All right, good morning, everyone. My name is Chuck Nabhan. I cover the payments and transaction services space at Stephens. Joining me today from PAR Technology is CEO Savneet Singh. Savneet, really appreciate you and Chris joining us again this year. Great to have you, and welcome to everybody in the audience as well. Just as a starting point for anybody who's unfamiliar with the story, could you just give us a brief overview of PAR, the customer segments you serve, and how you're differentiated?
So we sell enterprise software, hardware, and services to restaurant chains. Our core focus is driving our software platform. We sell across through two big software product suites. One is Operator Solutions, which is anchored on our POS product. And our second suite is called Engagement Solutions, which is anchored on a loyalty product called Punchh. The way we like to think about ourselves is we're a platform to run your restaurant. And then we have the complementary hardware and services you need when you're rolling out these products. We've been around for a long time. We kind of rejiggered the company in 2018 to be focused on software. And just this last year kind of crossed over the hurdle of the majority of our revenues now are software-based. I think what differentiates us is our products. We sell enterprise software.
So it is a product when it's not a go-to-market win or anything like that. You got to have the best products in the market. And so our products, we like to say, are standalone, the best in class in what they do. But then when you put them together under PAR, we make them better together. So we don't force you to buy the suite of products. You can buy each one individually. But our goal is to convince you that if you buy more from PAR, you, the customer, will get a better outcome if you bought two different products from two different vendors.
Great. Well, it's been a busy year for PAR. You've done a couple of acquisitions and divested a legacy business that was deemed non-core. Could you walk us through some of those strategic activities?
Sure. So I'll go reverse. We divested a long-standing government contracting business we had over the summer. There was no synergy between having a government contracting business where your customer was a DOD and McDonald's. So we got rid of that business. It was, I think, clarifying for our story, clarifying for our employees. Candidly, not very distracting because the businesses were run separately, but I think it just kind of cleaned up the story a lot, and our goal in doing that was so that we could become a pure-play food service technology business, and so that was a divestiture. On the acquisitions, in March, at the end of March, we acquired a company called Stuzo, which has now been branded PAR Retail. This is a really important acquisition for us because we had been selling our products into primarily restaurants for a long time.
But we noticed that we were having this growing customer base in convenience stores. And for those that don't look at that industry, food service has become the fastest-growing area of investment for convenience stores. It's their fastest area of revenue growth. It's the area where they have the most innovation. If you go to the big convenience store show, it's almost like you're at the restaurant show. Every vendor is selling you some form of food. And so convenience stores had started to adopt the same technologies as restaurants to engage their customers: loyalty solutions, engagements, offers, promotions. You've probably seen it in your own local markets. And so they were coming to PAR. And the challenge we were having at PAR is because convenience stores were, call it, 5%-10% of our loyalty business, they were not the focus. Our focus was solving the restaurant's problem.
But they kept coming. And in the end, we had a bunch of convenience store customers that were not unhappy, but not terribly happy and raving fans. And when they had a feature or a module they wanted that we didn't have, we'd say, "We'll get back to you," versus when the restaurant business, it's probably already on the roadmap. And so we made a decision to either get out of the business completely and focus all on restaurants, or do we go and make a big investment? And so we decided to acquire Stuzo, who we viewed as the market leader in the space. We viewed as probably the only product that we would ever lose to in that category. And it's been an incredible acquisition. I think it's been incredible for two reasons.
One, the company, the product, the people we bought were all better than we thought, and that almost never happens. We've literally retained, I believe, all but two employees, which is kind of amazing this far into acquisition, although we are usually pretty good at that. But the product is delivering to the customers. Every single customer they have is happy. Our existing C-store customers are almost excited to move to their product. So that's been kind of amazing. The second reason why I think it's been incredible for us is that, and I don't use that lightly, is that when we made this acquisition, it was a little contrarian. We funded it through a PIPE. And I remember it was we raised a ton of money and all, but we had to sell at a discount. And people were like, "Why are you diversifying into convenience stores?
