Good day, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Brait half-year results presentation. I will now hand the conference over to Mr. Peter Hayward-Butt. Please go ahead, sir.
Thank you very much. Thank you very much to all of our stakeholders for taking the time this morning to join the results presentation. I am joined by Sabelo, who is our CFO, and also Dean and Mark from Virgin Active. Unfortunately, Kobus Gertenbach from Premier couldn't make it. He is on a roadshow as we speak, in fact, flying to London, but he gave his results presentation yesterday. What we intend to do today is to spend some time going through the various portfolio companies, and obviously then to talk about the impact that has had on Brait and its NAV. I will talk to the Premier and New Look slides, Sabelo will talk to the Brait NAV and liquidity slides, and Dean and Mark will talk to Virgin Active.
From an overall perspective, it has been an extremely busy year for all of our portfolio companies and for Brait. If you look over the last six months, particularly Virgin Active, and I must credit Dean and Mark. I know we only speak to shareholders maybe it is twice a year or so, but the amount of work that has gone in the past six months has been phenomenal. Not just have they been building the core business, but they have conducted a rights issue to raise GBP 175 million in the company, which completed in early October after our results closed at the 30th of September. It facilitated a massive reduction, GBP 243 million reduction in the net debt in the business from 4.3x net debt to EBITDA down to 2.4x.
They have also conducting a whole debt refinance across the global, a global facility across the whole group, which will hopefully conclude in the first quarter of next year. Not only that, they have looked at and in the process of 10 new clubs overall in some different phases of completion, and refurbs literally across all of our territories across the world. In addition to that, as was announced on Monday, they announced the acquisition of Holmes Place Germany, which is the market leader in a fast-growing German market.
All of that really has been done over the last six months. I want to, before we get on to the Virgin Active strategy, just thank Mark and Dean and his whole team for the unbelievable amount of work that has gone into that. Just to give some of the highlights around Virgin, obviously Dean and Mark will go into a bit more detail.
As I mentioned, we completed the rights issue in Virgin Active, which raised GBP 175 million in October. So, just to be aware, that's not in the results. When you look at the Brait numbers as at 30th of September, we were holding the cash that went into that for our contribution in October. What did that facilitate? It facilitated just under GBP 250 million reduction. What's the difference between the GBP 175 million and the GBP 243 million? As you will remember, there were convertible preference shares in the business. Those had the ability to convert into equity at the election of the holder of those convertible preference shares. As part of the rights issues, all of those were converted into equity, bar 10 million, which were redeemed for cash.
That has resulted in the net debt in the business decreasing from 4.3x net debt to EBITDA all the way down to 2.4x post the capital injection. That will be used, as we mentioned, to fund growth opportunities. That's what we discussed at the time. Obviously part of that is M&A, and we'll talk a bit about the exciting new investment that the group has made in the German business. From an EBITDA perspective, EBITDA grew about 10% on a like-for-like basis. LTM is last 12 months. The last 12 months, EBITDA increased to GBP 116.7 million. That's up 10% from just over GBP 105 million this time a year ago. That is despite pretty difficult trading conditions, to be honest, both South Africa and the U.K., which have continued. But despite that, we've seen EBITDA increase.
Also, in addition to that, included in that is a whole lot of startup losses and closure costs from either the renovations or the new clubs that we're looking to invest in. As we've mentioned probably two or three years ago, there's been a strategic decision to invest in wellness clubs. As part of that, you need to reinvest in the portfolio and yield it up. That has impacted membership growth. You will see membership growth has been relatively flat across the territories, but this hasn't stopped an increase in revenue, obviously with yields increasing over time. So, you would expect, just given the elasticity of demand, to see some decrease in the membership base, which we have seen, but we've seen increased yields literally across the portfolio, which have driven revenues in all territories in the right direction.
We announced, and when I say we, the royal we, Virgin Active announced a binding sale agreement to acquire Holmes Place Germany. It's a business that we've known well, we've looked at in the past. We've been working on this probably for the best part of nine months. Again, when I say we, mostly Dean, Mark, and his team. The business was acquired for EUR 135 million, which implied a 6.3x EV to EBITDA. This has provided the business with a really great platform in one of Europe's fastest-growing and under-penetrated markets. We've always said the strategy of Virgin Active is to grow our non-South African profitability, particularly in core European markets, which we know well. We've opened up clubs in Switzerland, soon to be Austria, and now we have the leading platform in Germany.
As a result, South Africa, probably four or five years ago, was probably 65% of EBITDA on a group level. That, on a pro forma basis, post this transaction, will be down at 44%. We think that's a vital part of growing into a listing. We've always said investors would like to see further international growth as opposed to only South African growth. Despite the South African business continuing to grow and have really good, strong free cash flow this year, its contribution to overall EBITDA will be down at 44%. We'll touch on Holmes Place in quite a lot of detail, but it's a business that's grown really well, grew 27% EBITDA year-on-year. It has margins of 38%, which is above our margins that we see on a club basis, both in the U.K. and Italy. It's an absolute leader in that market.
There are some differences to that market which make it a really exciting place to play, and Dean will cover that in a lot of detail. In terms of the pipeline, Dean will also touch on that. There's a well-developed pipeline of growth opportunities. We can be very selective about which we take. Certainly, the new club growth will be mostly Italy, although we will pare that back slightly given obviously the German acquisition still needs to be integrated. There are opportunities in other markets as well, including South Africa, and Dean will touch on all of that. Overall, a fantastic result and credit to Dean and his team. A massive amount of work over the last six months for which we are massively appreciative. Just moving on to Premier. Premier had its results yesterday. A really strong performance literally across almost every category and division.
A real strong contribution from the RFG business, which was integrated post the acquisition, which completed at the end of March. We've seen the first six months of RFG included in the numbers. Revenue and EBITDA growth of 39% and 51% respectively, although I think probably the more sensible metric to look at is headline earnings per share, which takes account of the shares that were issued for the transaction, and that was up 27%. I think what we're seeing in that business, and it actually also reflects on what we are looking to do in Virgin Active, is the benefits of the CapEx investment cycle. That's been ongoing for probably three or four years in the Premier business, particularly in the MillBake division, and that really has driven growth, not just on an absolute basis, but relative to some of our competitors as well.
We will see two of the new bakeries come on stream in this calendar year, in this financial year. We haven't seen the impact of that really in the first half results, and the new bakeries in Aeroton and Lyttelton will start to contribute going forward, which will continue to drive growth in that business. Overall, EBITDA in that business for the first six months is ZAR 2 billion. I remember when we took over the management of Brait in 2020, the whole business made ZAR 0.9 billion of EBITDA for the full year. So it's a massively impressive result from Kobus and his team. The cash generated, even more importantly, for the first six months on an operating level was nearly ZAR 1.8 billion.
