Hello, everyone, and welcome to GBDC's earnings call for the fiscal quarter and fiscal year ended September 30th, 2026. Before we begin, I'd like to take a moment to remind our listeners that remarks made during this call may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Statements other than statements of historical facts made during this call may constitute forward-looking statements and are not guarantees of future performance or results and involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements as a result of a number of factors, including those described from time to time in GBDC's SEC filings. For materials we intend to refer to on today's earnings call, please visit the Investor Resources tab on the homepage of our website, which is www.golubcapitalbdc.com, and click on the Events Presentations link.
Our earnings release is also available on our website in the Investor Resources section. As a reminder, this call is being recorded. With that, I'm pleased to turn the call over to David Golub, Chief Executive Officer of GBDC.
Hello, everybody, and thanks for joining us today. I'm joined by Tim Topicz, our Chief Operating Officer, Rob Tuchscherer, Senior Managing Director and Officer of GBDC, and Chris Ericson, our CFO. For those of you who are new to GBDC, our investment strategy is focused on providing first lien, senior secured floating rate loans to healthy, resilient middle market companies that are backed by strong and partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. Yesterday, we issued our earnings press release for the fiscal quarter and year ended September 30, 2026, and we posted an earnings presentation on our website. We'll be referring to this presentation during today's call. I'm going to start with headlines and a summary of performance for the quarter and for the fiscal year. Then Tim, Rob, and Chris are going to walk you through our operating and financial performance in more detail.
Finally, I'll wrap up with some observations on current market conditions and on our outlook for the coming period. The headline is that we're disappointed with GBDC's quarter. There was some good news. Net investment income was solid. Adjusted net investment income per share was $0.33, and that translates into an adjusted NII ROE of 9.4%. Also, we booked a small amount of net realized gain. The bad news was in unrealized losses, which were higher than we'd like, and this caused GBDC's adjusted ROE to be meaningfully lower than our long-term trend. Specifically, adjusted net income per share was $0.08. That's after the impact of $0.25 per share of net unrealized losses, and this translates into an annualized adjusted ROE of 2.3%. So what caused the higher-than-expected unrealized losses? The answer is actually very clear.
Almost all the loss related to fair value changes on three investments that we had previously identified as problem credits. The vast preponderance of the portfolio continues to perform well. I am not excusing our credit mistakes. In retrospect, these three positions are investments we wish we had not made, but I do want to point out that this is the kind of bumpiness that I predicted earlier this year. If you have been following GBDC over the last 12 months, you have heard me say each quarter that the industry is in a period of elevated credit stress, and there are now many indicia of this. Fitch, one of the major credit reporting agencies, recently reported a 6.3% private credit default rate over the last 12 months. Cliffwater reported a roughly 5% private credit stress rate. That is a post-COVID high.
S&P, using a different methodology and a different dataset, showed a 3.9% last 12-month default rate. While in each case, the details vary, all of these data points point in a similar direction. Credit stress is currently running higher than normal. I would say about twice normal levels. While this is not a terrible credit cycle, it is more credit stress than we typically see. It is precisely in periods like this, periods of elevated credit stress, that we tend to see more volatility in fair value marks of problem credits. And I put that word volatility in quotation marks because when we see this volatility, it is usually to the downside. Golub Capital has a long history of focusing on alignment of interest with GBDC shareholders, and as GBDC's advisor, we view ourselves as being in the business of making money when our shareholders make money.
For that reason, we have elected to waive the entirety of GBDC's income incentive fee for the quarter ended December 31, 2026. Let me make one more point before I pass the microphone to Tim and Rob and Chris. Despite the disappointing quarter, we continue to be optimistic, in fact, very optimistic in our outlook for GBDC. Some of that optimism relates to market trends. The market trends have become more favorable. Base rates are going up, spreads have improved, documentation terms and leverage have become more lender-friendly. And some of our optimism relates to prior period fair value adjustments. We expect GBDC to benefit from the reversal in coming periods of a significant portion of its prior period fair value adjustments. Because these unrealized losses are primarily associated with well-performing loans, we are going to see fair value adjustments on those loans start to reverse.
In fact, there is approximately $0.29 per share in net asset value upside associated with debt investments in rating categories four and five. This is not to say we think we are fully done with this period of elevated credit stress. I do not think that is the case, but I do think, and this fits a pattern we have seen many times before, that after periods of elevated credit stress, our business tends to do very well. With that, let me turn it over to Tim, Rob, and Chris to go into our quarter in more detail. Tim?
