Good morning, everybody. I'm delighted to be joined on stage by Andrea Orcel, CEO of UniCredit. Really, no introduction needed, except I'm pretty confident in saying we're going to have a lot to talk about over the next 35 minutes or so. We have 35 minutes. We'll try and leave some time at the end for audience Q&A. I think to begin with, maybe as more of a broader question, you know, you've met a lot of investors recently. I'm sure you're going to meet many more investors today. Before we address specific topics, are there sort of key topics or themes that you think the investor community or the Southside community we should bear in mind more for UniCredit and keep foremost in our mind at the moment?
I think if you look at the performance of the last four years, people do talk about transformation, but they do not appreciate how much transformation there has been. We focus primarily on operational efficiency, operational transformation, and we let run the commercial machine just by imposing a discipline in terms of moving the attention from volume to margin, from just lending to fees, and we rebuilt a number of things. When you look at the results and everybody says, you know, you outperformed the sector, we were five times net income, five times return on tangible, three times the distributions. The other thing that people did not see is that those results were reached despite an increasing amount of investment front-loaded, despite creating EUR 3 billion, more or less, of P&L buffers to protect the future, and despite rebuilding capital to an excess of EUR 10 billion.
What does that mean? That means that if we had done like the average of the industry that actually took down to zero overlays mostly, did not overinvest, did not take the charges to exit people in the last three years, we would have performed a lot better than we have in the last four in terms of raw numbers. Those would be the like-for-like. If you take last year, it would have been EUR 10.3 billion instead of EUR 9.3 billion. Now we would need to do those things. We think that the rest of the industry needs to do these things now. You're starting to hear non-operating costs to get people exited in Italy, in Germany, in Spain. We've done that. You're starting to hear we need to invest to rebuild certain factories or fee income. We've done that.
I do think that as you move in the next three years, in our case, not only do we have a transformed bank and we can focus on the next step of our strategy that we can discuss, but we have not only a buffer below the line that allows us to have great confidence in the delivery of this year net income, next year net income, and the EUR 10 billion at the end of the past, and to distribute in line with what we have guided, which can well reach EUR 30 billion over three years. We do not need to do other things. In comparison, our competitors do not have those buffers, and we need to do those things. As we have said, many people will start saying, oh, but my underlying earnings are EUR 400 million better or EUR 500 million better.
Yeah, but then our underlying earnings were EUR 1.3 billion better last year and EUR 1.2 billion better the year before that. I think that that is not appreciated. I think on the other hand, there is still an overall optimistic view of the revenue performance of banks in the next three years. I mean, I think we have started justifying the structural hedges, replication, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Let's remember where fees were and that now we're looking at an exit rate of 1.5-1.75. There will be an impact.
In our case, that impact is less, one, because below the line, we have EUR 3 billion to play with, and two, because above the line, we have a particularly good dynamic on NII in the next three years, not necessarily this year, but realistically, as we continue to move on margin, and a good dynamic on fees to compensate that. Q1 was an indication. By the way, I think people are getting a little bit over skis on fee dynamics because Q1 was exceptional. Q2 of last year has significant one-off. While I am very confident on what we are going to get this year, I would caution being overoptimistic on fees and taking Q1 too closely. That is, I think, the difference. The other difference is that as we finished phase one of our transformation, which was the operating machine, let's say we are 70-80% there.
We continue to prod along. Now we moved on commercial acceleration. What is that? That is bringing to bear all the investment we have done in our factories and really accelerating the till towards SME, affluent, and private. For us, they are about 60%-65% of the P&L of the revenues, but they are a disproportionate part of our bottom line. Those segments have higher margins. Those segments have not only a higher degree of cross-selling, but a higher degree of crossover between them as the owner of a small company is also an affluent client. They will allow us to protect not only the NII decline through margin expansion rather than through volume, which seems to be the focus of most, but also to maintain the fee growth as we go into segments that can consume those fees more than we have.
I think all of that for us, if you ask me what is our degree of confidence to bring the over EUR 9.3 billion this year, reaching EUR 10 billion in 2027, high. Why? Because I have EUR 3 billion of buffers and I have excess capital to play with. And this is at constant perimeter. What the real question that I should be asked is, but above the line at GOP and NOP level, can you create a bank that when we are in 2028, will grow from EUR 10 billion bottom line when your buffers are gone, et cetera, et cetera? That is our challenge. That is where we are spending the most of our time.
