars, it turns out they can find fraud in the networks downstream as well, and they notified CMS to save those dollars. Again, I think moving the risk away from the government into private sector, such as ACOs and ourselves, is actually, again, thematically on point with what the new administration wants to do. Medicaid, I think, is a more challenging story given the cuts that the administration wants to find in the budget. It's hard for me to prognosticate. We've talked to folks who are close to people in CMS. I think there's political resistance to cutting Medicaid in a big way, just given where the base of voters sits. I don't see how the numbers quite work out otherwise. I think we're waiting see mode on that.
Notably, we're not expecting any, you'll see in the bridge on our slide deck, we're not expecting any Medicaid relief in 2025 or before 2027. There is nothing baked in that we would get better rates necessarily. If we do, that would be the cherry on top.
On that, you touched on it, but the ACO REACH program, DCE before it, that program does sunset, though, in 2026. Now, BAS obviously isn't in place yet, and we'll see what RFK means for all of that. Just in that frame, I mean, it is, you know, it's a good portion of your revenue as we sit kind of today. How should investors kind of contemplate that? I know you're moving into MSSP. We'll get to that in a second. How do you just sort of think about the ACO REACH program and the fact that in a year and a half, it could sunset?
Right. The prevailing thesis around ACO REACH is that it will be folded into MSSP. There are various tracks in MSSP today. There's that have varying levels of risk, upside, downside. Some of them have very low up, 25% up, zero down, for example. Some have 75% up and down, an enhanced track. There is already a glide path there for varying levels of risk and varying levels of sophistication from the provider groups that are participating in the program. We think it's very natural, and I think the industry thinks it's very natural for there to be just one more branch in that MSSP program that has 100% up down or 95% up down that looks very similar to ACO REACH. Again, the path is already set since enhanced is already at 75%.
That's what most people think will happen, that ACO REACH will just, some version of ACO REACH will be rolled into MSSP, and we'll just continue participating in that. Same thing happened five years ago, three years ago, I suppose, with NextGen ACO being rolled into DCE itself. I think there will always be an option that the government has in terms of allowing provider groups to take risk, especially given the new administration's priorities. We're not that concerned about it. There will always be an opportunity to take risk on the same membership. The worst case would be that they move into MSSP enhanced, and instead of 100% up down, we're having 75% up down, and we try to persuade some of them to join Medicare Advantage.
On MSSP, it's not a segment that you break out specifically by itself. I know you talked about it a little bit on the fourth quarter, but how's that program progressing within your book? I think you did pick up some MSSP lives with CHS. I'm not sure if there's any in Prospect, but how do we think about that program? Because it looks like so far, at least in 2024, it was a fairly successful program for you.
Right. Prospect does not have any MSSP lives. You're right. It's been successful. It's one of a portfolio of risk-bearing mechanisms, right? I don't view MSSP, ACO REACH, Medicare Advantage that differently. At the end of the day, it's a senior, and they can pick any one of those programs to be a part of any given year. In fact, they can switch from MA to ACO REACH in any given year or back or vice versa. It really is more about the contractual and financial implications of the contract. What MSSP allowed us to do was, by applying for a new MSSP, have a slightly different set of reimbursement years upon which the benchmark is calculated, have a slightly different risk profile than ACO REACH, which is 100% up down.
We tried to construct the appropriate network in each so that they would both be profitable.
I'll say, I'll call it pre-CHS, pre-Prospect, but you know, part of the thesis was you have sort of a partial risk book and then a full risk book, and you get comfortable with the partial risk book and then flip them to full on A and B.
Right.
Does Prospect or CHS change that trajectory at all, or does it not, or does it maybe make you accelerate that movement over? Just thinking about how these sort of two large acquisitions might sort of inform your thinking, and I'll call it the legacy business.
Sure. Sure. You know, I think it's been in vogue to talk about moving into risk slower in the past year, let's say, because of the challenges that full risk-bearing organizations have faced. I would note that this is something that we've been talking about for three decades of our existence. As many of you know, we were at 0% full risk, not so much as three, four years ago. We had always been in shared risk, partial risk only arrangements for the vast majority of our history. We started moving those members into full risk contracts where appropriate because we thought that we could improve our unit economics on those members because we are selectively choosing which members that we have a long patient history with to move into those full risk arrangements.
As you've gotten to, last year we said we would have two-thirds of our revenue coming from full risk arrangements. We ended up having just over 70%, and around 35% of those of the membership were in full risk arrangements in that legacy business that you talked about, which, again, is nowhere not even half, just over a third of the members on full risk. I think when people think of us as a full risk business, it's a prudently full risk business where it makes sense. It's not a full risk business across the book, and that's always been what we've said. It's not something flavor of the month that we're taking on now because it's what investors want. It, again, has been the strategy from day one in our 35-year history.
We also were one of the first to, if not the first, to talk about carving out things that we did not have control over in the risk book. Many years ago, we talked about carving out supplemental benefits. We talked about carving out Part D. We thought that was natural for the industry, clearly not, but again, it never made sense to us to take risk on something that we had no control over. I cannot control. No amount of preventive care, no amount of care management, no amount of patient outreach is going to prevent the senior from using their flex card on a greens fee. Like they are going to do it regardless. I do not want to take risk on it.
