Hey, my name is Scott Berg. I run our enterprise software and SaaS research efforts here at Needham. Like I said, thanks for joining our 19th Annual Tech, Media, and Consumer Conference. Today with us, we have Sprout Social. We have the company's head of IR, Jason Rechel, with us. Thanks, Jason, appreciate the time.
Yeah, thanks for having us.
You know, this conference probably feels a little bit like home to you. For those that may not know, Jason was at Needham at one point in his career.
Started my career at Needham, so it's a little bit of a homecoming for me.
Been a couple of years, though, it's all right. I guess why don't we start off with an overview of Sprout.
Yeah
For those that may be less familiar with the business?
Yeah. So, Sprout was founded in 2010, four co-founders in Chicago, on the thesis that social media would fundamentally transform the communication of brands and their customers, and that this brand-new form of communication would change the way that multiple users, multiple departments, would interact with their customers and interact with customer data across the entire customer life cycle. So with that thesis in mind, the company, in the early days didn't want to make bets around specific networks, didn't wanna predict the way that social would impact specific use cases, didn't want to make predictions about the type of customers that may or may not use social at some point in time.
And so went about building software that was architected on a single code base that could be rapidly deployed, could deliver rapid value to customers, and could be innovated on very quickly. Because the belief was that social media and the social APIs would change very quickly, and, and building on a single code base would allow us to innovate at the pace of social and deliver, deliver value to customers as we grew. And then, on the front end, because of the belief that this would be a ubiquitous technology across many users and scale horizontally across departments inside of organizations, the belief was that the software had to be incredibly easy to use.
The front end of our software has been, to this point, one of our greatest competitive advantages, because we are a software that is very easy to use, easy to deploy, and easy to get value from, even from the world's most sophisticated and largest organizations at this point. We were fortunate to, earlier this year, be recognized by G2 as the number one rated software in the entire software industry. I think that is a reflection, generally speaking, of the two kind of North Star principles from the very beginning around building around a single use or a single code base, and optimizing for usability on the front end. That's kind of where we are today.
We have 30,000 customers across 100 companies, continuing to grow very quickly with a primary focus on serving mid-market and enterprise organizations. And we've seen really good utility and adoption across, you know, multiple use cases and multiple products, which I'm sure we'll get into here.
Oh, definitely. So I started looking at the questions I was gonna ask and realized I had the wrong sheet out, so. But I got the right ones here now. It's, it's gonna work out much better this way, unless you wanna answer the other company's questions. Let's start off with kind of the big news over the last couple of months. You have a change in the CEO position. Justyn is stepping down, one of the co-founders of the company, and Ryan, who's been president for several years, is stepping in, into the position. I guess, why now? Why, why, why the timing today relative to six months ago or six months today?
Yeah.
I know there's a six-month transition.
Yeah.
Sounds like this has been kind of laid out internally for a period of time, but just help us understand kinda what the timing looks like, and what does this mean going forward? What changes, if anything?
Yeah. So maybe I'll just take one step back, right? Justyn Howard, our founder and CEO, founded the company, obviously, in 2010. He is a product-first person. He is a strategy-first person. His passion and his strongest characteristics as a leader are sitting behind the scenes and helping to drive the product roadmap, helping to drive corporate strategy, and not necessarily leading from the front, meeting with customers, managing a senior executive team. So he believed that the company had grown and scaled to a place where he was gonna be best served sitting in the background, helping drive product strategy, helping drive our broader strategic vision as an organization, and that could be best done in an exec chair role. Conversely, Ryan Barretto joined the company about eight years ago.
He had spent a decade leading global sales for Pardot inside of Salesforce prior to joining Sprout. When he joined us eight years ago, as what was SVP of Sales at the time, he began to architect what is today our go-to-market motion. He has, you know, over the last eight years, he's led the three acquisitions that we've made. He's led our evolution up into mid-market enterprise. He's helped scale our global model and built out our international sales teams. He's really, you know, helped us through every stage of our evolution since that point in time.
We promoted Ryan to president in the end of 2020, and at that point, a succession plan was put in place where it was pretty clear internally, and we'd like to believe it was clear externally, that Ryan would be the successor to Justyn at some point. But your question is kind of why now, and I think, and maybe to take one step back beyond just Ryan and Justyn, we also at the end of last year, Aaron Rankin, our CTO, and another one of co-founders, stepped back to just a board level seat from CTO, and elected for his handpicked successor, Alan Boyce, who was the first engineer ever hired at Sprout. He's been at the company for 14 years. He's hired every single engineer on our engineering team to succeed him as CTO.