Does that mean the restaurant TAM is out? What's going on? This seems non-core." And today, I would say it's completely consensus that convenience stores are the new restaurants. They're the new food service business. McDonald's' biggest competitor isn't Burger King. It's 7-Eleven. And so we got very lucky on that our thesis played out a lot faster than we thought. And so that one's been really fantastic. And then our second acquisition, which was closed just a few months ago, is called Task Group. Task Group is PAR, but international. They have a full suite of products like we do, focused on the international markets. And our vision in acquiring this was twofold. It was to bring our U.S. customers international. So for almost all U.S. chains, they have more growth outside the United States than in the United States.
And so we oftentimes are transitioning our technology to a vendor overseas that's not us to help their brands go overseas. That doesn't make any sense. And so our goal over time is to see can we build out international business, support our U.S. business leveraging the Task Group product suite.
Got it. I want to touch on the competitive landscape. And I understand it's a bit of a nuanced question because it differs from enterprise to SMB. You're also competing against in-house solutions as well as point solution providers and POS providers. But if you could just give us an overview of the landscape across your businesses and how your unified commerce solution enhances your value proposition to customers.
So categorically, I think restaurants have two ways of solving the problem that we argue that we can solve. One is they can buy a bunch of different point solutions and try to integrate them together to create a guest experience. So that would say, "I want to have a different point of sale vendor. I want to have a different loyalty vendor, a different online ordering vendor. I want to have a different payment vendor, a back office vendor, AI," this idea. You kind of take all these different products, and then you integrate them generally to your point of sale system. And there are these point-to-point integrations, and you're kind of hoping it creates this great guest experience. But I would argue that's not a great idea because you are at the beck and call of your vendors.
That's challenging because if one vendor makes a change over here, that'll cascade through all these other vendors. So every time you update a menu on your system, there's some place it doesn't get updated appropriately. So the DoorDash menu is different than the Uber menu that's different than the In-store menu, and things get all messy. I like to say that our customers go from thinking about great experiences they can create for their customers to being glorified vendor managers because you're trying to get a bunch of vendors to create this core critical part of your business. The other alternative we think our customers have is to try to build this technology themselves and become software companies.
This is only really available to a select few, literally a handful of brands that can make that investment because it is tens of millions of dollars. I would argue that too is a failing solution because the DNA of a restaurant company is not software. The best software developers aren't going to go to a restaurant company to build software. They're going to go to a software business. I do think it's possible or plausible that a restaurant company can build a really good product for their brand because they know everything about their brand. They're going to make it perfect for their brand. I think the moment you do that, you realize, "Oh my God, this product is not a static product.
I need to every single year add more products, more modules, more innovation." And so this great CapEx you thought would be a one-time thing is a perpetual thing going forward because guess what? Now we need online ordering. Guess what? We need to integrate into DoorDash. Guess what? Now we need this AI thing and this thing and this thing and that thing. And you end up with this really Frankenstein set of tech, and a CEO eventually comes in and says, "Why do we spend 10 times more on software than our peers? Let's go make the franchisees pay for this and do it themselves." And so that's the other option.
We think the best alternative is a more unified solution where, while we are a vendor, we are integrating deeply as opposed to a bunch of point solutions so that you can create an amazing guest experience for your customers. We think that's our true competitive advantage.
Got it. And as a proof point of that advantage, you won two large contracts in the past year, one with BK for POS, another with Wendy's for loyalty. Can you discuss some of the factors that led to PAR winning those RFPs?
So I think they're very different. So Wendy's bought us for loyalty and Burger King for POS and digital ordering. On the POS side, I think it came down to the fact that we, again, I think it's because we have the best product. But I think for a brand like them, my guess would be that, one, they could trust that we could scale with them. Most of these mega, mega brands like a Burger King are the laggards in adopting new technology, not because they don't want it, but because it's scary when you've got 7,000 stores and you're going to change those 7,000 stores. That's a big change. And so I think they got a lot of confidence in our track record of execution and felt that we could do it. I think part of it too was they wanted to be associated with PAR.