A phenomenal result, and we saw the results out yesterday with the share price up 7% or 8%, reflecting those facts. New Look has also had a great performance over the last six months and the last 12 months, to be honest. Last 12 months, EBITDA is up 32% from a maintainable EBITDA perspective, up to just under GBP 40 million as of September. This is driven by really strong cost management and also a lower reduced sales mix. The conditions in the U.K. remain tough. I'd love to sit here one of these days and say it's not. It is. Although having said that, the last six months we've seen real green shoots of recovery in that market, particularly in some of the products that we play in. So, a good result.
Net debt has always been one of the issues that we focused on over the last three or four years. It's down to GBP 13 million, or 0.3x EBITDA, which is a fantastic result. Gives the ability for that business to continue to grow without continuously having to look over its shoulder from a liquidity perspective. That was due to the comprehensive debt refinance, which was completed in the six months, providing the business with a runway to 2029. In terms of Brait, what does that mean for Brait?
The NAV per share from Brait is ZAR 2.64 post the rights issue. This compares to ZAR 2.59 as of September, so about a 2% increase. As you will all know, we've seen the currency, the rand, move against the pound, strengthen against the pound from 23.20, I think the number was in September, down to 21.75. So just under a 10% strengthening of the rand obviously impacts the value in rand.
If we had to look on a constant currency basis and exclude the equity reserve on the convertible bonds that were redeemed, we can touch on a bit of that later, which is about ZAR 300 million. Overall, the implied growth on a like-for-like basis is about 10% year- on- year. In terms of the rights issue, we are very grateful to our shareholders who supported the rights issue. It was massively oversubscribed, not just from an underwrite perspective, but from the over-allocations perspective. The BML RCF, which was refinanced and completed in August. This really set up the ability to redeem the convertible bonds, which were fully repaid in September, and that has resulted in a coupon saving for Brait of about ZAR 270 million. Overall, the NAV impact of that, you will see there was equity accounted valuation of that of about ZAR 300 billion.
So in the NAV, the convertible prefs were in there ZAR 3 billion, but actually overall, sorry, they were in there ZAR 2.7 billion. We redeemed them for ZAR 3 billion. So you will see that impact obviously negatively impact the NAV growth for the year. In terms of the strategic intent, it remains to unlock value from and unbundle the remaining assets. I know there was a question yesterday on the Premier call as to whether we need to sell Premier shares. We do not need to sell any Premier shares. We do not want to sell any Premier shares. We believe the company's going in the right direction. It's growing fantastically well.
We have about a ZAR 1.1 billion liquidity surplus currently, which means that we are well set up to execute really on the listing, hopefully, of Virgin Active over the next couple of years, and then unbundle all the assets to our shareholders. With that, I'll turn over to Sabelo to talk through the NAV.
Thanks, Peter, and good morning all. Starting with slide seven, Brait's key reporting metric of NAV per share is ZAR 2.64, which increased by 2% compared to September 2025 on a like-for-like basis after adjusting for the recapitalization. Total assets of ZAR 18 billion at reporting date is weighted 51% Virgin Active, 31% Premier, 4% New Look, and 14% in cash and receivables. Following the settlement of the convertible bonds, total liabilities of ZAR 3.5 billion comprise ZAR 1.5 billion drawn on Brait's committed banking facility, the BML RCF, whose tenure and limit were recently extended to March 2029 and ZAR 2.5 billion respectively. ZAR 1.9 billion outstanding on the BIH exchangeable bonds, which are due 3 December 2027, and accounts payable of ZAR 100 million. The resultant NAV of ZAR 14.6 billion equates to ZAR 2.64 per share.
Slide eight sets out movements in balance sheet positions for the half year. To note at the outset that the peer groups for Virgin Active and New Look remain unchanged. Virgin Active's pound carrying value increased by 1%. The company's valuation is based on LTM EBITDA of GBP 126 million, which was adjusted for club closure losses, new club startup losses, and embedded EBITDA. The valuation multiple was unchanged at nine times, and net third-party debt of GBP 448 million was reduced by GBP 19 million for CapEx spend on closed gyms. Premier's carrying value reflects the following: Brait's 19% stake, representing 31.3 million shares, valued at the closing price of ZAR 179.90. A further 4.7 million Premier shares is held within the cap and collar structure, which is valued at ZAR 854 million.
This is offset by borrowings of ZAR 791 million, as well as an IFRS option liability amounting to ZAR 80 million against the structure. The borrowings were included in the cash balance in September 2026 and were used to facilitate the Virgin Active capital raise in October 2026. New Look's carrying value reflects an LTM EBITDA of GBP 40 million. The unchanged spot multiple of 6.5x represents a 38% discount to the peers, and no normalization adjustments were considered in net third-party debt of GBP 14 million. The cash and receivables of ZAR 2.5 billion consisted of cash reserved for the Virgin Active capital raise. Turning to page nine, the liability movements were mainly driven by the settlement of the convertible bonds at par plus accrued interest, offset by the ZAR 1.5 billion drawn on the BML RCF.
Slide 10 analyzes Brait's liquidity and debt and is set out on a consolidated basis. Three major inflows occurred during the period that arose from the ZAR 2.5 billion that was raised in Brait's rights offer in August, the ZAR 1.4 billion drawdown on the BML RCF, and ZAR 791 million that was drawn from the Premier cap and collar structure. These inflows, as Pete said, then facilitated the settlement of the convertible bonds in September 2026 and participation in Virgin Active's capital raise in October 2026. Available liquidity at reporting date amounted to ZAR 1.1 billion post the Virgin Active capital raise. Brait is in compliance with all debt covenants, and this liquidity position provides runway for Brait to execute its value unlock strategy. Thank you, and back to you, Peter.
Thanks, Sabelo, and thanks for all your work getting that done. Without further ado, I am going to hand over to Dean and Mark to talk through the Virgin Active slides. Thanks, Dean.
Thank you, Peter, and good morning, everybody. Peter, if you can just go to the next slide. Before I discuss Virgin Active specifically, I would like to just start with why the market that Virgin Active operates in is an attractive place to operate in and an attractive place to invest in. It is largely because it sits at the intersection of two of the largest and fastest-growing areas of consumer spending, being wellness and the experience economy. From a wellness perspective, we have spoken about this before, the wellness economy has doubled in size since 2013. It grows faster than the wider economy, having grown 6.5% a year since 2013 versus 3.2% for global GDP, and it is forecast to continue growing at another 7.6% a year, reaching nearly $9.8 trillion by 2029.