I think there was a well-executed succession plans in place for both co-founders from the CTO role and from the CEO role. And I think just putting those pieces together, an indication of how far the company has come, and Ryan's bigger vision that the executive team in place today needs to be the executive team that is gonna scale us to $1 billion and beyond of subscription revenue. So thinking really strategically about having the right people in the right executive leadership positions for where the company is today and where we're going. And I think to bring this back to Justyn and Ryan, you know, Ryan is our leader from the front. He is our sales leader.
He's been the architect of, of our go-to-market motion, and so thinking about him as being our front of house leader or everything, customer, investor, partner facing, and then Justyn as being back of house, everything that is product and strategy facing. Putting them in the roles to be successful in their own rights, they believed putting them in, in those positions now puts the, the company in the best position to maximize our potential moving forward.
Okay. There's a couple of hiccups in the last quarter, a couple of things that we, I know we wanna discuss.
Yeah.
The next seven or eight questions I have are all about the first quarter results, and I've had a lot of these questions the last week, so I know we're gonna dive into them a little bit. But, you know, I think question number one that I've received is: What has changed so quickly in the business, if anything, between, you know, the date of your fourth quarter results in the end of March, that drove the big change or big enough change in the revenue guidance for this year, and your expectation around how the year kind of falls?
Yeah.
Why don't we start with there? 'Cause it was a pretty finite time frame that it seemed like it was-
Yeah
a pretty big step change for the business.
Yeah. So we, as I alluded to earlier, we've been evolving the business into mid-market enterprise, and our enterprise business specifically has been our fastest growing business for a number of years, for at least five years. Enterprise, for us, exited 2023, it was about 40% of our business, growing over 50%. And that's a combination of many things. That's a combination of larger initial lands, that's a combination of structurally, an enterprise having our fastest NDR, it's a combination of seat expansion from what had been traditionally marketing use cases into broader social customer care, customer success use cases, into sales and business intelligence. Many other areas and other departments that we historically have not participated in, which pulls more seats along with it, which pulls broader premium product adoption with it.
And so all those things have been working to our advantage in the enterprise, and all of those things, and that success to date, has really informed our success to double down on the enterprise. And so that had been a notable overperformer in our business over the last 18 months, I would say, in particular, and was a notable overperformer in Q3, Q4 of last year. And so we came into the year with a ton of confidence and conviction around the direction of our enterprise business. That confidence and conviction continues to be the case even in spite of Q1, which I'll dig into.
But really, as we walked into Q1, behind that success in enterprise, we wanted to make a couple of tweaks and adjustments to the go-to-market organization to put us in the best position to capitalize on that success. So a couple of these things you'd do in any Q1 anyway, but we did them to arguably a greater degree than we have done historically. So, you know, we accelerated some promotions, changed a couple of kind of frontline leadership positions to put them in the best position to be successful for 2024 and beyond. We took the entire sales and success organization out of the field for a couple of weeks to train and enable them on Tagger, which was the product we acquired late last year.
We felt like we wanted everybody to be wildly successful selling that product in 2024 and beyond. We also accelerated our vertical sales strategy. So historically, we've been generalists, because of the nature of our model, where we historically have been primarily inbound, we historically have led our sales motion with the trial. We'd wanted every salesperson to be a generalist and be able to talk to, you know, Caterpillar just as well as FedEx, just as well as Cigna. And we, over the last 18 months, we had experimented with a couple of pilot programs in the healthcare vertical and in the higher ed vertical.
We had seen tremendous success with those programs, to understand that reps in that vertical model are more successful on average, with higher quota attainment, they drive higher conversion of pipeline, they drive higher ACVs, and all of those things to indicate to us, beyond the initial land, higher future NDR as well. And so that informed the decision to build out a broader vertical sales strategy with a specific focus on healthcare, transportation and travel, government, higher ed, financial services, a couple of others. And so in making that transition, we pulled some fully productive capacity that would have otherwise been fully productive in Q1 out of plan and put them in those vertical sales teams. All of those things, right, you would, you would naturally then ask, we would have known in mid-February at the time that we gave our guidance, and we did.
Each of those things are relatively small changes in the context of the sales organization, but cumulatively, they resulted in distraction and misexecution in terms of getting deals across the finish line exiting Q1. I'd say beyond that, we've also been a company, you know, if you've followed us over the years, we've never mentioned macro on an earnings call. We've never mentioned macro with you. We, as a company, internalize accountability. We control the things that we believe are in our ability to control. And so we're gonna take ownership from an execution perspective in terms of the way that the last six weeks of the quarter materialized.
