A warm welcome to you, everybody, today. As you know and always have seen when we do open a quarterly investor presentation, we are starting with the DNA of the company, the 12 statements who are the guide to who we are and what we do. I have marked two of the values of Protector this morning. One is credible and the other one is open. I do understand that when delivering poor results to the market again after quarter four, I do understand that we have a way to go towards you in order to build credibility in you so that you can trust that Protector will return to what we could call black territory and to a combined ratio in line with the long-term objective, which is 94.
You have seen that we are far away from that kind of target in 2019 and in quarter four 2019. That is fact, it's history. We can't do anything about it. What we can do is to continue to stay open and be as transparent as possible explaining to you where we are and where we think we are heading towards in that area. Please challenge me during this presentation with all your questions, difficult questions, relative to whatever topic you would like. I try to be as open as I always have been or at least tried to be. Is that a deal? Someone nodding. That's fine. As you have seen, the combined ratio ended around 111 in quarter four. There are three main reasons why.
There are poor results in Finland and in Norway. I come back to a couple of other comments slightly later. At the same time, with the poor technical result in quarter four, we had a good return on investment. After five, six quarters where we have delivered worse than benchmarks on the equity side, we have kind of had a good quarter in quarter four, which resulted in a full year investment return close to zero on the equity side and a healthy return on the bond portfolio. As you can see from the slide, we continue growing in quarter four with 16%. I explain a bit later what kind of growth it is, but you can also see that the growth in local currency is very different because there was significant changes between norske kroner and other currencies in this quarter.
The growth in local currency is six, but in norske kroner, a lot higher. I'll be back on that one. As you know, we have a certain segment which is in a run-off situation, the change of ownership kind of area. When we include the result from that kind of run-off business, the combined ratio on an annual basis is somewhat better. The result, pre-tax in total on a company level is NOK 23 million, which is in line with what we announced in the message to stock exchange a couple of weeks ago. These kind of slides are for comparison compared to previous periods. What happened actually? If you go to Norway first, what you can see is that Norway delivered a very poor net combined ratio, both in quarter four, both gross and net, 125% and 139%.
The reason why is because we have some kind of run-off losses in Norway related to the occupational illness product and workers' compensation in Norway. We have a significant large claim on the property side which increased a lot. That is not a claim that happened in quarter four. It happened last year, 2018. The reserves on that property claim have increased a lot. Luckily enough, a significant part of that loss is transferred to the reinsurance treaty we have with the present reinsurance company. That's the reason why you can see that the gross combined ratio in a quarter is a lot worse than the net because a significant part of that kind of increase is sent to Munich Re. In general, I would say that there are poor results also outside those two elements in Norway.
When entering 2020, Norway have a slightly longer way to go to return to strong figures compared with what we expected a quarter ago. I come back and show you some of the figures that can help you bridge between what is happening on an annual level 2019, and what's happening entering then 2020. Finland had a disastrous quarter. It is a small country. You should expect volatility, and it's a combination of poor results in many products and two fires in the school sector, where two schools were put on fire by an arsonist in the same municipality in Finland. This is more like what we would call a bad luck type of situation, but it happens. The thing is that we should have enough premium to cover, obviously, for the unexpected, because this is not really unexpected on a company level.
If you look at Finland only, obviously, that will hit Finland in a quarter and in a full year. The poor results in quarter four are linked to two countries, it's Norway and it's Finland, and I help you to understand slightly better on the next slide as well, or the next couple of slides arriving. In Sweden, Denmark, and in U.K., quarter four was as expected, meaning they delivered figures in line with the kind of guiding that existed heading up towards quarter four. If anything, they delivered accumulated slightly better than expectation. Also, we have some kind of run-off losses in Norway, but we have some kind of minor, I would say, run-off gains in Sweden, around NOK 20 million. That supports Sweden a little bit.
I try to take a bigger picture on the reserve side. What you should expect is what I would call minor reserve changes in certain countries every quarter. It's normal. On a totality level, where do we go on the reserve side? That is a question some of you asked, and which we have received from investors, also up until this investor meeting here. I prepared another slide, which is on the next page, in order to try to explain the reserve situation in the company as a total. If you're looking at the bottom part of the page here, you can see that the kind of things happening in quarter four, it's not really very special. It's what you should expect. Volatility is a part of the insurance business, and we are in a commercial market. We have bigger clients.
