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Strategy Inc (MSTR)
NASDAQ: MSTR ยท Real-Time Price ยท USD
86.13
-4.19 (-4.64%)
At close: Nov 19, 2026, 4:00 PM EST
85.74
-0.39 (-0.45%)
After-hours: Nov 19, 2026, 7:59 PM EST
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Investor update

Nov 19, 2026

Summary

Digital-credit growth depends on disciplined risk, liquidity and durable STRC demand.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

Welcome, everyone, and thank you for joining us for another Investor Q&A with Strategy. I am Natalie Brunell, Author of "Bitcoin is for Everyone" and Host of the "Coin Stories" podcast. I know we have all been riding out some pretty wild swings in the market these last few weeks, so this is a good time to hear straight from Strategy's leadership. They will walk us through how the company navigates periods like this and where they see everything heading. Many of you sent in very thoughtful questions, and a lot of them overlapped, so I will be focusing on the themes you asked about the most. We are going to be addressing risk, volatility, returns, and growth. I also want us to look past the next quarter to where this company could be five to seven years from now.

Before we jump in, I need to share a quick note from Strategy. Some of what you will hear in this conversation about the company's plans and expectations will be forward-looking statements. Actual results could differ materially because of things like the price of Bitcoin and the risk factors described in Strategy's SEC filings, including the 10-Q filed on November 2nd. This session is for informational purposes only. It is not an offer to buy or sell any securities, and it is not investment, financial, legal, or tax advice, so please consult your own advisors. You can learn more about Strategy and its key performance indicators at strategy.com/notes. The views expressed in this session are those of the company's management team, and I am joining you as your host. In the spirit of full disclosure, I personally own MSTR common stock as well as STRC digital credit.

With that, I would like to welcome Michael Saylor, Strategy's Founder and Executive Chairman, who first put Bitcoin on the company's balance sheet back in 2020 and turned it into the largest corporate holder of Bitcoin in the world. Alongside him is Phong Le, Strategy's President and CEO, who is leading the company as it builds out its digital credit and capital business. Michael and Phong, thank you for being here.

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

Yeah, awesome. Thanks for having us.

Phong Le
President and CEO, Strategy

Thank you, Natalie.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

All right, let's zoom out for a moment and start with the basics, because many of the investors told us they want to better understand exactly what they're holding. What do I own? If I buy MSTR common stock, STRC, or another Strategy preferred share or Strategy debt, where do I stand in line to get paid, and how do those choices differ in income, upside, and risk of loss?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

I'll take a crack at that, and then Phong can add in any other additional thoughts. We roughly have four classes of securities. If you own the debt, there are six convertible bonds. You have to be a qualified institutional investor, a 144A investor. They trade over the counter. Those bonds are senior. There's about $6.5 billion of them. And generally, they're held by convertible arbitragers or convertible bond investors. Most retail investors either can't buy them or don't have interest in them. The second class of securities is digital credit, short duration. Stretch is short duration digital credit.

If you wanted to make an investment for anywhere from four months to four years, you need the money back in six months or you need the money back in a year, but you want to generate high yield and you want to avoid, say, the roller coaster of Bitcoin, the volatility of Bitcoin, then STRC is constructed for that. So, Stretch, STRC, is short duration digital credit. The third class of securities are long duration digital credit instruments, and in this category would be STRF, STRD, STRE, STRK. That would be for someone that wants to be invested in credit for four years to 10 years or longer.

If you're putting something in a portfolio to keep for the next 20 years and you want a fixed 10% dividend and you never want the dividend to change, or you want that dividend in euros, or you want super high yield like STRD, and you want to lock in that yield, you don't want to worry about whether the dividend will move up or down, and you're not so much concerned about the principal price in the next few months or the next year or two years because you're just parking it for a decade. That's a long duration credit investor. Those instruments appeal to long duration credit investors. The last class of security is the common stock, MSTR. MSTR is We're really emerging as the central bank of the crypto economy. You own a share in a company. The company creates digital credit.

If you own the common stock, you're investing in the world's largest digital treasury company. The treasury model is just like an insurance model or a banking model. Insurance companies take a lot of capital, and they write insurance policies to create shareholder value, or they might sell annuities to create shareholder value. You're owning a share in the insurance company. If you own a share in JP Morgan, you own a share in a bank, the bank creates value by creating consumer credit or corporate credit, and you own a share in that operation. A treasury company creates shareholder value by creating digital credit. In this case, you're owning the company that creates the digital credit. There are three ways to make money with MSTR.

You're either buying it because you want it as a Bitcoin proxy, and if Bitcoin goes up in value, we own 4% of all the Bitcoin there's ever going to be in the world. You are just investing in Bitcoin as a proxy. The second way you make money is you're investing in amplified Bitcoin, a company that can get a 1.3%, 1.4%, 1.5% amplification factor because it issues credit to buy Bitcoin without issuing common shares. Some people want amplified Bitcoin.

The third way you make money is you're buying a share of the central bank of the crypto economy, and if you want to own the biggest digital credit issuer in the world, and if you believe in digital credit, if you think the idea of STRC is a good one and you think it's going to grow by a factor of 10 or a factor of 100, then you would probably like to own the treasury company that creates it, and then you get the spread on the difference between the cost of the credit and the return of the Bitcoin. Those are the four different types of securities, and generally, if you're a convertible bond arbitrageur, you're definitely not an equity investor. People all decide what kind of security they wish to buy.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

Okay, let's talk a little bit more about the common stock itself, and this is sort of a two-part question.

Phong Le
President and CEO, Strategy

Hey, Natalie.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

Why own MSTR, and what can Strategy do to create value for an MSTR shareholder beyond a rise in Bitcoin's price?

Phong Le
President and CEO, Strategy

Let me, Natalie, if you don't mind, I just want to add a little bit to the ownership structure on the first question. A great way to understand the different classes of securities is if you go to strategy.com and go to our credit tab, you can see all of the convertible debt and cumulative convertible debt right now. Notional is about $6.7 billion, and we have about USD assets of about $4.9 billion, so the net there is $1.8. And below that is the preferred stock, which is $14.5 billion, or sorry, $12.7 billion. So, it's a great place to see sort of where you stand in the capital structure. And against that is, I mentioned $4.9 billion in USD assets, $52.5 billion in Bitcoin reserves, and then about $36 billion in US equity.