You talked about the confidence in delivery and what gives you the confidence that having had that better than expected first quarter to have actually taken the step to raise guidance for the full year. Is there anything, given all the macro volatility that we saw post-quarter end, I know you referenced fees just now, but anything that you think you need to do different from now on through to the end of the year in order to hit on that exit?
Actually, the short answer is no. It is no because of what I just said, that the buffers, the so-called EUR 1.7 billion of overlays and EUR 1.3 billion of non-operating charges that we have in the P&L were in a way built so that we would not need to deviate on our strategy and on our execution because of short-term accidents. The question is, how much of those buffers do I need to use to get to my end game? Because Q1 was, let's forget for a second trading, which was exceptional, but also does highlight that we can crystallize value when there is volatility, we actually were well above our plan because the NII plus fees was positive. You combine that with cost down, cost of risk linearly flat, our NOP and GOP were positive.
We had guided NOP and GOP down on Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, compensated in Q4 by non-operating charges. Instead, now we have a Q1 with NOP and GOP up and up even more because of the impact on trading. You get to Q2 and the guidance that we gave where we said, okay, if we are capable of reducing the negative on NOP and GOP in Q2 or to go flat year- on- year, then our ability to exceed our plan beyond EUR 9.3 billion becomes greater as we are not touching any of those or do not need any of those buffers at the end of a year to compensate for the first half. That is why we said, let us see how we close Q2. Let us see how Q3 begins.
If the momentum is the one that we're seeing, I think we will have upside this year.
Yeah. Before we, I think, dive into M&A and distribution, just one more topic on performance. You know, you and the team have clearly articulated a strategy focused around organic capital generation, a fairly distinctive approach to NII and fees, some of which you touched on. Maybe if you could just run us through more on the medium term, the future strategy on NII and fees, and then how you think on those the coming three years, as you referenced earlier, that's going to sustain the momentum on NII and fees that we've already seen.
We've said that many times, and I know that the industry looks at it a little bit differently. For us, EUR 1 billion in volume on lending at constant margin, heroic assumption, if volumes are going down for the market, EUR 15 million of increased revenues. One basis point of margin decline, EUR 45 million of decline. What should you focus on? The EUR 1 billion of volume in lending brings capital, uses capital, and therefore reduces your capital generation. One basis point in margin does not. Because of that, our focus has been, yes, we want to grow, but we want to grow in a way that at minimum does not compromise margin. At best, in the past four years, we've been able to increase this margin.
If you look at our revenue over RWA dynamic, that's exactly what we have done, recognizing that this is what generates not only net income, but actually profitability and capital generation. If you take that, we have gone from being well below the cost of equity on NII ROAC, which nobody looks at, but you need to look at as a standalone, if you're a commercial bank, your lending business, is that profitable or is that not profitable? Most banks say, oh, the client relationship. I've been in investment banking. You land to get fees. Then the fees don't come, and it's not a good picture, right? The same happens here. We want to have a lending business that washes face. At the end of Q1, the NII ROAC without anything else was 20% return on equity.
Now, it will decline, but we are now very confident that it will decline, still keeping a buffer above our cost of equity. Why? One, because of our starting point. Two, because of our discipline and focus on that rather than volume. Three, because as we move towards SME and affluent and private, margins are greater. We are offsetting some of the compression through the shifting clients and everything else. That is the commercial shift that we are doing. That does not mean not growing. It does mean growing credibly. If you look at it, even in Q1, we had guided more conservatively on NII dynamics. We are actually beating the industry on NII dynamics because we are going margin, they are going volume still. This will continue and is the first pillar of our commercial effort. The second pillar is the fees.
Given that I think that regulation will continue to compress returns in lending for banks, in my opinion, we're not done. Below the line benchmarking, review of models, et cetera, et cetera, will continue to take away profitability or return on capital in lending. You need to increase your fee base, which actually does not absorb any capital. We have gone from about 22% of revenues in fees to 36% last quarter. We are going to 40% and we are well diversified, so we are less volatile there. We rally less because we are not only investments, but we are much more stable because we are much more diversified. I think as we do that, again, client segments and products, I think that allows for our core revenue line to have a dynamic that is positive.