One of their executives was on a podcast or on YouTube. And when he was asked about the change, he said, "We think their products are the best, but we love their culture. We know we can text everyone from the call center person to the CEO at 2:00 A.M., and we'll get a response at 2:01 A.M." And so I think they liked that DNA of who we were too. But the 99% of the argument is the functionality we operate is what they needed at the time that they needed it. On the Wendy's side, honestly, I think I look back and say, "I don't know where else they could have done." If you're the largest loyalty provider in restaurants, particularly in the enterprise, by a long shot.
And if you're a big brand like Wendy's and you want to go move millions and millions, I forget how many millions of guests it was, onto a new loyalty program, that's better, more wholesome. You don't have a ton of options. And I think we gave them the most compelling solution to move. But most importantly, our product is built so that they can drive all these initiatives that they're hoping to drive on the marketing side, on the digital engagement side. We can actually power that seamlessly without having to build a bunch of software for them in a custom manner.
Great. Could you remind us of your expectations on ARR contribution from those two signings as well as how we should think about the OpEx necessary to support those implementations?
Burger King, when fully rolled out, which takes a couple of years, is about $22 million or $23 million. We expect that number hopefully to grow as we can upsell them more products over time. That's an annual number. The Wendy's deal, which we did take live, we've sort of said is $4 million-$5 million. That's already fully live. The advantage of the engagement side of our business is you sign the customer, you take them live, you get all the revenue. On the POS side of the business, you sign the customer, and then you recognize revenue as the product rolls into each store, which is generally a year to two years.
But just from an RPU standpoint, I think you had indicated that the RPU from BK is about 50% higher than the existing employees.
Yeah. Then I would say if you look at our legacy, our entire customer base, it is. But I would say if you look at it relative to deals we signed in the last two years, it's pretty much there.
Got it.
As we roll out these new deals, and we've kind of seen really consistent RPU growth across our products. I forget it was low teens or something this quarter. And so you're seeing that kind of nicely mature.
Great. So just looking beyond BK, how much capacity do you have to support another large logo implementation? And if you could touch on some of the opportunity within RBI, which is obviously Burger King's parent company as well.
So we feel we've got capacity. We think it is dynamic. And so if we have—we do think we have other large deals coming down the pike—we will prepare, plan, and sequence them in a way that we can get them rolled out. So I don't worry about capacity. I think it's more about making sure we sequence them appropriately. Could you do three Burger Kings at once? That would be probably hard from where we are today, but in a year or two, hopefully that's the norm. But to me, it's just a sequencing thing, and we feel pretty good that these things can be sequenced in a way that we can handle it. So I feel we'll be fine there. With RBI, I mean, there's not a lot we can say, given it's their—they're a big customer, and we don't want to say anything we shouldn't say.
But there are four brands within RBI, and we're really hopeful that we will hopefully win another one of those brands over time. And I don't think that's years and years. I think they are seeing the success they're having in Burger King and probably want to replicate that elsewhere. But I also think it creates an opportunity for more upsell within the existing Burger King contract we have today.
Got it. So I want to switch gears to financials. You made it over the hump on positive EBITDA this quarter, and you've outlined a long-term EBITDA margin target as well. How should investors think about the build-up towards your long-term margin targets? And if you could just kind of give us a sense for the uplift you're getting from gross margin as well as the pace of OpEx going forward.
Our long-term targets have been we want to be sort of 70% + gross margin business. We want our R&D expense to be 25% of sales, our sales and marketing expense to be 15% of sales, and call it 10%-15% going to G&A. And hopefully, obviously, that gets smaller and smaller as we grow. Today, we're pretty close on three of those. Our gross margins on our software business are 67%. Our R&D is at 25%. Our sales and marketing is at 15%. So we're already kind of at our long-term targets ahead of schedule on R&D and sales and marketing. So the core businesses, that's what's driven the EBITDA, is that we've been able to be really efficient on the core products. The G&A base, we've got room to grow, and that's just going to take scale. We've got to grow into that revenue base.