Physical activity, the core of Virgin Active, is one of the six sectors within wellness that is expected to exceed $1 trillion by 2029. The wellness economy, as we see, fast-growing, no longer just a trend, very much a part of everyone's lifestyles. From an experience point of view, we have seen a shift in what consumers are spending on, from owning things to doing things. McKinsey has found that the global experience market grew more than three times faster than spending on non-essential goods between 2023 and 2025. This shift in the experience economy is strongest at the premium end, which is exactly where Virgin Active sits.
Per Euromonitor, and you have seen this in the press as well, personal luxury goods have declined, sales have declined in personal luxury goods, while the experiential luxury economy, including wellness, has done the exact opposite and has grown by some 8%. When you look at the experience economy, specifically around wellness and luxury experiences, we have seen a growth in that. The structural tailwinds in the segment that we operate in are large, and they continue to get stronger. The harder question is really, who is going to capture that growth? From our perspective, we believe it is the premium operators that have the right physical spaces and a product that goes well beyond the gym.
That is what, I think two years, three years ago, we spoke about our strategy in terms of moving away from just a gym to a social wellness club, and that was our answer. From a brand perspective, Virgin Active is very aspirational, and it is extremely well recognized across the global wellness estate. It has market-leading positions in six markets, seven now if you include Germany with Holmes Place, and we serve now well over 1 million members. The product, as we have spoken about, it is no longer just a gym. We moved from the gym to the social wellness club. We often speak about Virgin Active Clubs today becoming a second space, a place where our members come to work out, but they also come to work, to socialize, relax, recover. It is no longer just a place to train.
The traditional gym segments are really fighting for the same pool of people who really want to exercise in a gym. Low-cost operators keep driving the prices down, and differentiation really gets harder. The social wellness club enabled us to step out of that competitive set, to step out of that fight, which is really around either adding value or driving down price. We start to access members or to consumers who never thought of themselves as gym people, as gym-goers, people that want a great place to work outside the office, someone who is interested in recovery, in spa, in saunas, someone who wants to meet people through a run club or a weekly social, and someone who cares about longevity and just overall feeling well. Our strategy is not just about winning market share within the gym sector.
That is important for us, but we also believe we can create a whole lot of new demand with far less direct competition, and we can price ourselves for the whole experience, not just access to gym equipment. That is why our addressable market is significantly larger than fitness, and why our premium position, we believe, is very defensible. Just obviously very topical at the moment is AI and digital, and just to discuss how we see that impacting in our business. As AI, as digital take over more people's lives, what becomes scarce and valuable is physical, human, and in-person interactions. You cannot download the sauna. You cannot stream the energy you get from one of our group exercise classes that take place in our facilities.
We see as people spend more time on screens, the more they will pay for real places and real community, our social wellness clubs. Digital doesn't compete with that. It enhances the experience. It helps us personalize the experience, makes joining and booking more effortless. It keeps members engaged and retained for longer. Digital is the layers that drive people into our clubs. Our clubs are the pieces that nobody can copy with software. From a portfolio point of view, our estate, the number of locations we have got in iconic cities around the world makes it very hard to replicate what we have got, these large format clubs in major global cities in prime locations. In addition, most of our members are on 12-month contracts, so we have predictable recurring subscription revenue, real visibility of our earnings going forward.
We often speak about our strong operating leverage. We have got a fixed club cost base, a predominantly fixed club cost base. This, coupled with the growing demand I have seen, we have spoken about, adds volume to capacity that we already own and we already operate. On top of that, we have got the additional levers that we have spoken about, club reinvestment. We've got a proven track record on ROR where we do reinvest in our existing estate. The new club pipeline, selective M&A will cover Holmes Place Germany a little bit later, and the ability to generate ancillary revenue. Just in short, summing up the proposition of where Virgin Active plays, a large growing market, a premium brand well-positioned to take advantage of that growth, and in a physical contracted portfolio that becomes more valuable, not less, as the world goes digital.
Before I hand over to Mark to discuss trading performance, I do want to note and just be upfront in terms of sales volumes in South Africa and the U.K., they have been soft, and you see this in the numbers that Mark will present. Active members in South Africa down about 4% and down in South Africa and down 3% in the U.K. Despite that, revenue in South Africa is up 5% and up 6% in the U.K. The reasons for the softness in the volumes in membership sales, one is a deliberate choice. We've spoken about it. We've prioritized yield and quality of sales over volume, so fewer discounted joins, fewer offers that we put into the market, but we are seeing members stay longer and be more engaged. We've seen that come through in an improvement in attrition.
Just U.K. attrition as of September 26 has improved by about 4% versus the same period last year. South Africa attrition has improved by about 2% as of September 26. The second reason for the softness in sales is largely within our control. It's around internal sales structures. We've done a lot of work over the course of this year to fix the sales teams, to change the sales structures. In the past, our teams were very reliant on selling discounts, on selling offers. We've had to teach and educate them and bring in new people that can sell the product on the value that we bring without relying on discounts and offers. The third reason is definitely the economy. Consumers in both South Africa and the U.K. are under pressure, right?
Important to note though, where we have reinvested and where we have the full social wellness concept, some clubs that will be familiar to you in South Africa, Point, Wembley Square. In the U.K., we've done Mayfair, Chiswick Riverside. We see the lower attrition in those clubs. We see higher yields, and in those clubs, we haven't seen a softening of decline in sales, despite having pushed prices up and an improvement in attrition. Just out of interest, at the Point where we spent a considerable amount of CapEx and we opened that at the beginning of this year, that club now runs a waiting list. We're at capacity, and we run a waiting list. So sales, attrition on- sales yield have really proved really great benefit for us there.
From an EBITDA point of view in those clubs, what we've seen, Point's EBITDA is up some 500% September 26 versus September 25. A U.K. club, Chiswick Riverside, which also got revamped, September EBITDA 26 up 180%. So, there's not a demand problem for our product, where members see the product, they join, they pay more, and they stay longer. The reinvestment clubs really show where the rest of the estate can head towards, and really show the proof points in terms of the social wellness strategy. With that context around softer sales, I am going to hand over to Mark, who will take you through the trading performance.
Thanks, Dean, and good morning to everybody on the call. I will start with the trading nine months ending September 26. Overall for the business, we ended September 26 with 991 members. That was down 3% on volume year-on-year, but up 6% in terms of revenue growth. As Dean just touched on, and I will not repeat what he said, but trading in South Africa and the U.K. has been softer. But that has been offset by more robust trading across our Italian and Asia-Pacific businesses. In Italy, we have seen about a 12% increase in sales year-on-year, so that territory continues to perform very well. Australia, which has been a territory that has been struggling over the past few years, has in fact been our strongest performer this year, with sales up 15% year-on-year. Singapore and Thailand started robustly.