We will normally be slightly more volatile than a consumer-based company like DNB or If or Tryg. Even if they have business in our segments with a lot of volatility as well, that is drowned in the big figures from the consumer sector. Somewhat more volatility than Nordic companies, that's normal. However, the situation in 2019 and entering quarter four is that we have had too low margin of safety in pricing, and we have been too late to do enough on the pricing side, which I told you after quarter one, quarter two, and quarter three, and can repeat again. Then I comment on the situation now entering 2020. When margin of safety gradually disappears through a year, you are more challenged by what you could call pretty normal quarter four situation. You don't have enough margin of safety, and it destroys a quarter.
If you accumulate the results up to an annual level, we have had a combined ratio of 103.8% and a growth size 19% and 18% in local currency. We have a solvency capital ratio of 168%. We had 164% after quarter three. I think that some of you might expect that to go slightly downwards after a poor technical result in quarter four. However, it went up slightly. I explain a little bit why. The solvency capital ratio is very strong, and it's even stronger after quarter four compared with quarter three. It's absolutely no issue at all around our solvency capital ratio. If you add on the discontinued business in Protector, we have then a profit before tax, which is close to zero, the NOK 23.5 million, as mentioned, which is in line with communication two weeks ago.
Including the change of ownership run-off business of a combined ratio, the formal figure of the company ends up at 101%. You might remember both 101% and 103.8% when looking towards 2020. Then I start telling you the story, which hopefully builds some kind of credibility that 2020 will end up with a pretty good result. That's my expectation, and I try to explain to you why that is my opinion, even if quarter four was disappointing. Before going into a bit more of a detail, I'm trying to take a slightly higher perspective. Not look into the figures as such, but try to explain what really happened on an overall level. I think it's fair to say that the rate pressure, which we have seen and communicated for three to five years, even longer in Norway, has led to, in our segments, a rather poor overall profitability.
You have seen and heard that other big companies in other market segments, like Tryg, do communicate that they are fighting through significant price increases during the second half year of 2019 and entering 2020. [NCEDER] gives the same message. The daughter companies of RSA in the Nordic markets do communicate the same thing, if a bit more relaxed type of communication, like the big competitors of Protector in our market. As you have heard before, we have, when entering 2019, underestimated motor claims inflation, and I share a bit more information how we view motor claims inflation entering then 2020. We have had poor management deliveries in Norway and Finland in 2018 and through 2019, and we have taken necessary actions on that area.
There has been management changes in Norway, where three out of five of managers running that business segment with NOK 1.5 billion annual premium, they have left their positions, and two of them have left the company, and the country manager in Finland left last summer. It has been necessary in order to take management actions, in order to build a credibility in that area, which we think can be strong enough in order to get back on track, deliver profitable volumes, and continue to develop a healthy type of organization and healthy figures in these two markets. It has been no such issues or situations, neither in Sweden nor in Denmark, nor in U.K. in that area. The new team's up and running in Norway and Finland.
It is not really a new team in Finland, it's more like one, two persons here, but the new team is up and running in Norway. Most of these positions are filled with people who have a long background from Protector, and some of them have been transferred from the change of ownership area, where they have done a good job, but they have also been working in the commercial segment before. The new team in Norway is not new in the meaning that all people are from the outside world. Most of the new people in Norway, they are well-known Protector managers, which I feel more confident in that situation because there is always a question if you have too many new people on board, what will actually happen. It's good to say that the Grenfell Tower arbitration was closed during last summer.
You have heard us telling the story that it has consumed a hell of a lot of resources on key personnel that we would have preferred to spend on other activities. We have passed NOK 5 billion in annual premium, which means that if you compare with 4 years ago, we had half the size. The only thing we have to do is to turn that NOK 5 billion into good technical results, and then we will deliver very good return on equity and shareholder return again. A small comment on the exit business. We won't talk too much about it, and less and less in future. As you have heard in previous communication, the run-off takes slightly longer time.