We don't grow G&A by a lot, but we have a lot of room to work to do, a lot of scale to go to get to those margins, and so to me, it's just time. It's not really like, "Can we do it?" We're already proving how efficient our sales and marketing motion is. We're proving how efficient the R&D is. You already have that efficiency today, and we're growing 25%, right? You could argue that if growth ever slowed down, we'd be even more efficient because then we wouldn't sort of need that. I think it's very reasonable to assume that we'll get to those long-term margin targets because on the harder levers, I think we've already proven it. Now it's G&A, which to me is just scale.
On the ARR side, you've guided to 20%-30% organic ARR growth. Could you walk us through the build-up to that growth level and how much is coming from new logos versus expansion within your existing base?
Yeah. It's hard to get a build-up because we've got different products in different markets. And so it's not there. But we have a build-up by each individual product that will take way too long to walk you through here. But I would say the way that we think about a new logo versus existing is I always wanted to get to a point of 50/50. Can we get 50% from price and from upselling to our base and 50% from new logo? We are not there. We are more 80/20 new logo. And that's just because while the cross-sell is actually working great right now, we have more pipeline than we've ever had for payments and for Data Central and MENU from our existing base. I mean, it's just being driven by that cross-sell motion. But our products keep winning new logos.
So if you think about it, we're like, "Great. We had a great year for cross-sell and upsell." We also rolled out Burger King and Wendy's in that year. And so the new logos are still the majority of the growth. I think that's a good thing in the end. It means our products are still super relevant, and we're not there. But we've got to get—we're working hard to balance the two.
I want to dive into the payment processing component. Clearly, part of the value proposition is consolidating vendors. But are you able to compete on price? And just from a financial standpoint, how should we think about the gross margin implications of payment growth as that business continues to scale?
Yeah. There's a lot there. So first, I say the thing is we recognize payments on a net basis. So it's very different than our peers. So our payment margins will be categorically higher because we're not including interchange and all that stuff that juices up the revenue but kills the margin. So that's number one. So the short answer is yes, there should be high margins because we're just recognizing our take on it. The second part is our payments are. Can we be great on price? Yes. We have tons of volume. PAR is one of the largest restaurant companies. We have a lot of volume, but we can keep bidding out to the big processors. But what's unique about our payments business is that we went on that vendor simplification point that you mentioned, but we also went on functionality.
Our last couple of big payments deals have been people taking our payments products that are using us for processing, but in reality, they're using us because we give them functionality on top of that processing. So as an example, we put out a press release for this. But Smoothie King uses us for something called One Tap Loyalty, where when you double-tap at the Smoothie King register, it pulls up your Smoothie King loyalty card, and that's connected into our processing. And so you can tap once, and you can earn points for that order. You can redeem your points or a coupon that was already in there and pay for the transaction all in just one tap. And that's an amazing thing because you're not like, "Here's my coupon. Here's my scan code. Here's my codes.
Can I get the new points?" It's kind of like when you check into this hotel. It's like, "Wait, is my Hyatt number on there?" It's all in one scan. It's on one flow, and so they chose us for that, and then we have to have processing, and so I think we've done a really nice job of wrapping products around payments so that it's not just a commoditized payment solution.
Got it. I want to touch on some of your larger relationships, just getting away from software quickly. McDonald's, Yum! Brands, and Dairy Queen are roughly 30% of revenue. Could you talk about the relationship you have with those brands and any potential for upsell there?
Yeah. And I think the 30% really overdoes it because it includes our hardware and services, which is the biggest part of that. We sell tens of millions of dollars of hardware to McDonald's. So it's not really anywhere close to that number. So we've got great relationships with all of them. McDonald's has been a customer of PAR since 1982. So we've got a tremendous relationship with them that we think will continue for a long time. Dairy Queen was our first mega or second mega software customer. They've been with us, I want to say, since 2018, 2019, around that time. And they've stayed with us through tough times and now good times. So I feel really great. We've got a tremendous relationship with the leadership there, leadership team. As you mentioned, with Dairy Queen and the others, they are not single product customers.