Thanks, David. Let's start on slide three, where we highlight key themes for the quarter and walk through the drivers of GBDC's earnings. I'll start with the drivers of our $0.33 per share of adjusted net investment income, and then unpack credit gains and losses that contributed to $0.08 per share of adjusted earnings. There were three drivers of NII this quarter. Number one, a stable investment income yield. Number two, continued low borrowing costs. And number three, prudent expense management. Let's go through each of these in turn. On number one, investment income yield was 9.9% annualized in the quarter, consistent quarter-over-quarter. It was supported by stable weighted average spread in the portfolio and consistent base rates throughout the quarter.
Given the timing of contractual rate resets across our floating rate loan portfolio, we expect to see the impact of the September rate hike reflected in our earnings beginning in the 12/31 quarter. On number two, borrowing costs increased modestly from the prior quarter to 5.6% annualized. This remains one of the lowest borrowing costs in the listed BDC peer group. The increase from the prior quarter was the result of the repayment of our 2.5% fixed rate unsecured notes that matured in August 2026. On number three, operating expenses remain low as GBDC continues to benefit from what we believe is a gold standard fee structure. No major changes here, just continued cost discipline and efficiency. Let's unpack the drivers of GBDC's $0.08 per share of adjusted earnings. First, overall credit performance remains solid.
A little more than 85% of our investment portfolio at fair value remains in our highest internal performance rating categories. Investments on non-accrual status remain quite low at just 1.6% of the portfolio at fair value. That's a level well below the average of our listed BDC peers. We did, however, recognize $0.25 per share of adjusted net unrealized and realized losses in the quarter. Of this amount, about $0.21 came from unrealized losses that were related to markdowns on debt and equity investments in portfolio companies currently on non-accrual status. Approximately $0.04 came from unrealized losses as we marked down equity investments in certain portfolio companies we had previously restructured. Regarding balance sheet changes and distributions in the quarter, NAV per share declined to $14 per share.
Through deleveraging, we continue to position the balance sheet for flexibility to participate more fully in new originations going forward. We wrapped up the quarter with net debt to equity of 1.17x . That was down from the prior quarter, where we ended at 1.23x . We paid total distributions of $0.33, and our board declared a $0.33 per share distribution for the first fiscal quarter of 2027. We also kept up our opportunistic share repurchase program. The company bought back 793,000 shares at a weighted average price of $12.75 per share, which represents an 11% discount to our June 30th, 2026 net asset value. In addition, the Golub Capital BDC Trust purchased, for the purposes of employee incentive compensation, approximately $23 million, or 1.8 million shares of GBDC during the quarter.
This brought purchases by the trust to $85 million over the last 12 months. The trust and other Golub Capital affiliates now hold about 9% of our outstanding shares, an indication of a high degree of alignment between GBDC's adviser and its shareholders. Now let's turn to slide seven. Here we've laid out the NAV per share bridge quarter-over-quarter. You can see visually how the earnings drivers that I just walked through translated into GBDC's September 30th, 2026 net asset value of $14 per share. We generated $0.33 of adjusted net investment income, covering our quarterly distribution of $0.33. Adjusted net unrealized and realized losses totaled $0.25 per share. If you put those together, net asset value moved down from $14.25 to $14 per share. That's the operating summary for the quarter.
I'm now going to pass it over to Rob to take us through our investing activity and portfolio in more detail. Rob?
Thanks, Tim. I will now highlight our fourth fiscal quarter investment activity and provide some additional context on portfolio performance. Turning to slide eight, across the Golub platform, we observed a modest increase in deal flow in the third calendar quarter relative to the prior quarter, albeit at a level that remains below historical levels. Sponsors and borrowers continue to experience a high level of macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty, which continues to contribute to lower sponsor-backed M&A activity. In the third calendar quarter of 2026, at the Golub Capital level, our team originated nearly $4 billion of new investment commitments. GBDC participated in these new originations on a limited basis, with $20 million in new investment commitments in the quarter, given our continued focus on deleveraging and on accretive share repurchases.