That's positive because the legislation which will change the law in Norway is postponed and some real estate brokers would like to stay with Protector for a somewhat longer period of time. To what we expect is a profit, because prices have gone up a lot in that market. Volume ended up around NOK 350 million, somewhat higher than expected, and it will end up slightly below NOK 200 million this year, and we will then gradually go down to zero during 2021. Half the tail has been sold, basically, without any cost from Protector side to a professional run-off player, supported by our investment bank in setting up a deal. We have the investment bank on the left side here, who helped us to negotiate that deal with Värde, who has taken off half the tail.
The good story here is that another professional party have looked into that kind of reserve pocket of money. The kind of reserves are around NOK 1 billion , and it's meaning that another professional partner have kind of ticked off and said that reserves looks credible, I trust it, and I sign a deal. Normally, you pay a lot to get such a deal signed. We did not. Their expectation is that they will earn on potential reserve earnings and/or return on investments. If that deal were not good in M2, then we share the kind of profits and they will take care of their own return on investment, or the part of it on our side in that area. It's a risk reduction initiative, and I think it's a kind of a credibility initiatives as well there. That's the change of ownership.
I think that the first statement on the slide entering 2020 is extremely important, is that we know for a fact today that the rate pressure we have seen the last five years, give or take, a bit different in the different Nordic countries, has, during 2019, gradually turned to be stronger and stronger price increases. That kind of price increase situation continue in 2020. We know for a fact what the result is on price increases on the very big renewal date, January 1st, 2020. The market are driving prices upwards in our business segments. Communicated, as I said earlier, by more than one of the big competitors of Protector. Our price increases January 1st, they were exactly 13.4%. I illustrate how we build up that figure on a slide here, just to give you an example, how do we build that figure.
It's not taken from the air. It's a lot of work in order to get to that kind of pretty precise figure. AM Best have not changed the rating on Protector, so that is the same as it was one and a half, two years ago, when they last issued a rating statement on Protector. The U.K. is according to plan. U.K. is growing closer to NOK 1 billion annual premium. We'll pass that NOK 1 billion this year, and it's playing a more and more important role in the Protector totality. U.K. is on schedule. What about the price increases? We all know that aggressive growth in the insurance market is risky. Protector do have a history of managing that growth in a very good way. We manage the balance.
What you have seen the last couple of years is that we haven't managed to balance properly the growth and the technical profitability development, which you pretty often see when insurance companies are growing quickly. What you can see now is that a pretty significant part of the growth is actually price increases on exactly the same clients. Price increases in 2019 is around NOK 330 million out of NOK 466 million, which is the growth figure in the Nordic market. Which means that there are a more limited number of new clients arriving compared with history, even if growth is higher. Our expectation going forward is that the relationship between the two will continue to grow closer. More or less all expected growth in the rest of the full year in the Nordic market in 2020 will arrive from price increases, not from new clients in that area.
Which obviously must mean improved profitability. Obviously. U.K. continue on the growth rate, even if in quarter one we had negative growth in U.K. due to one client, not lost, but increased deductible. We said a year ago that we got the biggest client in the history of Protector out from U.K., and that client have increased deductible with a lot and reduced premium to half. That's not really an issue. We think we will have an acceptable margin on that client going forward. That's up to the client to decide where the deductible level should be. Our expectation when it comes to growth in U.K. in the next quarters is obviously on the positive side. Very few clients leave because they have been there only one to, at maximum, possibly three years, and they tend to stay four years on average.
Very few leave, and new clients is obviously arriving every month in the U.K. When we have guided on a more conservative growth path going forward, at the moment, we expect that price increases Nordic is an element and U.K. is another in that area. The renewal rate here is a bit of a surprise. Higher than expected, I would say. That figure, 93.4%, the definition of it is exactly as it always has been. Actually, it looks like the renewal rate is going up. The only reason why it's going up is because of price increases. In previous years, prices have gone down. Rates have gone down. Now it's up, and that supports renewal rate. If you are looking at the churn or the renewal rate on number of clients, obviously, we are losing clients.
