Great. Welcome everyone, here in the afternoon session of day two of the 27th Annual Global Technology Conference. I'm Tim Chiodo. I'm the lead payments, processors, and FinTech analyst here at UBS, and we're very fortunate to have with us the team from Shift4. We have Jared Isaacman, the CEO, Taylor Lauber, President and Chief Strategy Officer, and also here at the conference is Tom McCrohan, who is Head of Investor Relations. So a special thanks to Jared, Taylor, and Tom, who've been at this conference many years, and we appreciate you making the trip to Arizona.
Of course.
Okay, well, we will hopefully have some time at the end for Q&A. We'll have a microphone available, so if you'd like to ask a question, please be prepared. But we're gonna start this out with hitting on, one by one, each of the four idiosyncratic growth drivers that Shift4 has. We're going to walk through SkyTab, international, gateway conversion, and new verticals. So with that, why don't we start with SkyTab, and let's talk about the distribution efforts there. Last year around this time, the talk was of the insourcing of about 350 salespeople. Maybe just bring us up to date on where we sit now in terms of both the insourced and the outsourced distribution of SkyTab.
Sure. So, at the time of our IPO, we distributed almost entirely through, you know, third-party, you know, partners, and. That was because basically, we were processing payments in multiple different restaurant point-of-sale system software applications. Some we owned, some we built, and some we partnered with. You know, basically a year ago, which was always part of the plan, you just couldn't do it essentially during a pandemic, we consolidated into a single cloud-based solution, which is called SkyTab, at which point you were taking away the software and brand differentiation these various partners had. So you were gonna inevitably lead to channel conflict, so it was a very opportune time to be able to insource our best partners, kind of leveraging the data we had. What are the best markets?
If, you know, we've been selling and successfully winning within the restaurant point-of-sale space for, you know, 20 years, we know that, you know, Fort Lauderdale, Miami, probably gonna be fine, and we know maybe parts of the, you know, central Midwest might, you know, more sparsely populated areas might be a little bit, you know, a little bit more challenging. So in which case, we insourced all the, like, high conviction areas around the country, good data support. We brought in over 400 employees in that process and pivoted largely to a direct model. We still have third-party distribution partners in those more sparsely populated areas just to round out coverage. But bottom line is the product strategy has gone incredibly well.
In our last earnings report, we put a nice chart in that showed you just, you know, system count growth over the last year. And I mean, pretty much all of our new cus- I mean, all net new customers now are essentially on SkyTab. And look, it's largely a two-horse race. You know, us and another really good competitor are the only two with, you know, cloud-based solutions and the sophisticated distribution capable of servicing complex table service type restaurants. And I'd say we're both, you know, continue to be good beneficiaries from kind of legacy providers that don't have that offering.
Okay, so to that point, let's dig in a little bit there. So would—you've said in the past, and maybe I think the truth is it runs a little bit the gamut, but would you say that you generally target a larger restaurant or can target a larger restaurant relative to that competitor?
Yeah. So I'd say, like a lot of things in sales, it's all, it's all about the sizzle features, right? The actual core product offering, for example, it's very mature for us and our competitor. Like the ability to ring up a cheeseburger, you know, or things like reputation management or analytics or online ordering, it's all table stakes. So the, the capability to power a restaurant is, is pretty universal between the two of us. I think that your sizzle features is what ultimately, you know, brings in, in customers. And, you know, if you want to target, you know, smaller or new restaurants, you have capital offerings and payroll offerings, that will resonate more with those type of customers.
You know, if you wanna move upmarket, then you're, you know, leveraging your integrations within hospitality environments, you're providing business intelligence tools, you know, that are, you know, what larger customers would tend to gravitate towards. So I would say that we generally, there's two players that are really targeting the complex table service market, and I'd say the bottom end of that would be more your startups, your new restaurants, higher failure rate would be one, and we would gravitate towards the middle and the upper end.
Excellent. All right, let's move on to idiosyncratic driver number two, which is international. So with Finaro closing, you had given some numbers around the kind of run rate EBITDA for that business, but inherent in that, there was a little bit of portions of the business that you purposefully exited, but at the same time, you were adding customers over to Finaro. So maybe you could just give us an update on the sizing and where we sit on the net of those two, adds and subtract.