We remain highly selective and conservative in our underwriting, closing on just 2.5% of deals reviewed in the quarter at a weighted average loan-to-value of approximately 40%. Portfolio company incumbencies accounted for approximately 56% of our origination volume on a deal count basis, demonstrating the sourcing advantages associated with our existing borrower relationships. In addition, we made loans to 18 new borrowers. We continue to leverage our scale to lead deals, acting as the sole or lead lender on 96% of our transactions in the quarter. Turning to slide 10, as of September 30th, 2026, GBDC's $7.8 billion portfolio remains well-diversified across 432 different borrowers. The granularity of our portfolio can also be seen in our small position sizes.
Each of our investments represents less than 0.2% of the overall portfolio on average, and our top 10 investments comprise just 13% of the overall portfolio, which represents a concentration level that is less than half of the average of our listed BDC peers. GBDC's portfolio is also well-diversified by industry sub-sector, with 50 individual sub-sectors represented. Investments in software portfolio companies continue to represent our single largest industry sub-sector exposure at 27%. As a reminder, we believe we are experts in software lending, having completed more than 1,000 software loans, representing over $90 billion in principal over the last 20 years, with a default rate averaging about 0.05% per year.
Importantly, at the Golub Capital level, we continue to see strong operating performance by portfolio companies across our software portfolio, with year-over-year revenue and EBITDA growth of 2.7% and 8.3% respectively, as measured by the Q3 Golub Capital Altman Index. On slide 11, you can see that non-accruals decreased slightly quarter-over-quarter to 1.6% of total investments at fair value, and remain at low levels in absolute terms and relative to the broader listed BDC sector. During the quarter, the number of non-accrual investments increased to 22 due to the addition of two portfolio companies. Our focus, as always, with underperforming borrowers is to use our deep bench of experienced investment professionals and the playbook that we've developed over several decades to minimize losses and maximize recovery values.
We remain highly confident in our ability to manage these idiosyncratic situations, as we have an experienced portfolio management and restructuring team of approximately 20 investment professionals. One example of a successful exit during the quarter was SPF Borrower, or U.S. Dermatology Partners. For context, U.S. Dermatology Partners had been a GBDC portfolio company since May 2016. In late 2019, the lender group executed a forbearance agreement to address covenant defaults following a period of underperformance. Thereafter, Golub Capital and the lender group assumed control of the company, converted a portion of its debt into equity, and started a multi-year turnaround of the business. In August of this year, DermCare Management and U.S. Dermatology Partners completed a strategic transaction to combine operations, creating one of the largest dermatology practice groups in the country, spanning 23 states.
The strategic transaction resulted in sufficient proceeds to support a full recovery of our principal, payment of all accrued interest, and additional proceeds related to our equity position. We believe this case study highlights both the value of our proactive approach to portfolio management and the unique capabilities of our workouts and special situations team. Slide 12 shows the trend in internal performance ratings for the entire GBDC portfolio. Approximately 85% of the total investment portfolio remained in our top two internal performance categories. The modest decline in the percentage of investments rated four and five was primarily the result of portfolio churn. Repayments were concentrated in four-rated investments, and the pace of new investments, which come into the portfolio rated four, was relatively slow.
Investments rated three, which signal a borrower may have the potential to or is expected to be performing below expectations, was 12.2% this quarter, modestly above historical averages. The proportion of loans rated one and two, which are the loans we believe are most likely to see significant credit impairment, remained very low at just 2.5% of the portfolio at fair value. Now I am going to turn it over to Chris to take us through our financial results in more detail.
Thanks, Rob. I will now cover GBDC's financial performance and liability profile for its fourth fiscal quarter of 2026. First, on performance, let's look together at the economic analysis on slide 13. We will start with the dark blue line, which is our investment income yield. As a reminder, the investment income yield includes the amortization of fees and discounts. GBDC's investment income yield remained stable at 9.9% annualized, the result of a modest increase in reference rates and stable spreads across the portfolio, while benefiting from accelerated discount amortization and fees from loan payoffs during the quarter. Our cost of debt, the teal line, increased 30 basis points up to 5.6%, reflecting the impact of the repayment of the 2.5% fixed rate unsecured 2026 notes that matured in August, and GBDC's nearly 100% floating rate debt capital structure, and the modest increase in reference rates in the quarter.