We are losing some market share in the Nordic market at the moment, which is okay in that area. It goes to different companies in the Nordics. One more aggressive than any other in Norway, and a couple of them in Sweden. On a Nordic level, it's not really anyone sticking out very aggressively on a Nordic level in that area. As far as we understand, in our segments, companies like DNB in Norway and Länsförsäkringar in Sweden are picking up market share at the moment, while others are losing clients and increasing prices like us. I think communication from Tryg is lost number of clients, strong price increases. Same we say. I think that both Tryg and we lose some kind of market share in the segment, which is okay. We don't leave our market share. We have an acceptable market share in this market.
It must turn into a profitable type of situation here. Growth now, U.K. and price increases, expect that also going forward. Claims development. On a annual level, we have the situation in Finland and Norway, which I've talked about. We have a run-off loss size 1.2%. I come back on next slide and comment on that one. That is not a significant figure. You shouldn't be worried about the reserves. It is only - 1.2%. It shouldn't be a big issue to be nervous about. The large loss element is around NOK 500 million on an accumulated gross in 2019, which possibly is somewhat higher than normal. To estimate a normalized large loss ratio is not very easy for a fast-growing company with different products in different segments and countries.
We said to you one year ago that we may reconsider whether seven is somewhat on the lower side or not entering a new year. We are doing our calculations now as we speak in order to check out. My expectation is that the estimated large loss element will be slightly higher than seven going forward, potentially one to three percentage points higher than today. It's not really an issue relative to the expected profitability. It is only a volatility element in that area. We have had a gross large loss situation in last year, which is around 10%, that accumulates to a combined ratio around 103.8% or 101% if you are getting into the change of ownership and adding that kind of business as well. If the large loss normalized element is going up to nine, that's in line with last year, 10%.
It is not really important. In order to help you to understand what we should expect from that element and what kind of volatility we should expect and where we have had bad luck or positive luck on the non-electric side, it's a bit easier to see that here. Obviously, if you have seven out of eight quarters, which is above seven, you start to think that you are not estimating the large loss rate properly, which is absolutely possible that we haven't. Expect that to be 8%, 9%, potentially 10%. I will be surprised if you come back and say that that large loss element is anything above that. We have to do the mathematics first. That type of mathematics is normally to do in the insurance business when you negotiate reinsurance contracts. It's nothing extremely sophisticated about it.
It's pretty straightforward, we are not straightforward because we are fast growing in many countries with many products. Calculation is easy, company is developing. That makes it a bit more unpredictable on oversight. When it comes to the reserve situation, I say you shouldn't really worry on the reserve situation in Protector. We have around 2% on the positive side in 2017, around 2% in 2018, and around minus 1.2% in 2019. None of them are very significant. If you go back in history in Protector, when we were smaller, the volatility was bigger. This is not what you should expect in a strange year going forward. We were smaller in 2006, a lot, and we were obviously a lot smaller in 2013, more like NOK 2 billion in annual premium, not NOK 5 billion, in that area.
What we have discussed with you before on the capital market day in November 2018, and what we share with you today, is that we have been, historical to date, pretty prudent on the reserve side. If history repeats itself, you shouldn't worry. For the first time, we will deliver a run of reserves on a company level, accumulated into different product groups, and make that available Monday, the 17th of February. If you don't trust the message I'm giving here today, feel free to enter the spreadsheet available figures and do your own mathematics on the reserve side in history of Protector. Back to 2005, that's history. We started in 2004 and had basically no business in 2004. On the reserve side, I'm relaxed. Yes, in Norway, Q4, we had some losses. In the bigger picture, it's not really an issue.
Do you trust me on that? Would you like to pop any question on the reserve side? I got them in advance, made this slide in order to try to respond to questions right before this investor type of meeting. Nothing to say about the cost development. We are number one in the world, continue to be. I saw Tryg give a good statement in their figures. They didn't say that they were cost leader in the world. They just indicated it. They said that, "Look to Scandinavia, and you will find the most efficient insurance companies in the world." I do agree. I think they talked about themselves and Protector. That's kind of how I read the statement from Tryg. You can probably then ask them on that.
I do agree that Tryg is very good on the cost side. Many other Nordic companies are as well. We are better in the Nordics in order to run an efficient kind of setup. I think it has something to do with the challenge in the Nordic market that we, relatively speaking, have small markets. We have to get our hands into all insurance policies from each and every client. We have to because we don't have a kind of critical mass to go product by product towards the market. For historical reasons, we have been forced into a corner to develop a different value chain and establish a different market situation in Scandinavia. It's not because Scandinavian people are better people, it's because there are differences in the market that we understand.