Yeah, sure. So when we announced the Finaro transaction, we expected that had we owned it for the entirety of 2023, it would contribute about $15 billion in volume, about $30 million of EBITDA. The transaction took longer to close for regulatory reasons than we would have liked. But on the plus side, we were able to deliver a bunch of customers and work kind of in concert with that business around a lot of what the key strategic objectives were. Just to give you a sense for what that kind of extended review period afforded us, we would have expected the true synergy opportunity, which was to light up, you know, a restaurant in the UK, for example, would have taken probably 3 years from the day we closed on that transaction.
We lit up our first restaurants in the UK within a month of closing the transaction. So the synergy benefits have been, have been immense from our standpoint, especially on the technical side. We can deliver a product that is, you know, was, was pretty aspirational at the time of signing. We can deliver that today. That's really encouraging... The stats we've talked about publicly, just to get a sense for what the blended business looks like today, is a run rate EBITDA in excess of, $45 million a year. And we did try to break out some of what the kind of legacy business could contribute from a volume perspective and what we think, you know, the synergized contribution can be in our most recent earnings materials.
I want to say that's not a guide, that's just a path that gets us to what has been a three-year plan at this point, that we're in year two of.
Yeah. Maybe just to layer on, 'cause that's very transaction specific of why did you buy an asset to open up a payments opportunity in Europe and what that transaction looked like pro forma for synergies. Why, you know, maybe just give rationale of why do it in the first place. So for those anyone new in the story, you know, Shift4's been in business 24 years. And, you know, throughout those 24 years, we've derived virtually all of our volume and revenue from the United States. And we've grown both of those KPIs double digits every year without missing a beat through every downturn on that. And I say that because I think most would agree, the U.S. is the most competitive market for payments in the world. I think probably a lot of you would agree.
There's a lot to get your arms around with all the different payments companies, public and private, right? So if we've been able to kind of prevail in that highly competitive market for so long, and a lot of it is being very ahead on things like integrated payments, the convergence of software and payments, imagine what you can do when you take those products and services that have won in this highly competitive market, and you bring them into other markets that are less competitive. So Europe is a great example. Integrated payments, table stakes here in for restaurants and hotels in the United States, and we lead in that regard. In Europe, it's all standalone. So they might bring a what looks like a wireless payments device over to the table. It doesn't do order at table.
It doesn't integrate to the software. They have to reenter the check amount into it. Hotels, they'll pull up your reservation, and then they'll key it into a local bank terminal right next to that. So, like, the opportunity set is really wide open. We wanted to follow a very important customer of ours all over the world, which is why we embarked on the transaction that Taylor just walked you through, with the aim of taking those products and services that have worked very well for us here in the U.S. in a competitive environment and bring them into Europe, which is why we're chasing down restaurants, hotels, and stadiums across Europe now that this transaction is complete.
Thank you, Jared and Taylor. Let's move to idiosyncratic driver number three, which is the gateway and software conversion. So to set the stage, you recently updated us that there's about $180 billion of volume to go after. That's split $150 billion from the gateways and about $30 billion or so from the software side. Those gateways, they were acquired pre-COVID, and you have been converting some of that business. We've talked about this many times in the past, but when we think about the mechanics of converting a gateway-only merchant over to full end-to-end, when you approach them, there's kind of four potential outcomes, and maybe you could just talk through those being, number one, there's some inertia and maybe they're just not ready. Two, they convert. Three, maybe they're repriced in terms of their gateway fees.
And then the fourth is, a small portion of them will depart the platform.
I was going to say, does everyone know just background, 'cause you, again, getting into the meat of it, but understand, like, why gateways even exist, why this opportunity even presented itself? Like, like the card brands and the original legacy acquirers are essentially the backbone to the payment industry. Like, the technology is really binary and quite, quite dumb, actually. It's an approval or a decline, and that's it. Maybe every now and then it said, like, voice authorization. So as there were new use cases for payments coming up that required capabilities beyond just an approval or a decline, the card brands and the payment processors took a very lazy approach and said, "Talk to this company, they'll fix it for you." And what happened is, like, best example is, like, Authorize.Net.
It was like, whoa, people are buying on this internet thing, and now we need to make sure that where we're shipping the television set is the same address that's on the card. So, like, there's AVS, and then we got a whitelist, like, IP addresses that come from, like, international markets that shouldn't be ordering this. And, and these gateways basically became a technology layer that lived in front of the card brands and the legacy payment providers, and all the software that businesses needed to make that commerce experience happen integrated into that technology layer instead of the processors or the card brands. And again, became a very lazy way out. Oh, hotels, you need to do authorizations online, but then you got to check in, but you can go to the lobby bar and charge back to your room.