Dairy Queen uses us for point of sale. They use us for back-office. They use us for loyalty. And so when you have those three products integrated to PAR, if they hated us, it'd even be hard to move. So it helps as you sell more products. It's great for our financial profile. It makes us stickier, but also makes them have a better customer experience. So we've got a great relationship there, and hopefully, we can continue to sell more innovative things to Dairy Queen. What was the third one?
Uhm.
Yum. Yum is a hardware and services customer that uses our loyalty business. And so Yum is a super important customer in our loyalty business, but in dollars-wise, it's quite small. The reason why it's listed there is just the legacy hardware and services stuff.
Got it. I want to take a step back and talk about the demand environment and approach it from a couple of different ways. I guess just heading into 2025, tapped-out consumer, same-store sales growth, but nonetheless, we're undergoing this digitization within the restaurant space for a number of reasons that are really not controlled by, not really contingent on the economy. With that said, could you talk about the demand environment heading into next year as well as any potential changes in priority you're seeing in the restaurant space?
It's funny. I pay attention to this stuff very closely. As an example, we refinanced back when Chairman Powell said inflation was transitory. A couple of months before that, we had done, again, a very contrarian thing. We refinanced our debt and did an equity offering because we had been tracking the menu prices at the restaurants we serve and noticed that they had categorically all moved up double digits. And we were like, "Oh man, inflation is here." And so at the time, our shareholders were super pissed, and I got a lot of angry calls. But subsequent to that, the SaaS market went down 50%. And so I felt like, "Oh, well, we got pretty lucky." So we track it really carefully at PAR to see what is the underlying health of the customers that we serve. Because as you suggested, I do think it's very resilient.
Digital transformation is not something you stop, but the macro still rules everything, and we're not ignorant enough to assume that we're going to be the one thing that doesn't get hit, and I've been saying this for the last year now, which is we have not seen the slightest slowdown of interest from our customers in a year when most of our customers have done just okay, and there's a large gradient. We serve CAVA and Sweetgreen, which have had amazing years. We also serve brands that have had very challenged years, and so I think our organic growth has been so strong all year long, and I think that the main driver of that is that the challenges that restaurants are facing, software is helping them solve that.
Loyalty solutions are phenomenal in these environments because everyone wants to focus on value, but one of the greatest ways to create value is through loyalty programs because instead of just giving value, can you build loyalty? Can you build repeat guests, repeat visits? And so loyalty is really powerful in these times. You're going to see strong commitment there. When you think about upgrading your operations, if times are going to be tough, you want more software, not less, because then you can have less bodies. And so as you add back office, as you add our solutions there, you're able to actually cut hours. You're able to save costs, order less food. And then lastly, I think the point of sale system, which is the biggest lift for our customers, the longest sales cycle, but our most important product to sell.
It's one of those things now where I think if you're a brand and you haven't moved to a modern solution, if you're that CIO or CTO, you know that you're going to get a call from your CEO one day. It's like, "Hey, Starbucks launched this thing," or "Panera did this thing," or "Chick-fil-A did this thing. I want that too." And that's been happening now for like five or six years. And eventually, you're like, "I got to just upgrade because I can't keep sticking together junky things and hoping I'm going to be catching up to my competitors.
The term modern solution is a pretty broad one. But one thing that comes to mind is just the shift from on-prem to cloud-native or cloud-based. And that's something that we're hearing more and more about in the restaurant space. And I was hoping you could touch on that trend and how you're positioned to capitalize on that opportunity in the market.
So on-prem to the cloud is definitely the transition that's happening. I never look at it that way. I look at it more as legacy to modern. And I know it's, like you said, modern is very, very broad because you can be modern and still have a legacy architecture. But in the restaurant space, you have a few legacy guys that are really dominant. I won't use their names because I know some of them are here. But really great brands, been around for a long time. And they have tremendous market share. They have tens of thousands of restaurants that have been running their products for a decade, two decades, sometimes even more. And it's the shift from that. So I always argue, even if those products were in the cloud, I don't think it changes your decision to move away from them or stay with them.
