Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK.A)

ASM 1996 Part 1

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May 6, 1996

It's just a little early, but I think, everyone's had a chance to take their seats. I must say this is the first time I've seen this program. They told me they'd surprise me and they certainly did. Mark Hamburg, our Chief Financial Officer, who is now known around the office of CB, was in charge of putting all this together. We have I want you to know we have no multimedia. This entire meeting is handled by a regular staff. We have no public relations department or investor relations or multimedia department or anything of the sort. So everybody just pitches in and Mark will forever more be in charge of the pregame ceremonies. We have a very large crowd today. I hope everybody has found a seat either in this main room or in the 3 overflow rooms. I think we can handle around 5,400. And historically, 62% or just about exactly 62% every year of the people who request tickets have come to the meeting, and if that percentage holds true today, we have just filled the rooms and we will have a problem in the future, which we haven't figured out the answer to yet, but we've got another year. The way we'll run the meeting is that we'll get the business out of the way at the start, and we'll talk about the Class B issuance then too. So it'll take a little longer than historically has been the case. And then we'll have Q and A for until about noon. We'll have a short break at noon. There'll be sandwiches outside, which you can buy. And Charlie and I will have a couple of sandwiches up here at the podium, and then we will stay around until about 3 o'clock to answer more questions. And at that time, afternoon, I'm sure everybody in the overflow rooms will be able to find a seat here in the main room, but people have come from great distances to attend this meeting, so we really want to give everyone a chance to get their questions asked, and Charlie and I are delighted to, we'll have to break it up at 3 no matter what, but we'll be delighted to stick around. You can leave any time, obviously. As I've explained in the past, it's much better form to leave while Charlie is talking. But feel free to do that. And then at noon, you'll get a chance to do it en mass. We have buses available to take you to, if you have any money left at all after yesterday to take you to other business establishments of Berkshire locally. So, that will be the plan. I hope everyone does get their questions answered. We've got a system where we break this room into 6 zones and we have a couple of zones in other rooms. And then this afternoon, everybody will be able to be here in the main room. So that is the procedure. I'm sure you recognize Charlie Munger, the Vice Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, who also had not seen that movie before, showed I think Mark was afraid to show it to us, but in any event, we will go on. I thought you might be interested. This is a list of people that came in for tickets and we had, in addition to 99 from Canada and of course the US, we had Australia, the Channel Islands, England, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland. I'm not sure all of those people are with us today, but they did send for tickets and I've met a number that did come in from a distance. So with that introduction, I will call the meeting to order. I'm Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Board of Directors, and I do welcome you to this meeting. I hope everybody has a good time this weekend, and I'd like to introduce the directors in addition to myself and to Charlie. Now, you don't get quite your money's worth this year from our directors. They've collectively, they've lost £100 since last, our last meeting. I think they've been trying to live on the directors' face. We have with us, Howard Buffett. You want to stand? Susan T. Buffet, Malcolm G. Chase the 3rd, and Walter Scott Junior. Along with us today, our partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors mister Ron Burgess and mister Craig Christiansen. They're available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm's audit of the accounts of Berkshire. Mr. Forrest Crutcher is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. He will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors. The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Junior and Mark D. Hamburg. Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing says number to come. Okay, there's another. Oh, yeah. Here's a script on that 1. 1,041,567 Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders as indicated on the cards. That number of shares represents a quorum and we will therefore proceed directly proceed with the meeting. We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that, we will entertain questions that you may have. First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize mister Walter Scott Junior who will place a motion before the meeting. I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with. Do I hear a second? I second the motion. The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say aye. Aye. Opposed? Motion's carried. The Secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting? Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by 1st Class mail to all shareholders of record on March 8, 1996 being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,193,512 shares of Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share intelled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting. Of that number, 1,041,000 567 shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday. Thank you. To shareholders present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the two items of businesses provided for in the proxy statement, he or she may do so. Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person or on those two items, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish 2 ballots to you, 1 for each item. With those persons desiring ballots, please identify themselves so that we may distribute them. First item of business of this meeting is to elect directors. I now recognize mister Walter Scott Junior to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors. I move that Warren E. Buffet, Susan T. Buffet, Howard G. Buffet, Malcolm G. Chase III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Junior be elected as directors. Is there a second? I second the motion. Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? I learned a lot in China. We did, so The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections. Will the proxy holders please also submit to the inspectors of Elections a ballot on the election of directors voting, the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received. Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you are ready, you may give your report. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 1,000,000,000 100 and 67 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes including the votes cast in person at this meeting will be given to the secretary to be placed in the minutes of this meeting. Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. Warren E. Buffet, Susan T. Buffet, Howard G. Buffet, Malcolm G. Chase III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott, Jr. Have been elected as directors. The second item of business of this meeting is to consider the recommendation of the Board of Directors to amend the company's restated certificate of incorporation. The proposed amendment would add a provision to the restated certificate of incorporation authorizing the Board of Directors to issue up to 50,000,000 shares of a new Class B common stock with each Class B share having economic rights equivalent to 1 30th of a share of the current common stock and with 1 200th of the vote and to re designate the company's current common stock as Class A common stock and to make each share of Class A common stock convertible into 30 shares of the new Class B stock the option of the holder. I think before we get into moving that motion, I think this would be a good time to have discussion and take your questions regarding the issuance of the Class B. And I should give you a little background. I think many of you know the background on this, but over the years, we've, we've had probably half a dozen people one time or another propose that, the creation of an all Berkshire investment company or unit trust. In other words, an entity that would hold nothing but Berkshire stock and then would parcel out its own shares in smaller denomination pieces to the public. And we have generally discouraged that because we felt that there was considerable potential for abuse in such an arrangement, and our discouragement has been successful up until last fall when there was 1 or there were 2 proposals that went as far as submission to the SEC for clearance that involved, unit trusts, and these unit trusts would have owned nothing but Berkshire shares and then been sold to, the public in small denominations probably with a minimum investment of around $1,000 or so. And holders of those considerable in the way of costs and some tax consequences that they might have considerable in the way of costs and some tax consequences that they might not anticipate when they came in. And, Charlie and I were worried that a combination of, Berkshire's past record, which cannot be repeated, and high sales commissions and a low denomination and a lot of publicity about Berkshire and myself, which as you've seen this morning, we attempt to discourage. The, that the, A great many people would end up buying these unit trust holdings without any idea really of what they were buying and with unrealistic expectations as to the future and that, that would, in turn, create a considerable demand because these unit trusts would go out and buy Berkshire shares. That would create a considerable demand against a fixed supply, much of which is almost unavailable because people have a low tax basis and are reluctant to sell, and I hope they're reluctant to sell for other reasons. And that the very action of the creation of these and that push on the demand would might very well create some, speculative spurt in the stock, which in turn would induce, people who had been approached about the trust to feel they were missing even more of a good thing by rushing in. Rising prices in certain kinds of markets create their own kind of demand. It's not a sustained demand, and it's a demand that the reversal of which later on when people become disillusioned can cause a lot of problems, but that potential was there with with the flood of buyers with unrealistic expectations, high commissions, and a fixed supply. So we attempted to dissuade both of the promoters. 1 backed away and then came out a few months later with something that was a combination of Berkshire and some other securities, which were at least thought to be in our portfolio. And we started hearing from people, that it was clear, had no understanding of what they were buying or the costs involved or the potential tax implications or anything of the sort. So at that time, we faced we had to make a decision and we had to make it rather quickly as to what would be the best solution to this problem that in turn wouldn't create the same sort of thing that we felt had potential harm when being done by these promoters. Obviously, we considered a split of the stock, but we were worried that a split would send out signals to all kinds of people who, want to believe in things that may not be too believable, about future performance and that they would look at it as a as some grand chance to buy in at a lower price. Of course, it wouldn't really be a lower price in relation to value, but it would a lower denomination. And that, again, against a fixed supply, might very well have created the same kind of problem, maybe even a greater problem than would occur with the unit trust. So we came upon the idea of, the Class B shares, which would create a supply that would match the demand for, in effect, split shares and that would be offered in a way that did not create special inducements or to create false false inducements to people thinking of buying. And, one of the things we did was we stuck a commission on it on the issuance of the Class B shares that was about as low as any I've ever seen in many years in Wall Street because we did not want salespeople to have a great inducement to go out and sell the shares. We wanted anyone that was interested to read the prospectus and think about it and make their own decisions. And we did another thing, which is quite counter to the normal commercial approach which is that we said we would issue as many shares as people wanted to buy. And you do much better in this world if you're selling something to say only one to a customer and you have to get in early or you have to know somebody in order to get shares. And that's many new issues are sold that way. And it's very effective. I mean, it seemed like those old stories about in Russia where there'd be lines and people would get in them without knowing what they were going to buy when they got to the front of the line. And that's a very effective selling tool and it's one that Wall Street is not unfamiliar with. But we decided that to reduce any of that feeling that you have to get in early or only the big guy is going to get it or something of the sort, that we would announce loud and clearly that we would have shares available for everyone that wanted. So there was no reason to assume that it couldn't be a hot stock in effect. And we've done various other things. So our hope is that the Class B shareholders that we attract are of the same quality as the people in this room, that they have an investment attitude that where they feel they are buying into part of a business that they expect to stay with it for the indefinite future, maybe the rest of their lives, and they do not think of it as a little piece of paper that may be hot because it's a new issue or something of the sort. And, it lets it lets the people who are happy with the present shares stay in exactly the same position, which is what I'm going to do, what Charlie will do. We have made the B very slightly disadvantageous in two respects to the A. It has a lower vote and it will not participate in the, shareholder contributions programs. There were reasons for both of those, but in addition to the explicit reasons, there also is the desire that the be not be made fully. It's just a slight bit inferior, but it's not fully as attractive as the A because, we did not want to do anything that pushed everybody into converting into the B. If that started in a big way, the B would then enjoy the better market and it would create its own dynamic where it made sense for everybody to do it. So we have left it so there is no reason for you, if you own the a, to convert to the b unless you wish to sell or give away some portion of your holding that would be less than a full A share, and it will be convenient for that reason, but beyond that, there should be no incentive. If the B should trade slightly above 1 30th of the price of the A, there will be arbitrage activity that will keep that from being anything other than a negligible amount. It, of course, could trade well below 1.30th because the B is not convertible into the A. Charlie, would you like to add anything before we start taking questions on this? And I