If you are living as an insurance company in London, you can act very differently, but that is adding cost. That's their way of doing the business, and that's the reason why our competitive advantage arriving from Scandinavia to U.K. is very significant. We are up against very high cost structures in the U.K. market. Cost is not really an issue. This is kind of the profitability picture entering 2020. Poor in Norway, very poor in Finland, kind of not good enough in Sweden, but not really a big issue. Some smaller run-off losses, workmen's comp, Denmark, a couple of property losses, not big issues in Denmark. I think Denmark will have an underlying situation continuing to improve.
What we are doing is fixing up Finland and Norway and are continue our development in Denmark, which is now is close to NOK 1 billion annual premium. Sweden, which is NOK 1.5 billion, and have passed commercial segment Norway with NOK 10 million for first time in history. Sweden is bigger than Norway made a point this morning when I had state of the union to the employees about that, and will obviously congratulate the Swedes when I go up to Stockholm then next week. If we start here and go towards 2020, this is what is important. What you have heard and what you have seen is that we have demonstrated that prices are going up. After quarter three with 10.8%, 13.5%, 7%, and 10% on an accumulated level in the different Nordic markets. Quarter four, 11.2% accumulated.
That did end up in 10.5% on average in 2019. You can see 13.4% arriving on January 1st. You who know insurance business, you know that to get a price increase up is fine, but you earn the money one-twelfth at a time, and you have to give a statement to the client two, three, potentially six months before the policy is renewed. From decision, it takes from two to six months to increase prices, and then it takes 12 months to get full effect of the price increases. If an insurance company is in trouble when it comes to the combined ratio, it normally takes around two years to solve because of that delay process. We don't sell anything that is booked immediately.
It's booked close to exactly like the risk will run off, which is a twelfth every month, give or take, in that area. If you are late, if you even have discovered you are late, then two years period of time in order to fix profitability on the insurance sector is pretty normal. If you are brilliant good, it take only 18 months. If there are more unexpected situations arriving, and/or you don't really see what's happening here, it takes more than two years. Now we have two bad years behind us, to a certain extent also influenced by the great Silverfish crisis last year, but underlying reality was poor last year as well. You have seen two poor years in Protector. If you accumulate 10.5% and 13.4%, let's say go somewhere in between, let's say 12%.
If you have claims inflation sized four, which is our best estimate of claims inflation going forward, seven in the motor area, more like three in personal lines of business, two point something on the property side. If you mix our portfolio, you will give or take end up at four. We are give or take entering a new year with price increases through the year, so it's starting to work. If we have had zero here and 13 here, it takes time. Those two are pretty close, meaning that somewhere in between here around 12 is the estimated full year effect of 2020. Everything else equal, it's normally not. Everything else equal, you are 12 minus four is eight. Then you start with what we had last year.
You subtract 8, you will end up with some kind of a view on the combined ratio next year. Bear in mind two other elements. One, we have been through 2019 with a change of reinsurance structure from a quota share contract to a normal excess of loss type of contract. We lose technical profitability in the transition year. This has been explained to you before. If you would like, you can ask questions after the meeting. We can explain it again. You lose, declare 1.5 to 2 percentage points. Again, everything else equal, you have potentially 8, potentially 1.5 to 2, you start from 103.8. Obviously, everything else is not equal, because we lose clients, new clients is going on board, and something could happen on the positive side or on the negative side.
This is not a guiding, but it is a kind of a back of the envelope, pretty easy to understand calculation of how we might develop. That is the reason why I am saying that my expectation is that we pretty quickly will move towards our long-term target, which has been and still is 94% on the combined ratio side. Quarter one, normally worse because of seasonality effects and earned premium development that will grow through the year. Why? Quarter two and three will be better. Quarter three, normally the best one, and then you are back, not like quarter one and quarter four, but there are seasonality effects in Protector and in most other companies as well in that area.