Lots of different transaction amounts moving around, but when you check out, it's only a single card type. Well, we know there's a gateway that took care of that. Just go talk to them. And basically, they would do all of this work, integrating the software, tokenize transactions, provide the encryption, all the analytics associated with it, for the smallest portion of the payment economics pie, right? Like, if 50 basis points is the magic, they're getting $0.02-$0.03. And they had to exist in an agnostic environment where they didn't partner with any payments companies, or they didn't favor any payments companies. They let them all play equally. We recognized that, saw there's, like, $250 billion in volume sitting on these gateways, right?
That were not being rewarded for the service they were providing, acquired them, gave up the Switzerland agnostic model, and pivoted them towards our own processing service, which in the spirit of just general vertical integration, which makes sense, owning more links in the value chain is more value to the customer. It'll ultimately save money, and in the process, it's a huge gross profit uplift for us. And for the better part of the, you know, last 6 years or so of our 24 years of existence, half of our production has come from moving those customers to our end-to-end platform through a variety of kind of carrot and stick methods, which is where I think you were ultimately teeing Taylor up for.
Yeah, so if you talk about the response from a customer who's integrated to the gateway, they've got a lot of software. They know inherently that we have a very different value proposition from their historic go-to-market. They don't have to work with six different vendors. They don't need the gateway to send transactions to a merchant acquirer, which creates multiple sort of points of failure for the transaction, a lot more complexity, and just a lot more mouths to feed inside of it. So the natural proposition is, if I shift to end-to-end, which is our, you know, full stack offering, there's no physical friction inside my merchant location. Nothing changes from a technology standpoint, but all the transactions are in one spot, and that's really valuable for me, and I save money. So why doesn't everyone do it?
And I, inertia is a huge point to it, and I think, Tim, you coined this in your, like, opening research on Shift4 a month after we went public. You said, "If there's an enemy to this strategy, it's inertia." And I think that's the reality of it. Like, we'd love to think that hoteliers and restaurateurs and retailers are waking up every morning thinking about how to optimize their payment processing transaction costs. They're not. They're waking up thinking about how to provide an amazing experience for their guests. So what tells us that the strategy is working? Number one, to Jared mentioned this, about half of the growth of our business comes from these conversions.
Number two, and probably more impactful, basically, every new resort that's been built in the country over the last three years has chosen Shift4 for all of those value proposition characteristics from the start, whether that's the Fontainebleau in Las Vegas being built. They could have chosen, you know, any one of the competitors that we have. They chose Shift4. They know the value proposition. So the hardest challenge we have is, you know, in the summer of 2023, I don't think we anticipated this would be the busiest time for hotels in probably a decade. It's a hard conversation to compel them to have. With that being said, it drives a healthy portion of our production. We've got, you know, multiple teams that focus on this, and we're not unhappy with the pace, and I think that's most important.
We have implemented strategies like, you know, modestly increasing the price to compel more of the conversations to happen. But I think as you lay out the likely outcomes, you've got a healthy portion that just kind of ignore the phone call and leave things status quo for a while. You've got a really healthy portion that migrate to end-to-end, and you've got this more modest portion that are willing to accept the price lift because they've got kind of nothing going on. Very few leave. The technological barriers to leaving are significant, and you don't save money, you don't save complexity. So the reasons for leaving are, you know, quite, quite idiosyncratic, related to a decision a merchant might have made five years ago, but very few ever take that path.
What all this means is that Shift4, just in terms of winning net new customers in the addressable market, which across restaurants, hotels, stadiums, is pretty enormous, is probably one of the fastest-growing payment companies out there. And then we're further advantaged because we sit on $180 billion plus of volume that's highly dependent on our technology. That's a natural cross-sell, and it's basically like an embedded ARPU expansion story in the business, and for every $1 we make from a gateway customer, when they move to end-to-end, it becomes $4 or $5, and they're paying less in the process because they kill off 3 other mouths they're feeding. It's one of our unique advantages.
Thank you. There's a couple follow-ups there, but we'll save it if we have time at the end. Let's go to idiosyncratic driver number 4, which is new verticals, which you just alluded to in terms of stadiums. I think a good place to start is just to talk about how many stadiums you had at the time of the IPO, which I believe was 1, versus how many that you have now, and then also just updating the audience on how you view the size of that TAM for stadiums and entertainment.