encourage everyone to ask. Charlie, as you will note during the meeting, does not get paid by the word. But we, I encourage anyone to ask any question. There are no bad questions about this. I mean, last year, we talked about a preferred issue, and people had very valid questions. I might take those two points of difference between the A and B, just to start with, on the shareholder designated contributions program, which was $12 a share last year. In addition to wanting the A to have a very small edge over the B, which would be a reason for not having the B participate. It also would get very impractical in terms of taking $12 dividing it by 30 and soliciting the names of charities to designate contributions. We can handle the present program fairly efficiently, but we would not want to be sending out checks for a dollar or 2, and it would get very inefficient. So we have told prospective vote, the issuance of the bee does create more votes outstanding. So absent any change in the situation, through the issuance of shares, which we are not particularly eager to issue, the vote, my vote will be will be diluted somewhat by this. And and I hadn't frankly, I had no desire to create a lot more shares, which would dilute the vote of the Buffett family. It will be diluted somewhat by this action because we will have all the present votes outstanding plus some votes from the B. If there is a lot of conversion to the B, it is true that our holding will go up percentage wise, but I see no reason why people really should convert. So I don't think that's likely. I think in the end, it'll stay very much the same. And as I mentioned earlier, we want there to be a slight disadvantage to the B. In all other respects, we will treat the B just as the A. We have a problem with numbers at this annual meeting. We're going to have to do something next year, and we haven't figured it out yet either. But the suggestion was made by someone that maybe the B would get 2nd class seating or something. We're not going to have any of that. From this point forward, with the exception of the two things we put in the prospectus, the B shares will be treated in every way as equivalent to A. So with that and with Charlie's reluctance to elaborate, we have a 6 zone system in here and then we have another 2 zones in the overflow room. So if there are any questions in zone 1, somebody just raise your hand and somebody will bring a microphone. Zone 1 is over there. 2 is back in the corner. 3, 4, 5, and 6. So it just goes right around clockwise. Just raise your hand and somebody will bring a microphone to you. We've got a question, I think, in Zone 1. Good morning. I'm Marshall Patton from Bandera, Texas. And when the prices struck on the Class B shares, those of us who buy our shares through computer programs, do we have assurance that whoever we buy from, that will be the price that we pay for these shares? Yeah. Well, the price there'll be a price established probably about Wednesday night or thereabouts of this week and everybody will pay the same price and a very high percentage of that price incidentally will come to Berkshire. I mean, there is a very, very low underwriting spread compared to any other offering. Now once the initial offering is everybody will pay the same price, large institutions, the buyer of 1 share will pay the same price. Subsequently, the stock will we expect will be listed on the New York Stock Exchange probably Thursday morning. And we have the world's greatest specialist here, I believe, Jimmy Maguire, who handles the trading now of the common and will handle the trading of both the A and B. Jimmy, are you here? You want to stand up? Just so there he is, the world's greatest specialist, Jimmy Maguire. I think he leads the singing of Wait till the Sun Shines, Nellie, to it annually. You can see him on CNBC occasionally. And the nightly business report. I want to give equal time here. The but Jimmy will be trading both classes of stock starting Thursday. As I say, as I said, the the it will be impossible, after the 1st few days, it would be impossible for the B to sell much above 1 thirtieth of the A because people would buy the A and sell the B if more than a very small with even the smallest of arbitrage differentials. But there will be markets in 2 shares and in 2 classes. They will both trade in 10 share lots. That will be the round lot, so so called round lot. Usually, the round lot on the New York Stock Exchange is 100 shares, but in the case of both Berkshire shares, the round lot will be 10 shares. Now I read 1 or 2 press accounts that said, therefore, the minimum purchase is 10 shares. That's not true. The minimum purchase of each stock, each class of stock is 1 share. I mean, you can buy 1 share or 2 shares or you can sell 1 share or 2 shares, and you have an odd lot differential just as you would if you were working with less than 100 shares of a company whose stock traded in 100 share round lots. But there is no there's no minimum size in the case of either share. And you will see they get the mechanics straightened out and they may have a little trouble with it, but you will see Berkshire A and Berkshire B and quoted in the papers. And I think that you're that it will be quite clear after Thursday what is going on, on that. I don't know about the computer purchases, but I don't that certainly in terms of the initial offering, that will be through 1 of, I think, 137 people or brokers in the selling group, and it's the same no matter who you deal with. Zone 2. My name is David Haendel. I'm from Boca Raton, Florida. To your knowledge, will this program effectively discourage the unit trusts? Well, we it's certainly designed to, and and and I think the answer to that is is yes, because I see no way that a unit trust, either in connection with the initial offering or with the subsequent trading, I see no way that a unit trust could offer people as an efficient and inexpensive way of participating in Berkshire as direct purchase of the B. Bear in mind that the unit trust if the unit trust were established, it would have to buy Berkshire shares in the market. So it would have the costs that people have in buying shares and then on top of it, it would superimpose these other costs. And in addition to the initial commission, they even had a valuation fee. That was a job I wanted to have because every 3 months or however often, maybe every day somebody was their job was to evaluate this trust value which involved the great skill of being able to locate it alphabetically in the newspaper. The figure was left blank as to what the evaluator's fee would be, but I had a feeling that, it was one of the more cushy jobs available. And there was an added problem too. I mean, if these unit trusts started and did not get off the ground very far, they could have become something in the way of orphans and they certainly would have become expensive to operate. And then with Berkshire paying nothing, in the way of dividends, but with the trust incurring expenses, including this evaluator's fee among others, but with the trust incurring expenses, they would have to sell small amounts periodically to pay the expenses and that would create tax consequences for every unit trust holder. I mean, people would not know what we felt they would not know what they were getting into. The more serious problem is that somebody would flash our past record in front of them or show them some chart on Berkshire's stock price and say, you know, this is your chance to do the same thing and it obviously isn't, wouldn't have been. And, but based on what we have seen, right now we anticipate the offering being 350,000 shares, but the extent to which the number of tickets involved that even seeking out informed purchasers only, there's very substantial demand. So I think if you widen that circle to include problem with the unit trust in the future. Not have a problem with the unit trusts in the future. Zone 3? I'm Adam Engle from Boulder, Colorado. In terms of the number of shares that you're going to issue B shares, do you plan to just look at the book on Wednesday and issue enough to totally satisfy the demand? And do you have any plans to do a secondary if it starts becoming a hot number? Yes. Well, I think what we plan is to tailor the size of the offering to fit the demand that appears Tuesday night or Wednesday morning or whenever the exact moment will be on that. But the offering will be designed to do that. Like most offerings, I would anticipate that the underwriter will, and this is a supposition at the moment, but it's frequently done, would sell some more shares than the initial offering with the intention of creating some short position in the security, and then they have an option to take from the company for 30 days up to 15% of whatever we initially sell, which protects them on their short position, but the short position also helps in terms of having an orderly market in the stock subsequently. But we will essentially tailor the size of the issue to the demand as it appears to us mid week. We have no plans for any secondary offering. I think this has been sufficiently publicized. There's a large network of, selling group members. So the people that are interested but wanted to buy in a smaller denomination will have had their chance. I think there will be a, well, the President indications there'd be 350,000 shares out. There would be a fairly large a large number of holders based on what we're seeing. So the market should starting Thursday morning on the exchange, there should be, in my opinion, a reasonable market based on that kind of quantity and the number of people buying. And so I anticipate nothing subsequently. Zone 4? I think I'll leave I think I'll leave that one up to you. What I said I said at present prices, Charlie and I do not think Berkshire stock is undervalued. And now that is not what's gotten reported sometimes. I mean, sometimes people have said we thought it was overvalued. We did not. If you look at the prospectus or if you look at the if you look at the prospectus, you will see that what we said was we do not think it's undervalued. Now I find it somewhat entertaining that people regard that as a kind of an amazing statement by somebody making a public offering. But if you think about it a bit, can you imagine a management that goes out and says to the world, We are selling you something in the in the new stock, and it's way undervalued. What do you say to your present shareholders if you go out and say to the public, we're selling you something that's worth $1 and we're going to sell it to you for $0.80 Now, that would leave me very unhappy. So I feel that any management that is talking about selling their stock and they say it's very undervalued either doesn't know what's good for their present shareholders or they, they may have their tongue in cheek. We would not be selling we would not sell a part of your interest in Berkshire at a price which we did not feel was adequate for the present shareholders. It's that simple. If we sell 1% of the company and 350,000 shares is close to that figure of B, We are selling 1% of your ownership in See's Candy. We're selling 1% of your ownership in GEICO. We're selling 1% of your ownership in the Buffalo News. Those are all valuable assets. We have no intention of selling 1% or 10% or the 100% of any of those entities at a price that is not fair to present shareholders. That doesn't mean it's unfair to new shareholders, but we're not going to we're not going to we would not be selling the stock if we thought it was undervalued. I'm not sure what we would have done if we'd had that position when the unit trust came along, but we have and put it in that perspective, but we are not selling any of our shares frequently on a new offering you see present holders, but you know, I have very close to 100 percent of my net worth in Berkshire and it leaves me quite happy. I've got a trust I run set up in 1964. I'm the sole trustee. I can do anything in that trust I want, and I am freed by the person who set up the trust of responsibility for a concentration of investments. And I have some members of my family who are beneficiaries of that trust. That trust owns nothing but Berkshire Hathaway stock. That doesn't bother me at all. I'm not recommending purchase, but I'm perfectly happy owning Berkshire. But we do not want people to think when they buy into Berkshire that they're buying something that's undervalued because it's not. And we say in that 4th caveat on the prospectus that we want people to buy it only if they expect to be holders for a very long time. Charlie and I expect to be holders for a very long time. And I think you may see us up here sometime where we don't know who the guy on next to us is, but But we'll put on an act though. We we, you know, that that is our attitude toward Berkshire. We do not want people to come in who think it's going to be a hot stock or selling for more a year from now because we don't have the faintest idea whether it's going to be selling for more or less a year from now, never have had. We do think that to the extent that Berkshire attracts a special class of shareholder that really looks at themselves as owning a part interest in a business like they'd own a part of a farm or part of an apartment house and they expect to hold it really for the rest of their lives, we think that it's a perfectly sensible thing to do because we're doing it ourselves, but we don't want to go beyond that. I'm not sure whether you got zone 4. Can we go back there? My name is Gordon Sheppard from Montreal. I wondered whether you had any plans for what to do with the money? Well, the answer to that is in the prospectus but we have no immediate plans for the money but we've faced that situation a number of times. I mean the money the inflow of money and outflow of money should not be in our view attempted to be matched too carefully in this world because you get investment and business opportunities at times that differ from the times that funds come in. And one of the most important disciplines in running a business or managing investments is that is to not get your not to try to coordinate your actions simply with the availability of cash. Over time, we found a way to use money. It's much tougher for us to run $17,000,000,000 than it was when we had $20,000,000 in the business. There's no question about that. And we pointed that out many times and it will get tougher still if we get larger, which I hope we do. But the fact that if $400,000,000 comes in on this offering or whatever, that's really no different than $400,000,000 coming in, in some other manner. And when our float grows, we take in more money. When our earnings are retained, we take in more money. When we have, I forget what the check would have been on the Cap Cities transaction, but it was certainly well over $1,000,000,000 that came in on a single day. So, money is fungible and we have to keep looking for bigger and bigger things as we go along and that's what we do focus on. But it doesn't bother me to take it. It wouldn't bother me if we weren't taking it. It wouldn't bother me if we took them 3 times as much. It doesn't make a lot of difference. And we will have the constant challenge for Charlie and me is to allocate capital as we go along. And it's a nice challenge. Zone 5. Hi there. Lee Dubroff, long time shareholder, I think going back a number of years now to when it was a little more intimate affair. Not quite sure whether I should look at