But I would say that the selling environment, and you've heard this from other software companies at this point as well, the selling environment in the last six weeks of Q1 was different and harder than it was in the back half of last year. And so I think the combination of these smaller go-to-market tweaks compounded what was an environment where we needed to execute really, really well, and that environment didn't allow us to do that in Q1. And so those, you know, as I think a lot of folks would tell you, you know, you sit there in mid-February and you have a sales forecast, you've risk-adjusted that forecast. And ultimately, over the final six weeks of the quarter, a couple of our larger, you know, million-dollar plus, multimillion dollar transactions slipped out of Q1.
Couple of our other larger six-figure transactions didn't get closed or across the finish line by 3/31. So that resulted in, you know, some of the, I'll call it the mid-single-digit million ARR miss from Q1. And then we, coming out of that, wanted to be in a position where, from a guidance philosophy perspective, wanted to kind of reset the bar so that we're in a position to go out and overperform our guidance the remaining, you know, three quarters of the year here. And so that means we wanted to be in a position where all of the sales and go-to-market tweaks that we made in Q1, they're done, they're now set, and all of our capacity is in a position to be fully productive over the course of 2024.
We think, and we have expectations around what that means. So let's let those things, as they play out and as our sales execution improves over the course of the year, materialize as upside to the revised bar that we've set for everybody over the course of the year. And so those would be kinda characterizing the what I would say is a relatively small ARR miss from Q1, and then drawing the bridge to the larger revenue guide down that we laid out for the rest of 2024.
Okay. So I'll let you take a break there. There is a lot. One of the components that you and I had discussed on another call back last week was, you mentioned some of these larger deals moving. You also talked about on the call that your business is becoming a little bit more seasonal, kind of in line with typical enterprise seasonality, which is a little bit more back half-
Yep
half-weighted. Is how do we think about those changes relative to the current guidance philosophy? Have you kind of taken most or all of those enterprise-level deals-
Mm-hmm
those large ones, and thrown them in the back half, or maybe even assume they don't close till next year? But I think some are trying to understand, with the movements that you had in Q1, just really how risk-adjusted those-
Yep
... expectations are in the second half.
Yeah. So if you think about the shape of our year, and you would've seen this over the last three years probably, Q1, as a percent of our total annual net new ARR, has been becoming increasingly small, and I think that will continue to be the case in 2024. So Q1 net new ARR will most likely end up being the smallest quarter from a net new ARR perspective, and even smaller as a percent of 2024 relative to the last couple of years. So that reflects a lot of things. That reflects enterprise seasonality, that reflects mid-market seasonality to some degree, that reflects a lot of the vertical sales capacity investments that we've made, you know, building on what has been a precedent of very strong performance over the course of the last couple of years.
And that will reflect a lot of the sales capacity and, hiring and investments that we made late last year into early Q1, ramping to productivity over the course of the year. And then all of those things align to what are more traditional enterprise buying cycles in the back half of the year. Those things also align to, you know, having now trained 600 sales and success folks on Tagger, cross-selling and reselling Tagger across the install base over the course of the year. We've got a lot of partner opportunities that, I'm sure we'll get into, Scott, which are pretty exciting for the back half of the year. And so we know what historically the execution track record has looked like for all of those things.
And all those things are what give us confidence over the balance of the year. I'd say, from a guidance philosophy perspective, right, the back half revenue reflects the new business subscription that you turn on in Q1. But you will, over the course of the year, see very strong and healthy billings, CRPO bookings, and RPO growth over the course of the year.
So you mentioned RPO, you mentioned billings. Good segue to the next component from the quarter is the company is shifting its metrics from talking about ARR to RPO and CRPO. In fact, you're not even talking or disclosing what the ARR number was, both in the quarter and on a go-forward basis. You know, some of the feedback has been, you did that in a quarter where you missed your bookings, obviously, and but the concern is maybe that there's more going on there, because there's really not a metric to see exactly what the performance was in the quarter, right?
Yep.
However, at the same point is, I don't think CRPO is the right metric for the business today, given what the invoicing mix is like. It will be going forward, especially as the business tilts more toward the enterprise-
Mm-hmm
... but you're kind of, like, in the middle here.
Yep
You know, I'm getting those questions as in terms of how to actually measure that business here, at least in the short term. But why remove ARR as a metric today, and when does CRPO be the right metric?