Net-net, GBDC's weighted average net investment spread, the gold line, decreased modestly quarter-over-quarter to 4.3% annualized. Looking forward, our earnings remain sensitive to changes in base rates, given our nearly 100% floating rate loan portfolio. As noted earlier, this quarter's yields do not yet reflect the full impact of the September rate hike due to the timing of contractual rate resets. And based on our balance sheet at quarter end, and assuming no changes in our investment and borrowing structure, every 50 basis point increase in base rates will result in over a penny per share of incremental earnings per quarter. Moving to the balance sheet on slide 16, we ended the quarter with approximately $7.8 billion of total portfolio investments at fair value, $4.3 billion of outstanding debt, and $3.6 billion of total net assets.
Net debt to equity leverage for the quarter ended at 1.17x , down 0.06x from prior quarter, reflecting the impact of lower average investments outstanding in the quarter. And turning to GBDC's liquidity on slide 19, overall, our liquidity position remains strong, and we ended the quarter with approximately $1.7 billion of liquidity from unrestricted cash, undrawn commitments on our corporate revolver, and the unsecured revolver provided by our advisor. This provides approximately 2x coverage of our unfunded investment commitments and our unsecured notes that come due in February 2027. In the quarter, we successfully amended certain terms and extended the maturity of our syndicated corporate revolver to July 2031. Among other restated terms, we successfully negotiated the removal of the 10 basis point term SOFR credit spread adjustment and maintained a drawn spread of term SOFR plus 1.525%-1.775%, subject to borrowing base levels.
GBDC continues to have what we believe is one of the most competitively priced revolvers across our listed BDC peers. Our debt funding structure, highlighted on slide 20, remains highly diversified across multiple financing markets. Our weighted average borrowing costs of 5.6% annualized remains one of the lowest in our listed BDC peer group and is underpinned by a differentiated investment-grade ratings profile. Consistent with our asset-liability matching principle, approximately 92% of GBDC's total debt funding is floating rate or swapped to a floating rate, and 53% of our debt funding is in the form of unsecured notes across a well-laddered maturity profile.
Following the July maturity extension of GBDC's corporate revolver, the weighted average maturity on our outstanding debt at September 30 was 5.3 years, well in excess of the weighted average maturity on accruing debt investments of approximately three years, reflecting a prudent approach to asset and liability matching. Now I'll turn the floor back over to David for closing remarks.
Thanks, Chris. There are three trends we're seeing right now that I think are worth highlighting. First, on the origination side, while M&A activity remained muted in calendar quarter three, our fourth fiscal quarter, I think momentum is improving, and I think the risk-adjusted return profile that we're seeing on new deals, that it's attractive now and it's going to get more attractive. We've been particularly active over the course of the recent period in areas like business services, financial services, value-added distribution, and software. In software in particular, we found that broader concerns about the sector, that those concerns have reduced the supply of lending capital that's available, and that in turn is creating opportunities for specialists like us to lend to high-quality software businesses on attractive terms. Second trend, amendment activity has been and is going to continue to be important and credit-enhancing.
Maturity extensions and amendments, they allow us to reprice stronger performing credits to current market levels and improve economics. And for challenged borrowers, amendments create an opportunity to reassess risk and to negotiate stronger protections, to obtain sponsor support, and in some cases, where appropriate, to drive an orderly exit. Third area, my expectation is that higher-than-normal credit stress, this environment that we've been seeing, it's going to continue as an industry-wide headwind for the next several quarters. In addition, I think you're going to start to see more and more discussion about junior debt investments, of which we have relatively little. I think junior debt's going to likely be a meaningful driver of underperformance in the coming period. With that, operator, can you please open the line for questions?
Thank you. We will now begin the question-and-answer session. If you would like to ask a question, please press star one to raise your hand. To withdraw your question, press star one again. We ask that you pick up your handset when asking a question to allow for optimum sound quality. If you are muted locally, please remember to unmute your device. Please stand by while we compile the Q&A roster. Your first question comes from the line of Kenneth Lee with RBC Capital Markets. Your line is open. Please go ahead.
Hey, good morning, and thanks for taking my question. Just one on, in terms of the risk buckets that you mentioned in the prepared remarks, you noted that the investments on the risk grade 3 were higher than historical levels. Maybe could you just provide a little bit more color in terms of what are some of the challenges that you're seeing in some of these portfolio companies? Any commonalities in terms of the benefits there? Thanks.