you in the TV here or in real life on the stage. But anyway, I'm on the very right of you. And I see all the guards around you, and I see all the security and that sort of thing. And then I see this offering of the class b and I sort of wonder whether, from your perspective, you feel you might be in the same boat that the pope and the president are? And I mean this absolutely sincerely because, I don't I don't think that you have perhaps as good a handle as some of us do on the renown that you carry outside of Omaha, Nebraska. People who have no idea what investments are about are fully aware of who you are. And when they see this offering, I think you may find that, there are substantially more people who are interested in just having a piece of you for the sake of saying they have a piece of you than having absolutely any idea what they're doing. And I noticed that on I tried to read the fine print here on Page 14, first paragraph, second line, you indicate some 50,000,000 shares of Class B common stock may be offered. And so I'd like you to comment on this situation that you find yourself in where you may be perhaps out of touch with the, with the, popularity that you have? Well, my first reaction, maybe I should tell the my barber we could save the clippings and say sell them. The, They, I don't think it's quite I don't think it's quite as extreme as you say, but I I, you know, I, in relation to the, in relation to the 50,000,000 first, we have to authorize enough shares because we are going to allow every share of Class A or present common stock, but the Class A to convert to B. So we have to have the shares authorized to take care of 30 times the present 1, almost 2,000,000 shares. So 36,000,000 shares in effect are reserved for the present common stock, and as long as we were authorizing it, well, we need that much or we wouldn't have the shares actually available if everybody came around to convert. That's not going to happen, but we still have to be prepared for it. We have no plans to issue a lot of shares. The but the point you mentioned, which I think you stressed a little more than I would have, but the that is what we were worried about in terms of the unit trust. It's there are people that think that it can all happen again from this kind of a base, which is mathematically a joke. And Charlie and I would settle for 1 whole lot less you know, right today. And we have done everything we can. I mean, if we hadn't done this, the unit trust would have moved forward and I think they would have cashed in on that phenomenon you suggested and in a few years, you know, it would not, I would have been in a somewhat different position because people can get very disillusioned if they have hopes that aren't realized. And we have done everything possible, I think, to filter out, those who might have an unrealistic belief. Everyone should read a prospectus before they buy shares. And I think we have tailored we've designed what we're doing about as well as we can to moderate that phenomenon you're talking about. There may be a few come in, but not too many. Charlie, do you have any thoughts on that? Well, if we, if we only issue the amount we're now talking about, it's sort of a non event around Berkshire. It'd be 1% or something like that. It solves the problem of these disreputable followers. 1%, what does it matter? We, you heard that remark. We were referring to Charlie earlier about all I wanna know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there. Well, we think about that in terms of we believe in reverse engineering, and how do we keep people from buying it who really are going to be unhappy, you know, a few years later. You know, it's a little like singing country songs. You should sing them backwards. That way you get your home back and your auto back and your wife back. Good morning. I'm Rayna Lohrey from Chicago, proud to be here. All right, Laurie. All right. Over here. Okay. I have a question that's been asked me and I really don't know. Several people wanted to know if they could buy directly from a company. The answer to that is no, but Solomon Brothers is the underwriter of the issue. They have 100 and, I think, 37 or something broker dealers, virtually all the major ones in the country in the selling group. The cost to the company of doing this are really very, very low compared to any issue I've seen. When AT and T had their spin off or the sale of Lucent, which was close to a $3,000,000,000 deal, Their percentage costs were more than double what our costs will be, for example, on this offering of Berkshire. So it's almost as if you're buying it, Class B holders buying it from us in terms of the of what I would call the frictional costs involved of getting the issue done. In fact, if we handled it ourselves, it might cost more. But the company itself is not a broker dealer and it would require a whole group of different hoops to jump through in order to have a direct issue. It will be sold only through broker dealers. Zone 7, This will come in from another room. Here we are. There aren't any questions at Zone 7. No questions in Zone 7. Zone 8? No questions from Zone 8. Okay. Then we'll go back to Zone 1. Mike Rucker from Flint, Michigan, God's country. I noticed in the press when this issue of the unit trust was going on, that there apparently also were some people trying to form mutual funds to carry Berkshire stock, which I kind of thought was a good idea because there is one potential class of Berkshire owners that could only own Berkshire stock via either an open end mutual fund or a closed end mutual fund. And that is those thousands of teachers and hospital employees whose future retirement money is in 403 plans that are limited to investing in mutual funds only. And so I wonder if, first of all, if you were aware of that, and if so, if you considered that, and if not, if you might. Yes. Well, the answer is I wasn't aware of that. So it wasn't considered there are, of course, some mutual funds that own Berkshire shares, but there's no all Berkshire fund outstanding. I would say this, that if the law was set up to in some way to restrict investments of this group you're talking about to options that involve mutual funds but that don't involve individual stocks. I would think it might even be regarded as a way around it if a fund owned nothing but one stock, because if you can't buy General Motors directly under, I assume, the relevant rules or statutes on that, it would seem that a fund that owned nothing but General Motors might be regarded as a way of getting around that. But the answer is that it was not considered. I don't know where the rules are derived, whether they're, whether they can be changed by some organization or they're part of some statute, but they're part of some organization by a vote of their directors, they might be able to allow purchase of individual stocks within those plans that you described. But if not, it does seem to me that an all one stock fund is, might be regarded as simply a way around the rules. Zone 2. Allen Rang, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Have you determined what the symbol will be for the Class B? The symbol? No, we haven't. May I make a suggestion? As a broker, the stocks that have come out and given themselves Class A and Class B caused massive confusion. If there'd be any way to make the symbol something like BRB and just keep it a simple three letter symbol, It aids people both in following it on the tape on CNBC as brokers, 4 letter symbols on the New York restrict a lot of things we can do as far as punching them in. If there's any way you could keep the symbol for the B a symbol 1, 2 or 3 letter symbol, it would be greatly appreciated. Well, thanks for the suggestion. The exchange has generally been exceptionally cooperative in trying to work with us. I mean, a 10 share trading unit is no piece of cake for them, and I'm sure at times that they have wished we were a little more like some of the other companies that list on the exchange. But they've been very, very cooperative and helpful and we are they'll they'll they listen to things we suggest, we listen to things they suggest. So we will try to do whatever facilitates things at the exchange and the reporting of prices. And it's nothing we will try to impose on them, believe me. I have no favorite name that I'm looking for, so we'll see what they what ideas they have and we'll include that suggestion. Paula Fenster from Tulsa, Oklahoma. Very glad to be here. I'm one of those few second generation finally finagled a ticket out of my dad. 3 years ago. Her dad has a soda fountain incident. If you're ever in Tulsa, be sure to see him. He certainly does, and you're certainly invited to come back. I was here 3 years ago for the movie theater, and considering the growth, I know you won't leave your beloved Omaha, but maybe you could build a stadium with that's covered. Considering the growth, with adequate parking, here's my question. You said there's going to be unlimited offering as much as they want. This question is not designed to get a rise out of mister Munger. However It's that easy to do. Understood, considering the bridge game of yesterday. Anyway, my question is, you're authorizing up to 1%. What happens if it goes bananas, as Zone 5 suggested, and it goes greater? You said this 1% is yours. Is the next 1% yours? Is the next 1% ours? Do I know we are limited partners and you're a controlling partner, but how far does this ballgame go? Well, in terms of the size of the offering, it whatever the size of the offering, it affects everybody economically the same. I mean, our shares are no different than the ones of the people in this room. So we do not care from an economic standpoint, whether the issue turns out to be approximately 1% or whether it was 1.5 or 3 quarters of 1%. It's simply as long as we're not selling the stock below its true value, we are not going to be hurt by it. So it's inconsequential to us. We're not going to be helped in any significant way by a large sale. The it would appear to me, and we're just a few days away from the offering and it's been out there a while. So I would doubt if there's huge changes, but I don't know the answer to that. I mean, that could depend on what happens in the general stock market. But I don't think you'll see any huge change in the offering. If there were a big change, we obviously would very promptly let the SEC know. The SEC has wanted us as we have seen changes in demand as we've gone along, promptly changed the size of the offering and the covering page gets modified, and we've done that. As every day as indications come along, we've tried to be responsive to their instructions on that. And the 350,000 shares is our best estimate as of last Friday and we'll look at it the next day or 2. But I don't think it's going to change dramatically. I don't know though. I don't want to I'm not giving you a definitive answer on that, but it's just my it's a strong impression. Thank you. Zone 4. Mike Asail from New York City with a question for Charlie about his investment models. I'd like to know the most useful models on industry consolidation, vertical integration and models which explain the special cases when it makes sense to invest in retailing stocks? Well, I think I don't want to interrupt you now, but I think we'll save those to the general question and answer. This is only on the issuance of the Class B right now. But we're glad to have that question later on. It will give Charlie time to figure out the answer for one thing. We'll go through all of the questions regarding the Class B and then we'll have a vote on the authorization of the Class B And then we'll get into general questions and answers. Somebody over there? We'll take another one from Zone 4, if there's somebody. Mark Venditti from Connecticut. I'll apologize ahead. This isn't meant to be an impotent question or in any way, shape or form. Do you think that the issuance of the B in any way might exact in an effort to protect the folks who might be out there suckered in by the trust, if you will, anyway penalizes the A shareholders, either 1 or might penalize them, either 1, financially or 2, philosophically in the Burke experience. I don't mean that in any kind of elitist fashion because I don't think you've ever propagated that. Burke doesn't propagate that. But clearly, there's a room full of people or rooms full of people who have made a commitment financially to show that their philosophy is with you. Does that get diminished? The other part of the question is the trust as you portrayed them didn't sound terribly attractive. In a longer term, would they perhaps have ultimately failed as folks realized that they hadn't gotten into what they thought? Well, they might have, but I think the rub off would have been on us rather than the promoters of the tribe pie. It might have been on the promoters too, but in terms of the failure of the trust, I don't mean failure in an absolute sense, but in terms of disappointing their investors. I really think if tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people had come into something that was sold as being an all Berkshire type trust, if people came away disappointed some years, I think they would tend to project that disappointment upon Berkshire fully as much as the promoter who sold the trust to they might not even be able to find at that time. The first question, you know, this I don't think we wouldn't be doing this if we thought it would hurt present shareholders. Much as we might detest something else that was going on and we designed it so we felt that it wouldn't hurt present shareholders. In terms of them having a philosophy, new shareholders having a philosophy similar to the present ones, we've tried to filter those out coming in. But I intend after the offering to send out a booklet, you know, kind of like freshmen at college orientation greetings to Cy Wash U and we'll send it to everybody, new shareholders in the old shareholders explaining our philosophy and just as an orientation, of course, on the company and we'll get that out probably in a month or so after the offering settles down. I don't see any reason that, you know, Berkshire has evolved over a long period of time. We had 12 shareholders at the annual meeting 15 years ago, and it we seem to be able to retain the same class and group of shareholders in terms of people who really understand the business. It's a different group than you find at other companies, and I think we can, as long as we've had this filter in effect operating as new people join us, I think we can keep it. Charlie? Yeah. If the offering went wild and you issued 3% of the company new, you're also taking in $1,000,000,000 odd dollars. It is, it's a nonevent for us. He's very excitable. Don't say anything. Zone 5. Ed Johnson from Park City, Utah. As you receive the proceeds of the Class B sale and generate other cash, are you seeing opportunities out in the marketplace to continue to provide the kinds of returns that we've been fortunate enough to experience in the past. With or without the sale of the B, we don't see things to do that can maintain anything close to the average returns of the past. We've tried to convey that and it becomes a mathematical absurdity to money just won't compound at that rate in this world absent extraordinary inflation, certainly won't compound in real terms. So absent the issue of the B, we are not looking at things. We're not seeing things. We're not hoping to find