Yep.
Because it grew 50% in the last quarter.
Yep.
I don't think the revenue growth this year is gonna be 50%, so-
Yep
... they're clearly not quite aligned yet.
Yep.
But like I said, those metrics will converge properly. I don't know how long the timeline is, but it will be the right metric eventually.
Yep. Yeah, revenue growth will not be 50% this year. That is... That's for sure.
Okay.
So if you think about ARR in the context of our metrics, ARR has been our number one North Star KPI since IPO. At the time of our IPO, we were a business that over 60% of our business was month-to-month, meaning smaller customers that did not have contracts with us. A much smaller portion of our mix was enterprise mid-market customers on annual contracts. That mix has dramatically changed over the four years post-IPO, to where now 70% plus, mid-70% of our business is mid-market enterprise. Those customers come in on annual or multi-year deals, and the success that we're having in mid-market enterprise is reflected in things like billings, CRPO, RPO. CRPO being the duration adjusted metric to evaluate those businesses on. And so the point being, the mix of the business has changed very significantly.
And to disclose or not disclose ARR has been an internal debate that we've been having for the last 12 or 18 months as those mix changes unfold in the business, and that's true both internally and externally. And one of the things that Ryan wanted to do, and felt very strongly about in coming in as CEO, was to lay out the benchmarks and the KPIs that he wants all of you to measure him against. And so that meant no longer focusing on ARR, and focusing on the metrics that he believes are best representative of, of the direction, the trajectory of a mid-market enterprise software company, and those metrics being CRPO and, and RPO.
Now, we can debate all of those things, but I think to your question specifically, one thing I do wanna clarify for folks is that ARR exiting Q1, and we've talked about this historically, ARR should approximate subscription revenue growth, and so ARR exiting Q1 should have approximated subscription revenue growth, which grew about 28% exiting Q1. So you can think of that as being the ballpark for ARR exiting Q1. And then to your question on the timing of CRPO, I think there's. We're at a point in time right now where mid-market enterprise are about 70%, or slightly more than 70% of the total business.
That mix will continue to change over the next number of quarters, and I think you're at a point in mid 2025, where, you know, had we disclosed ARR. ARR and CRPO would've likely converged from a growth rate perspective. Because at that point, CRPO will be fully reflective of, you know, not 100%, but virtually all of the business by that point in time. And so that'll be kinda the timeline for everybody to think about from a convergence of metrics perspective.
Okay. So very helpful there. Thank you for that, additional disclosure. One of the primary questions coming off the quarter I've also heard, is around competitive environment. Now, you purposely earlier talked about how you're not blaming the macro, even though it is a tougher selling environment, especially for marketing solutions. You've purposely tried to not necessarily blame the macro. But I think the natural question I've had multiple times has been: Is the market just too saturated? Is your primary competitor, at least upmarket, becoming more competitive, whether it's, you know, it's pricing or product or, or, or something else? You know, have you seen a shift or a change in any of those dynamics that would've driven the Q1 performance and, you know, relative to maybe what you're expecting the rest of the year?
Yeah. So I'd say, particularly in the enterprise, our competitive position continues to strengthen. And in the enterprise, we've never felt better about our competitive position, and when we look at things like competitive win rates, you know, win rates in greenfield opportunities, win rates in displacement, and rip and replace opportunities, and then where we see opportunities in what I'd characterize as more brownfield, where we may be consolidating multiple point solutions into our platform, we continue to execute incredibly well from a competitive position upmarket. And just coming back to some of the comments I made up front around the usability of our software, and the fact that we built Sprout on a single code base, those things are very different than the approach that our competitors in the mid-market enterprise have taken.
And I would say strategically, you've, you've heard, you know, our public competitor talk about a strategic direction that's different than ours. Our primary private competitor in the mid-market enterprise has also taken a strategic direction, in that they've backed away from aspects of marketing use cases inside of social. They've backed away from listening and social. And so when we think about where we're going in mid-market enterprise, we're building the platform of choice for large enterprises, right? And that starts with core social media management, publishing, engagement, reporting. You build out from there, things like social listening, premium analytics and reporting, social advocacy, influencer marketing, and it's really this unified suite that is built on a single code base, that delivers a disproportionate amount of value, and a disproportionately attractive user experience to large organizations.
And so even when you look at, you know, some of the logos that we talked about in Q1, Procter & Gamble, Brown-Forman, Atlassian, these type of companies, are indicative of the type of momentum and success that we're seeing upmarket in the mid-market enterprise.