It will have a setback in 2025, and it will have a setback in the first half of 2026 as rates compress. Let's remember that banks, when rates were negative, did not have this profitability. If we are capable over 2025 and 2026 on the compression on rate to not only not ditch down on the record profitability of 2024, but actually add to it, and then when the environment is normalized, grow from there, you have a little bit redefined the rules in at least European banking, and you can offer an investment opportunity that I think is quite attractive for investors in banks in Europe. That's what we're trying to do.
Considering all of those comments, I guess when you take a step back, can you confirm then the current view for 2027 in terms of net profit return, capital distribution, excess?
I think the end game of reaching EUR 10 billion at current perimeter. If we or when we consolidate Alpha Commerce Bank, or if we were to do any M&A, that's all out. You should consider it as incremental. If we take the perimeter of today, which does include the internalization of insurance, for instance, and does include the consolidation of Alpha Romania, for instance, if you take that perimeter, we will make EUR 10 billion or EUR 10 billion + by 2027, I'm confident, and we will make them at a return on equity in the high teens and probably at 20%. That we will. The returns, the capital return, we're talking standalone status quo.
You know, we have not reviewed because we need to assess a little bit the more volatile part of our excess capital, which is the part that is linked to the contribution of a strategic portfolio. Things go up, things also go down. Russia, things go up, things also go down. The EUR 7.5 billion excess is going to allow us to say that we can distribute without a doubt what we committed to distribute unless there is a very, very negative development. Because whatever happens, I can modulate, first of all, the release of buffer to get the net income. From that net income, if it is not enough, I can modulate the distributions by accelerating or decelerating the amount of excess that I give back. The path to 2027, I think, highly confident.
As I said, the question for everybody is when we are going to be sitting some point in 2027, what is the perspective for 2028, 2029, and 2030? For us, we need to be able to articulate that the level of transformation and change allows us to say, we will grow more than the industry, top line, bottom line, et cetera, without relying on any buffer, on any excess capital, on anything else. That is where we need to get.
On M&A, you've reiterated on many occasions that you've got inorganic opportunities across your 13 markets or so, and you'll only close on deals that demonstrate real value creation to you and meet those financial criteria that you have. Can you help us understand how this applies to some of your recent potential moves of Commerzbank, Banco BPM, and ultimately for you, what is the upside more broadly given the proven strengths as you just outlined of the standalone franchise?
I think, look, I think we all say yes, it makes sense, but then we forget about that. M&A is a tool, it's not an objective. We all say, yeah, that makes a lot of sense. Once you are in an M&A transaction, everybody wants to see, are you going to close it? Are you going to close it? Are you going to close it? Let's remember it's a tool. It's a tool towards what? Towards two objectives: strengthening the group, and the end is in block capital letters, increasing value creation. If that objective is not achieved, then you need to have a discipline to step back.
In addition to that, if you have a base case where you've done your work and you have a lot of buffers, and I do believe that our base case is at the top tier, if not at the top of the industry in terms of what we can deliver at our current valuation, then why would I dilute that or endanger that for an M&A that doesn't add value? Because remember that if we do an M&A, integration means the normal running of a company gets set back. People cannot do five things at the same time. The point is we have a great base case. We're making a lot of value. We're very confident. We're also very confident that there will be positive dispersion between us and the peer group when they do their homework.
If the target does not allow us to at least exceed by a small delta what the base case allows us to achieve, we will not do it. You should not want us to do it. If we look at those cases, the first comment that I would make, but this is a more general comment, Bank M&A, we will see if in other industries the same, has now gotten another constituency. Those are government and politicians. I am not criticizing, it is a fact. When you do Bank M&A, you need to take that into consideration. We always did take that into consideration, but now it is not only moral situation, it is not only we need to have a dialogue, it becomes binary, digital. If they block you, they block you.
Second thing that needs to be considered in M&A in Europe at the moment in banks is a question that I will ask the audience. If management teams, instead of maximizing the value for their shareholders and potentially giving opportunity to clients and their people, et cetera, believe that because they do not like a transaction, they can go and lobby to a government or to a politician and block it, is that good? In my opinion, given our view of life, it is not. That is no criticism on government or on politicians, but it is a criticism on using this angle as a defense strategy because that prevents the market from functioning correctly and brings the whole dialogue somewhere else. It is not factual, it is not rational, it is not value creating, it is just defense for pure defense. This is happening everywhere at the moment.