It is just a place to go look at the ownership structure and the capital structure.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

Okay, so the question now is, what can Strategy do to create value for an MSTR shareholder beyond a rise in Bitcoin's price? Then separately, why might investors pay a premium to the value of Strategy's Bitcoin, and what could make that premium grow or shrink?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

Yeah. The number one way we create value is we create credit against the capital. If we have net reserves, like right now, the company has almost $40 billion in net reserves, we can issue credit against it. We could issue $4 billion of credit against the $40 billion in net reserves, and it would be 10x over-collateralized when we did it. The company can generally create an amount of credit equal to the reserves, and the credit has a spread in it. If we offer 10% on the credit and Bitcoin appreciates 20%, then the company is capturing a 10% spread on the cost of the credit. We track that as the hurdle rate, and there is something called the BTC Hurdle ARR.

If you think about our hurdle rate, if the company creates credit and then Bitcoin outperforms the hurdle rate, then all of the residual gains accrue to the common stock shareholders. The number one way that the company creates shareholder value is to issue good credit. The more efficient, the more credit we issue, and the lower the cost of the credit, the more shareholder value we create. Of course, if Bitcoin appreciates 30% and our hurdle rate is 10%, we are capturing a very large spread. But if Bitcoin appreciates 10% a year and the hurdle rate is 10%, then the issuance of the credit looks sort of neutral. The company has a lot of ability to solve volatility and has some optionality in that, but there is not as compelling an argument for creating shareholder value if Bitcoin performs at the hurdle rate.

So, you could think of it the same way like an insurance company. If an insurance company had $40 billion of net reserves, how would it create shareholder value? It would underwrite risk, and it would use the $40 billion to take on risk, and it would charge a premium, and that is generating a spread, the difference between the risk it takes on and what it gets paid to take on the risk. That's the hurdle rate of the insurance company. For us, we have a pretty clear understanding of the cost of the credit, and then we have an opinion about the value of owning the Bitcoin. And so, we're basically creating credit. Yeah, the last point I make is that's what banks do.

If you're a bank, you're either creating consumer credit via credit cards, or you're creating consumer credit via retail residential mortgages, or you're creating corporate credit by making corporate loans. When you create that credit, you either carry it and capture the spread, the difference between the cost of your capital, and the actual return you get paid, or you turn around and you securitize that credit and you resell it. You sell the credit yourself, like mortgage-backed security. So, that's how we create shareholder value. We use our balance sheet to back credit, and we sell the credit, which creates a spread versus the underlying Bitcoin price appreciation.

Phong Le
President and CEO, Strategy

And part of what makes that successful is scale. So the fact that we have over 850,000 Bitcoin on our balance sheet makes us more effective in issuing credit. Then the liquidity of the credit, we have the most liquid preferred securities in the world, and that also makes this more effective also.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

All right, let's get into how Strategy decides where each dollar of capital goes. A lot of investors want to know, when does issuing MSTR help existing shareholders? When Strategy needs capital, how do you choose among issuing common shares, preferred shares, borrowing, or selling Bitcoin?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

Yeah. I think that that's one of the more powerful things about the company. We can buy or sell dollars, buy or sell Bitcoin, buy or sell MSTR common stock, buy or sell STRC, or buy or sell other credit instruments on any given day. We weigh in, take into account a bunch of considerations. We consider the capital market sentiment, like how is Bitcoin trading? We consider the credit market sentiment. Are the credit markets contracting or are they expanding? Then we consider the equity capital markets, right? Are equity premiums expanding or are they compressing? Generally, if you look at the most common swap transaction, we would swap MSTR for BTC, or we would swap MSTR for the credit STRC, or we would swap MSTR for dollars.

If we swap our common stock for dollars, then above one times mNAV, it's accretive on a net Bitcoin basis. That's the threshold of accretion. If we swap MSTR for Bitcoin, then there's a Bitcoin accretion threshold. It's like about 1.3 right now, or 1.29. It varies over time. When the mNAV multiple gets very high, if it gets in the 1.5-2.3 range, then we can just swap the equity for the Bitcoin, and we can generate an immediate Bitcoin accretion. We've done tens of billions of dollars of those transactions. Then if the mNAV is at a discount to one, but it's at a lesser, a more shallow discount than the discount of STRC.

If STRC was trading at $95, and if the mNAV was 0.98, then swapping the common stock for STRC would still be accretive, because you're swapping the common stock at a higher factor, and you're getting back a liability. So, we have various multiples for that, and we're always considering those thresholds. I think we're opportunistic. If we've got the ability just to generate a simple Bitcoin premium through the swap, well, we could do that at any time, and you don't really need a reason. You're just generating pure gross Bitcoin yield. But the strategy of the company, the business of a treasury business, is to create good credit. Our primary focus right now is to support the digital credit and strengthen STRC. Now, when STRC is strong, when it's doing well, that is actually supporting STRD, E, K, and F.

Strong Stretch also supports the other publicly traded credit instruments. We will go into the market and we'll support STRC when it's trading below par. If it's below 100, we will go and do a swap where we would swap MSTR for STRC in order to strip the risk, strip the volatility, and facilitate the liquidity of the flagship digital credit instrument. We're doing all three of these things when we're swapping MSTR for STRC. The other thing that we're doing is generally we're accreting net Bitcoin per share, so we're generating a positive accretion in U.S. dollar value, a USD yield. Then we're also expanding the, increasing the net reserves of the company. So, when we're actually retiring the liability and we're issuing common equity, our net reserves increase, therefore our credit capacity increases.