Okay. Another item from the quarter that came up multiple times, at least in my callbacks, was the shifting disclosure around your CRM Social Studio opportunity there. Historically, the company had been given or had given the number of customers that you'd bring on, on a quarterly basis. You're not doing that going forward now, but you did give some additional disclosures around that business.
Yep.
I guess, why change the messaging there? Because it has been a point of emphasis, at least by-
Yeah
- your shareholders and other investors.
Yeah, and I would say it continues to be a point of emphasis, continues to be one of the growth opportunities that we're most excited about both for 2024 and beyond. And just to take one step back, in March of 2022, Salesforce announced that they'd be deprecating and moving to end of life, the competitive solution that they had in market called Social Studio, and they'd be recommending that all of those Social Studio customers migrate to Sprout as their preferred partner for social. We've since gone much deeper with Salesforce, where we've co-built product together with them.
We've co-built integrations of Sprout natively into the common data layer of Salesforce, and so Sprout now looks, acts, and feels like a Salesforce product inside their ecosystem, where Salesforce has been built natively into Service Cloud, into Marketing Cloud, into Tableau, and Slack, and Marketing Intelligence, and other aspects of that ecosystem. And so we very much see Social Studio as kind of the entry point into a much larger footprint with Salesforce. And so when the partnership was first announced, we disclosed the number of logos that we had migrated from that partner channel on a quarterly basis. We felt like that was important to validate the opportunity and indicate to you all the momentum that we were seeing from that partnership. It has performed incredibly well over the past couple of years.
I think in part, because of that performance, there's been a pretty loud narrative in the market that a disproportionate amount of our growth had been driven by Salesforce, and that just wasn't true, and it wasn't indicative of the data that we see internally and externally, nor the health of the rest of the business. And so we wanted to shift away from disclosing logos, and more broadly, talk about the business impact or the new business impact that the Salesforce partner channel has had on the business. And so from that perspective, we felt like it was important to share that Salesforce and all of the revenue that comes from the Salesforce partner channel, contributed about 15% to new business in 2023, contributed less than that in 2022.
And you know, that math from a new business contribution perspective would get you to about 300 basis points contribution to our total revenue growth. So we grew 31% revenue last year. Without Salesforce as a partner, that number would have looked closer to 28%. When we think about the contribution from Salesforce on a dollars basis, we see a really strong opportunity for that number to grow in 2024 relative to 2023. And then we perceive 2025 as another growth year and beyond as incremental growth years beyond 2024, again, because of the opportunity that extends beyond Social Studio.
So Social Studio becomes about migrating customers from an existing product at Salesforce to Sprout, and the broader opportunity, specifically with Service Cloud, becomes about the opportunity for Sprout to unify the omni-channel customer care experience that Salesforce delivers to its customers. And if you think about Service Cloud, it is a fantastic and market-leading product. It aggregates all of these various channels across customer care, customer success dimensions, but it has a hole, as it relates to social, especially with Social Studio going away. And Sprout integrating natively into Service Cloud allows for Sprout plus Salesforce to unify that omni-channel customer care experience for their customers.
We've seen, you know, some of the big logos that we've talked about through the back half of last year, Honda and McDonald's, Fortune 50 logistics company and others, that were not Social Studio customers, but did come to us through the Salesforce partner channel. You know, we've deployed technology with Sprout and Salesforce together to help make those customers successful in care.
I like the additional CRM opportunity disclosure, mainly because it looks like you're gonna hit the range I was talking about two years ago. So good foresight there. So that'll hopefully be a good goal there.
Yep.
Last item on the quarter, unless there's something else that you wanna add, is your current guidance suggests a sub-20% revenue growth rate in the fourth quarter. I know that's not what you're targeting right now, obviously-
Mm-hmm
especially given the conversation the last 20 minutes or so.
Yep.
But how do we think about the growth versus profitability balance going forward? Because it's it's also kind of the ending question that I'm getting, is, if this is gonna be a sub-20% grower, your margin structure probably isn't the right structure in that. So you-
Yep
you can get a stock to work for a couple different ways.
Yep.
But in terms of long-term health-
Mm
of the business, are you really still more focused on growth and opportunities to continue to move that back towards, I don't know, 25%-30%, or is this the new viewpoint, and we can see some maybe margin leverage down the line?