Sure. So, level set first. I think both Tim and Chris indicated that the portfolio that's in our performance rating categories four and five, which are our top two rating categories, are a bit over 85%. That number is within the range of normal conditions over the course of the last 10 or 15 years. Sometimes it goes up to about 90%. In periods of more stress, it goes into the low 80s. So, we're in the range of normal. In the last quarter, what we saw was not so much an increase in the dollar amount of threes, but we saw a series of repayments of fours and fives, and we purposely have been prioritizing the repurchase of shares and a little bit of deleveraging, which has kept us from increasing the amount of new investment that we've been undertaking.
We've been saving firepower, in part because we think conditions are improving. So it's that math really more than any change that resulted in a small increase in the category 3 credits. Categories one and two, which are our two not good performing categories, those have stayed very low.
Great. Very helpful there. Just one follow-up, if I may, and it is just on capital allocation, and it sounds like you are still emphasizing or prioritizing repurchases over new investments there. But just given some of the improvements you are seeing in terms of some of the newer deals and the pipeline there, just wanted to get any updated outlook in terms of near-term priorities there. Thanks.
It is a great question, and we are actively looking at that and thinking about it. We want to, over time, balance the opportunities that are in front of us for new investment activity and the opportunities that are in front of us in respect of repurchasing our own shares at a discount. I think your statement hits the nail on the head. We are now in an environment where both are attractive. We are going to have to find the right balance.
Got you. Very helpful there. Thanks again.
Your next question comes from the line of Paul Johnson with KBW. Your line is open. Please go ahead.
Thank you, Brian. Thanks for taking my questions. In terms of just the uptick in the category 3 names, I appreciate the color there that you gave, Ken. Was there any uptick, I guess, from new credit issues in terms of the watch list? How much of these, I guess, are essentially new credit issues versus existing issues maybe that you've been covering for a while?
If you look at the unrealized loss during the quarter, the unrealized loss is overwhelmingly a couple of credits, very small number of credits previously identified as problem children, where we decided to take some fair value write-downs. If you look at our non-accrual list, very little movement, Paul, really for the last couple of quarters. I think we've done a pretty good job here of scouring the portfolio and identifying where we have challenged credits, and we're working them. There is always in a 430 borrower portfolio, there's always some degree of movement. But I think the overwhelming insight I would share with you is we're not seeing migration. We're not seeing emergence of a bunch of new problems. We've got an identified group, and we got to work them.
Got it. Understood. Just, I guess, staying a little bit longer, sorry, on the category 3 names. I mean, it sounds like the trailing growth, particularly within the software companies, is still modest, still positive. But I guess what happens to future interest coverage, cash flow, that sort of thing, for an additional 50 basis points of rate hikes for those companies? That's probably question part one, and then part two, I guess, would be if you are observing any sort of change to cash flow forecasts as these companies, the software businesses, start to budget for AI.
Two good questions. First question was, what are we seeing from a forecasting standpoint in terms of looking at higher interest rates? We routinely, as part of our underwriting of new credits and part of our monitoring of existing credits, are looking forward and doing sensitivity analyses on what ifs that include changes in interest rates of the sort that you're describing. Any increase in base rates starts out as a good thing for us because we are a floating rate lender. We lend, the vast preponderance of our loans are denominated in terms of SOFR plus a spread. If SOFR goes up, we get paid more.
Your point in your question, I think it's right, is that at some point, those increases, while a positive, can also be a negative because they can create credit stress in borrowers who have a harder time paying their interest. Our analysis indicates that in the range of 50 basis points, with the economy still growing, this is not going to move the needle in a meaningful way from a credit standpoint. I worry more about an economic slowdown and the impact of an economic slowdown than I do about something, a change in interest rates at the range of your question. The second topic that you raised was, are we seeing changes in how software companies are planning and budgeting as they respond to AI? That's a harder question to answer because it varies by company.
But I'd say a couple of points that I can make that are generally true. Good software companies are figuring out ways to make AI a source of competitive advantage. They're looking at ways to embed AI in their products. They're looking at using cheaper, faster coding capabilities as ways of expanding their products, and they're doing so with meaningful success. The second point I'd make is that IT budgets at their clients are getting to different degrees, but the theme is the same across all of them, are getting stressed because they're all paying for tokens, paying for AI capabilities, and they're not wanting to just wantonly increase their IT budgets. The common characteristic across the software industry has been some longer time frames to get sales done, extended pipelines.