Everywhere. There is no exception. Okay? I have always thought that management teams are here not to own the bank, but to do the best by what their shareholders and their people have asked them to do. If you move that on saying, I know better, and because I do not like it, I am going to block all of that, and I have my own agenda, I do not think that that is aligned, my personal view. That is now a factor. If that factor drags and makes it even more difficult or less economical to do deals, we need to be in a position to pull back. If you take BPM, there is a lot of noise, but the noise always gravitates on the same thing.
The elements in the golden power are not actually things that if I were a government, mostly, I would take Russia out of there, I would worry about. I am not concerned about that. If it is not exactly clear what they mean, once we close the transaction, we will have the risk of a EUR 20 billion penalty if what we have in our mind in terms of what they mean is in disagreement with what the Ministry of Finance stubbornly feels what they mean. That is not a risk any shareholder should want me to take. Explain to me exactly what you mean. If I am told cease activities in Russia, we have effectively ceased all of our lending activity in Russia since 2022. Ceased. We have EUR 800 million or EUR 900 million of lending left, and it depletes. I'm sorry, guys.
If I have a mortgage of 20 years, I cannot accelerate more than that. We're down 85%-90%. I think that's good enough. We have ceased all the payments effectively, different from euros and dollars. And we went from EUR 25 billion a quarter to now we're going to trend at EUR 6 billion a quarter. Incidentally, even the golden power is indicating that those payments I need to keep going because companies in Germany, in Italy, in France are still operating there, need it. Let's talk about the ugly truth. We still buy energy, we still buy commodities, we still buy things from Russia, and that is allowed. How will a government-controlled company even pay for that if there is no payment system? That's why it's always excluded. Then you're left with cross-border. We're down 95%. We have a loan repaying or not repaying.
In October, we will be down 100%. We have ceased activity since 2022. We have deposits. I'm sorry, people, if we are doing payments, you have deposits on one hand and on the other. We have less than EUR 1 billion of deposits. We are declining. Under Russian law, we are obliged to take this deposit. Is that cease of activity and are those deposits linked to payments excluded from the golden power or included in the golden power? Oh, we'll tell you later. Later, if we disagree, there is a EUR 20 billion fine. As I see it now, if a golden power is not clarified, by the way, I'm not saying change. Everybody takes change, and some people say, oh, the medicine.
There is no medicine because do we agree that we want to increase, not only maintain, but increase the lending to SMEs in Italy? Yes. It's in our strategy. Do we agree that we will continue to manage Anima in the best interest of savers? Yes. We always do that. Do we have a problem with maintaining EUR 1.5 billion of project finance in Italy? None. Clarifying in Russia and, oh, deposit to loan ratio. As you all know, if I have a meltdown in the economy, deposits increase because they come out of asset management, they go there, lending decreases, and nobody wants to borrow. What do I do then with the deposit to loan ratio? It's a question of definition. It's not a question of content. If the definition is correct, for me, the golden power is absolutely acceptable.
If it is not clear and if it's not correct, then the probability that we take that risk is zero, and therefore we will pull. At this point, you should consider that if the golden power is not in some form, shape or form clarified, we will pull. Why did we ask for suspension, extension, et cetera? Because we believe that we agree on the content. We are trying to have a dialogue to clarify it and still have the time to run an offer at the back end. As you can see, we have not even started running an offer. BPM has defended. We have not even started. We are one month and a half late. We need time if we want to educate shareholders on that.
At the moment, given how I see it, probability 20% or less, and it's all linked on the digital, whether government clarifies or doesn't clarify those topics. On Commerzbank, I think we talk a lot about M&A on Commerzbank. At the moment, we have a 30% stake. That's it. We haven't made an offer because we're unwelcome. We are exactly where we said we would be in December. Where are we? We raised our stake to 10%. By the way, I would like to underscore participating as the only invited institutional, or institutional, strategic, call it whatever, but the Ministry of Finance of Germany in their sell down of a stake. We were the only bank invited because we had been talking to them for a long, long time. We signed an NDA in the morning. The whole market came in the evening.
We were asked to increase our offer to get that stake because the placement did not go well. If you go and look at the statements from the Ministry of Finance, that's what they said. During the whole process, we were in complete contact with the then leadership of Commerzbank until that time who was favorable to us moving in that direction. I still don't understand this business of opaque or style or anything else because if you sell me something and you turn around and you say it's opaque and hostile, I don't get it. That said, from then, we said very clearly, we will ask for authorization to go to 30%. We did. We moved to 30%. Probably by the end of this month, we will have all the authorizations to be at 30% because we still have a lot of derivatives.