There has been some moderation during the course of the second half, and both are behind prior year in terms of membership, but up year-on-year in terms of revenue. Overall attrition for the business is at similar levels year-on-year. In fact, it is a 1% improvement. So despite the challenges we have seen in the South African and U.K. economies, we have overall seen an improvement in attrition. As Dean mentioned, the U.K. was 4% better year-on-year, South Africa 2% better. So that points to the product itself is resilient. It is more of a challenge around acquisition in those two markets. What does stand out when you look at the estate is that our APAC and Italian estates are the newest and well-invested. When you look at the South Africa and the U.K., where the clubs are well-invested, we get strong performance.
Where they require further investments, those are the clubs that lag. And within South Africa, there is a demographic split between the more affluent and the less affluent markets. In terms of EBITDA, the last 12 months EBITDA for the business has been GBP 116.7 million at actual exchange rates. That is a 10% improvement year-on-year. Within that result is about a GBP 10.9 million year-to-date investment in our IT spend, which is about GBP 1.2 million up year-on-year. And that is focused on initiatives to improve member engagement and improve our sales efficiency, touching on the points that Dean mentioned around evolving our sales methodology. From a cash flow point of view, our maintenance CapEx for the year was GBP 46.8 million. And we had working capital and tax of about GBP 7.2 million. So that gave us a free cash flow before servicing of GBP 62.7 million.
Moving on, in terms of our refurbishment programs, we have spent GBP 45.2 million on our refurbishment CapEx in FY2026, including Mayfair, Chiswick Riverside, and Point. The focus of our refurbishment is primarily on our U.K. and South African estate, which, as I mentioned, was slightly older. We target a minimum of 30% return on invested capital, and I will touch on the track record on those in further slides. Dean mentioned we have seen strong returns on the investor capital, Point up 514% year-on-year EBITDA, Chiswick Riverside 180%. It is too early to measure Wembley and Mayfair, but we expect those clubs to follow similar trends as to what we have seen in the other major refurbs. From a new club rollout perspective, we spent GBP 29.7 million on new club CapEx in the year. This has been spent across six clubs.
Two have opened, one in Italy, and the other being our first club in Lugano, Switzerland, marks our entry into the Swiss market. Two will be opening later this year, and then two will be opening early next year, one of those being our first club in Vienna, Austria, targeted to open in January 2027. We are seeing a strong ramp-up in membership from these clubs, with about 7,300 members at the clubs that have opened. As with our refurbishment program, we are targeting a minimum of 30% return on invested capital from these projects. Moving on to M&A, as we touched on the 30th of October, we signed an agreement to acquire Germany business, which is the number one premium operator in the German market with 13 clubs.
The enterprise value for that transaction was EUR 135 million, of a 2026 budget EBITDA of EUR 21.5 million, excuse me, that is EUR 135 million, of EUR 21.5 million, 2026 EBITDA, that gives us implied enterprise value to EBITDA multiple of 6.3. For the record, the business is trading marginally ahead of its 2026 budget. This is the largest premium health club operator in the German market. Germany is the largest European economy. It is under-penetrated when you look at similar U.K. or Spanish penetration rates. So this gives us a high-quality asset with an experienced management team, and a platform in Germany to continue our expansion, not only in Germany, but to support the other DACH territory, Switzerland and Austria. Just touching on the relative EBITDA contribution, the impact of the Holmes Place acquisition will move the offshore contribution to EBITDA from 49% to 56%.
It is our continued aim to diversify our earning streams across various geographies, particularly outside of SA, and this is a further step in that direction. Just taking a closer look at territory performance, starting with South Africa, top left, we have seen a 5% year-on-year increase in revenue. From a membership perspective, we have seen from September 2025 to June 2026, we saw a reduction in South African membership. That was a consequence of two main strategies. One was our yield strategy, focusing yield over volume, and the second part, as Dean touched on, it was focusing on quality of sales. What we did in the Q2 of 2026 was a restructure of our sales force, focusing on modernizing the sales methodologies to align it with other territories, and we saw some disturbance in the sales levels in Q2 of this year.
But what we are seeing going into September 2026 in Q3 is a recovery in the membership from 602,000 to 605,000. From a U.K. perspective, U.K. had a strong start to the year, but we have seen some weakness in the second half of the year. A lot of that is driven around a weaker consumer market, particularly impacted by the high energy costs in that market. Italy remains very strong. The dip in June 2026 is mainly seasonal, and that happens every year, which is why the GBP 40.1 million EBITDA is below the GBP 44.3 million in June. But when you look at that September 2026 versus September 2025, that is an 8% improvement in a year-on-year revenue.
What happens in July, August is we get a high level of freeze that reduces revenue, and that unwinds in September, October each year. That is naturally just a seasonal impact. Then finally, moving across to APAC. APAC remains steady. As I mentioned, we have seen a good recovery in our Australian business, which has supported the growth in that business since December 2025. Touching on our performance. So overall as a group, we have seen a 2% reduction in active members, but a 7% increase in yield. Those two combined has resulted in a 6% increase in group revenue, excluding Kauai, and a 3% increase in EBITDA. We are seeing some cost pressures in the period year- on- year. The first has been utilities as a result of the rise in energy costs.
Particularly in our European businesses, we have seen an increase in the utility costs because those territories are mainly gas, electricity is gas-driven. We have also seen an increase in loyalty costs as our loyalty program adoption has increased. You may well have seen we have taken steps in October this year to change the way we reward, and we expect that to have a significant benefit in reward costs going forward. Finally, in those numbers, we have been investing in our digital OPEX to drive our member engagement and sales programs, and that has contributed to the year-on-year increase in OPEX. Just looking at the split between South Africa and international. South African membership is down 4% on an active member basis, but yield is up 8%. That has given us a 5% increase in revenue year- on- year and a 2% increase in EBITDA, once again, excluding Kauai.
Offshore membership has been flat. Yield has been up 6%, revenue up 7%, and EBITDA up 4%. Overall, in terms of contribution, that means that South Africa is 33% of our revenue contribution and 51% of our EBITDA contribution. Just touching on the quarterly trends, when we look at Q2 and Q3 2026 versus 2025, we have seen a 4% increase in EBITDA. That has slowed from the 16% we would have seen in the prior two quarters. Looking at just the breakdown of EBITDA and our adjusted EBITDA, just starting with our GBP 116.7 million last 12 months, September 2026, which I touched on the earlier slide. When we look at adjustments, we adjust for major refurbishments where we have closed a club for a period for refurbishment. We normalized what the EBITDA would have been for that period.
We also adjust for closed clubs and startup losses at new clubs. So the GBP 116.7 million adjusted for those normalization items would be, we would add GBP 1.2 million. That would give us GBP 117.9 million adjusted EBITDA. Then looking at embedded EBITDA, this relates to clubs where we have made the investment, so the investment has been spent and is out of our cash. We have yet to see the upside in the investment flowing through into earnings. We have GBP 8.5 million of EBITDA. The way we look at that is we look at, for major refurbishments, we look at the targeted year two EBITDA.