We might get a small immediate accretion, but long term, we also increase the growth potential of the company because we are increasing the backing reserves that we can use to create more credit in the future. That strengthens the balance sheet. Because we actually retire the liability and we expand the net reserves, that actually stretches out the U.S. Duration, improves the USD strength, increases the BTC Rating of the credit, decreases the risk. The BTC risk falls, the BTC credit spreads compress, the durations expand, the BTC duration expands, like the amount of years of Bitcoin we have expand, and the amount of years of dollars expand because we are removing the liability. That is a very common swap to support the credit.

The other thing that we would do is if the credit is strong, if it is too strong, when STRC trades above 100, we reverse that swap. We would actually sell STRC, and then we would swap it for U.S. dollars, or we would swap it for BTC. When we are doing that, we would probably be increasing the amplification of the company. We would be slightly increasing the risk. The risk starts to increase, the amplification increases, the overall enterprise value of the company increases. In that particular case, you are creating more amplification, so you are probably feeding more volatility to the equity and potentially more upside potential to the equity investors and expanding the balance sheet in that way. Obviously, when the credit markets are strong, we are doing the swap and we are selling STRC.

When the credit markets are weak or contracting, we are contracting our amount of credit, so we are buying STRC. There are a lot of zones where generally it makes sense to do with MSTR, but if MSTR were to trade below our STRC accretion threshold, then we could do the same swap with BTC, and you would swap Bitcoin for STRC, and that becomes accretive on a net Bitcoin per share basis when you cannot do it with the equity. Which of those we do, we have a lot of flexibility. We can decide how much we do. We can decide sometimes that it makes sense to issue $100 million or two or three, $400 million worth of STRC quickly in a day if there is the demand for it.

We could also decide that we wanted to buy back a certain amount of it, but we have a discretion as to how much we buy back, depending on how much support for liquidity and trading that we want to inject in the market. That would be a function of the credit market strength or weakness, the equity market strength or weakness, or the Bitcoin market strength or weakness. We can tailor all those programs all the time. Those are just some examples. We could do other things, but to get in those other things is probably outside the scope of this conversation because you would end up discussing it for many, many hours. The fundamental, most important point that I want to make is, the company is in the business of issuing and selling digital credit. Our digital credit Stretch is like an insurance policy.

If someone bought your insurance policy, you would want to make sure that you pay the claim. If you don't pay the claim on the policy, if they have a tornado or hurricane and their house gets blown away, and they make a claim and you don't pay the claim, then the credibility of the insurance company collapses. No one will buy insurance from the company again, right? It's devastating for the brand. For us, people buy the credit, and the credit investor is the customer. They actually don't want to take long duration risk. If you wanted to take long duration risk and get rich, we would say, "Wait 4 - 10 years, and you either buy Bitcoin or you buy MSTR." That's a long duration investor that is accepting volatility and risk.

People that are buying short duration credit, they're willing to give up that 40%, 50% potential ARR, and they don't want the volatility. They would like a steady 12% dividend stream paid daily, and they want the company to absorb the risk, the volatility, et cetera. When the company is swapping either BTC or MSTR for STRC, we're supporting the credit, we're supporting the brand of the company, we're improving the product quality, and the result of that has an impact that's beneficial to all the shareholders over a one-day, one-month, one-year, and three or five-year, and seven-year timeframe. If you think about it, immediately, it improves, it strengthens the balance sheet. It generally creates net reserves and decreases risk and increases credit capacity. So there's an immediate improvement in net Bitcoin per share.

But over a one-year timeframe, it makes it a lot more likely that credit investors are going to buy more credit and sell less credit, and it makes it more likely that the market makers that trade our credit will step in and support the credit and facilitate liquidity because they see that the company stands behind the credit. It decreases selling demand, it increases buying demand, and it attracts third parties to support us over the one to two-year timeframe. Over the longer timeframe, the three to seven-year timeframe, it creates a compelling product for retail investors, high net worth investors, and other institutional investors because they see that the company is trustworthy and will commit its balance sheet to protecting their interests. They're more willing to consider the credit. They're more willing to increase their allocation to the credit.

The company's credibility is improved in the same way that an insurance company's credibility is improved if you go and you say, "I insured my house with such and such, and when the windstorm blew out my windows, they settled my claim quickly, and I would recommend to my friends and family they should do business." Over the zero to one-year timeframe, it's really important for the capital markets to see we're doing it. But over the 1- 10-year timeframe, it really is critical to the brand of the company and the perception of product quality. A lot of times, our swap decisions or capital market decisions, they're not just made with consideration of what are the immediate impacts next week.

They're made with a consideration of what will be the second-order impact on existing investors, new investors, and market maker, and then the third-order impact, which is, will we have more support for this credit in three to seven years because of the way we performed in a credit crunch, in a contracting capital market? People judge you based upon how you treat them in difficult markets, in the bear markets. That stays with the company's brand over the course of a decade. We're thinking about the legacy of the company and the reputation of the company when we're doing it. Sometimes you'll make a decision that isn't terribly profitable this week, but over the course of one to seven years, it turns out to be a very profitable decision, and that's how we think about these when we're making these decisions.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

I want to dig into some of those points a little bit further, but first, Michael and Phong, I just want to make sure everyone understands one of the main ways that Strategy is tracking its progress, which is Bitcoin per share. What is the difference between gross Bitcoin per share and net Bitcoin per share, and what does each tell me about my stake as a common shareholder?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

If you were to liquidate the company tomorrow, if we just wound up the business, if we paid off all of our liabilities at their face value, then we would have net Bitcoin per share. That's what we have in a liquidation. If, on the other hand, you were a short-term investor and you're pessimistic and you're thinking the company should be wound down tomorrow, then the book value of the company is that net Bitcoin per share.

On the other hand, if you have a 10-year time horizon and you're a Bitcoin maxi, if you think that Bitcoin's going up 30% a year and you're invested for the next decade, then gross Bitcoin per share becomes a lot more interesting to you because if you have a lot of gross Bitcoin per share, then you're going to get the spread between the hurdle rate, which is about 10.5% for us, and the 30% return on Bitcoin. We have a lot of leverage and amplification built into the balance sheet, leverage from the $6.5 billion in convertible bonds, and then amplification from the $12 billion of digital credit. That gets us about $20 billion of gross Bitcoin, and the cost of that is about 10.5%.