things that match some of the things that we have found in the past relative to the capital base we've had in the past. But we have that problem with or without the B and it has not changed in any even very minor degree by the issuance of the B. We are looking for things all of the time. Anytime we find anything that makes sense to us, we will do it. The harder part is to make sure that we don't do something when we don't find something that makes sense. I mean, that's the bigger worry. And when we find them, we'll you know, they'll come along and you never have you never know when it's going to happen. We run into businesses, so I described a little bit of that in the annual report almost by accident that we've had contracted to make one purchase this year. The people who run it are here today. And it came about because I was attending a birthday party. And, you know, I'll go to more in the future. So things have not ended around here. We'll find interesting things to do over time, but they can't remotely be as profitable as the things we found in the past simply because of the large capital base. Zone 6. Hi. I'm Matt Zuckerman from Miami. I don't know, I think Charlie is the same class as Ed Dirkson. Dollars 3,000,000,000 We'll soon be talking about real money. The two questions I have basically are 1. Number 1, referring to the gentleman over here before who commented on your popularity, which will definitely affect the stock. Don't you think and the second part of that is that even my wife's beautician has put in for some shares of the stock, and he represents a small tip of a large group who are probably doing the same thing on the one hand so that there's going to be a large popular demand for the stock, which probably is not reflected in the numbers that the selling brokers are getting from institutions. And number 2, mutual funds themselves, in order to lend some panache or glamour or whatever to their portfolios, will certainly be sucking up Berkshire stock after this. And have you taken all of this into consideration when you decided upon the number of shares to go that you're sending out, number 1. And number 2, that the reaction, at least in the 1st 14 days, of the public to the shares, which will probably be in the range of $1100 might not send the B shares up high enough to make a very, very interesting spike in the price of the A stock? Well, we've considered what you're talking about. I think that the issue has been well enough publicized that the demand will largely be reflected on the books of the underwriter in a day or 2. And I see no reason at all for a spike in the stock. I mean, the way we've designed it should really prevent that. We and we tell people not to expect it. If any institution wants to buy it, if any individual wants to buy it, they're going to have a chance to do it. And I don't see any reason why there should be some huge influx of people immediately subsequent to the offering that didn't hear about it during the offering period. It's interesting. I think most of the demand will be retail and smaller holdings, not so much institutional. The most new offerings are done in a manner where the idea is to have far more demand than supply and therefore cause people to maybe order stock they didn't even want. And just on the idea that this restricted supply will cause a big jump the 1st day, whether you've seen Yahoo! Or a number of other offerings. I think I don't personally like that sort of distribution arrangement because you'll find that 30% to 40% of the issue will perhaps trade the 1st day. Well, I think and perhaps at a lot higher price, I think there's something a little wrong with that kind of an offering because the company obviously isn't getting proceeds that are equivalent to what people are willing to pay and favored customers get the chance to flip the stock and really are getting paid an exorbitant underwriting fee themselves, even though they're called purchasers because they sell it the 1st day. We will be very interested in seeing the volume in the B stock the 1st couple of days relative to the amount of the issuance, And I will be disappointed and I'll be surprised if the trading volume in the B stock the first couple of days related to the whatever the size of the issue is, turns out to be anywhere near as high as with most new issues. I think that we will have a better success in finding people who really want to own it and who do not buy it to flip it, I think, by this method of distribution. But we'll have a test of that. We will see what happens on trading volume. And I invite you amount we issue and then look at that relative to other new issues this year and just see how successful we were in finding real investors rather than people who were buying it to sell it to somebody else the next day. Let's see, was that zone 6? I guess we go to zone 1. Every week in vote. Yeah, but I don't want to cut off. Charlie says maybe we can vote, but I do I want people to have their questions. It just encourages it when you do that. I I want I want I want to be sure people get their questions answered on this. I don't want to prolong it beyond if you feel your question has been 95% answered by an earlier question, I hope you'll skip asking it, but we do want to have people who have questions about it answered because I can tell by commentary and letters I've received that some people have genuine concerns. Yes? My concern my name is Jan Anglin. I'm from Southern Indiana, and this is my first Berkshire meeting. I did have a concern about the B shares that's less business and more, I guess it would be concerned with your and Mr. Munger's personal safety. I often see your picture in the newspaper and I certainly don't mind seeing it on financial magazines, but now it's kind of like proliferating. I don't like the idea that you are so visible. That bothers me. It's I mean, do you understand what I'm saying? No, I understand exactly right. It's occurred to me. I appreciate that. But the answer is there's no other way. I mean, if over time in terms of what happens and as it grows, you get more visible, basically. I know, but along with the B shares and things, can you kind of like be quotable but less available for photos? Well, I normally am. If you've noticed, in terms of interviews or anything of sort, I do not do them. I've been invited to go on all of the news shows and I basically don't do it. Frankly, with the shareholders, I feel differently about this group. I'm delighted to see everybody come here and I enjoy getting together with the shareholder community. I think the real protection is if we'd done something that had caused the stock to balloon way up and then come way down, I might have had to be a little more careful. I think she has a very good idea. Having seen that acting, I think I think hereafter, maybe you should be the voice of Mickey Mouse. I do appreciate the sentiment on it very much. And it is unavoidable to a fair degree, although Charlie may have thought I wasn't pushed into those acting jobs. Zone 2. This is Joe Greer from Omaha, Nebraska, of all places. Regarding the conversion privilege, is there a time limit on the converting from the A to the B? No, that's a good I'm glad you asked that question. The first 5 days or so after issuance of business days, there's no conversion. But after that, you'll be able to convert until judgment day at, it's forever convertible from A to B, but it's not convertible from B to A. So there's no need to convert it until you have a reason to do so. And as I pointed out, there's a very slight disadvantage in converting it. I wouldn't until I had a need, I would not convert it. Zone 3. Scott Dowling from Redmond, Washington. Kind of related to this question, as an A shareholder, I can only see really two reasons to convert A shares into B shares, one of them being gifting reasons. In regard to that, how does one convert A shares into B? Yes. There are instructions on that in the proxy statement as to how that, I guess it's in the annual report too that, it describes how to do it. But basically, you get in touch with the Bank of Boston to do that and proceed from there. Or if you have your shares with a broker, you would instruct your broker to do it. Zone 4. Good morning. I'm Ruth O'Wadees from San Francisco. I wondered how did you decide that the ratio of the Bs should be 30:one instead of 300:one or something in between? Yes. We wanted to have something that was roughly would trade initially at least in the $1,000 range. We thought it very unlikely that anyone would find it commercially feasible to set up a trust that offered units that were denominated much below that. So that's as low as we felt we had to go. And we did not want to signal in any way that, that, you know, some sort of last chance or something like that to get in for some very low sum for people that, you know, just had some wishes that they could turn $100 into $100,000 or something. I get letters from people that think that somehow that can be done and it can't be done. And we don't want to appeal subliminally or any other way to people who harbor those hopes. I'm sympathetic with them, but we don't have the answer to that. So, we went down to the level to match the unit trust. Zone 5, we'll try and do we'll try and end the questions on the beat fairly soon, but I don't want anybody that feels that they've got some reservations about this not to have a shot at asking their question. My name is Bob McClure. I live in Singapore. The way I figure it, the sale of the B shares at the price they will probably be sold will give an immediate boost to the book value of Berkshire Hathaway. So as far as I'm concerned, the more the merrier. Can you give us your thinking on that, the accounting treatment, how this will affect the book value of Berkshire? Well, any shares we sell at the equivalent per A share of in the range of 33,000 or thereabouts where the stock is selling. Now we'll increase the book value per share, but that does not mean it increases the intrinsic value per share. I've said many times in the report, we use book value as a proxy in tracking a movement of intrinsic value, but it does not represent anything like intrinsic value per share. And the key is not what it does to book value per share, but what it does to intrinsic value per share. And, you know, we believe the intrinsic value is materially higher than the book value. We don't spoil your fund by ever giving you a number, but we do not regard the fact that it increases the book value per share as being any kind of a determinant in deciding to issue the shares, but it will have that consequence mathematically. The key is the relation to intrinsic value. Zone 6. Any questions in 6? Your problem seems to be that you've attracted a fair number of potential shareholders that don't have a way of estimating intrinsic value or developing expectations about what Berkshire's future prospects are. Do you have any suggestions about how they might do that, short of the general guidance that you can't continue to compound your intrinsic value at the same high rate that you have in the past because of your asset base, and that you don't believe the share is undervalued? Yes. Well, we'll probably talk more in the general question and answer period about our various businesses, but we simply try to give you all of the information about our businesses in a large general way that Charlie and I consider important and that we would want if our positions were reversed. I can assure you that if all Charlie and I knew about our businesses, what we publicly disclosed, it would not change our estimates from what they might be from being intimately involved with the businesses. The facts are out regarding what we do. So, you are in the same position to the extent that you have followed our kind of businesses and understand industry conditions and all of that. And we'll continue to do that. We essentially regard you as our partners and we try to tell you exactly what we as partners would want to know if you were running the place, and we'll continue to do that. We won't tell you a number because we don't know the number. We have a range in our mind. Things change that range over time and, we'd probably get in all kinds of trouble if we tried to put out that range. But, and Charlie and I would not come up with the same range, but they'd be pretty close. We'll talk more about that a little later. We do have questions now from zone 7 and 8 in the other room. So we'll take on zone 7, please. I guess you've answered our questions. Took care of Zone 7. How about Zone 8? No questions from Zone 8. Okay. I think at this point we can move on to general questions after we have this vote. And then if you have another question or 2 that comes up during the general question and answer period, I'll be glad to we'll be glad to work those in at that time. So we are now at the point. Is there a motion to adopt the Board of Directors' recommendation? I move the adoption of the amendment to the 4th article of the restated certificate of incorporation that's set forth in Exhibit A of the company's proxy statement for this meeting. I second the motion. Motion has been made and seconded to adopt the proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation. It says here isn't any discussion, but I'm not going to say that. We are ready to act upon the motion. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the proposed amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation and allow the ballots to be delivered to the Inspector of Elections. Would the proxy holders please also submit to the Inspector of Elections a ballot on the proposed amendment, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received. Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you're ready, you may give your report. My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 970,495 votes in favor of the proposed amendment. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes including the votes cast in person at this meeting will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting. Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. The amendment to the certificate of incorporation is set forth in Exhibit A to the proxy statement for this meeting is approved. After adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the business of Berkshire, but do not call for any action at this meeting. Anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize mister Walter Scott Junior to place a motion before the meeting. I move this meeting be adjourned. I second the motion. The motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say aye. All opposed say no. The meeting is adjourned. Now we'll move to a, to general questions, and we'll do it by the same zone system. As I said earlier, any of you are free, obviously, to leave at any time. We will break formally at noon and reconvene about 15 minutes later after you've all had a chance to buy a sandwich and you can, those in the other rooms can come in here and we will go from then until about 3 So we'll start in with Zone 1. Okay. I'm Will Jax from Chicago. I'm sort of representing Benjamin Graham today, the question he might ask. You talked earlier about how you about the value of your shares, A shares, let's say, because the B is tied to the A. But and I know I don't expect a complete answer, but generally, how would you go about placing a value on the A shares? Well, that's obviously a key question. As I've said, we try to give you the information. But I think people to the extent they've made a mistake in the past in valuing Berkshire and they have made this mistake over time, including many commentators, including some institutions, is to look at it as simply a breakup value to our businesses. I mean, you can do the same thing with General Electric, a magnificently run operation by Jack Welch, But I don't think the way you should look at a business like General Electric is to think about what would happen if they sold each division today, paid the taxes and then distributed the proceeds. And that has tended to be the case with many people looking at Berkshire, looking at it on a static basis and that is not the way that Charlie and I have looked at it over time. It lends itself a little more to that kind of analysis because we have a lot of money in marketable securities, but we have a lot of money in other things too. And the question of Berkshire in value and the intrinsic value of any business, of course, is what is going to be the stream of cash over many years in the future, in fact, all of the years in the future discounted back at an appropriate interest rate. I've talked about that in the past in the annual report. Berkshire is a collection of businesses and some of which we own in their entirety, some of which we own part of. And some of those businesses have very interesting dynamics to them and they the value of our insurance business, for example, if you go back 26, what was it, 20 8 years or so since we, 29, I guess, since we bought it from Jack Ringwalt, we paid 8,700,000 I believe, 8,400,000, 8,700,000 for 2 companies, that Jack controlled. If you had the foresight at that time to and I didn't, but if you had the foresight at that time to see what that would develop out of that insurance business, you would have come to the conclusion that their value to us was going to be far, far greater than the value at which they were then carried on our balance sheet. They were part of a business which had enormous potential. And that's been probably the most significant asset that's been developed at Berkshire. But right now, we have over 7 right at $7,000,000,000 over $7,000,000,000 a float that's been developed from our insurance business. We couldn't foresee that 25 or 30 years ago, but it would have been a big mistake to think in terms of the book value of that business being representative of its actual value to us over time if it was run right. And that situation probably prevails today. So, it's a Berkshire is a group of, on balance, very fine businesses to which we hope to add. The intrinsic value will be affected by the job we do in allocating capital. It'll be affected by the job our managers do in running their businesses. It'll be affected by some items that we don't foresee now and perhaps have no control over, but it is not measured essentially by what we could sell each separate business for and pay the tax on now. We haven't run it that way. We've run it so that we get the use of a lot of capital at very low cost Between deferred taxes and our insurance float, we have some $12,000,000,000 or so on the liability side that, that, is we think will be a very low cost and that doesn't show as an asset, but, it can be quite valuable. Charlie, you want to? No, I don't think I've got anything to add to that. I was all set to write it down, too. Zone 2, please. Mister Buffet, mister Munger, I'm Tim Medley from Jackson, Mississippi. My question is on allocation of Capital 1. You've indicated that one thing you like in companies is a willingness on the part of management to repurchase its own shares. I wonder if you would talk for a minute about your own frame of reference on repurchases when it appears that the current price of the stock is rich in relation to its intrinsic value. And some have said that with the right company, ongoing repurchases of stock should be made irrespective of the price. So would you speak for a moment as to how you think it pencils out when the current price of the stock is rich in relation to its intrinsic value? Yes. If you're repurchasing shares above a rationally calculated intrinsic value, you are harming your shareholders. Just as if you issue shares beneath that figure, you are harming your shareholders. That's a truism. Now the tough part of that, of course, is coming up with the intrinsic value. And for example, a good example might be Coca Cola. I think a number of people might have thought Coca Cola was repurchasing shares at a very high price because they'll look at book value or PE ratios, but there's a lot more to intrinsic value than book value and PE ratios. And any time anybody gives you some simplified formula for figuring it out, forget it. You have to understand the business. The people who understood that business well, the management, have understood and been very forthright about saying so over the years that by repurchasing their shares, they are adding to the value per share for remaining shareholders. And like I say, people who didn't understand Coca Cola or who thought mechanistic methods of valuation could, should take precedence, really misjudged the value to the Coca Cola Company of those repurchases. So we favor when you have a wonderful business, we favor using funds that are generated at that business to make the business even more wonderful and we favor repurchasing shares if those shares are below intrinsic value. And I would say that if it's a really wonderful business, we probably come up with higher intrinsic values than most people do. We have great respect, Charlie and I, we've I think it's developed over the years. We have enormous respect for the power of a really outstanding business and we recognize how scarce they are. And if a management wishes to further intensify our ownership by repurchasing shares, we applaud. We own we just went over 8% of the Coca Cola Company probably in the last 3 or so months by a very tiny fraction. But we had a second purchase one time, but our percentage interest in the Coca Cola Company has gone up significantly through their repurchases and we are better off because they have bought those shares at what looked like to some people perhaps high prices. And we thought they were wrong at the time and I think now it's been indicated or proven. So I urge you if you're trying to decide on the wisdom of repurchases or of share issuances that you don't think in terms of book value, you don't think in terms of specific PEs, you don't think in terms of any little model, but do you think in terms of what would you really and A, pick businesses you can understand and then think what you really would pay to be in those businesses. And that's what counts over time is whether the repurchases are made at a discount from that figure. And I would say with the companies that we own shares in, our interest in GEICO went from 33 or so percent to 50% over a 15 year or so period simply through repurchases and we benefited significantly. So did every other shareholder, I might add, that stayed with the company and we benefited in no way disproportionate to them. But that was a very wise action on their part. And there too, they were all usually buying that stock at at least double book value and you could compare it to other insurance stocks and say well that's too much to pay, but GEICO wasn't an insurance company that was comparable to other insurance companies. It was a very different sort of business and they, they were very wise in my view to be following that course of action. Charlie? No. Zone 3. I'm Elaine Cohen from San Diego. I'm a little confused about how the B shares are going to be moving if they're onethirty of the A shares when they get out on the market, are they always going to be onethirty of the A shares? And if they are, is that going to dilute the earnings of the A shares? Could you just explain? Yes, it won't dilute the earnings or value of the A shares as long as we use the money reasonably effectively that is produced. As I mentioned earlier, if it happens to be 1%, you'll own 1% less of all these other things. On the other hand, we'll close to $400,000,000 more of cash. So it will not in our view, it will not dilute the value of the A. I expect over time that the B, a very large percentage of the time, will be selling very close to a 30th, but it could sell for less than that ratio. It can't sell for any significant amount more than that ratio or arbitrage will eat away at any slight premium. I think that takes care of that. Zone 4. Mr. Buffet, my name is Hugh Stephenson. I'm a shareholder from Atlanta, Georgia. My question involves the company's interest in Wells Fargo. As you know Wells Fargo like most banks has a very expensive branch system for deposit gathering and servicing their customers. As I guess you know they also have moved more into branches in supermarkets and in online banking that seems to have the potential to very significantly reduce their costs relative to the branch system. Would you comment on how you think that might play out and how significant it might be? Well, the question, you're right. Wells Fargo has been a leader in moving into supermarkets. They've got a couple different formats they've used and they've been a they've certainly been a leader in the online banking services. Unfortunately, in banking, it's a little hard to have any secret formulas. Coca Cola has 7X down there in the vaults of the what used to be the trust company of Georgia, now SunTrust. But in the banking business, anything you do, your competitors can copy. Nevertheless, there is an advantage and sometimes it can be a quite significant advantage in being first and learning more about different distribution methods. And I think Wells Fargo has done a a terrific job in learning that. I think they've got some advantages, but they aren't advantages that other people can't work at copying and chipping away at. But it's a good management. They've done a very good job of seizing on that particular trend in supermarkets and as such, they are they have the potential perhaps for having a relatively low cost deposit gathering operation. And every other bank in the world will be looking, though, to see how that works not only there but at other banks to figure out whether they can copy it. Charlie? Okay. Zone 5. My name is Alan Parceau from Omaha. Berkshire has increased the rate of growth in its insurance float in excess of 20% a year since 1967. In regards to GEICO, its rate of growth, what has its historical rate of growth been in its insurance float and what impact will it have on the rate of growth in the overall Berkshire insurance float? Well, I would say that GEICO is a huge plus to Berkshire. Now we owned 50% of it before. I mean, we've had a we've benefited from our GEICO investment in a big way, ever since 1976. So it's not a it's not an entirely a new benefit that's coming in. We paid a good price for GEICO, but it is a terrific company. It has outstanding management. It has a low cost method of distribution, which is very difficult for people to I mean, everybody wants to have that, but they very few come close to it. The management is focused on bringing costs down even further and widening that competitive moat. GEICO, I personally think that just from what I see that GEICO I would think GEICO's growth rate is likely to be greater at least in the future that I can see over where it has been in the past, but it's been perfectly satisfactory in the past. I think there are some advantages to it being part of Berkshire in that, there are costs attached to bringing new business on the books and we care not at all about reported quarterly earnings. GEICO was relatively insensitive to those before, and that's a compliment when I say that. But they had some more pressure on them in respect to reported earnings than they will have as part of Berkshire. And I think there's some really big opportunities in terms of what can be done with GEICO as part of Berkshire. So I think 5 years from now, you'll be very happy with the fact that we own 100 percent of GEICO. And I think you will see that as marvelous a company as GEICO was independently, as an independent company, it will flourish maybe even a bit more as being part of Berkshire, not because we bring anything to the party. I mean, the management will continue to run it autonomously, but there's there are some advantages, for it in being part of a larger enterprise. Zone 6. Mr. Buffett, my name is Stephen Tuckner. I'm a shareholder from Toronto, Canada. And my question concerns the valuation of Berkshire Shares. Given the large number and dollar size of the private businesses recorded at historic cost, which Berkshire owns, shouldn't the multiple to book that the stock trades at essentially expand over time to reflect the increases in intrinsic value of the private holdings. And I cite Buffalo News on the books at essentially, I think around 0, and even GEICO now will be on the books at probably between $3,000,000,000 $4,000,000,000 worth more than that as examples of the disparity between intrinsic value and book value? Most of the businesses that we own all of or at least 80% of are carried on the books at considerably less than they're now worth. And with some of them, it's dramatic, although it's not dramatic compared to a $40,000,000,000 total market valuation for Berkshire. It's dramatic relative to the carrying price because when we bought, when we bought See's Candy for an effective $25,000,000 in 19 72. It was earning $4,000,000 pre tax. It earned over $50,000,000 pre tax last year. When we bought the Buffalo News, it was making nothing, paid 30 and a fraction 1,000,000 and it's now earning maybe $45,000,000 And we've got a number of businesses and GEICO is worth more than we carry it for because of the accounting peculiarities of the first 50%. So it is true that overwhelmingly our businesses are worth something more than intrinsic value than book value and in many cases, very substantially more, although that's reflected in the market price of our stock. I don't think you can go from year to year and trace the intrinsic value precisely by changes in book value. We use changes in book value as a very rough guide as to movement. And sometimes I comment, there have been certain annual reports where I've said our intrinsic values grew more than the proportional change in book value and there's been others where I've said I thought it was roughly the same. So I don't think you can use it as a stick some multiplier on it and come up with a precise guide, a precise number. But I do think it's a guide to movement. Our insurance business though is the most dramatic case of dollar difference between book value and intrinsic value. I mean, the number has gotten very big over time there. And I personally think it will tend to get bigger because I think GEICO will grow and I think our other businesses will do well. The trick, of course, is to take the new capital as it comes along and not from the issuance of the B because that's relatively small compared to the amount of capital we will just generate from operations. Our float will grow from year to year. Our earnings will be retained and we've got to go out and find things to do that 3 or 5 years from now that people say, well, that's worth more than the book value. And that's a job. It's a tougher job than it was, but it's kind of fun. Zone 7. Yes. My name is Jim Elliott. I'm from Minneapolis. I wonder if you could help me with an upside scenario where the B shares after they're