For new clubs, we look at year three, and we cap that at the higher of 30% return or the business case for that investment, and then we discount that by the weighted average cost of capital, which is we use about 15.3% for South Africa, 11.2% offshore. So we get a sort of value of those year two and year three upside to EBITDA. That is how we come to the GBP 8.5 million. So that gives us a mature EBITDA of GBP 126.3 million. Looking at net debt, and Peter touched on this earlier, at September, we had a net bank debt of GBP 467 million, plus we had the GBP 79 million of convertible preference shares. That gave us a 4.3x leverage for the business.
As a result of the rights issue and the capital restructure, the GBP 7.9 million of rights of convertible preference shares have been converted into equity, all but GBP 10.8 million of those. The residual of the GBP 175 million rights issue less the repayment of the GBP 10.8 million of convertible preference shares gave us GBP 164 million capital contribution. So that moves our total debt position down to GBP 303 million and down to 2.4x effective gearing pre the Holmes Place acquisition. The EUR 135 million is GBP 155 million, so that will result in a post-transaction gearing level of 2.9x . Just looking at the way we look at capital allocation, for us, it is about a balance of driving growth within the business versus de-gearing and returning cash to shareholders.
It remains the target of the management to return this business to a 2x net debt EBITDA. The way we balance this is we look at minimum returns of 30%, and if a project can get us greater than 30% returns, we consider that project. If not, we look to de-gear or return cash to shareholders. From a waterfall perspective, the number one priority for us is maintenance CapEx. We target a 5%-7% of revenue target for maintenance CapEx each year, and that is the first call on our capital. That for us is non-negotiable. It is what supports EBITDA and maintains the sustainable earnings of the business. Thereafter, we allocate based on looking at refurbishment CapEx, new club rollouts, and M&A, in that order. Refurbishment gives us the best return on capital.
The reason is we are putting money into a club which has existing operating costs and existing member base that we can leverage, and I will touch on returns. That gives us clear the best return on capital, so we focus on that first. That is 100% discretionary for us in terms of where we commit, and in terms of managing our cash flow, we can make the decision to up or increase or decrease the investment in that area. The second part is the new club rollout. This is discretionary until we have committed to new clubs. At the moment, our pipeline has 25 new clubs, 10 of which are committed. That pipeline is predominantly focused in Italy, 19 of those clubs, but we have one in the U.K., two in SA, and another three in continental Europe.
We are very much focused on the hot shell model where we can get a landlord contribution. That reduces the capital base for us going into the business, into the club, and improves our return on capital. As a result of the Holmes Place acquisition, our need for a new club rollout will decelerate because we have added on 13 clubs, giving us immediate scales, and our focus will be on integrating that Holmes Place acquisition. Then finally, we look at M&A activity. The main reason for that is to give us a foothold in a new market with an experienced management team. It gives us immediate scale, and in fact, it is a lower risk way into a market and avoids startup losses.
The key for us in these is to get attractive valuations which can shorten the payback period for those opportunities. Then finally, for us, it is in excess of that. It is about returning capital, firstly in terms of debt repayment to get our leverage down to 2x , and ultimately return cash to shareholders. Looking at the top right in terms of our free cash flow, as mentioned earlier, GBP 116.7 million of EBITDA translated into free cash flow pre-growth CapEx of GBP 62.7 million. 2026 has been the first year where we have been able to service our debt from free cash flow generated by existing clubs. If we took the GBP 62.7 million and we deducted the GBP 17.9 million, GBP 45.1 million of interest, that would give us GBP 17.6 million of free cash flow.
There still is, however, significant growth CapEx in the plan for 2026, and the result of that is that our free cash flow post-growth CapEx, post-interest servicing is GBP 63 million negative. We need to consider this in terms of where the business is heading over the course of 2027, 2028. You are seeing 2026, 2027 as peak CapEx for the business. As our EBITDA grows, so the business will be in a position to start funding the growth CapEx through free cash flow, and ultimately, if we look forward 2028 onwards, start to utilize free cash to reduce debt. Finally, just touching on the track record around return on capital and capital allocation. From a new clubs perspective, we measure return on invested capital, which is an industry norm of mature EBITDA, which is year three, divided by less maintenance CapEx.
So that is indicative of the sustainable cash generation of a club divided by the CapEx. We have had a strong track record in South Africa and Italy of 84% and 38% respectively in terms of return on invested capital. Those territories have mainly been invested on a hot shell basis, hence the stronger returns. Across the balance in Australia, we have had a 26% return in our residential markets on a cold shell basis. However, across U.K. CBD, Singapore, Thailand, Australia CBD, most of those clubs are CBD locations, and we were seeing a lower return. So when we look to the right-hand side, what informs our new club CapEx allocation is firstly, hot shell over cold shell, where we average a 55% return on hot shells.
Secondly, residential and mixed-use locations where we have averaged about 30% return versus the CBD locations, which, due to work from home trends, have underperformed. So it is hot shells and residential mixed-use areas that we focus on. In terms of paybacks of new clubs, South Africa has been particularly strong with a 1.4x , 1.4 years payback versus 2.7 Italy. Across the remaining of the estate, it has been slow, but the context here has to be that we enter into leases of minimum of 20 years. So once a club is paid back, it has got a long runway to deliver returns from that invested capital.
Finally, looking at the major refurbs, both in terms of payback and return on invested capital, clear across South Africa and Italy, you can see the strong returns in both in terms of return on invested capital, 124% for South Africa, 125% for Italy, and then paybacks of a year and 0.8 for South Africa and Italy respectively. Even within the U.K., we have seen a 60% return on invested capital. That is well in excess of our 30% target, and a 2.2 years payback on the investment. That completes my section. I am going to hand over to Dean, who is going to go through Holmes Place Germany acquisition in a little bit more detail.
Thank you, Mark. Specifically with regard to the Holmes Place Germany acquisition, maybe just to start why we looked at the German market. It is Europe's largest fitness market by members, about 12.4 million members with about 9,600 clubs. The market in 2025 was about EUR 6.3 billion, and it is forecast to reach EUR 7.7 billion by 2028. It is also an under-penetrated market relative to the rest of Europe and other countries in Europe. So just closing that penetration gap alone will add several million members to the German market. Within the market in Germany, the premium segment is the fastest-growing segment. It is growing by 6.2% a year over the last decade and is forecast to grow by 9.3% a year to 2028. There is also a very attractive corporate-funded demand in that market.