This is a very important slide. I have added some information on the next slide, which is not sent to the market. That's not a very important slide, but only to tell you a little bit about the granularity. That was a good one. Behind. To say 13.4% is easy, but we have a very thorough reporting system. How much volume to renewal? January 1st in Norway, NOK 753.4 million. How much do we lose? Are they profitable or unprofitable? What is index price increases? Seven on motor. How much does that accumulate to? What are general price increases? Everybody is getting five up. That is a general price increase. How much individual price increases do we see? What kind of influence do the increased deductible have on profitability, like the client in U.K. I mentioned. There are other profitability improvements.
What we follow up is on these five elements. We communicate a price increase to the market, and we are getting acceptance from most clients, but some do not. Then we have a dialogue. We might change slightly, and then we follow up on exactly what kind of price increase did we get in quarter one, 11.7%, in quarter two, 8.00%, first half year, 10.7%, quarter three, 12.2%, quarter four, 16.2%, second half year, 13.2%, the full year 2019, 11.4%, January 13.4%. We have a view today on February and March, and only thing we expect is that it looks good in that area. January is good as well, so it's nothing new here. We follow that on three different segment: Commercial segment, Public segment, and Affinity segment.
We are looking at auto, property, other property and casualty products, workers' compensation, group life, and other employee benefit type of products. This kind of follow-up methodology is implemented in Protector and building up to this slide here. It's a learning exercise, which is important in order to follow up with that kind of granularity. Sweden, sorry. Below that level, we are looking at client number one, two, three, four, five, six, seven , eight, nine to 20, or deeper down. These are real clients with last year volume NOK 11 or NOK 4.8 or NOK 3.3, and what happened with the different elements and what was the kind of result. What you can see is individual price increases realized from 58.1% to 0.7% at the lowest in that area.
It's not like in consumer sector where you add 10% or 6% or 4% price increase on everybody, give or take. This is a bottom-up kind of exercise, which you have to monitor and follow up pretty closely here. That's what we do, and this is Sweden, and we have Finland, and we have Denmark, and we follow up on a monthly basis. To me, it's important as a follow-up mechanism in order to go deep down, see what's happening, get up again, and accumulate type of figures. That is the most important slide in this presentation looking forward. Questions? Yep.
Go back one slide. I suppose it was one more. It can be that one. When you have a price increase of 60%.
Yep
Do you do any review of how you ended up in this pricing so dramatically?
Absolutely. The question is very relevant. If you have a price increase size 60%, did you do something wrong when you underwrote it and you risk evaluated that client one or two or three years ago? Probably yes, in that area. It not necessary, but normally the answer is yes in that area. To do post-underwriting analysis when these kind of figures appears, obviously, we must learn. Did we do something wrong or did we not in that area? Post-underwriting exercises is important. We are obviously, we know I can explain in a lot of detail the reason why we ended there with that client. Won't share it with you. I know the client. I know the name. I know why we ended there. I know why we made the mistakes. I think we learn from it in that area.
On the investment side, if that's okay, this is kind of The portfolio's growing. After a poor year and buyback of shares in 2018, as expected when you grow your balance sheet growth and the investment portfolio is growing. You have seen the results on the investment side, which ended up pretty good in quarter four. If you're looking at the equity side, after poor quarters, we delivered then finally a good one in quarter four, and this is a comparison since we sourced in our investments in quarter four 2014, picking up a little bit here. If you have had NOK 1 billion invested here to this point, and if this is the different Nordic markets, if you are averaging this to around 70, so we are on 102 and the Nordic market is on 70.
The difference is 30, and if you multiply 30 with NOK 1 billion, it's NOK 300 million. The kind of accumulated equity result above benchmark in this period is plus NOK 300 million. Whether that is only good luck or skills, it will take another how many, what would you suggest? 20 years to find out that, or maybe never. We have a methodology with, I think we have a good team, and the results here is good in quarter four. On the bond side, we have a very low risk type of portfolio, and we are happy with the return on the bond portfolio in 2019. Very important is that the capital consumption relative to the portfolio, which we explained for you last quarter, is very low.
To go to one of you and to put our bond investments with you could be a good idea, but you are not following up, understandably, on the solvency capital requirements, which we as an insurance company have to follow. If I go to good companies like you and place my bond portfolio with you, that costs more money without any expectation of a better return. That's the reason why I think we will continue to manage the bond portfolio basically in-house forever, unless regulations are changing, or some of you are specializing on putting up bond portfolios, which is targeting solvency related companies like us in the insurance business. You may see that happening in future. It's not ruled out that we could buy us into some of you now and then. We are happy.