Because in the end, you're doing it for functionality. If you're the guy working at the restaurant, do you really have any clue if the POS is in the back in a closet in the back or if it's in the cloud? Probably not. If you're at the corporate level, do you know? Yeah, because you get some real-time reporting. But there's always ways to work around it. And you'd be surprised how many technologies are now moving back on-prem, which is kind of a fascinating trend that's happening. But so to me, it's still that: is the product itself modern? Can it handle the modern user? And so I think about that as more of, can our products pretend our products were in the cloud? Pretend they were in the clouds in the back.
Could they still solve all the needs that the other products didn't do or didn't offer and give you the ROI that you needed? And so that's what I mean by modern is, yes, it's in the cloud. So that does give you a huge advantage, like real-time reporting, real-time menu changes, all these integrations we can offer. But it's really still the core product is being able to do what the legacy guys can't do.
Got it, and I'm going to have to ask the obligatory AI question from two different angles. The first being how you could use AI to benefit your customers and enhance your value proposition. The second being how you could potentially use AI internally to drive efficiency within your operations.
It's a great way to tee it up because that's how we look at it. We actually break AI at PAR into those two buckets. Internally, I don't think we're doing anything others are not. We're adding AI to the call center. We've already done that. We've got Copilot running with our engineers. I am an AI junkie. So every other town hall of our company, I'm showing a tool and showing my own use case and trying to create more, trying to convince people I can get rid of IR with an AI bot now. Just kidding. Really thinking about how we use AI to automate what we're doing to get faster on the air. I would say it's not yet been a game changer. We're not calling it out. I haven't seen the game change this year, but I think that's the enterprise side.
We're still dealing with these mega enterprises where I do see the advantage of just we can ship software faster and cleaner in a more automated fashion, and that's really exciting. On the customer end, this is where I'm incredibly disappointed, and the best way to explain it, I hate anecdotes, but I'll give you a good one. We have a customer advisory board. We invited them to Chicago, and we asked them to rank the things that they're most excited about in the industry, and it was like 9 out of 10 or 10 out of 11, how many people were there? It was AI. We said, "Okay, that's amazing," and then we asked them to say, "Here's our roadmap. Where would you rank AI?" and AI was literally the last thing on the list.
And then I asked, "Okay, how much money are you allocating in your budget to AI next year?" And it was like, "Pennies." It was like, "I want free stuff to play with." And so it was fascinating, which is they're really interested in AI. It is definitely something they care about, they think about. But there's no budget allocated to it yet. And they don't want us to change what's on our roadmap today. Now, that doesn't mean we shouldn't do it because the customer doesn't always know what's coming around the corner, and that's what they pay us to do.
Yep.
But it's very clear that if we had an off-the-shelf AI thing, I'm not sure we could sell to it. So the way we're applying AI is actually thinking about not AI to disrupt what they're doing, it's just to add to our product.
So as an example, we have a data management product called Data Central. It's an enormous product. It's all the data. It's kind of like literally your central data, your central data system. You would have to write traditional queries to pull up data. Now we made it natural language first. Hey, what were the profits on my store in Jacksonville, Florida that did that promotion? And you'll be able to pull it up. So it's stuff like that. On our loyalty tools, autoresponders do sentiment stuff. So if you had a bad review on Yelp in a restaurant, you can press a button, and it'll give an automatic review and stuff like that. Things that make our product more attractive. I think part of it is almost like marketing. It's like letting our customers know that, "Hey, if you're into AI, we got some cool AI stuff.
Give us a call," but today in the restaurant, there's not a lot of use cases of AI that I can say are actually being rolled out. I think it's going to happen. It just hasn't happened yet.
Got it. So AI aside, maybe we could talk about your product roadmap in terms of first how you think about things from clearly there's a lot on your plate right now with the two deals and the two big customers. But what are you working on from an organic standpoint? Is M&A completely off the table right now? And maybe just thinking long-term, how you balance organic versus inorganic product strategy?