Employers can give staff up to EUR 50 a month tax-free for fitness, and this helps grows the market and also lowers our member acquisition cost by using the corporate market, using the aggregators. Specifically, why Holmes Place? Holmes Place is the number one premium operator in Germany. It has 13 clubs with about 88,000 members if we combine corporate aggregator members with direct membership, and it had clubs in Berlin, Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Essen, and Lübeck. Mark has spoken a little bit about the price. Our enterprise value over EUR 135 million, that translates on an FY2026 EBITDA to a 6.3x with a EBITDA of EUR 21.5 million. So we are buying earnings not only below our own valuation benchmark, but also against the peer benchmarks. So our entry price, the entry economics into that market was very attractive for us.
If we also compare buy versus build, large format clubs, they are on average over 4,000 sq m. They have pools, they have spas in every club. We acquired for around EUR 2,700 per square meter, and that is well below the cost of building new sites. In addition, to build sites organically probably would have taken us over a decade to reach the scale that they have got. Buying gives us the scale, gives us cash flow from day one, and we do not have to deal with any startup losses. It also removes execution risk, no looking for new sites, no construction, no ramp-up periods. The demand, the club economics are already proven before we need to commit capital to a new market. Holmes Place, a high-quality business, all 13 clubs are EBITDA positive, and the group EBITDA at 31% EBITDA margin, which is attractive to us.
In addition, the clubs are well-invested clubs in Germany, so they need limited refurbishment and CapEx to bring it up to the Virgin Active standard. In terms of how the acquisition fits in with our overall strategy, continental Europe has always been a growth priority for Virgin Active. We already have premium positions in Italy and the U.K., and now we are also the number one premium operator in Germany. So that gives us premium leading positions in three of Europe's biggest fitness markets. We can also use Germany as an anchor for the German-speaking countries. We have a club under construction currently in Vienna, in Austria. We have opened Switzerland. So these new clubs can share management systems, procurement, and support with the German business. From a cost base, there is no incremental head office costs to the deal.
All our group functions, digital data, AI, IT, brand, product, finance already exist, and they can absorb all the German costs without adding any additional costs. From a Virgin Active point of view, add value to that business. Yield is probably our biggest lever. If we look at Holmes Place Germany's average yield at EUR 59 a month against EUR 75 that we achieve in Italy and EUR 86 in Europe, we think we have levers to improve the yield in Germany and across Holmes Place. There is also an opportunity to work with the aggregators. Those are the corporate markets, who aggregate the corporate market. We think there is an opportunity to improve the revenue we get from the aggregators and also use our Virgin Active brand and the product that we have to grow direct memberships as well.
So there is volume in the existing capacity that we have, that we see. The direct memberships are low relative to what we see in our other territories, so it is an operating leverage model that we really understand. It was touched on a little bit earlier, but what we see now is with the German transaction, Holmes Place Germany being about 14% of pro forma group EBITDA. That means some 50% of group EBITDA is now delivered from outside of South Africa. Europe alone delivers now about half of group EBITDA. This was up from about 2/5 a few years ago. So we have a much more balanced earnings and cash flows, less dependence on the rand.
From a listing point of view, we think this is important, a much broader universe of investors and potential buyers, international and European, not just South African investors, more hard currency earnings, euros and sterling, and less concentration on any single market or currency. Also from a peer group and a comparability point of view, the peers in Europe now support our valuations much stronger. What I hear when I see South African companies making acquisitions, I know South African investors have seen a lot of acquisitions offshore go wrong. Just to maybe elaborate a little bit why this is different is firstly, Virgin Active is not a South African business going offshore. We have always been a global business. It started in the U.K., it is headquartered in the U.K. Virgin Active already runs a large and successful business in Europe. Italy has 192,000 members across 39 clubs.
It contributes almost a quarter of group EBITDA. Many of our senior leadership team are not South Africans and are not based in South Africa. We are not learning Europe from scratch. We are adding a business into a model that we already run. We were also very disciplined, 6.3x EBITDA multiple, profitable clubs from day one, and a very experienced local team retained. As Mark said, we funded the deal from existing cash following the rights issue. We will see a leverage multiple move up from 2.4x to 2.9x . We are comfortable with that. We see it as temporary, and the cash generated from day one from Holmes Place, together with group cash flow, we are confident that we get back to the targets that Mark spoke about, which is below the two times leverage multiple.
Just summing up Holmes Place, it is a disciplined, accretive acquisition that makes Virgin Active more European, more international, and more investable. That is all from us. I am going to hand back to Peter. Thank you.
Thanks, Dean and Mark. Again, thanks to the huge amount of work that has gone in, not just over the last six months, but over the last couple of years. We are massively appreciative, and we are starting to see the results bear fruit. So thank you very much. I will talk relatively quickly around Premier. The results came out yesterday. It is on their website if you want to see Kobus and Fritz and Rolf chatting through the results, but I will give you the highlights. It was another great six months for the business. That business has continued on its trajectory that it has been on for the last two to three years. The completion of the Rhodes Food Group deal in March, and that was integrated, and by integrated, we really mean around supply chain, merchandising, systems, et cetera. That is largely been complete.
Synergies in the region of ZAR 150 million were mooted before the deal, most of which have been seen already, although the costs are probably more in the first half of this year. We will see the benefits of that in the second half. From a revenue perspective, overall, the group grew at nearly 40%. Like-for-like revenue growth was broadly flat, though, in a deflationary environment, particularly around grains, 20% deflation in maize, 5% in wheat. So revenue was largely volume-driven, especially in bread, where market shares continue to grow both in the informal and the formal space. As I mentioned, EBITDA in the group, ZAR 2 billion for the first six months, up 51% year-on-year. A great performance even on a like-for-like basis. Very, very significant growth across the portfolio. Very pleasingly, EBITDA margins continue to grow from 12.7% to 13.9% on a like-for-like basis.
And probably most impressively across that was a free cash flow of just about ZAR 1.8 billion for the six months, which talks to the working capital management in the business as well. Return on invested capital of 20.6%, that is despite integrating the intangibles of RFG. That is up from 17% as at March. So great progress over the last six months in terms of the integration and getting profitability up in RFG. Overall, the right sort of measure to look at in terms of like-for-like growth is earnings per share or headline earnings per share, up 27% year-on-year, with the leverage ratio down now at 0.7x, probably slightly below the group target of one. Just talking at a very high level, culinary integration, I have mentioned that, merchandising largely done and integrated on the 1st of July, supply chain and ERP systems.
As I mentioned, I think we will start to see the benefits, the ZAR 150 million of synergy benefits accruing in the second half of 2027, so the year to March 2027, as opposed to the costs which were largely incorporated in the first six months. As I mentioned, earnings compounding at 27% a year on a like-for-like basis. The investment program in the business has continued, ZAR 759 million of investment CapEx spent, probably just under half of that being growth CapEx. That really talks to Aeroton and Middelburg, which are now largely commissioned, and are starting to see run at full capacity. Again, the benefit of that will only be seen in the second half of the year. Then on the distribution center, a significant expansion there to incorporate the RFG business.