Yeah, at the time of our IPO, which was June 5, 2020, our majority of our customers were restaurants and growing very quickly, which, you know, is not, not the most desirable vertical when, you know, during a pandemic, from a regulatory perspective, you weren't allowed to go out and eat. So we kinda committed, if you pull off an IPO during a once-in-a-century pandemic, you should diversify. So we went into other pandemic-sensitive verticals like hotels, travel, stadiums that were equally shut down during the pandemic. But it turns out they're all really good now, and, at the time of the IPO, we did have a single stadium. To give you a sense of where we're at presently today, some 750 stadiums and entertainment venues. What's an entertainment venue?
The biggest theme parks in the country use Shift4 software to power, you know, their commerce experience. Of that 750, a little over 150 in venue are using us for payments, so software plus payments. The other 600 and some odd will all come over over the next two years as we migrate them from Appetize to VenueNext. Of that 750, at the beginning of this year, we had one, maybe two, that were giving us ticketing volume. Ticketing volume is huge. If you think about when you go to a stadium, whatever the face value of the ticket is, you probably spend, like, a third of that at best, in just food and stuff at the stadium, right? You know, if it's like $200 ticket, you probably spend $50.
So, like, every time we get ticketing, it's like a 4x lift in volume per customer, and it's actually a substantially higher take rate than what a concession stand would be. So we started this year with, like, 1 or 2. We're gonna end this year at 10, and then kind of in the ecosystem around the stadium, you've got parking and retail, and we probably have, of those 750, maybe 20 or so that are using us for retail and parking. We say all this not in any way to imply that, like, we're not having success in this vertical. We're killing it in this vertical.
It's more or less to set expectations of what you should expect to see over the next couple of years, is all 750 of those wind up moving over to payments, and then we think a very large portion will wind up inevitably moving ticketing, retail, and parking.
Okay, great. I think we covered those four quite well. Let's move on to take rates. So the take rate's been pretty stable in that 65 range, and I think that's been well-received by investors, and that's despite some mix shifts that we would have expected for it to come down more. So you're bringing on larger merchants, whether it's through new verticals or through gateway conversion, and there's also the mix shift over to Europe that's sort of pending, which has some markets that are higher, some that are lower. Where we net out is we're modeling take rate coming down slightly over the next few years, each year, a few basis points. Is that the right way for investors to think about it?
Yeah. Well, I... The first thing I want to start, because I totally get the sensitivity to take rate and how easy you can make some of the modeling on this, just to level set for everybody, right? If, if a competitor of ours, like our biggest value prop for us in moving into stadiums, why we win like crazy there is we enable to order a burger and a beer in your seats, and it gets delivered over, and that gives us the leverage to get concession stands, the suites, the ticketing, and everything else.... Reality is like a $multi-hundred million-a-year stadium, you know, isn't gonna pay 100 basis points. If they were, there's a problem, it should be a red flag.
But what I can tell you is, let's just say hypothetically, they pay us 30 basis points. There is no way any competitor can come in and say, "Look, I'll do it for 5. I'll do it for 2 basis points, but you got to give up this whole order, order the burger and a beer in a seat." They just would never do it. So I say across all fintech right now, like, actually being able to grow payment volume is very difficult, right? You have to be providing a superior commerce-enabling experience, not an approval or decline, but a broader commerce-enabling experience, even to have the right to win. And then once you do have the right to win, the pricing corresponds to the size of the customer.
So of our 24 years in business, like 17, 18 years of it, all we did was the Irish pub on the corner, like 90, 100 basis point customer. You know, the last five, six years being in business, we've got some of the largest hotels, resorts, half the Las Vegas Strip, massive stadiums. They, they don't come on at 90, 100, 100 basis points. They come in less, and what happens is it starts to average down. It's a mix shift towards somewhere around 65. Now, what I would say is, like, I do believe we reached a point where we're exiting this year, call it $110 billion in volume.
You're dealing with such large numbers now, that when like a $3 billion a year enterprise hospitality customer comes on at appropriate pricing for them, it has less of an impact than it did a year ago, you know, when you still had a lot of smaller 100 basis point customers, and comes on, it brings down the averages. So I think Nancy said we're probably, you know, using 65 is a good launching off point for this year, makes a lot of sense, and that, you know, we're still majority of our customers are the small restaurants and hotels that come in north of 65. But we also are doing a really good job winning some monsters, too, and hopefully averages out and stays, you know, in that zip code. But it should progressively come down over time. I mean, it just makes sense.