It's low risk portfolio. It hasn't been any kind of incidents in 2019 to speak about in our bond portfolio. That ends up in a kind of profit and loss statement that you have seen, with or without change of ownership. Our balance sheet is strong, and the reason why we went up is that we have an after-tax result which is likely better than what you would expect, because the equities did good in quarter four, which is free of tax in our investment portfolio. The tax is lower than expected, what you normally would expect. That goes all the way around. If you have losses on the equity side, then tax is higher than what you would expect in that area. That's the main reason why we are picking up from 164 to 168.
There is also a change of discounting rate, which went the opposite direction compared with last summer in that area. We went down a little bit because of, and now up a little bit, and that is kind of decided by authorities and not by Protector in that area. We have a strong solvency capital ratio, and we have kind of said to you that expected growth the next three years are more like single digits. I come back to a more precise figure. It's not really meant to be that precise, but okay, it is anyway. Capital needed for growth is more limited, with the kind of expected growth we have to go forward for the next two to three years. We have a new top shareholder here. As you can see, Wilhelmsen Capital Holdings, they have passed the 10% threshold.
Congratulations, or the other way around, depending on how you see your investment in Protector. They are obviously in the room there. Thanks for meeting us. We have done one change now on the long-term financial objectives, taking down the expected growth rate to kind of, we could have said 0%-10%. What we are signalizing is that profit must be first. It has been our ambition all the time. It's nothing really new, but we must be even more serious about what we are doing on the profitability side. Taking down growth expectation, looking three year ahead in that area. You saw that we were around 5%, slightly below in quarter one. Quarter one, or January first, the very big volume date, half the volume of Protector is slightly below 5%. What about the rest of the year?
Give or take the same, in that area. Obviously, five is too precise. We can't know, but we are saying that you should expect for a period of time which is long term, defined around three years, that our growth expectations are lower than what you normally see. The good story is it's signalizing potentially something around discipline and profitability, et cetera. It will take longer time to double the size of the company again, which we have done in previous years. We will not then give a precise statement on a guiding for 2020 as such. The previous guiding history of Protector has been saying something pretty precise about the first year and the first year and the first year. We have NOK 5 billion annual premium, and we prefer now to go to a situation where we only are stating long-term targets.
I do understand that to rebuild your credibility on the profitability side, we need to deliver two or three good quarters. We do understand that, starting with the credibility and the openness, which I started this meeting with this morning. AM Best have confirmed the rating. The summary is that we have seen rate pressure in history that has influenced our Nordic profitability. We have done our own mistakes. They have been too many, and we are working to fix the different problems, and I think we haven't finished that. That's too optimistic. We have delivered a lot, like 13.4 percentage points price increases both in Norway and on the Nordic level accumulated January 1st, 2020 here. We have seen a very strong growth the last 10 years. You should expect lower growth in the next years to come.
My expectation is that Scandinavia will be back on track in 2020. I'm not that optimistic on Finland, but it's only 3.5% of the totality of the company. It may take slightly longer, also due to the fact that there are some insurance contracts in the public sector who are long-term, which is market standard in that area, where it's not that easy to pick up prices every year in that area. That's a minor issue, but to manage your expectations slightly when it comes to Finland, don't expect necessary anything below 100 on the combined ratio in 2020. U.K. is according to plan. Last year volume was NOK 853 million written premium. Earned premium is now growing quickly. We obviously expect more growth to arrive from the U.K. side. Then, feel free to pop your questions.
Do we, Amund, we have a new IR responsible, Amund here. Have you received any questions from the webcast side?
Yeah. We got a couple of questions from Mr. Heffermehl.
Heffermehl.
Heffermehl.
Yeah.
Yeah. He's talking about pretty bad underwriting results in 2019, and our countermeasures appearing not to be as good as we would hope. Then he asked if our underwriting resources is inadequate, or how we could strengthen them. Yeah.