If you're a Bitcoin believer with a long-term time horizon, then you're going to get a 20% spread on $20 billion of Bitcoin over the course of a decade. That's worth a lot of money to you. If, on the other hand, you're maybe a JP Morgan conventional portfolio manager and you think that Bitcoin's going up 10% a year, you would say, "Well, Bitcoin's going up 10% a year. The hurdle rate is 10% a year. They've got $20 billion of credit. They're paying 10% for it. They've got $20 billion of Bitcoin. They're collecting 10% for it." It becomes net neutral. Gross Bitcoin per share is net neutral if Bitcoin appreciates at the hurdle rate. If you're a skeptic and you think Bitcoin's going up 0% a year, then gross Bitcoin per share becomes a net negative, right?

Because you're going to pay 10% and collect 0%, and it's actually dilutive. It is important to consider both. I would say, in the limit to infinity, if you're looking out 100 years and you believe Bitcoin's going to outperform the hurdle rate, then gross Bitcoin per share is a measure of the growth potential and the shareholder value creation of the company. In the opposite limit, if you're going to wind up the company tomorrow, net Bitcoin per share. The more bullish you are and the longer your time horizon is, the more you're interested in the company's gross Bitcoin per share, because you expect Bitcoin to outperform the cost of the U.S. dollar denominated assets. You're going to compound at 30%.

You're going to reinvest that capital every year for 20 years, and then you're going to make an obscene amount of money because you borrowed at 10 and loaned it out at 30, right? I think that's why it's a mistake to think that the only thing that matters is net Bitcoin per share, and it's a mistake to think that the only thing that matters is gross Bitcoin per share. I'll give you another limit. If the cost of the credit goes to zero, then the gross Bitcoin per share performance looks great, right? Because you're actually getting The gross Bitcoin per share is your metric, because you're getting all of the Bitcoin for free for the next 100 years. As the cost of the credit goes to zero, you want to be leaning toward gross Bitcoin per share.

If the cost of the credit were to go to 40%, Natalie, or 50%, if the cost of the credit is higher than your anticipated performance of Bitcoin, then all you really care about is net Bitcoin per share. When the cost of the credit gets to be higher than your forecast for Bitcoin, right, then there is no value creation. You really just have to plug in your There's a formula. Plug in your time horizon, plug in your outlook for Bitcoin, plug in the hurdle rate, and then you'll determine whether gross matters to you or not. I have one more interesting comment here. A lot of times people look at amplification, like, maybe we're amplified 1.4% or 1.3%, and they think that that's an immediate thing and that's it. It's either 1.3% or 1.5% amplification.

But the truth is, when you are considering an equity, and when we consider it, we have a dynamic model. So, for example, the company is not going to stay 1.3x amplified forever. If you have a good company and you have the option to create $40 billion of additional credit, you could increase the amplification. So, when you have a good business, then the business is not just based upon the static capital structure and the static amplification. The question is, does the company have the ability to increase the amplification, maintain the amplification, or will the amplification degrade over time? That is also a moving part. So, you have to have a dynamic model, and you have to have an outlook of how long you want to hold the instrument. Will the company's amplification increase or decrease?

For example, convertible bonds were something where we concluded we could not maintain constant amplification as we scale the business. We were going to de-amplify over time because we were not going to be able to sell enough convertible bonds to maintain, say, a 1.3 factor or a 1.5 factor. That is why we switched to digital credit. With digital credit, we thought that was better, like with STRK, but then we also concluded that we needed the best digital credit, and we concluded that short duration digital credit, like STRC, was more scalable, and we would be able to sell more, and we would be able to amplify more, and we would be able to build that amplification or hold it better. Like yesterday, STRC traded 100 times more in the market than some of the long-term perpetuals.

So, I think the reason that Bitcoin per share on its own is kind of simplistic, gross Bitcoin on its own is simplistic. A sophisticated equity investor says, "I understand the current model. Is the model durable over the next decade? Can they grow or maintain amplification?" And then, at what cost? I can build amplification at a hurdle rate of 10%, or amplification at a hurdle rate of 15%, or at a hurdle rate of 20%. So, what is the cost to create the amplification, and is it durable, and is there any credit risk in it? This is why there is no one factor or one metric you can use to value the company. You really need to build a non-linear dynamic simulation, which is exactly what I wrote my thesis on at MIT. I did non-linear dynamic simulations.

And newsflash, the conclusion of anybody that builds non-linear dynamic simulations is, A, you cannot describe physical phenomena in the real world without them. If you do not do it, you cannot describe anything sophisticated in the real world. And B, you cannot do it on a spreadsheet. They are not linear, they are non-linear. So, when you get to a certain point, you have a phase shift and things change. So, we track those numbers, but we think in a much more sophisticated, multivariate, dynamic fashion than any one of them. That is what I think. Phong, you have comments?

Phong Le
President and CEO, Strategy

Yeah, the other distinction in addition to what Mike mentioned with gross Bitcoin per share versus net Bitcoin per share, gross Bitcoin per share is a simplifying calculation that is easiest to evaluate over a long period of time. For example, we say we are going to double our gross Bitcoin per share over a seven-year period, but there are simplifying assumptions in there, right? We, for example, on the fully diluted share count, assume that all of our convertible debt will convert to equity. That is a simplifying assumption. When we go to net Bitcoin per share, we use that on a day-to-day basis to make decisions on swaps. When you are using something on a day-to-day basis, you want to be more precise.