It's actually pretty simple. The way we look at building is if there's a greenfield, we want to build it. Meaning if there's a new product opportunity, we're going to build it because we think we have the hubris to think we can do it better than the next guy because we have more data on the market than anybody else, and so we can probably know what you're doing. If it's a brownfield market and there are already established players, our view is generally to buy, and what I mean by that is we could have gone and built a loyalty solution in 2021 and say, "Let me go do it," but it takes a year to really build a true enterprise software product.
Then you put it in the hands of a few customers, and they're like, "This is great, but I need these 15 things done." And then you spend six months adding those 15 things. And then you go back to market, you win your first customer. And it takes you years before you get close to the market share of the company you would have acquired five years before that. And so to me, if you can do it in a creative manner, that's when you acquire. Provided technology is still good, you can integrate it and so on and so forth. If it's a brand new category, I think you'll see us build because we're sort of like in the payment space. We could have bought a bunch of different payment processors, a bunch of different things.
But we said this idea of using software to make kind of do interesting loyalty transactions. We're going to be the best in the world with that because that's what we do. So we will probably build there. Now, again, everything is price dependent. There's so many other levers that matter, but that's kind of how we look at it from this perspective. The last thing I'd say is when we look to buy something, it is the financials come last. And you have to check that box. Meaning that we first like to see if we bought this product and added it to our suite of products, does it make our collective more exciting to our customers? Can we sell more of our existing products in addition to being able to sell more of the product we buy?
Now, I'm pretty convinced any product we buy, we can sell more because we have a customer base we can sell them into. But can we sell more of our existing products? Or can we put them together and just one plus one equal three for that customer?
Got it. I want to touch on service. It's a topic that doesn't always get a lot of airtime in the investment community. But when you talk to customers about why they switch vendors, that is one of the top reasons. So I was hoping you could share with us your thoughts on service, how you've approached that function of the organization as you scaled.
I would say I think we're great at everything. Relative to our peers, I think we're best here, and the reason why is we survived as a company for 40 years in the public markets by selling hardware and services that was manufactured, assembled in the United States. You only won by great service. We were not the cheapest. We were not the fastest, but we survived by great service, and so that cultural legacy, if you will, has kind of stuck with us. A McDonald's franchisee still to this day would fight to keep PAR in their stores, even at a more expensive cost because they know the service would be better, and I think we have benefited from that culture, and so I've been very excited by taking that kind of historical hardware service as DNA and applying it to PAR.
And we also have the benefit that our peers have just done a bad job on the service side. I always say go find a happy customer, one of those legacy guys. There's not a lot of them. And that's not just because the products haven't delivered. It's also because they didn't pick up the phone or they didn't do it. And I think that starts at the top. I think I give every customer my cell phone and I say, "If you've got a problem, call me." And so we take all of that pretty serious.
Great. I want to end with an announcement you made this morning before opening it up to Q&A. You had a release this morning in case anybody missed that you're exchanging some of your converts. You obviously have some that are still outstanding. So we could maybe touch on that announcement as well as how we should think about the capital structure.
We have two converts, 26 and 27. Our 26 is worth $120 million. We exchanged $100 million of that today for a debt for equity swap. It's pretty simple. This convert is now within the timeline that you would have to either refinance it or take it out. We were at the point where we could do a forced conversion. Our stock price had—I should start with this. The convert was in the money. And so I had already in my mind kind of treated it as equity because we were in the money by quite a decent amount now. And so to me, it was sort of saying we can go through this whole process of forced converting them, but we could just do a negotiated exchange and remove it now.
The reason why we did that as opposed to doing a refinancing and pushing the debt out five more years like most companies do is that I wanted more flexibility on the balance sheet because M&A has worked so well for us that adding more flexibility, I think, is better because it gives us the opportunity that if we ever needed to go back to the markets, we'd have the capacity to do so.
Great. I want to open it up to the audience to see if anybody has any questions.
[You repeated the exposure to McDonald's, Yum! Brands, RBI, saying that 37% was probably much less.]
I think it was 30, and it's heavily hardware related, right? So you sell our software products are 2,000 bucks a year. One hardware order is like $10,000, but it's one time.
[When we think about ARR, how fragmented and diversified.]