issued are limited and there is not a significant reissue afterwards. The A shareholders are somewhat reluctant to convert and you have a run on the B shares where let's say it goes to $2,000 a share, do we then have the tail wagging the dog where the 2,000 command is $60,000 price on the A shares? And what does the this arbitrage take care of that or what do we do in that case? If there is demand for the B that pushes the price up somewhat, it will produce conversion from the A. I mean, the only way the B will be able to get we'll just pick a figure if it were to get to $1200 there's no way that the A could be selling appreciably below 36,000. And I don't think I think that introducing the B into the equation may mean it will mean that there will be some people who like a lower denomination stock and come in. But it takes a lot of that to, in an appreciable way, affect $40,000,000,000 worth of what is now A stock. So, you know, if there were incremental demand of $100,000,000 a year or something like that, that's a little more than the demand that might otherwise go into the A, but I do not see it producing anything in the way of a big movement. But you're quite correct in that there's no way that the B stock can go up and not really force some conversion from the A. It'll I think it'll be minor. Zone 8. Hello. This is, Rick Marleyov from Oakland, California. I wanted to ask you about World Book Encyclopedia. World Book seems to me to be an example where Berkshire has invested in technology without necessarily intending to. I would expect that in 5 or 10 years, it's going to be real tough to sell a paper encyclopedia because at that time you probably be able to buy the computer and the electronic encyclopedia for less than the paper encyclopedia. Up till now, I haven't had the impression that World Book has been as aggressive as its competitors in marketing and developing its electronic product. It's been the highest price that I have seen of the competition. It asked at least a year ago. Its list price was 600 and the competition was 80 to 100. You sold as low as 100 on special promotions but I don't think that was the list. A year ago, we were still selling by direct sales. I have not yet seen it in a mass market software store. I've never seen it bundled with a computer and I have seen one newspaper review of electronic encyclopedias that mentioned the World Book print version, but didn't seem to be aware that a World Book electronic version was available, which it was at that time. In terms of the product itself, we have both the World Book and the Grawiers at our house. The Graw Years came with a computer and both encyclopedias in this last year solicited us to buy an upgrade. World Book was asking $85, Grauer's was asking 30, But in addition, I ended up buying only the Grawiers because it addressed my biggest disappointment on the original version of both of them, which was it's sort of a, in a way, a minor issue, but I thought it was relevant for kids doing school reports. Neither one allows you to print out a very big percentage of the pictures in the encyclopedia. They have a lot of pictures, but you can't print them and you can get a color inkjet printer for under $200 these days, so it's real practical to print things out. The world book made no mention of having any improvement in this area. The Grawiers said you can print out almost all the pictures and I have found since we got the upgrade, I found that to be true. So I'm concerned that I don't I'm not an expert on this, but I don't think World Book is as aggressive in either developing or marketing, its electronic encyclopedia. So my question is, do you plan to become aggressive in this area and a leader in the electronic technology, or have you considered selling your electronic business and just getting out of it? Yeah. We won't sell the electronic business. That I can tell you. You're quite correct. Some of the technical stuff I'm not very good at. I have a little trouble turning on the light switch. But the in terms of the in terms of the bundled product, which is the encyclopedia that is offered with the purchase of a new computer, there's no question that that's become a large business in units. It's not so large in terms of dollars because, those units bundled with a an original equipment sale are very low. Actually, Encarta is probably, well, I'm sure has sold many, many millions of units bundled with a new encyclopedia. It doesn't necessarily produce a lot of dollars, but it produces a lot of units out there. We at World Book Encyclopedia, some of you may not have noticed, but Encyclopedia Britannica has, within the last couple of weeks, announced the cessation of direct distribution of the print product and unit sales of encyclopedias, of print encyclopedias in the country have gone down very significantly in the last few years as they have at World Book. We changed the we are in the process of changing and have already changed in some parts of the country the distribution system, because we are going to see what can be made to work, if anything, in the direct distribution. There are some indications that we may be able to make money in that business, but with a different cost structure than before. And it we'll know more about that. We're not that far along because we changed the distribution system within the last or partially changed it within the last few months. We it's not easy to figure out how to make money in either the electronic or print encyclopedia end of the business. And we have some ideas in the electronic end that we'll know a lot more about in about 6 months or so, but I can't really I don't want to go into any detail on those at present. I've got the electronic product myself. It's a 1st class product. We've got ideas about how to make it an even better product. And we have taken a lot of costs out of the print end of the business. We'll be putting some of those into the electronic end, but we've taken a lot of costs out of it. It may well be that it'll be a workable business for us even though it isn't for anybody else, but the jury is still out on that. It is not the business that was 5 years ago and I don't think it will be the business that it was 5 years ago because the world has changed in some ways on that. But we will not sell world book. I'll state that unequivocally. We will not sell electronic world book. We are in the business to stay, but we are groping a bit in terms of figuring out a configuration that will produce decent profits for us and sell a lot of world books in the process. Charlie? We don't have any way of avoiding declines in some of our businesses some of the time. Blue Chip Stamps once sold stamps at the rate of $120,000,000 a year. Now it's about $200,000 a year. So we lose some. We were in the windmill business many years ago. We try to make we think probably about the problems, but there are industry problems. I was in after site coal at one time too at the street railways. I've seen them all. They but World Book is a first class product. It's a product I use, a product Charlie uses. And there is through an electronic means, you can deliver information that costs far, far less than I mean, unbelievably less than was the case not that many years ago. And the world in many forms will be adjusting to that, not just in encyclopedias. And it affects some of the businesses we're in, and it's something we think about, but it's very unlikely that Charlie and I are going to be smarter than the rest of the world in terms of the electronic world. I mean, we are looking at it as something where we're looking for the obvious and something that is within our capability of doing something about, but we're not trying to beat people at their own game where we're not very good at the game. Zone 1. Mr. Buffet, Richard Charlton from Canada. One of the highlights of good afternoon, Mr. Munger also. Well, one of the highlights for me in coming to the Annual Meeting for the past 7 or 8 years was the way that you dealt with the question that was inevitably asked by a new shareholder as to why you will not split your shares. I know how much it has meant to you to keep the shares trading in an exclusive way. And you have been my mentor for the last 17 years. And I think that what you're doing in splitting these shares in order to protect the public and indirectly Berkshire shareholders, but mostly to protect the public is just another expression of your and Mr. Munger's tremendous integrity, and you're setting a fantastic example for corporate America, and I salute you, sir. And I thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Well, I hate to leave Zone 1 after that, but we'll go on to Zone 2. Thank you. Wesley Jack from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. As a stockbroker, I can say I definitely don't like UITs, and I appreciate your plan for the B shares, but as long with the rest of the shareholders, what we hope that the shares go up in value in the future, don't you see a problem with them coming back with this idea in the future? On the unit, you mean on the issuance of unit trust? SECRETARY Yes. SECRETARY No, I don't see any problem because the B will be out there, and it is a superior product, whatever its absolute merits may be. On a relative basis, it is a superior product to anything that is going to carry a big commission to a salesperson and a lot of annual costs. So I think my guess is we've taken care of that problem. I wish it hadn't come up, but it's I would think that it'd be very difficult for anyone to honestly offer a product, derivative type product through a unit trust that would be superior to buying the product that will be available? I think he's afraid that the B will go up to the place where the whole story comes again. And I must say that if that were to happen, we'd like it. Well, we'd like it only if it reflected underlying values, but yes. Yes. We have a very strange attitude on that. I mean, most managements feel that the on the price of their shares that the higher the better. And that's an understandable feeling, but the trouble is the game isn't over at any time. We really feel the fairer the better. Our goal is that every shareholder participates in the progress that Berkshire makes during as a business during their holding period. In other words, we don't want one party getting wealthy off the other. We want them to share based on the gain and value of the business. And to the extent that the stock got way overvalued or way undervalued, That may make one party in the first case, the seller, in the second case, the buyer very happy, but there's somebody on the other side of the transaction. In economics, the most important question, maybe important beyond economics too, but when everybody somebody tells you something, the first question to ask yourself is and then what? And we tend to do that around Berkshire. And so the stock going up is not an end of itself because it's the next question is and then what. And to the extent that the stock goes up because the intrinsic value goes up, everyone is getting their fair share of the pie as they go along. To the extent it exceeds that in some way, the selling shareholder gets a benefit, but the entering shareholder is at a disadvantage. And we really like the idea of the price tracking intrinsic value over time. And we think that by having the right kind of shareholders and by communicating with them properly and following the right kind of policies that we can come as close to that as is attainable in a world where markets essentially are fairly volatile. And so far, I think it's worked out pretty well that way. But the intention is to and the goal is to keep it that way. One thing to remember, in the end, the owners of businesses in aggregate cannot come out any way better than the businesses come out. I mean, you can the businesses are the not just our business, I'm talking about all American business. The profitability of American business determines the profitability of what the owners of American business have And you can forget all about the little ticker symbols and everything else. The owners suffer to the extent that they have some extra costs imposed in brokerage commissions, fees, all kinds of things. That diminishes the return from the business. But no one has figured out yet how to perpetually have owners do better than their businesses. And our idea is to have them do it as they go along in proportion to the gain that occurs during their tenure as a shareholder. And that isn't easy to do and it's not attained perfectly, but that is, that's the goal as we go along. Zone 3. Morris Spence and I have a serious question and then a less serious question. First, the less serious. You said that you and Charlie had lost between you £100. I was curious who had lost more? No, I said the Board had lost £100. I have some members of the Board who would take umbrage of the fact that they weren't included in that total. Charlie and I are we're pretty close at the moment, aren't we? Or modesty. I must say you're both looking very good anyway. I was wondering who lost the most and what your diet secrets were. And then the most serious question was about float. You touched on this a little bit earlier, but you've often said that your insurance business is probably the most important business that you own. On page 12 of the annual report, you said, we have benefited greatly to a degree that has not been generally understood because our liabilities have cost us very little. I was wondering if you could describe this a little bit better so we can understand it. Yeah. The Charlie and I have lost about the same amount at about £20 each. The insurance business provides us with float and float is money that we hold that doesn't belong to us. It's like a bank having deposits. A bank has deposits. That money doesn't belong to it, but it holds the money. Now when a bank holds deposits on everything except demand deposits, there's an explicit cost and interest rate attached to it. And then there are the costs of running the system and gathering the money, which is also must be attributed both to demand and time deposits. So there's a cost to getting what they would call deposits and we could call float. In the insurance business, a similar phenomenon takes place in that policyholders give us their money at the start of the policy period and therefore we get the money paid in advance for the product. And secondly, it takes time to settle losses, particularly in the liability area. If you bang up a fender on your car, it's going to get settled very quickly. So there's but if there's a complicated injury or something, it may take some years to settle. And during that period, we hold the money. So we have, in effect, something that is tantamount to the deposits of a bank, but whereas the deposits of a bank, it's quite easy to calculate the approximate costs. In the case of the float that the insurance company has, you don't really know what the cost of that float is until all your policies and losses, the policies have expired and your losses have all been settled. Well, that's forever in some cases. So you're only making an estimate as you go along of what that float is costing. To date with Berkshire, in the 29 years we've been in the business, it appears, never certain because you don't know for sure what's going to happen, but it appears that our flow does not cost us anything on average. It's been years when we've had an underwriting loss. When there's a cost, there's