Agreed. All right, let's move to EBITDA margins, specifically your very high incremental EBITDA margins. So the past four quarters, they've benefited from the residual buyouts, which had a benefit to the cost of revenue line, and the incremental margins were, I want to say, in the 90% range. But what's the right number to think about on a go-forward basis? Is it in that roughly 50% range for incremental EBITDA margins?
So it's a great question. I think the right way to contextualize this is all the new verticals we've introduced, despite the spread consternation that I think some have had, the incremental margin's phenomenal on them. Like, when we enable ticketing for a stadium that we're already supporting, that is 100% flow through. The Ticketmaster integration or the SeatGeek integration or the Paciolan integration, once they're built, the maintenance on them is relatively low throughout the time frame. So the flow through margins are really attractive. One thing I want to emphasize, because I think at a... Like, many of our competitors were not, you know, profitable businesses. They are changing the way they do business in a climate where being profitable is a requisite for doing business from their investors.
We are in the opposite position, which is that we've been profitable for, you know, the entirety of the company's history, and we view times like this as a time to invest in the business. So despite the margin expansion you've seen, we've implemented two new headquarter facilities in the past year. We've got multimillion-dollar sort of software revamp projects for internal systems, and we're upgrading talent across the board. So if any of these investments have a positive ROI, and I think they all will, you'll see further margin expansion. But it's important to realize that, you know, the flow-through in the payments business is always very, very high, and the new verticals that we're penetrating, you know, offer that to an order of magnitude.
Yeah. I'd also say, like, where our foundation was built, which is on restaurant-small restaurant software customers, and gateway business, you're talking about some of the most labor-intensive customers imaginable. I mean, they call you for, you know, you want to change the price of buffalo wings. That's a phone call. There's a new tax in this county. It's, it's a phone call, like, you know, small volume, high take rates, lots of, lots of overhead burden to support them. So literally everything we're doing in our strategy, which is consolidate around a cloud-based solution, which is SkyTab, take out the parts and delete gateway connections and move them to end-to-end, all favor margin expansion.
I would say, like, better than half of the organization in terms of headcount, we have 3,000 people, is spent maintaining legacy solutions, all of which have active efforts to drive them to a modern solution. So, you know, we declared last year, essentially at this conference, "Hey, we're going to maintain flat headcount going into this year, but you should expect all our midterm outlook growth numbers to hold," essentially exactly what has happened. We're going into next year doing the same thing, and it's based on constantly reallocating personnel from the past to work on your future-based solutions as they inevitably move over towards it. Not to mention, all the new verticals are all very high flow through type customers that don't require a lot of overhead, a lot of incremental volume from them, too, so.
Okay, great. I want to squeeze in one last question and then hopefully leave some time for the audience. So Jared, as a part of your Q3 investor letter, you wrote that the company was, and I quote, "actively exploring strategic opportunities and alternatives that will reduce distractions and serve our company, employees, and shareholders best." Can you elaborate on that some more?
Yeah, I mean, my commentary would be consistent with what I've said before, which is it's in the board's hands, but like, yeah, I don't think we're always very appreciated for the results that we deliver, and that can come at a expense from a, you know, management perspective. Like, we're management, you know, holds 40% of the equity in this business. We think with that equity on every decision we make, and I think that's reflected in the results. And it's like, I mean, look, I write my own letter. I put in there, like, is it? Do you feel like the crowd is cheering for you as you're running very fast, or are they hoping you trip and fall?
I'd say over the last year, there's more, more people rooting for us to trip and fall, and if you have alternatives, it's worth considering.
Thank you, Jared. I think we can go to the audience. If anyone would like to raise their hand, we can come around and ask a question... Anyone out there? Okay, I've got a few more if, if we can squeeze them in here with the time that we have left. So the, let's go back. Taylor, you touched on this a little bit in terms of the, the levers for the gateway conversion, and you mentioned pricing, and you, I think, correct me if I'm wrong, you sort of alluded that you haven't really pressed that too hard. And when I look at our model, and I look at the gateway fees on a quarterly basis, they've been flattish too, and then in Q3, they were down a little bit, which to me, makes me think that you haven't really pushed that lever much at all.
We appreciate that some of the volumes have gone away. So how much of an opportunity is this, and would you consider pushing that lever some more?