Incredibly diversified. So that was the point that I was making, which is.
[What would be a big contributor?]
I don't think we have a 10% customer in ARR.
In the back?
I think you're agnostic to size. Is that still the case in terms of small to—if you saw something that was almost closer to your size, you would contemplate it? And have you made a mistake in the go/no-go back when an acquisition, say, "I don't appreciate that"?
So, on our size, I mean, I think.
Let's repeat this.
Oh, the question was, are we agnostic on the size of the deal, big or small? What do we think? And the second part was, is there an acquisition we regret? So on the size question, bigger is definitely better, not because it's better and easier, it's because there's something already operating. Smaller deals are harder because you're inheriting a product that doesn't have a go-to-market function. Generally, there's not a lot of tribal knowledge. If somebody walks, you're like, "Oh my God, how can I replace that knowledge?" It's scarier. So it does matter. But it all matters what we're doing. All but one of our acquisitions has been product related, meaning we were buying a net new product. And so we weren't buying a competitor where we were trying to put two things together and take out market share.
In those acquisitions, we may buy something smaller because we say, "Got a new product. It's big enough where there's a team of people we will still be able to run it, or we can slam it through." If we were ever to buy a competitor, it would probably have to be for size. We wouldn't do it because you're not going to see us buy a bunch of tiny point of sale companies. That would be really complicated to integrate, integrate, integrate. But you might see us buy a large one one day. There's nothing we're planning or anything like that. I think it's just also, are we buying something for market share or a new product? If it's a new product, then I think we are more agnostic because we think it's a great product. We'll do it.
If it's for market share, it'll be size. As far as the deals we've done, if I go through them, we bought them all in a highly accretive manner. So financially, no, I think they've been great. From a product perspective, Data Central, our back office product, great deal. I give us a B plus, A minus. I think B plus going to A minus, that's going to be one of our fastest growing products in the next few years. Punchh, our loyalty product will be A plus, plus, plus. I don't know if we'll ever have a deal as good as that. That company was the same size as Brink, growing faster with better retention. And we bought it for 25% of our market cap. We can play twice as much and still have been really creative. And again, our stock was trading at a silly multiple back then.
The only deal, our C-store deal, I think will be a home run again. We bought it for an EBITDA multiple for a decent growing SaaS business. So I think we snuck one out there. And Task is way too early to—we're three months in or something. So I can't really judge that yet. The only deal that I think is debatable will be MENU, which is our tiniest deal by a long shot. But I told investors, "You got to measure us in three years out because that was an example of we bought a product, not a business." And so we'll see. We'll see. But I would say on the bigger deals, we would do them all over again, and we probably would have paid more for all of them.
Any other questions in the back?
[audio distortion]
great question. So the question was, what are the wins that a franchisee at Burger King gets if they move to POS? So it's a great question because it's the hardest one to answer if you're not in the business because you're changing a point of sale system. What does it actually do? So the few things that I think the franchisee noticed is speed of transaction, speed of payment. These are massive issues when you have all POS companies and all POS products. You should have close to perfect order injection of your off-premise orders. Off-premise orders are your online ordering system, your loyalty system, but also your DoorDash or Uber or whoever that store is partnered with. And you'd be surprised, nobody has 100% order accuracy, and the majority of stores are way lower than you think. And so you should be noticing that relatively quickly.
But where you get the real value, I think, over time is the stuff that comes on top, which is like, "Oh, well, now I can add this product because it's an Open API and it's in the cloud, and I can do all this stuff. I can do this management of my labor and all these things." And so it comes over time, but the immediate stuff is in that bucket. Now, they're moving off of a really old, funky thing. So it's not that hard for them to notice the difference.
Are the other ones in RBI similarly old where?
It's a mix because they're acquired brands, so there's no consistency.
Great. I want to thank you for joining us today, Savneet. Also, just to give a quick plug, PAR will be holding its investor day on Monday. If anybody's interested in tuning in for more details, which I'm sure we'll get plenty of on Monday, feel free to reach out with any questions. Thanks again for joining us.
Thank you very much.