We only have in physical the 10%. When we get there and during the summer, we'll need to take a decision whether we consolidate the 30%, yes or no. We'll see. If we consolidate the 30%, meaning we take the physical on the 30%, it means fact, we will have a 30% stake. Fact, but 30% stake comes with rights and influence. Fact, I have a duty to my shareholders to protect that investment. The only way this moves in any direction, and the direction may be up, maybe down, maybe a compromise of any sort, is with dialogue. If no one wants to talk, we are going to have a situation where we are stalling for a long period of time. I do not think that is in the best interest of Germany, in the best interest of Commerzbank, and not for us.
We have earned the right to be patient. We're going to sit it out, have the 30%, exert the power that goes with it, and wait and see what happens until my shareholder tells me, you know what, at this level, I think you should either launch, exit, or do something else. We have taken until 2027, so we have a long time to do that.
Okay, one last quick question for me before we turn to audience Q&A. I'm sure we'll have many. You know, we're here in Berlin. We just talked about Germany. You have a EUR 5 billion revenue bank here in Germany. How do you see the outlook for that business specifically in Germany? How do you think the fiscal plan will benefit that business, but then maybe also the European franchises more broadly?
We are, I think I'm actually quite proud and thankful to a team here because when I arrived at UniCredit, I had a long line of people telling me, Germany, you're never going to be able to make money out of that country. Sell it. We closed Q1 with a 26% return on equity at 30% CET1, with a 36% cost income ratio. Both were improving still. The bank is very capitalized, very liquid, very clean, completely the most advanced in the transformation in the group, and ready to take opportunities. From that standpoint, very positive. By the way, because you asked and it is connected, as we set it out, look at the Q1 performance of UniCredit Germany versus Commerzbank. Net income + 12%, net income at Commerzbank - 2%, - 4% if you eliminate the release of overlay.
We increase the difference in cost income ratio to 20 points. We're at 36%, they're at 56%. We increase the difference in return on equity to 26% versus 14%. In my view, the two are not on the same trajectory. You should expect Commerzbank to converge if they're doing their plan, not to diverge because we're ahead. Our margin to increase further is limited. Their margin to increase further is very great. Cost, ours in Germany - 2%, theirs + 7%. If there is no revenue, we're going to see where that takes them. In the short term, can play with margins because of our deposit base, but let's see where it gets them in two, three, four quarters. That's where we are. As we said, Germany this year, last year, slight negative growth. This year, very lackluster growth. Next year, big bounce. The following year, big bounce.
For us, and I have been chairing HVB since 2021, big opportunity. Big opportunity. I strongly believe in the country, strongly believe in the Mittelstand, strongly believe in the new plan of investment that tries to find growth and transform a number of things in Germany that need transforming. I think with HVB, we are right at the heart of that. Few people know that we keep on winning number one bank for trade finance again and again and again. We have been the number one bank in defense again and again and again. We are positioned in the regions where there will be, for example, most of the innovation budget is going to touch [Foreign language]. We are very positive on what we can do out of this economy and supporting this economy in 2026 and in 2027. This year, still tough.
This year is still tough because you get the compression of rates and all the investment that we are expecting are not being rolled out. I mean, when you get such amount, you need to prepare how you're going to roll them out, the infrastructure, who's going to do what, et cetera. That takes time. Once you start rolling them out, in which form? Guarantees with lending of bank attached. They're buying, I don't think anymore, but American planes or European planes. You know, depending on that, the role of bank is more or less. Without a doubt, we think big rebound on economy and even bett er rebound on banks.
Yeah. Okay, with that, any questions from the audience? No, we're good. Okay, maybe just one sort of final wrap-up from me. I know we're running out of time. You know, we talk about returns, durability.
I mean, we talked about that earlier in some of your, you know, confidence in delivery. There has been a focus, you know, on this organic capital generation, as you talked about earlier. You talked about the higher returns outlook, high teens, et cetera. Do you think that's fully appreciated when you look at the conversations you have with investors, you know, today, I guess, and in recent weeks, that there is confidence that you can consistently perform at that level?
I do think that, you know, people use a lot of proxies. Yeah. Or let's go back. If, at least in my times, there was a great article on the FT on nobody cares about numbers anymore, which I suggest people read because it is true. In my time, how do you value a company? Cash flow generation.