Whether our underwriting capacities and competencies are good enough. I think I’ve explained pretty much about what went wrong, and I would say that I’m happy with the underwriting capacity and competence, in most countries. Today, adding some competencies in Oslo. We are out there in the market looking for two new people to add to the competence we don’t have sufficient capacity on. In the meantime, Oslo are asking for support from Stockholm, in the kind of areas where we think we lack what is needed, but pretty happy on the situation. It’s not really the key issue at the moment. Another one?
Yeah, the second part of his question is about Protector's ability to keep up with new technology in the insurance business, for example, machine learning and internet of things.
The question on the IT side, I think we are well positioned. We develop our own systems, which I think is important. It gives us better flexibility. I think that most of the sophisticated AI technology that will arrive out in the insurance industry the next 10-15 years, will arrive targeting the consumer sector and not really the medium to large corporate client segment. My first AI seminar was in 1988 in Brussels with Big Blue. It didn't happen that much between 1988 and 2018, so we are not very worried. We are following up, and we'll be fast followers if anything interesting will appear in our segments. We don't really worry.
Yeah. Last question from Mr. Dee Gruber. He asks if we expect increased building fires in the Nordic market, and if we set enough premium to cover the expected large loss claims.
Okay. What about the expected large loss element on the property side in the Nordic market? I comment on the fact that we have an estimated large loss scenario around seven. From up until today, we may go up one, two, or three. It's not a big issue. It's nothing happening in the Nordic market. The fire safety situation in the Nordic market is basically equal. If you look back, there are some volatility. You saw a big fire in Stavanger a few weeks ago. That was one of the biggest one in the Nordic the last 12 months. There will be some, but it's not really an issue. If it will be, it's reinsurance food. Then the very significant ones. It's got to the international reinsurance market. Thanks a lot for your patience. Okay, one more question.
If your gross written premium is expected to go by 5%.
Yep
You have 12% premium increase.
Yep.
That means you're expecting 7% loss of existing business.
Net, yes.
If you're going to make some NOK 100 million in the U.K.
Yep
that means you're going to lose that amount in the Nordics.
Correct. The level of lost clients will be higher in the Nordic market.
10% of your Norwegian business.
Say again?
10% of the Scandinavian business you expect to churn.
More. Normally, you have seen that closer to 15%, and it could be slightly more than 15% as well on that area. You basically are doing the mathematics correctly, and you understand the situation. To lose clients at the moment, that's acceptable. I think that our cost advantage gives us a very strong position in the long run to compete in the market. I don't expect to lose market share will continue for many years. It is a rational market. Some of those who are picking up volume at the moment, they will lose money on it. That's our expectation. That volume will come back in the market two, three, four years from now, in that area. In the long run, we are very happy with our competitive position. Yes. One more.
When you go and look at the individual review, is the case for the review or the miss that you have, is that ever the case of being a loss leader?
Say again, I didn't catch it.
You price it low to win business because you think you're going to make.
Oh. That we do that?
That's the question.
No. The question is whether we undercut prices in order to increase prices to earn in the long run. The problem with the long run in our segment is it's only four years. That will basically never, ever happen. Any new client arriving will and should be profitable year one. That's the kind of underwriting philosophy. Extremely seldom you see a situation where you may accept a small loss in the first year, but then you need to have a hard contract linking the client or the group to you for three or four years with a price increase mechanism which you can calculate. It's theoretically possible. There are a handful of such deals out there in the market every year, five out of 500. The standard underwriting methodology is always profitable year one.
Do you think-
Obviously, you do more mistakes on new clients than on old clients. That's the underwriting guidance for all employees in Protector.
What are the main reasons for the mispricing of 50%, 60% in general?
That is a question which needs to be addressed on a very detailed level. I cannot do it in this meeting. Could be various difficulties in order to find the right rate in a portfolio. Something could be even close to fraud, where client and/or broker are delivering false claims history information to us. That exists. It may be up until a fraud situation in the worst situations. Then you have a large range of situations that may end up in a post-underwriting review saying that we did some kind of mistakes in that area. As you saw on the list, you saw 40%, and you saw three with very significant price increases. It is not a huge number. It is not in that area. In such a meeting like this, it is very difficult to be very precise on the question.
We have to go deeper. I'm happy to do that. It's not really any secrets, it must be outside this kind of meeting. I apologize for being over time. Thanks for your patience, have a great day. Thank you