Yep. So I think we, as a business and leadership team, would be pretty unhappy if the growth rate were mid-teens as is implied-
Yeah
in the Q4 guide. I think philosophically, we, as a business, have always been relatively prudently managed from an operating expense and a margin perspective. We, you know, even in the early days, you know, pre-IPO, Justyn and the team were never the type of, of founders or leadership team to, you know, burn through cash or to chase growth for the sake of growth. We've always been reasonably balanced between the growth and, and margin expansion equation. You know, you saw that in Q1 with 29% revenue growth and 12% free cash flow margin. We're, we're balancing that equilibrium at this point relatively well. I think you're right, that if growth were gonna be 15%, we'd need to expand margins faster, to make sure that the business is, is efficient for that growth profile.
The way that we perceive the opportunity and the momentum, especially in mid-market enterprise, is very, very much continues to be in investment mode, to make sure that we're properly capitalizing on the opportunity, and we're delivering the type of growth that we know that we're capable of delivering. That growth will come with margin expansion and efficiency as we continue to scale. I think the biggest that I think was lost a little bit in a lot of the moving pieces in Q1 was the improvements that we've made to the NDR of this business. And again, you go back to the IPO and the composition of the business being disproportionately weighted to month-to-month customers, disproportionately weighted to SMB and agency customers.
And even then, is true today, our mid-market and enterprise businesses have historically had NDR over 120%. One of the things that we executed over the course of 2023 was changing our customer success model, changing our customer support model, making sure that all of our resources were pointed at the most successful opportunities inside of our customer base, and supporting the customers that we believe, from a long-term unit economics perspective, are the most attractive customers for us to serve. So that meant pulling forward close to $30 million of contraction from very low-end customers in 2023, and the belief was that we would see that materialize in the form of gross retention benefits starting in 2024. You started to see that in Q1, where gross retention very meaningfully overperformed our plan in Q1.
Net retention, in total, overperformed our plan in Q1. You'll start to see or continue to see the benefit of those NDR improvements continue to play out over the course of this year and beyond, where it really is just about mix. Because we know mid-market enterprise today, which again, are 70% or so of our total business, as they continue to increase as a percent of mix, the NDR of the business naturally gets dragged to where those businesses are today, and so we continue to execute on that. We will, you know, continue to execute or get back to executing in the way that we historically have on the new business side of the house, and that's kind of the growth equilibrium as we exit the year.
Which I think is something that if we execute on those things in tandem, we'd feel really good about the trajectory into 2025.
I have a lot of additional questions, but I'll finish with one, and happy to take a couple from the audience. There's a developing bear thesis around TikTok, and the potential-
Mm.
Obviously, removal of that or shutdown here in the United States, et cetera, 'cause it's a social media channel, and customers do use that-
Yeah.
- in,
Mm.
In some cases. But you or the company tried to, I guess, marginalize that a little bit on the Q1 call. Why is that really not a significant impact to the business if it materializes in line with the current context of the bill?
Yeah
... that was recently signed?
Yeah. So on a personal level, I hope TikTok. I hope nothing happens with TikTok. It's maybe I get a few hours of my day back. But the way that we think about our business, right, and and the problem that we're really solving for customers is fragmentation of time, fragmentation of consumers, fragmentation of social media networks, right? And so I think one of the data points that we've shared, and this this statistic is, I think, two quarters dated now, but over 95% of our ARR comes from customers who leverage Sprout to execute their social strategy across five or more social networks. And so that speaks to the fact that no one specific network is overwhelmingly important to the business or to the value that we're delivering to our customers.
And so, you know, if the problem that we're solving is fragmentation, then more networks, generally speaking, is better for that, for that value proposition that we bring to customers. But historically, when, you know, a network has changed market share or a network has run into problems, other markets or new, other networks or new networks have emerged to capture that consumer time and attention and eyeballs. And, you know, our customers have evolved, and arguably, you know, you could think about one particular network losing or gaining share, implying to our customers that there's incremental, you know, change inside of their own customer base that they need to be aware of, and they need to be managing against, right?
If all of a sudden one place that you've marketed is no longer relevant for you as a brand, you need to figure out where your consumers have gone, and you need to be, you know, on top of your marketing execution strategy to stay in front of your consumers or your customers across those other networks, wherever customers have gone. And then from a care perspective, you as a business don't get to pick where your customers come to you, right? Whether it's on TikTok or Pinterest, or whether they're tweeting at you or landing on your Facebook page, you as a business need to show up where your customers are. And none of those things change, right? If any of these headlines play out as a draconian situation could indicate. But
So that's kind of our perspective on the news from Washington.
Okay. We have about three or four minutes.
Mm-hmm.
Happy to take any questions from the audience, if there are any.