When you look at net Bitcoin per share, one key impact is we take the dollar-denominated liabilities, right, and we convert them to Bitcoin using current Bitcoin price. So, net Bitcoin per share is impacted by Bitcoin price, where gross Bitcoin per share is not impacted by Bitcoin price. The other piece is on the fully diluted shares, we take the current share price and we assume that anything, any convertible debt with a strike price above the current equity price will not convert. We treat that as debt, and anywhere it is below, it will convert. So, it is a much more precise calculation that lends itself to day-to-day decision-making, like the swaps we make, whereas gross Bitcoin per share is that long-term calculation and long-term metric that we use.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

I just want to crystallize this a little bit more with how net Bitcoin per share can rise while gross Bitcoin per share falls, and maybe another hypothetical example in which Strategy issues common shares and uses the proceeds to retire preferred shares. How would a shareholder distinguish the immediate effect from the effects of dividends and the changing Bitcoin price over time?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

Whenever there is a net Bitcoin per share accretion, it is accretive to the common stock shareholders, right? If you are wondering, is something accretive, it is very simple. It is net Bitcoin per share. You end up with more net assets per share the day after you did the swap than the day before you did the swap. If you are concerned about shareholder accretion or whether it is rational, a very simple rule of thumb is it is immediately accretive if there is a net Bitcoin per share accretion. When you are doing something on a gross Bitcoin per share basis, well, I could sell $10 billion of bonds tomorrow, and I could agree to any terms. They are 100-year bonds, they are 10-year bonds, they are 10% bonds, they are 2% bonds. I could sell them. We would generate a massive gross Bitcoin per share increase.

You can create that, but gross Bitcoin per share comes with a credit risk. The issue is, did I take out an overnight margin loan at 20%, or did I borrow the money for 100 years at 2%? Both of those will generate the same gross Bitcoin per share, but one of them has a very different credit risk than the other one. Gross Bitcoin per share is a more complicated creature because you really have to dig into the terms of the credit that created it. Net Bitcoin per share just tells you immediately it was accretive. The last point I would make is that companies all the time make an investment that is cash negative. Netflix took, whatever, seven years to become cash positive. Amazon took seven, eight years before it was profitable.

Lots of businesses take one, two, three, five, seven, 10 years before they are actually accretive. In this particular case, net Bitcoin per share is accretive immediately. You could imagine doing something that was even dilutive over the course of a month or a week if you thought you were going to get a return in a year or two or three years, and most people, and it happens all the time in business. I think that is a simplifying observation. Was there another part of the question?

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

No, but if we turn specifically to STRC, could you explain what would justify an STRC repurchase near its $100 stated amount, and how do you decide how much to buy, how quickly, and when to maybe slow down or stop as markets change?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

Well, our view is it is worth $100, and if you have a share STRC looks to us like investment-grade digital credit, right? It is like 5x over-collateralized right now. Our credit models spit out a fair credit spread of 60 or 70 basis points. Anything less than 150 basis points is investment grade. We view it as investment-grade credit, 5x over-collateralized, and the company stood behind it. We just raised $8 billion-$10 billion in capital to support it, and we think that 12% is a very rich dividend for an investment-grade credit. Any other investment-grade credit in the market would yield six. We are already paying double what investment-grade credit normally pays, and we are offering in a tax-deferred return of capital, which makes it triple.

We think it is, for a typical retail investor or high-net-worth investor, it is somewhere in the range of two to three times better than the comparable credit. If someone does not agree with us, we would rather buy it ourself. If you do not agree with me, I will take it because I think that it is worth 100 bucks, and we will buy it back.

If you do not think it is worth $100, sell it, right? It is kind of like a simple thing, like you want to go buy an iPhone from Apple, and you do not want to pay the price, the retail price. The answer is they are not selling it to you. If you do not really want to buy our flagship product, which we think is already trading I think on our website, we calculate the premium to the risk, and it is 500 basis points or something.

It is already trading a massive premium against what we think is the risk. In our case, we are going to buy it rather than sell it if no one values it there. The other point I will make is, the credit markets expand and they contract. We have been in a contraction of the capital markets for about 14 months. Bitcoin hit an all-time high, like, last October or something.

We have been in a crypto winter for 14 months, but we have been in a credit market contraction for about six months. If you look at the credit markets starting in about May, between May and November, they are undoubtedly contracting. You can see it. The sovereign rate or the rate of the long end of the yield curve has moved up 100 basis points, 150 basis points. Investment-grade credit spreads have increased 70, 80, 90 basis points.

Junk bond rates have increased hundreds of basis points. CCC rates have increased 400 basis points. Neoclouds saw their bonds go from trading at 9% yield to 15%. Lots of people that wanted to sell credit got squeezed out of the market because the hyperscalers, like the Alphabets of the world, they started issuing credit. When you are competing against credit issued by a SpaceX or by a Google, right, and you are a small company, you are not that creditworthy. The credit markets have contracted. The private credit markets have seized up, right? Private credit contracted. It may very well, there was demand for $10.5 billion of STRC yielding like 11%, 10%-11% six months ago. Now, there is not quite the demand at 12%. The demand for that is more like a 7 billion number. The credit markets contract.

We are going to contract the outstanding STRC, and we are engaged in a continuous auction in the market. The way to think of it is, if I did a Dutch auction and I said, "I am willing to pay 12%, and you guys bid on it, and I will sell credit equal to the amount that people want to buy," and if that number is 6 billion, then that is where the auction settles, and we have 6 billion outstanding, we buy back the rest.

We could do a tender offer, Natalie, right? It would take a proxy statement, and it would take a month, but we could say, "We are ready to buy back at 100. Just tender your shares and let us just figure this out once and for all." Are there $7 billion of holders or 6 billion or 8 billion or 5 billion? There is a number.

The fact that there is less demand today than there was six months ago is not at all surprising, right? There is just less demand for all private credit, Neoclouds credit, corporate credit, junk credit. Now, there is even less demand for government sovereign credit, right? If you look at the 30-year rate and the 10-year rate, there is just less demand. The credit markets have contracted. Our view is, we are going to contract the outstanding STRC because 12% is a fat dividend for an investment-grade instrument. As we buy it back, we lengthen the duration, we strip the risk, we improve the credit. I do not know exactly where the number is, but I am going to go out on a limb and say that somewhere between $5 billion and $7.5 billion, there is natural organic demand to hold the instrument at 12% dividend.