So a few things. I think it's a constantly evolving process. We basically get, you know, for simplistic purposes, a shot a year per customer to evaluate the pricing they're on. Our first year we were, I think, you know, more conservative than we necessarily had to be. It didn't necessarily create the phone calls that we would have liked. And you know, to a certain extent, the same in the second year. And I think that if I'm being, you know, critiquing the strategy, I think it's generally worked, you know, a little bit less on conversions than we would have hoped. A little less phone calls, quite frankly. You get a steady number of conversions, kind of, just in the regular course way we think about and attack the gateway population.
The things to keep in mind are, it's a hospitality-oriented group of customers. Hotel rates have gone through the roof over the past year. If our bill goes up, it has gone nowhere up, nowhere near as high as probably the night to stay in this hotel over the course of the last two years. So you're in sometimes, you know, the merchant's got a lot bigger things to deal with than just your pricing strategy. But we also wanna be thoughtful and cautious and play for the long term. I think you've had two very notable missteps by competitors in our industry who introduced aggressive pricing, and one got a phone call from Congress.
Like, so we wanna be mindful, we wanna be thoughtful, we wanna get the value we deserve, and the day we will find out our strategy isn't working is when we're not winning net new customers with the exact same value proposition. And to the point I made earlier, we're winning a ton, so we're relatively content. We assess on a weekly basis the tack that we're taking, and over time, we will get full value, and we're stepping in that direction. And whether they move to end-to-end or they stay on the gateway and pay a higher fee associated with that, we're reasonably content with either option.
Okay, thank you. One more time for the audience. If not, I have one more I'll squeeze in. Okay, I'll--let's see if we can get to it. So you guys have given some color on this, and even in a shareholder letter once, but could you just talk a little bit how you consider the total cost to the restaurant of SkyTab relative to some of your largest competitors?
Yeah, I think that's, you know, this is just how we grew up in the, you know, as a company. You know, like we're a basement startup in New Jersey. You know, we never, never had, like, a Series A, B, C, D. It was all self-funded out of our own cash flows. All our growth was driven. Every hire that we made was out of our, essentially, our own pocket. I think that shapes an organization a lot, a lot more differently. And we're a payments company, which means that's how we're, you know, we're gonna, we're gonna monetize through, through spread on volume.
But we also recognized very early on, going back to 2005, when we created Harbortouch, that you had to, you had to be able to differentiate from traditional payments companies by providing a broader commerce solution, a software application, that would allow you to differentiate, win customers you otherwise won, and retain them longer. And we looked at that as pain points that you were solving for your customer to capture payments volume, right? So over time, you continue to have good feedback loops, and you figure out how to evolve your, whether it's your restaurant software or hotel software, in order to make a better application to win and retain more payment volume, right?
I think it's very different to approach it as a software company that's like, I have to depend on, at some point, ARPU expansion, so I need like eight different modules, right? And I better think of a ninth, and then I need a tenth, as if customers are super excited about the eleventh module that they get to pay for, right? So I think just that evolution has manifested itself in our pricing to customers. Like, unit economics isn't something we had to learn in the last couple of years. It's been, like, foundational for us since the get-go.
So we understand exactly what we can invest in a customer and what we need to charge, and if we'd rather charge that through SAF, SaaS or payments, we made a conscious decision long ago to do it through payments, which happened to work out really well in an inflationary time period, where you'd rather capture spread than a fixed, a fixed dollar amount, 'cause the characteristics of the revenue, if anything, are superior, probably in payments. So that's how it's evolved to such an extent, where there's this massive disparity between us and our competitor in terms of what we're willing to charge from like a, a SaaS perspective, and if we need to invent another module to get us across the finish line. And instead, it's like, you know what?
The headline looks really good for us, and we'll get a little bit more in take rate on payments, and the customer will like that, right? And I don't say - suggesting, you know, provide this in such a way that it describes like one has to win and the other has to fail. It's not the case. Talking about two players that really have the best solution to take a ton of share from so-called legacy providers. So there's a lot of winning at the end of the day for both organizations, but we think a little bit lighter on SaaS, a little bit more on payments, and I think that's just based on the organizations, one as a payments company, one as a software company, and how they've evolved.
Well, Jared, Taylor, Tom, on behalf of our team here and everyone at UBS, we really appreciate you being here with us. You've been a big part of this conference for many years, and thank you for being here. It's been a pleasure hosting you.
Thank you so much.