That's particularly so for some software packages that are, let's call them more volitional for clients as opposed to core to their business model. My expectation continues to be that AI is going to create winners and losers in software. The good news for us, Paul, is that the kinds of software companies that we've focused on for 20 years, market-leading, applications-based, deeply embedded in their customers, these are likely to be among the winners. But we'll have some mistakes too. We'll have to work them.
Got it. Appreciate. Thank you for those answers.
Your next question comes from the line of Robert Dodd with Raymond James. Your line is open. Please go ahead.
Hi. Morning. Thanks for taking the question. On the write-downs, the availability to write-downs, a lot of that was concentrated in non-accruals. You also had some write-downs, obviously, as you said, in previously restructured assets. Obviously, something like an SPF recovery points out that sometimes you get pretty good recoveries. But the stress does seem to, if anything, there is broader credit stress, but it seems to be concentrating more and more in the companies that already have trouble, and that's showing up in your NAV, and that's not unusual across the space right now. Is there anything you can discern about why initial turnaround efforts or whatever aren't working as well as they used to, maybe, for some of these things?
Because it has been a bit of a theme where an asset has a problem, it gets addressed by the lender, and then it just continues to have more and more problems. It seems a little different than it used to be. Is there anything you can give us on that?
Yeah. I think the pattern you're describing, which is, I'll use my words, not your words, Robert, turnarounds are hard. Turnarounds are hard, and that's a very longstanding pattern in my experience over decades. That's not new. Generally speaking, when a private equity-backed company underperforms to a degree that it needs to be restructured, there are significant strategic and operational issues that need to be addressed. It's not surprising when you think about it in that sense that those kinds of turnarounds are hard. I think one of the markers of our success over time has been keeping the number of those companies small and having internal resources that are really skillful at affecting those turnarounds. I think this cycle is going to test that across the industry, because when you get too many of these in your portfolio, wow, it's hard.
When you don't have the right staffing, wow, it's hard. I think you're onto something that warrants kind of continuing careful observation.
Okay. Fair enough. Thank you. On the outlook, you mentioned momentum might be picking up. There are a lot of uncertainties with rates, with the economy, with the new political environment, et cetera. Yet, to be fair, this is a crystal ball question, but how comfortable are you or confident are you that 2027, maybe 2028, it shows maybe not a spike, maybe not a 2021 kind of event, but kind of a swell in activity? We've all heard, yes, the LPs want their money back, but that's been true for years at this point. Just given all the moving parts, are we likely to see a real sustained increase in activity, maybe a multi-year cycle rather than a one-year cycle?
Is this just kind of year-end, everything gets more active, and then it dies off again as it did kind of in the middle of this year?
I think it's a great question to ask, Robert, because I think your observation that you've heard this song before is valid. For several years in a row, the investment banking industry in particular has been very vocal in Q4, even into January, saying, "This year's going to be different. We're going to see more deal flow." It hasn't happened. There are reasons in each case for why it hasn't happened. You pointed out some of them, the conflagration in Iran, the concerns over software, the changes in interest rates. It's not that there haven't been reasons, it's that the world has maybe not cooperated as much as some pundits and forecasters would like with the conditions that are conducive to their predictions. I think, first thing I'd say is, let's all be humble.
The prediction business is a really challenging business, and there are lots of sources of uncertainty. Having said that, I think there are some reasons for optimism, and they underlie my reasons for optimism. Now, first one, the average portco in a private equity fund right now is about seven years old. That's a record. I don't think there's ever been a period that has had a higher average age for portco. You can't just keep pushing that to the right. Second point, you've got a lot of private equity firms that are under-deployed. They've got capital that has been given to them in the form of commitments, and they are not deploying that capital at the pace that they're accustomed to, that their investors expect. Ultimately, this can redound to hurt them if they have their commitment periods for this capital end without the capital being deployed.
The third piece, the economy's strong. We are not seeing economic weakness. We're seeing continued resilience despite tariffs, despite energy prices, despite the political uncertainty that you alluded to. I think all of those point in a positive direction. Your question's fair, and we should all. I mean, our standard answer to questions about predicting the future is, let's talk about a few scenarios.
Fair enough. Appreciate it.
There are no further questions at this time. I will now turn the call back to David Golub for closing remarks.
Thank you. Thanks, everyone, for joining us today. As always, if you have a question that we didn't cover, or you think of something, please feel free to reach out. We look forward to reporting back with what I hope will be better news next quarter. Thank you.
This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for attending. You may now disconnect.