We are engaged in an incremental day-by-day exercise to figure out where that equilibrium point is. If you are a retiree, you probably ought to hold it for a decade, because why would you want to sell it and pay capital gains tax on it to sell, right? There is someone that wants to hold it for a decade and collect the return of capital dividends. So, there is that core group of holders. There are other people that were tourists, they came in and they bought it, but they do not want to hold it long term, and they do not value it at par. That is okay. We will take it off their hands. Eventually, we will find the equilibrium in the market.

There is a dynamic equilibrium in the market, and when we find that equilibrium, say it is $7 billion AUM outstanding, it will trade at par, it will be balanced, and then at that point, when the credit markets are expanding again, we will be issuing. When the credit markets are contracting, we will be buying it back. Why do we do it? Because it is very important for us that we have a short duration credit instrument. We want an instrument where you could buy it and think, "Okay, in a normal market, I could sell it at the same price I bought it a month from now or two months from now." In a total crypto meltdown or a credit meltdown like March of 2020, it might take us three, four, five months or something in a meltdown.

But in a normal market, people want to know that they can buy it and then in four weeks or six weeks or eight weeks, they can sell it. We want to shorten the duration, we want to strip the volatility, we want to facilitate the liquidity. It is more important that the quality of the credit be high than it is important that we have 10 billion outstanding instead of seven. It does not matter to the company, right? I almost think sometimes we ought to just do a Dutch auction and we ought to just say, "Sell it all back to us. Tell us at what price you will Who wants to hold it?" Then we just get it all done. The truth is, that would take us a month or two months.

What we are doing right now is a gentle, continuous auction to buy back and stabilize the credit. Once we reach that equilibrium point and it is neutral, the buyers offset the sellers and it trades at 100. At that point, it becomes a pretty compelling instrument for short duration credit investors, and they will buy more. The last point I will make is, there might very well be more demand for this if we were paying 15% or 20% than 12%. We just do not wish to do that. If we were to raise the dividend rate, we would raise the hurdle rate, and if we raise the hurdle rate, we increase the risk to the equity investors. We are playing the long game. We are not playing the fastest growth game. If our business model works, we will be growing 20% - 30% a year.

When you have a $70 billion company growing 30% a year or 20% a year, it is pretty good. We do not need to grow faster. If we were a smaller company and we had less capital, we might choose to grow faster. But we set the hurdle rate that there is a natural organic size of the market that wants to hold that instrument. We need to facilitate their holding it for the long term, and the credit representation or the credit guarantee that we are making, that they have every right to expect from us, is we are going to put the interest of the credit investors first. They are the people with a one-month time horizon with a low-risk tolerance, and they are giving up Bitcoin upside, and they are trusting the company.

What we are doing is taking our balance sheet, we are compressing that duration from hold it a decade and wait to hold it for a few months, and then we are giving them the 12%, but not more. We expect more, but we are not giving it to them. We are issuing when there is too much demand. If there is too much demand to keep it at 100, we issue it. When there is not enough demand, we are shrinking the outstanding and we are supporting the market. We are doing it because strong credit makes a strong treasury company. If the credit works, we can sell $10 billion, then $100 billion, then $1 trillion, and then the company is $100 billion, then $1 trillion, then a $10 trillion company, if the credit works. That is the product.

If the credit does not work, we are a holding company, and we would be valued at maybe a 0%-20% premium to our net asset value based on optionality. But an equity investor would be saying, "Okay, you have Bitcoin, but tell me what the business model is to create shareholder value. You do not have one." We would say, "Well, we might find one, but just give us a little premium because we might find one." Well, we found one. It turns out to be not an easy business, but insurance and banking are not easy businesses either. There is no such thing as an easy business. If you expect the business to be a walk in the park in the second year after you invented it, then you are being a little bit idealistic or naive.

Our business is create digital credit, make the best credit in the world that we can, and if we sell too much of it, the credit will collapse. When the credit collapses, the duration expands, the volatility will increase, the anxiety for the credit investor will increase. The ones that hold it will sell it. The ones that are considering buying it won't buy it, right? Then confidence in the credit falls, and if confidence in the credit falls, confidence in the equity falls, because who's going to trust an insurance company that doesn't pay off its insurance policies? Who's going to trust a bank that tells you you're going to get a mortgage but then doesn't fund the mortgage on closing day, right?

It's very important for the brand and the credibility of the company to make good on its commitments and to stand behind its product, and that's what we are doing. It is not so important that we sell $7 billion of it versus $3 billion versus $30 billion. No one cares how many billion. Probably nobody knows how many billions of dollars of iPhones Apple sells each week or each month. But what they do know is, did the iPhone catch fire? If the iPhone catches fire, that's devastating to the brand. If the iPhone doesn't work, if you tell your friends, "I bought one, but it didn't work," it's devastating to the brand. So we're very focused upon backing the product and then protecting the brand of the company.

Protecting the brand, it's like an insurance company has a bad year, there's a hurricane, and they have to pay off a lot of claims, and they lose money that year. You're sitting in the board meeting, and you say, "What if we just don't pay the insurance claims this year, and we can report a profit to the shareholders this year?" Like, I found a loophole to get out of paying the claims. Okay, that's a very shortsighted thing, right? Because people then will then talk about it, and the insurance company's reputation is destroyed. That's why we don't do that, right? We may have a difficult time in a six-month credit contraction, but the credit markets will stabilize, then they'll expand, and the important thing will be the quality of the credit and what we did during the difficult times, right?

Not what we do during the bull markets when it's easy.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

I want to stay on the theme of risk and liquidity, and Phong, I'll direct this next one to you about Strategy's decision to take on more risk or reduce it. When you talk about amplifying the balance sheet, which decisions magnify gains and losses for MSTR holders, and what would lead you to reverse course and strengthen the balance sheet?