In terms of the macro headwinds, I think this is despite fuel costs being up, which has forced some price increases across some of the commodity and products. Civil unrest, which we saw, I think it was back to June, did have an impact on the business. It has been slow to recover in some territories, particularly KZN, but we are seeing the benefits of that, and we will probably see the benefits in the second half. Then obviously the last one being the canned fruit, which has been well documented, the closure of the Tulbagh facility. Again, Fritz and Kobus spent a bit of time covering that in their presentation yesterday. Again, quickly on a MillBake's perspective, largely this was driven by MillBake.
If you look at EBITDA, up 24% year-on-year, that is like-for-like because there is not an incorporation of anything else into that business, which is a fantastic performance despite revenues only being up 1% for the first six months of the year. EBITDA margins in that business grew to 16.8%. As I mentioned, market share in bread increased from 27% to 29% in the formal space, and even across wheat and maize, either held or increased their market share over time. So, we are seeing the benefit of operating leverage in this business, efficient cost management, despite the fuel cost increases that we have seen over the time. In terms of the groceries, now this includes culinary, which is effectively the RFG business.
These are not like-for-like growths, 400% increase in EBITDA, but that groceries division is now 34% of revenue, and will contribute ZAR 500 million odd of EBITDA. Again, largely that was a really good result from the RFG business, post the integration of that with the Premier products. Slightly more challenging, sugar confectionery business underperformed during the period, with high fuel and packaging costs, and the EBITDA in that business was actually down year on for the six months relative to the last six months. Just quickly on a cash flow perspective without dwelling on it too much, as I mentioned, ZAR 1.8 billion is a massive cash flow for the first six months of the year. There was about ZAR 759 million CapEx split, maintenance CapEx of ZAR 350 million odd and ZAR 400 million odd of expansionary CapEx. That was largely Aeroton and Middelburg and Lord's View.
A significant amount was also spent, ZAR 200 odd million spent on the groceries division. In Kobus' presentation yesterday, he covered significant growth opportunities in that groceries division, which we will continue to invest behind. In terms of the overall outlook, as I mentioned, the synergy benefits will only accrue really in the second half of this year. We will see the integration and operational benefits of the RFG integration probably in the second half. Hopefully, grain deflation is likely to continue, we believe, probably till around April, pre the El Niño impact, which will kick in post that. We will start to see the contribution from the two bakeries, Middelburg and Aeroton, in the results going forward. Again, a fantastic result from Curtis and the team. If anyone wants to get more detail on that, they can go onto the Premier website.
Just talking about New Look, it is also great to be able to speak positively about New Look. New Look has had a really strong performance out of the last six months. Despite revenue being slightly down, I mean, tough markets, as I mentioned, have continued to persist in the U.K. What we have seen is good stock management, good product, and then reduced markdowns. Therefore, overall, we have seen the gross profit margin in that business increase. Also focused on costs year- on- year, have seen that EBITDA for the six months relative to the six months last year is up 14% to GBP 24 million. The LTM that we have used for the valuation is about GBP 40 million. We continue to see some growth year- on- year in the business.
Importantly, the debt refinance in that business has left us in a much stronger position to take on the relatively difficult markets as we see them. Without spending too much time on this, I think just focusing more on the gross profit margin, which increased 0.7%, a great result in difficult market conditions, driven really by full price margin growth, to be honest, and much lower reduced sales mix, and total costs of GBP 8 million, which came out, that is four odd percent lower year- on- year. This has increased EBITDA and reduced the net debt to EBITDA multiple below 3x . From a liquidity perspective, they stand with just under GBP 64 million, significantly better than they ever have been in our five years of looking after the business. Now, in terms of overall perspective here, they have retained their strong market position across the market.
It remains the leading omnichannel business for the place in which it plays, and they have a very, very large and loyal customer base, which they continue to leverage also through the digital space as well. Overall, a fantastic result from New Look, and we look forward to that continuing and hopefully having a very good golden quarter, November, December. In terms of valuations, relatively easy for New Look. The LTM EBITDA has increased to GBP 40 million. There are no adjustments to that number. We have kept the EV/EBITDA multiple the same at 6.5x, which is below the average of 10.4x odd. You can work your way down the various PIK facilities where the shareholders participate, and overall, that means from a pound carrying value, the valuation went from GBP 20 million to GBP 37 million.
Obviously, a strengthening of the rand had a negative impact when you convert that back into rand, but even so, in rand, it was up from ZAR 474 million to ZAR 800 odd million . That talks to the New Look business. Premier is obviously valued at the market share price, which was ZAR 180 as at September. Then just talking quickly on Virgin Active, we have been through the numbers. The maintainable EBITDA number we have used this year, as Mark alluded to, is GBP 126. We have kept the multiple the same at 9x , or reduced it from the 9.25x that was in September last year. In terms of the actual net debt, you will have seen the net debt go up from 410 to 467.
That largely talks to what Mark was saying around the investment in growth CapEx in the business, and we have added that debt adjustment, which Mark alluded to. That is for clubs that we have spent the CapEx that are not yet open. So we spent the CapEx. We cannot do an embedded EBITDA calc for them because they have yet to open, so we make a debt adjustment of 19 million. You work your way down, including the convertible prefs at 18. Now remember, those were all converted in October post this. The equity value is 560 for the group, which means that the carrying value from a Brait perspective is 422, broadly flat in pound terms to the 433 in September last year.
As I mentioned at the beginning, 10 odd percent strengthening of the rand means that actually in rand terms, it is about down 9%, from ZAR 10 billion down to ZAR 9.2 billion, really a reflection of the fact that the rand has significantly strengthened versus the pound. What we have done over the page is again to look at a bit of a pro forma. As I mentioned, the capital raise in Virgin Active was only done in October, so post the September, so it is a post-balance sheet event. You can see the impact that will have in that column, PF capital raise there. Obviously, the EBITDA, the enterprise value remains the same. You will see the adjustment in terms of net debt being reduced by ZAR 164 million to ZAR 284 million.
The shareholder funding and the convertible prefs have converted to equity, and therefore, overall, the dilution, as we mentioned in June, to shareholders' Brait participation will reduce from 67.7% to 62%, and that would mean that the carrying value for Brait would be ZAR 528 million. Then what we've done, just to show you, is post the Holmes Place Group. Obviously, I'm not saying this is an Excel spreadsheet clearly, but if you add the Holmes Place to and pro forma that, obviously at the higher multiple, you would see there's some value accretion. I'm sure particularly Steve will tell me you can't do that, but that's just from a pro forma perspective to give you an indication of what the business will look like and what we will compare it to when we speak to you again in March.