A healthy company can generate cash recurrently in a growing pattern over time. That is where you want to be as a shareholder. Now, for a bank, that is not cash flow, that is dividend. Why? Because the restriction on distribution, the capital, et cetera, is dividend. It is the same concept. At the end of the day, a bank should be valued on its ability to distribute. How much do you distribute on a consistent basis? Is that amount growing or not growing? What is the proxy that is being taken? Net income. It is a proxy that may or may not work. There are banks that are capital heavy and that lend by volume that cannot distribute more than, say, 40%-50% of their net income without decreasing their capital. They have decreased this capital. That is not sustainable.
You can do it one year, two years, three years, but then the capital will be decreased and then you go back to 40%-50%. Okay? There are banks, one of our greatest competitors, which has been my benchmark in Italy. They're capable because they are much more capital light to distribute 80% and not then fair capital, which of the two models is worth more money? In my opinion, the second one. Okay? You can have two banks that both make EUR 10 billion in net profit, but one can safely distribute recurrently EUR 5 billion and the other one EUR 8 billion. I'll take the eight. People don't make that distinction. That's the first problem. The second issue is the mixing between the return of excess capital and the ordinary. Okay? We separate the two.
Organic capital generation should be, I make a profit and without considering the return of excess capital, how much can I distribute without denting my CET1? That for me is the core. You want to have that number. By the way, when you are in normalized state, that number by definition is below net income. All the banks that distribute at or above can do that for a time because they're using excess to do it. If I make EUR 10 billion, it is not possible that I generate capital for EUR 11 billion. Unless I'm doing some extraordinary stuff, which occur. In the case of UniCredit, we've been generating EUR 120 million, EUR 130 million and distributing EUR 95 million, EUR 100 million. Therefore, that's where we are, 16.1% of capital. Okay? Over time, all the efficiency measures, all the things finish because you're efficient.
You go and you distribute a subset of the EUR 10 billion for us or of net income. The question is when you get there, how much? The question is when you get there, how high is your EUR 10 billion? Is it EUR 10 billion? Is it EUR 11 billion? Is it EUR 12 billion? Or is it EUR 9 billion? Because it is a portion of that. Second, how much of that E UR 10 billion can you distribute without denting your capital? We are trying to move those two. If you go by volume only, you could, let's say, get to EUR 11 billion, but then you can distribute 50%. Maybe if you go by margin, you get to EUR 10 billion or EUR 10.5 billion, but you can distribute 85%. I think the second one is much more recurrent and in time will, we are a yield industry. You are not going to buy me for extraordinary growth. Last four years, maybe.
Over time, we are boring, increasing. Yeah, but boring sometimes is good in banks. Does not feel boring. Boring, increasing element of the portfolio that gives you a secure growing dividend yield, et cetera. That is what we are. Okay? That is what this industry is now. I think if we can get something where your net income grows at a return on tangible, but in the high teens, it means it is a profitable growth. Because it is combined with capital light, it allows you to ordinarily distribute 80%, 90%, 75%, 80%, 90%. You have the best on EPS growth and the best on distribution growth and the best on how much of that net income you are distributing out. By definition, that bank is worth more. As of today, nobody is making that distinction.
Therefore, if you have banks that have released overlay and paid back some of the excess capital to support their distributions, they're viewed exactly the same to other banks who have not distributed their overlays and who have not distributed their excess capital. Actually, in our case, we shouldn't have, but we have. We have increased our excess capital. By definition, we have more capacity. I think that's the question. When I talk a lot about after 2027, EUR 10 billion net profit, high teens return on tangible, and growing from there, I'm trying to bring you to your proxy, but in my mind is not that. In my mind is what will be the organic capital generation and my ability to distribute consistently from 2027 and beyond. Is that number nine growing? Because I don't have any extraordinary.
Is that number nine plus growing or is that number eight, seven? It won't be. But the more I am close to the net income trajectory, the better I think over time people will appreciate because at some point they will see the difference in EPS growth, in DPS growth, in distribution return, et cetera. At the end of the day, from a financial standpoint, that's what we're doing. Industrial is different, but the objective is that the industrial, you know, converts into this.
Okay, look, great. I think we could go on and on, but in the interest of time, we have to stop somewhere. Thank you so much for giving up your time today. I really appreciate you coming. Thank you.