Phong Le
President and CEO, Strategy

Well, a lot of it is based on the credit markets and what the market allows us to take on. For example, right now, amplifying the company is a function of whether the credit markets allow us to grow Stretch. You know what Mike mentioned, and if you zoom out and look big picture, what did we do? We IPO'd Stretch a year ago at $2.5 billion. The credit markets were open. We were able to sell $8 billion of Stretch at $100, further amplify the company. What happened over the last four to five months is the credit markets tightened, and therefore, we de-risked the company. We bought back $3 billion of Stretch at less than what we issued it for, so at $95, $99, $96, $97, $98, $99.

The decision of amplification or risk a lot of times is a function of what the market will allow and whether they see the credit product as something that we can add more to.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

A lot of investors are worried about a prolonged Bitcoin downturn. If Bitcoin stayed depressed and raising new capital became more difficult, how would Strategy fund preferred dividends, interest, and debt coming due, and what public figures could an investor use to judge how long available cash would last and when a Bitcoin sale might become necessary?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

Well, we have three years of cash right now, 3.4 years or something. You can check the USD Duration on our website, and you can see if there was a downturn, and we could not sell any securities for three years, we would still be just running on cash. The truth is, there has never been a situation where you could not sell equity derivatives or commodities for four years, right? It is really just a question of which product is best priced. Is it a digital credit instrument? Is it a derivative instrument? Is it an equity instrument? Is it a capital asset, or is it a derivative of the capital? I think we are confident that over the course of three years, we would find accretive, fairly valued assets, either the Bitcoin or the equity or an equity derivative or a credit derivative that we could sell.

Markets, even in the bottom of a crypto winter or in the worst possible conceivable market, there is enormous convexity, so people oftentimes want to buy an option on the upside at all points in the market. I guess one last point I would make, the company's position is constantly de-risk or adjust the risk of the company every single day. In the 20th century economy, if you are financing a business like ours and you are doing it with corporate bonds, you do these Rule 144A bond offerings, and you do them once a year or once every six months or once every two years. If you think about an LBO, it is like the company borrows $40 billion once, and then it has got that debt hanging over its head for eight years. The traditional way of financing is very low frequency, very discreet.

Our financing is we decide how much credit or equity to issue every day. If we actually see the market weakening, we do not seize up and do nothing. We actually de-risk or we adjust risk, and then we adjust our balance sheet and our capital structure dynamically in response to the Bitcoin market, the equity market, and the credit markets continuously.

I do not think we would ever get in a position where it is not like we will go for three years and do nothing and then wake up and there is a problem. We would be doing something every single day. If you told me there were going to be 1,000 days, the only situation I think that really represents existential risk to us with our business model is Bitcoin has to go immediately irrevocably to zero tomorrow, right? If it goes immediately irrevocably forever, right, to zero, right?

Okay. There are not a lot of things we can do, but that is kind of the same as you get hit with a meteorite or sink beneath the ocean. If you have a prolonged bear market, then we are always able to monetize the volatility or arbitrage some credit instrument against a capital instrument, against an equity instrument in order to de-risk. Right now, again, the company's balance sheet has never been better. We could run on three years of cash without touching the capital markets. That was a lesson learned in the last credit meltdown, that you really want to have a USD strength, and you want to back some proportion of the credit duration by dollars. Right now, we are about 40% backed by dollars.

Phong Le
President and CEO, Strategy

I think the market's also telling us that they value the USD cash, right? The 3.4 years of USD Duration we have. Last time Bitcoin was at $62,000, we had 0.7 years of USD Duration and Stretch's price down to $80, $75. This time, it's at $95 and likely strengthening. I think there's a recognition that we can withstand a long-term Bitcoin downturn if that was necessary.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

You've sort of alluded to this in your answers, but I would love for you to just put a highlight again on why a liquid stable market for digital credit should matter to MSTR shareholders. How would you explain that in a sound bite?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

If the company has a liquid credit instrument, it has the option to sell 250 million of it in a single day, capture the spread, and make anywhere from $250 million - $500 million in six hours, right? That's why, right? The company can make $100 million an hour, right? When the credit markets turned positive, when the credit markets were expanding, I think that we had one day where we sold $1 billion, or no, we traded $1 billion, but we issued $500 million or more. I noted in a tweet today, STRC traded $600 million yesterday. That was more than every income-bearing preferred stock in the U.S. capital markets this year. It's the single most liquid preferred income-bearing instrument in the entire world, most likely, but certainly in the U.S. capital markets this year.

Being able to combine a shelf registration where you can issue it instantaneously with a credit instrument, with a variable dividend rate means we are in a position to capture the spread. If you believe Bitcoin's going up 10% a year, or sorry, more than 10% a year, then we could sell hundreds of millions or billions of dollars of this instrument. We never pay the money back. The shareholders get all of the spread on the upside, and it is the most efficient financial tool, maybe one of the most powerful ways to generate shareholder value that has yet to be created. The reason that the company is the largest holder of Bitcoin in the world is because we created a $21 billion shelf registration in 2024.

When the equity capital markets became bullish, we actually issued all $21 billion in like four months, and we captured about $14 billion of shareholder value in four months. We made $14 billion for the company in four months, because the equity capital markets were enthusiastic. We have a similar $21 billion type shelf registration on STRC. When the credit markets expand, the company's in a situation that's similar, where the shareholder value created, if you believe that Bitcoin is going up 22% a year or 20% + a year, when you sell $1 billion of credit, you probably created $2 billion of shareholder value. The company might very well create $20 billion-$40 billion of shareholder value very rapidly in an expanding credit market.

That's why it's really important when the demand arrives, and when it arrives, it arrives at the rate of $1 billion a week, and it might arrive at the rate of $10 billion in a month. You have to have the security listed, and you have to have all the programs in place. Most importantly, you have to have the capital markets backend structure. You need the programs to manage it, to issue it. You need the programs to manage it. You need the USD reserve. You need the cash balances. You need all of the structures that would give a credit investor confidence in you. The reason that people bought $21 billion of our equity is because they knew that we believed in Bitcoin, and they wanted to invest in Bitcoin.