been years when we had an underwriting profit and so we had a reverse cost. So we have obtained that float on very advantageous terms over the years, far more fully as important as that. It's important to get it at a low cost, in our case no cost. But the other important thing is that we've grown it dramatically. I guess, a float that we had in 1967 and it was no cost, it was no cost. And if we still had our 16,000,000 or 17,000,000 I guess, afloat that we had in 1967 and it was no cost, it would be very nice, but 17,000,000 of free money is worth something, but it's not worth a ton. Having $7,000,000,000 if we can achieve that as free money, it's worth a lot of money. And that growth has not probably generally been appreciated fully in connection with Berkshire nor has the interplay of how having 0 cost money in terms of affecting our gain in value over time. People have looked at always looked at our asset side, but they haven't paid as much attention to the liability side. Charlie and I pay a lot of attention to that. And I mean, this it's not entirely an accident that the business has developed in this manner and we have intentions of trying to make it to continue to develop in this manner and in that manner in the future. But we've got competitors out there too. Float per se is not a blessing. We can show you many insurance companies that thought it was wonderful to generate float and they have lost so much money in underwriting they'd be better off if they never heard of the insurance business. But the job is to get it in increasing quantities, but above all, get it cheap. And that's what we work at. And you do that in the business through having some kind of competitive advantages. You won't do it just by having an ordinary insurance company. The ordinary insurance company is not a good business. The ordinary insurance company is not a good business. We have it in certain respects because of our attitude toward the business. We have it because of our financial strength gives us certain competitive advantages and we have it in the case of GEICO because of a very low cost operation and it's us up to us to try and figure out ways to maximize each one of those competitive advantages over time. We've built those advantages. I mean, in 1967, we were not looked at that way in the insurance business. We were we've built a position of competitive strengths and in the case of GEICO, they had it without us, but we have bought into it over time. It's a very important asset and you ought to pay a lot of attention over the years as to what is happening with that asset as to both growth and costs and that will aid you in calculating intrinsic value. Charlie? Nothing to add. Okay. That's zone 4 is the next, Henry. Henry Neuhoff, shareholder Dallas, Texas. My guess is that you consider the intrinsic value of the shares to be more than that represented by the price. More than represented by the current price of the shares. If that be the case, what would be your thoughts about Berkshire repurchasing its own shares? Yes. No, we have said we do not consider Berkshire undervalued at this price. We didn't say we thought it was overvalued, but we said we did not consider it undervalued. So, a repurchase based on our estimate would not be in the interests of shareholders. It's conceivable it could be at some time but we do not think that's the case. We think intrinsic value far exceeds book value, but we do not think it exceeds present price. We're not selling any shares though either. Zone 6. My name is Carlos Lucero. I'm from Idaho. And my question relates to street names. Our stock at Berkshire Hathaway is in a family limited partnership. And in addition to that, it's in a street name. Now what is the reason and the rationale behind the reason for, street name shares not being able to participate in the charitable contributions by Berkshire Hathaway? We submitted a request for ruling to the IRS, I don't know, 15 years or so years ago in connection with the shareholder designated contribution program and the ruling we received specifies record holders and not street name holders. Now, that doesn't mean that a different ruling might not be obtained, but frankly when we get into the multitude of indirect holdings and the problems we have with those indirect holdings in other respects, I think it would be a bit of a nightmare for us to attempt to get that program extended through into into street name holders. I think the costs would far exceed the benefits and I think that it is the situation that anybody with it in street name can move it into their own name if they want to. So I think with very small amount of effort on the part of an individual shareholder, it would offset an enormous set of problems that we would encounter at Berkshire. We can handle the present system. We've got 12 people there. And they run the annual meeting. They make movies. They do all kinds of things. And it would be very tough. And if an extra 10,000 shares participated, it would be $120,000 of contributions. I just don't think it would be worthwhile. Our ruling doesn't presently cover the subject, in any event. It's something we thought about. Charlie? Yeah. I think even if they change the ruling, we wouldn't change the policy. It would be administratively very difficult. We run into other problems in terms of people getting their material, just the material on the annual meeting. And we've heard from a number of shareholders that they can't get it from their broker and they don't know what the B is all about because they didn't get their proxies and probably have more than forget about the B, we have more than twice as many, I believe, holders in street name as in direct ownership, although the number of shares is far, far. I mean, it'd be less than 20% of the shares, but it's probably double the number of holders. Zone 7. Good afternoon. My name is Bill Guerra. I'm from the San Francisco Bay Area. I've owned your shares for many years and appreciate the good job you've done. However, in this year's Chairman's letter, you developed a concept a few years ago called look through earnings. Right. And I failed to see that this year and I'm wondering if that no longer is a valid concept or why you refrain from showing the data? Yes, that's a good question. I should have actually covered that in the annual report in terms of mentioning because I've talked about it and we'll talk about it in the future and we do have a goal on look through earnings of $2,000,000,000 in the year 2000 and that's going to be adjusted upward to allow for the fact there are more shares outstanding. It'll be the same basic goal. But, there were there were two reasons, that it was skipped this year. And like I say, I should have mentioned it. 1, one was it was the longest letter we've ever had and, and, having that section in there would have elongated it, even a bit more and, that coupled with the fact, and this is the important part of it, we had major changes in our the composition of the company immediately after the end of the year. So our Capital City stock disappeared. At the time it disappeared, we didn't know whether it was going into cash or all Disney stock or a combination. We had the acquisition of the other half of GEICO or even now the accounting treatment isn't clear. And I felt that the diluted earnings last year were fine, but I felt that by the time I got through explaining all of the adjustments you would have to make for the transactions then pending, that adding it to the already the longest letter I've written would have slowed things down a lot and not been particularly helpful. It will be back in this year, this upcoming report and future reports because it's a very important concept and it's something that we're focused on. It's just that last year's number would have been a mess by the time I got through trying to explain it. I normally the accounting stuff I know puts a lot of you to sleep, but believe me, it isn't so much fun writing it either. So I skipped it this year. We'll have it next year. And the number would have been okay last year, but there would have been a lot of asterisks attached. Zone 8, please. Yes, Mr. Buffet. Good morning. My name is Ed Wolczak from New York. I'm a student and admirer of your investment philosophy. I have a question. In determining a company's intrinsic value, you seem to write or indicate that you project out a company's owner earnings for a number of years and then discount that back by prevailing rates. My question is how much of a premium, if any, to prevailing risk free rates do you demand when you discount back the owner earnings of a company? Or stated differently, for example, today with long rates about 7%, if you did the same exercise with Coca Cola, at what rate of interest would you discount back their own earnings? Yeah. We get asked that question a lot and we've answered it to some extent in past annual reports about what discount rate to use. We basically think in terms of the long term government rate and there may be times when in a very we don't think we're any good at predicting interest rates, but probably in times of very what would seem like very low rates, we might use a little higher rate. But we don't put the risk factor in per se because essentially the purity of the idea is that you're discounting future cash and it doesn't make any difference whether cash comes from a risky business or a safe business, so called safe business. So the value of the cash delivered by a water company, which is going to be around for 100 years, is not different than the value of the cash derived from some high-tech company, if any, that you might be looking at. It may be harder for you to make the estimate and you may therefore want a bigger discount when you get all through with the calculation. But up to the point where you decide what you're willing to pay. You may decide you can't estimate it at all. I mean, that's what happens with us with most companies. But we believe in using, the a government bond type interest rate. We believe in trying to stick with businesses that where we think we can see the future reasonably well, you never see it perfectly obviously, but where we think we have a reasonable handle on it. And we would differentiate to some extent, we don't want to go below a certain threshold of understanding. So we want to stick with businesses we think we understand quite well and not try to have the whole panoply with whole different kinds of risk rates because frankly we think that'd just be playing games with numbers. I mean, I don't think you can stick something numbers on a highly speculative business where the whole industry is going to change in 5 years and have them mean anything when you get through it. If you say I'm going to stick an extra 6% in on the interest rate to allow for the fact, I tend to think that's kind of nonsense. I mean it may look mathematical, but it's mathematical gibberish in my view. You better just stick with businesses that you can understand. Use the government bond rate and when you can buy them something you understand well, the significant discount, then you should start getting excited. Charlie? Yeah, the discounts were once greater than we now see. That's all you've got to get, folks. Zone 1. Hi, Warren. It's Peter Newman, Nick and Racky's son, you can't see me because I'm on your hard left over here. And by the way, Racky says to send her love to you, Susie. I'm going to take a cue from something that the guy who asked the questions about the World Book. I know you're loathed to normally interfere in the running of your individual corporations because they do so well on their own. And I am particularly fond of See's Candy and their products. And you may or may not know that we have a chocoholic in our family as you do in yours. Makes good chocolate syrup too. I won't mention who. However, when I was in there this Christmas buying some gifts, I noted that with the exception of the little candy canes, there's nothing in that store that is fat free. And we are facing a trend in the world, especially in dessert items and ice cream and candy items of fat freeness. And I just thought that perhaps it would be worth a word to management to consider expanding the hard candy line. Well, we look at a lot of things. One of the problems is you probably know, for example, in using aspartame is it doesn't interact well with heat. And so that's been sort of tough. Now Charlie and I have kept getting our regular boxes of candy during this weight loss program and we've devoured them. Candy, you know, maybe on average 100 and, depends on whether it's a sugar product or not, but take the lollipop, it'd be about 100 110 calories per ounce, but there's that's 1.5 or 1.25 lollipops or something like that. Most things are in that 100 per ounce to 150 per ounce range. So the candy is not a specific no no. If we can find something that the customer likes that makes them think they're getting skinnier by eating it, That will be a breakthrough and we look forward to it. And we test all the we test everything that comes along. I can assure you that back, Charlie and I may be the main testers, but that, Chuck Huggins is here today and if you've got any ideas on it, who runs SEAS, done a terrific job of running SEAS ever since we took over in 1972. He'd appreciate ideas, but we are looking for things that appeal to the consumer that, that taste good and that, they'll go for it. I mean, just as is the Coca Cola Company in terms of carbonated soft drinks. So it's a constant subject. And there were high hopes on aspartame originally, but it just hasn't panned out in terms of candy. And I read a few articles about the fat free stuff. Well, it should be the fat substitute, which didn't get me too excited about trying it, but I'm not sure whether some of you read those articles or not. We'll keep looking, Peter. I appreciate it. Zone 2. Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. As an aspiring shareholder, I'm very happy and proud to be here. Maybe I can encourage Mr. Munger to respond to my question this morning. In regards to your purchase of the other half of GEICO, would you comment on your reasoning behind paying the premium above market value and why you instead did not purchase shares in the open market? Well, we couldn't have purchased very many shares in the open market at the quoted price And the price we paid for the large number of shares we got, we thought was a very satisfactory price. We put charges at 100 percent rate. We also had a restriction that we agreed to many, many years ago, almost 20 years ago, as to the number of shares we would own without the consent of the directors and I believe the insurance department. So we actually had some special restrictions on us in the case of GEICO, but if we hadn't had those restrictions, we'd have behaved in exactly the same manner. And we didn't think we could buy it any cheaper than that price, and we gulped a few times and paid it. And I think we will be happy that we did as it's turning out. GEICO is doing very well. I mean, I knew it would do well, but I feel very good about it. Zone 3. Mr. Buffet, my name is David Lowe from Ventura, California. My first Berkshire meeting, and I want to mention that I'm very intrigued at the influence you have over the shareholders here. I note that the first beverage they ran out of in the lobby was Cherry Coke. My question is about the Buffalo News. You say in the, in the letter from the 'ninety five report that the, newspaper industry has lost another notch in its economic attractiveness. Can you elaborate on that? Yeah. The, what you are seeing in newspapers is a circulation trend that has been prevalent for a long time in terms of newspapers per household, but that has been declining and that daily newspapers and that I would say the trends of the last couple of years are somewhat worse in that respect. I would say that the ability to price both at the circulation and advertising level is as weakened a bit in recent years, not dramatically, but it's weakened a bit. At one time, newspapers really, daily newspapers in single newspaper towns were probably as attractive economically as any business you could find. I mean, a large percentage of advertisers had very little choice in terms of using them as an advertising medium. People had less options in the way of learning what was going on around them, other than the daily newspapers. So that they started from a position of extraordinary strength. They still have a very strong position and I've tried to emphasize that in the report. I mean, they are they're a bargain at the price they sell for. They give you all kinds of information with very low price and, they're a magnificent way for most merchants to reach their customers. But they are not they do not have the exclusive advantages in many cases that they had 15 or 20 years ago. 3rd class mail has become more of an option. People have more ways of obtaining information. As we talked earlier, information can be processed electronically and delivered at far lower cost than people dreamt of 20 years ago. So all of those things eat away a little bit. It's still a very fine business, but those I don't see anything that will reverse those trends. I don't think that they will necessarily accelerate, but I, but I, I think that if the only thing you owned in life was a daily newspaper and a single newspaper town 20 years ago, you would feel slightly less secure today than you did at that time, but you'd still be a lot better off than owning virtually any other business. Charlie? Nothing to add. How about zone 4? Mr. Buffet, my name is Hutch Vernon. I'm from Baltimore, Maryland. I know that you read lots and lots of annual reports and I'm curious what you are reading for, if you would share that with us. But I'm more curious because I think I know what you're reading for, if there are any disclosures, any further disclosures that you would like to see companies make in their financial reporting or that the SEC require in financial reporting or proxies or other communications with their shareholders? And that would be for both you and for Mr. Munger. Yeah. The main thing that they can't mandate in annual reports is I really like to have I like to know as much as I can about the person that's running it and how they think about the business and what's really going on in the business. In other words, I would like to have a report that would be identical to what if I owned half of a company but was away for a year and I had a partner who owned the other half, when I came back that he would tell me about what had taken place during the past year and what he foresaw coming up and all of that. That is what I think the purpose of the report is. Now the SEC mandates a lot of information and some of that is helpful, but there's an intent behind the report. I mean, if it's a sales document, I'm less interested. And I don't see any way to mandate what I'm talking about, but that's the kind of report I'm looking for. What I'm trying to do as I read reports, a, I like to understand just generally what's going on in all kinds of businesses. If we own stock in a company in an industry and there are 8 other companies that are in the same industry, I want to own or be on the mailing list for the reports for the other 8 because I can't understand how my company is doing unless I understand what the other 8 are doing. I want to have the perspective of in terms of market share or what's going on in the business or their margins or the trend of margins or all kinds of things that I can't get unless I know I can't be an intelligent owner of a business unless I know what all the other businesses in that industry are doing. And so I try to get that information out of a report. If I'm thinking about investing in the specific company, I try to size up their business and the people that are running it. And over the years, I found reading a lot of reports to be quite useful in terms of making business decisions at Berkshire. If we own a whole of a business, I want to own shares in all of the competitors just to keep track of what's going on. And I want to be able to intelligently evaluate how our managers are doing that. And I can't do that unless I know the industry backdrop against which they're working. It's amazing, what how well you can do in invest in investing really with what I would call outside information. I find inside information. I'm not sure how useful that is, but outside information, there's all kinds of information around as to businesses. And you don't have to understand all of them and you just have to understand the ones that you're thinking about getting in and you can do it if you just but nobody will do it for you. You can't read in my view, you can't read Wall Street reports and get anything out of them. You have to do it yourself and get your arms around it. I don't think we've ever gotten an idea in 40 years from a Wall Street report, but we've gotten a lot of ideas from annual reports. Charlie? What I find is that it takes a long time to read the annual report, even if it's a comparatively simple business. As if you really are trying to understand it, it's not a bit easy. Yeah. I would say that on average in a business we're really interested in, even though we know what to skip to some extent, what to read, I mean, it's going to be 45 minutes or an hour on a report and if there are 6 or 8 companies in the industry, that's going to be 6 or 8 hours perhaps and then their quarterlies and a lot of other. I mean, the way you learn about businesses is by absorbing information about them, thinking it, deciding what counts and what doesn't count, relating one thing to another. And, you know, that's the job. And you can't get that by looking at a bunch of little numbers on a chart bobbing up and down about a or reading market commentary and periodicals or anything of the sort. That just won't do it. You've got to understand the businesses. That's where it all begins and ends. Zone 5. Mr. Buffet, my name is Hank Strickland. I'm from Fairfax, Virginia, which if it were a city, would be the 10th largest in the United States. I'm here as a stockholder, and my daughter, who's also my broker, is here with me. We were also out there Friday night when we watched you warming up for the beginning of the ball game. And we noted that you didn't drop the ball. You seemed to be able to get it to the guy that was warming you up. We noticed your, 1st pitch, which I had difficulty characterizing as either being a pass ball or a wild pitch. He was a premature sinker, actually. Very, very hard to hit, I might add. And then you, moved sprightly into the stands, did a lot of picture taking photo opportunities, signed autographs, vaulted over a rail or 2, and we noted with great enthusiasm your fitness. Now that all having been said, many people would characterize Berkshire as a 1 man company with all due respect to Charlie. And many of us in this audience here, I'm sure are retired or semi retired. It's not unthinkable that perhaps you might want to retire or for good God's sake. It's unthinkable. I don't want that one to go by. Or for something worse could happen. And for those That would be the worst. I think I think death would be second. I could think of something some of us might want to do to protect our sizable investments, say, having owned Berkshire since blue chip stamp days. But anyway, we could put in a stop order, might take out an insurance policy. We might ask Charlie to masquerade as Warren after you moved on. Those don't seem like very attractive options. I'm very serious now. How would you respond to the question of a stockholder that's really concerned about Berkshire being a one man show. Well, Berkshire is not a one man show. It's a 2 man show in terms of capital allocation. There's no question about that at present, but it's run by many managers that are doing an outstanding job and that don't need any guidance from Charlie or me as go along. But I might say that I will die with all of my Berkshire stock essentially and that stock will be held either in the family or in a foundation depending on the order of death for a long time thereafter. So there's no one that's more concerned about the subsequent management issue than I. I mean, this is not something that ends at all on my death and it doesn't end for the Buffett family or the Buffett Foundation. So, it's a subject that Charlie and I both thought about. The most likely situation, you've got to get away from the idea that it's a 1 man show, because right now we've got 30 3,000 people working for Berkshire out there as we speak. And I'm sitting around watching movies myself or something. I mean, you can see how vital I am to the place. So the but the question and the other thing we do besides allocate capital is we do identify these managers and hopefully we make it attractive for them to stay and work for Berkshire. But that doesn't require 150 IQ or anything to do that. It does require a certain sensitivity to why people want to get up in the morning and do what they do. And when I'm not around, the logical, somewhat depends on exactly when it happens, but Charlie's a little older than I am. And it's likely that it will be broken into a 2 person function again, but not exactly the way Charlie and I function. And that is that there will be, someone in charge of investments in capital allocation. I mentioned Lou Simpson's position because he is younger than I am. And allocation. I mentioned Lou Simpson's position because he is younger than I am in the annual report. And then someone in charge of operations. And we have that person in the organization now. Now, I don't know what the situation will be when I die because it could be in 20 minutes or it could be in 20 years. And when that so I can't specifically name the individuals. We have the individuals now for both those functions. We'll have the individuals for the same functions 20 years from now. I don't know. I don't know whether they'll be the same people. But it's a quite a logical way to run the business. GEICO was run that way and still is run that way, and has been for some years. It's always struck me as terribly illogical the way property casualty insurance companies are run because they've been dominated by the underwriting side of the business and here they have this important investment side, but it's always been virtually every company has been subservient to the underwriting and GEICO very logically set up a co CEO arrangement, some years back where originally Bill Snyder and before that, but Tony nicely ran the underwriting end of the business and Lou Simpson ran the investment side and those are 2 very different functions. Same person logically doesn't fit both functions in most cases. I mean it's a rarity when the same person happens to hit for both functions. So GEICO worked very well that way, still works that way. Lou runs investments, Tony runs underwriting. And Berkshire slightly different, it's a variant on it, but essentially at some Berkshire headquarters, you need someone overseeing, and not meddling in them too much, but making sure you've got the right manager, and you're treating them fairly. You need someone on the operating side, you need someone on the investment and capital allocation side. We've got those people now. And we'll have them, you know, whenever it happens too. But that's the, that is the structure and we've got some very good businesses and nobody is buying See's Candy because they think I'm sitting in some office in Omaha and no one's buying a GEICO insurance policy because my name is there as Chairman or CEO. The businesses are marvelous businesses. They'll continue very well. And there will be a capital allocation problem then just like there is now. And there will be the problem of keeping good managers in place and treating them fairly. And that's a solvable problem. So that's the future as seen from Kiewit Plaza. Charlie? Yes. If you just run your mind through all the assets, I think you will quickly decide that there are large momentums in place that would do very well without us. I mean, is Coca Cola going to suddenly stop selling because some manager's dead at Berkshire Hathaway? You know, are the people going to stop using Gillette razor blades? Is GEICO suddenly going to stop being intelligently run? Or is the Nebraska Furniture Mart going to try any less hard? So the existing assets, you can argue, have been lovingly put together so as not to require continuing intelligence at headquarters. And what there would be a disadvantage and that I think would be unreasonable to expect that a successor would be as good at making new investments as Warren has been in the past. Well, that's just too damn bad. The sympathetic air over here. Let's see, where are we, zone 6 now? Mr. Buffet, I'm indebted to Walter Schloss for introducing me to you some 40 years ago. And finally, in the early eighties, I became a stockholder. My question is now that you've expanded headquarters 9% from 11 people to 12 people, Do you now more frequently answer letters from stockholders? As a specific, had you looked at my letter in January, 1986? We haven't gotten to January yet. Relating to Cap Cities ABC and talk radio, the problem that occurred last month at cap cities might have been prevented. You should get a form letter from us, but we do not A, we do not get into the activities of our investee companies. I mean, if people are unhappy about Coca Cola or Gillette, and they shouldn't be, but if they happen to be, they should talk to the companies themselves. I don't interject myself into the management or operations of the investee companies. In terms of questions about Berkshire, I put in the annual report a few years back, just running Berkshire takes up a fair amount of time in terms of keeping track of a lot of businesses and doesn't need to take up as much time as it does with me, but I enjoy it. But the I feel that the annual report, the annual meeting are the time to take up everything on shareholders' minds. And so I don't answer 1 on 1 questions. I get all kinds of letters. They want career guidance. They want advice on their business. I mean, there's a 1,000,000 letters that come in and it would really be it would take a significant amount of time that otherwise would be spent on Berkshire to reply to that sort of thing. I may note them in terms of what I address in subsequent annual reports, but the annual meeting and the annual report I feel are the best ways to communicate with shareholders and I really don't do it the rest of the year, although you will get some form of reply or you should get some form of reply on it. Thanks. It's noon now and I'd like to give everybody a chance to visit our other stores and everything, but we will be back here at 12:15, and all of you in the outside, the overflow rooms can come join us in the main room, and we'll just continue these questions at that time. Thank you.

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