I made a comment a couple of years ago at a conference, I believe, where I even said we would be happy to take a lower percent of premium if it meant we got to carve out things that we did not have control over. Again, that is now becoming an idea that is in vogue now, but that is how we become and manage to stay profitable literally every year of our existence. I will remind the audience, we have never raised outside capital before. We have had to be profitable, and so we had to figure these things out way before maybe some other folks have caught on. That has always been a feature of the model. To answer your question about whether Prospect or CHS changes that, not really. No. Prospect is in the same process as us in terms of moving members from a partial to a full risk arrangement.
They're actually around similar to us in terms of % of revenue from full risk as well, just over 60%. We're just over 70%, so maybe slightly behind. Once we have them in the fold, I believe that we will continue prudently moving members over to full risk when appropriate. Less than half of their members are in full risk arrangements today.
That's maybe sort of a place to talk about differences in business models. Like obviously, like you said, you've been talking about that for a few years. Some others are maybe starting to kind of follow that lead. Maybe remind us delegated risk model, maybe a couple of minutes left, give us a sense on maybe where you differ from some other folks in terms of your approach to this business.
Yeah. I think the business models have been lumped together in the past, but the nuances are very important. Our business model, I think, is one of the most unique in the industry, primarily because it only in the past existed in California. We're taking that business model and taking it across the country, and it's what we or what is called the delegated financial and administrative model. In most models, there's a benchmark that is set from a financial perspective, $1,000 PMP, whatever the case is. You are in arrears reconciling the amount of claims that you paid related to those patients, whatever part of the risk that you take, whether it's full, partial, whatever you carved out.
You sum up all those dollars, you compare it to the benchmark that you agreed upon in the beginning of the year, and if there's an excess or a shortfall, that's reconciled, that delta is reconciled at the end of the year or at the end of the reporting period, whether that's a quarter, a year, 18 months, whatever the case might be. The classic example of this is MSSP. MSSP has a benchmark 18 months later in Q2 or Q3 of the following year of the performance year. CMS tells you what it is, how you actually performed, and they give you a shared savings payment or you pay them a shared savings or shared deficit depending on your performance. In our model, we act as the payer. We're not reconciling something in arrears.
We're actually every month getting an agreed upon percentage of the premium dollar from our payer partners. We're responsible for creating the network downstream, both primary care, multi-specialty, and hospital networks. We're not piggybacking off of the payer's network. We're credentialing those doctors. We're authorizing prior authorizations for those for claims in the network. We're paying out claims from the dollars that the payers first gave us at the beginning of every month. The working capital dynamic is different, but most importantly, the visibility is different in terms of the visibility into future prior auths as well as future utilization that we have in the model.
We truly act as a payer in that sense, and we act as a single payer because we're aggregating premium dollars from our 20 different payer partners at the beginning of every month, and then we're paying downstream as a single payer to our primary care, specialty, and hospital networks downstream. When we talk about full risk and visibility, we're looking at members that we've been paying claims for for years before we have made the decision to move them into a full risk contract. After moving them to the full risk contract, instead of paying just their outpatient claims, we're now paying both their outpatient and inpatient claims the same way that an MCO would, which gives us visibility into that utilization in a differential manner, I would say, than our peers.
Got it. I think we're just at time, but I'll ask you the same thing I've asked everybody. What are you most proud of at your time at Astrana?
Yeah. I think it's the impact, no question. When I came to the business in 2019, we were serving far fewer members. Revenue was less than $500 million or less than $500 million or just around there. We've grown the number of communities that we're serving. We've grown the number of patients that we're serving. We've grown the amount of responsibility we're taking on those patients, probably three- or four-fold, if not more, in the last six years that have been the business. Our team has grown from 300 individuals to over 2,000 individuals over that time period. It's really the amount of impact we have each and every day on the patients. We've built new centers to serve patients in our hybrid kind of network and owned model.
We've taken care of them through thick and thin, whether it's most recently the fires in Los Angeles or a couple of years ago with the COVID pandemic in LA and in California or nationwide. It's really been a tough time, and we've never wavered from serving those patients and increasing the impact we have. I'm very proud of that. I'm very proud that our model actually aligns us with what the country needs. People are clearly not happy with, whether right or wrong from a reaction standpoint, clearly not happy with the status quo of healthcare insurance in the country.
We're taking actual steps to cut costs from the system, not try to game it with some financial arbitrage, not try to risk adjust something to make some dollars, not try to aggregate a bunch of providers together to negotiate for a higher rate so I can skim a little off the top. Those are fine from a financial perspective, but those are just games. They're not going to fix the true problem that we have, which is that the amount of resources that we have for healthcare is growing at too slow of a pace for the amount of care that Americans need. That's the real problem of healthcare in America, and we're here to actually solve that problem. I'm proud that we are profitable, that we're the most profitable among our peerset while actually solving the problem that we have in America.
Instead of just creating some financial engineering game to scrape a couple of dollars off the top, we're fixing the issue, and we're doing it while being profitable and growing. That's a long-winded answer, but I'm very proud of the actual work.
I think we're a minute over. Thanks, everybody. Brandon, thank you for being here. Appreciate it.
Sure.