It took us four years of work to build the credibility and the trust in the market that they would trust us with the $21 billion of equity in a matter of weeks. The credit business is the same way. You might very well invest years, two, three, four years, and the market's watching you for the four years. There are people that value, they run $50 billion portfolios, and they're looking, and they have a zero allocation. After three years, they might very well look at you and say, "Okay, I get it. I understand how they do it. I know they'll back it. I feel safe with these guys. Go ahead, and let's just buy $500 million of this week, and maybe we'll buy $1 billion next month.

Then I'll tell my friends, and they'll buy $10 billion more." That's how success happens in the financial markets. It's you work very hard, then it comes very rapidly. It comes because smart money, who have been watching you for years and years and judging your character and your performance under stress and how you handle yourself, they make a decision, and they flip a switch. When they flip that switch, $500 million moves in 30 seconds, and it's either on or it's off. When it's on, the most lucrative thing in the world is to create credit on top of capital, right? The central banking model of, I buy a bunch of digital gold, and I create a bunch of digital credit on the digital gold. It's the best business in the world if you can get it.

It's just, it's very challenging to create a central bank. The Bank of England did it hundreds of years ago. "The Creature from Jekyll Island," people write about the Federal Reserve and what it took to do it. It's not easy to do it. Sometimes you have to start your own country. We're very fortunate. We're the Bank of Bitcoin, and we've established credibility, and the credibility has to be with the credit investors. It's the credit investors that legitimize a treasury company. It's not the equity investors, and it's not the capital investors, although the equity investors will assign the company a premium if they believe in the credit business. So, when a credit investor says, "I believe in you," we create obscene amounts of shareholder value.

The equity investor says, "I want to own a part of that treasury business because they are going to be the biggest player in the market for as long as I can see." Everybody wants to buy the winner.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

Mm-hmm. All right, we're unfortunately running out of time. So for our last question, I really want to focus on looking ahead, because clearly you're making decisions maybe in the near term that will pay off in the long term. Can you talk about what Strategy is building and what investors may only appreciate in, say, three or five or seven years, and what investments in infrastructure or customer relationships matter most today, and the milestones that would show shareholders that those investments are really paying off?

Michael Saylor
Founder and Executive Chairman, Strategy

I'll go quick, then I'll leave the final word to Phong. First of all, our objective for STRC is we create a digital credit instrument with a duration, three to four months. Shrink the duration, keep the vol, get the vol below 10, have the instrument pay 10%-12%. We think, for a three-month duration instrument, 10%-12% for an investment-grade instrument with high liquidity, low volatility is a world-beater product, a magic product. So we will continue to try to build liquidity. We'd like to see it go, $600 million a day is great. If we get to $500 million a day consistently or drive it toward $1 billion a day, building the liquidity is a big deal. Getting the volatility below 10 and keeping it there is a big deal.

Expanding the AUM, there is no reason why we cannot grow it from an $8 billion or a $7 billion to a $10 billion-$20 billion - $40 billion-$80 billion - $100 billion type product. That would be enough for the company to be a trillion-dollar company. I would not have to come up with any other ideas. We think that Stretch is a platform for other people to build cool things on top of and to be tokenized. I will not dwell on it, but Phong might have comments on that. Ultimately, we feel like this exercise in STRC is a stepping stone to eventually bring digital money to the market.

The ultimate idea is if you can create a money market, a digital, a one-day or two-day credit instrument, one where you could buy it at par and sell it two days later at par and collect 400 basis points more than your normal money market. A zero vol, 8% dividend yielding digital money, we think would also be a very magic product. I think there is a market for a three-month instrument that yields 10%-12%, and there is a market for an overnight, a one or two-day instrument that yields 7%-8% in a market where the risk-free rate is 4%. Both of those require maturity, a lot of capital, a lot of net reserves.

You have to start with tens of billions of dollars, and you have to have access to, you have to have a lot of cash, a lot of Bitcoin, and capital markets programs to do it. I think those two things together are enough for the company to be We can go and grab 1% of the credit market, and we can sell $100 billions of credit. We can create an enterprise that has got a trillion-dollar enterprise value. We create a multi-trillion dollar company just with those ideas. We might not even need the digital money. It might be just the digital credit is enough. We will be laser-focused on that, and that future, and then helping other people that either want to invest with us or build products on top of us. Phong, what do you think?

Phong Le
President and CEO, Strategy

In three years, every major bank in the world will have a stablecoin issued by that bank, and it could be a U.S. dollar stablecoin, it could be a euro stablecoin, it could be a yen stablecoin. In three years, all securities will be trading in a tokenized fashion 24/7, 365 days. Agents will have banks, agents will be conducting commerce, and they are going to demand modernized rails with stablecoins and modernized securities with tokens. Of course, what are they going to want with their stablecoins? They are going to want yield. They are not going to want treasury yields of 3.5%. They are going to want yields of north of 6% or 7% because an agent is going to make a very non-emotional decision to go to a stablecoin that offers high yields.

If you imagine what might back some of those yields would be a digital credit product like Stretch, which provides 12%. You mix that with a treasury, and you might be able to provide 6% yields on a stablecoin, as an example. That is what an agent will prefer. In the tokenized world, what are they going to want in a preferred product? They are going to want something that is providing high yields, tax deferred, and paid daily, maybe paid hourly, maybe paid every single minute, right? That is what an agent is going to want in a tokenized security and tokenized preferred world. I think what people likely see is the future of DeFi, and we expect Stretch and Strategy and Bitcoin to underlie a lot of that future.

Natalie Brunell
Author of Bitcoin is for Everyone and Host of Coin Stories Podcast, Talking Bitcoin

Well, the AIs will know that we are getting diluted in money supply by 6% a year, right? So they want higher rates. All right, that is all the time we have, Michael and Phong. Thank you so much for taking on all of these questions and topics. We appreciate your time. Do not worry, I just checked, we have not breached the $60,000 level with Bitcoin. Thank you to everyone who sent questions in and tuned into the show. These events are built around making sure there is a better understanding of the entire Strategy. I am Natalie Brunell. You can catch a rerun of this on Strategy's and my YouTube pages, as well as on X, and we will see you next time. Thanks so much.