Just then in terms of the outlook and what's happened over the last 12 months, I think it's been a very significant year both for Brait and the portfolio companies. As I mentioned, the NAV per share up 2% from September last year, but actually probably more likely on a constant currency basis up 10%, which we think is a decent result in pretty tough conditions. Virgin Active increased its EBITDA by 10%. Obviously, our higher net debt resulted in a slight decrease in value on a constant currency basis. Premier, post the integration and the strong capital investment program has resulted in 27% growth year- on- year in earnings. New Look has seen a 95% growth in the last 12 months EBITDA and a 31% in maintainable EBITDA over the period.
From a VA perspective, very, very busy period, as I mentioned, the GBP 175 million rights issue, the simplification of the capital structure, and a reduction of GBP 243 million of debt down to 2.4x puts the business in a much better place to capitalize on the growth opportunities in the markets that they operate. The Holmes Place acquisition, I think provides It's great. It's fantastically exciting for the group. It's another market that they can dominate in Europe, in a market that they know well, with a good management team. So, we're very excited about what that will do. Obviously, as we talked about with Premier continued to invest through some relatively tough times in the three, four, five years ago. We're seeing the benefit of that now, and the same applies to Virgin.
You've got to continue to invest growth CapEx, either in new gyms or in the refurb program, to position this business to list on the front foot in two years' time. From the last point, just quickly on capital raise, we completed the rights issue in August, converted sorry, repaid the convertible bonds in September, which resulted in GBP 270 million of coupon savings. We will have contributed GBP 108 million to the Virgin Active rights issue, which concluded in October. As I mentioned, nothing has changed from a strategy perspective. We continue to look to realize the assets that we have and unbundle those values to shareholders. I know that's taken a bit longer than we thought, but very happy to open up to questions.
Thank you. If you would like to ask a question, please press star, then one on your touch-tone phone or on the keypad on your screen. You will hear a confirmation tone that you have joined the queue. If you decide to withdraw the question, please press star, then two to remove yourself from the list. Those participating via the webcast, please use the ask a question box should you wish to submit a written question. There are no audio questions in the queue. I will now hand the conference back to management to accommodate the written questions submitted by webcast participants.
Thanks so much. I only have one at the moment, and it's from Steve at 36ONE. Good to see you, Steve. "Do you think the 9x EBITDA is the right valuation multiple for Virgin when you're paying an acquisition at 6.3x for the German business?" Effectively, is paraphrasing a bit. Steve, look, it's obviously a good question. I'd answer that in a couple of ways. Firstly, I don't think you can compare a business that's dominant in six markets around the world, massively diversified across those territories, with 230-odd gyms, to one that has 13 in one single country. That's the first point I would raise. I think it's obviously a question of size, and I think you've looked at a number of deals in your life where you can't compare a bigger organization to a smaller acquisition. I think that's one of them.
I think the market dynamics are different in those markets, as Mark and Dean mentioned. Yields are a lot lower in the German business. We think we can get those up, but at the moment, the yield on those is probably two-thirds of what it is in our other core markets, so that obviously has an impact. I think at the end of the day, there are a limited pool of buyers who can pay that sort of value in cash, and we knew that when we were in negotiations with the counterpart. I must give credit to Mark and Dean here. I think we played the game extremely well on M&A. As you know, in M&A, if you know you're the last man standing, you can end up getting a very good deal.
I think at least 50% of the reason why the multiple is less than the 9x is because we executed well. Obviously, there are some dynamics to take into account, but size, I think, at the end of the day, I think is an important one. At the end of the day, Steve, we compare ourselves to a whole host. I think there's eight or nine comparable companies. We're trading at 9x at a discount to the average of that. I've said 100 times, you must plug whatever you want into your own model, but we think a discount to the peer group, which I think is trading at 10.4x, I can't remember the exact number, is right. We think given the growth and the investment that we're making in the business, I think you asked the same question when we listed Premier, right?
How can we list it at that valuation? I think we look back now, the multiple and the share price is probably threefold higher. We genuinely believe if you are investing in a good business with a good brand, it will continue to trade at a premium multiple. We believe nine times is the right valuation for this business. Andrew Bishop, "Holmes Place margin is above 30%. This is a lot higher than SA. What causes this difference in margin?" Dean or Mark, do you want to take that one? I am not sure that is right, but
Yeah, I mean, look, it trades at a good margin. I think it has an extremely lean head office, so that margin, that is a group point of view. The aggregator model, which lowers the cost of acquisition for a big portion of the membership base, also adds to that EBITDA margin. The aggregators, which are a big part of the business, which we do not see in our other territories, at this stage, we are not working with a lot of the aggregators. The tax benefit in the German market makes the aggregator model, the corporate model, quite attractive, and that has quite a significant impact on the EBITDA margins and improves those margins. Our target within the rest of the group is to get closer to that. There are some things we can learn.
As I said, I mentioned the aggregators, but it is a good margin business, and that is and was attractive to us.
Thanks, Dean. Those are the only questions I have. I am very happy to wait and see if there are any other questions. Sorry, Charles, as always, great to have you. Why did Holmes Place only sell the German operations and not include the Austrian, Swiss, and Portuguese operations? Again, a good question which maybe, Dean, you can answer.
Yeah. Just to be clear, the Portuguese operations sit totally separately with a total separate shareholder. The Austrian and Swiss have a common shareholder, not the same. One of the shareholders in the German business is also a shareholder in the Austrian and Swiss. So, it has one common shareholder. They still see the growth in the Austrian and Swiss business, that shareholder. My sense, it will come to the market at some stage, but at this stage, they want to continue growing those markets themselves. I would be surprised, though, at some point in time that they also don't come onto the market. Portuguese operations are totally separate for Holmes Place, separate shareholder, and are not really in the premium space. They're more in the HVLP space.
The one shareholder who is not common in Germany, which is the private equity firm, also needed from its mandate to dispose of the German business, and that's why there was, not pressure, but that's why they decided to dispose of the German business. Arctos is not a shareholder in the Austrian and Swiss business.
Yeah, I think it's a very good point, Dean, that they were at the end of their fund life. They've been in this asset for 10 years. They did need to exit. As we know, if you're buying from a private equity investor who needs to exit, you always have the ability to squeeze at the end, and I think you guys did a great job in doing so. Well done. Those are the only questions I have. Without any further ado, thank you very much to everybody for participating. Thank you, Dean and Mark, for all your hard work as well. Again, from our perspective, if there's any other questions, feel free just to reach out. We don't have to wait for six months. Very happy to answer any questions from anybody at any point. So, thank you very much. With that, we will conclude the conference.