Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by, and welcome to the GoodRx First Quarter 2022 Earnings Call. At this time, as a reminder, today's conference call is being recorded. I would now like to introduce your host for today's call, Whitney Notaro, Vice President, Investor Relations. Ms. Notaro, you may begin.
Thank you, operator. Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to GoodRx's Earnings Conference Call for the First Quarter of 2022. Joining me today are Doug Hirsch and Trevor Bezdek, our co-founders and co-chief executive officers, and Karsten Voermann, our chief financial officer. Before we begin, I'd like to remind everyone that this call will contain forward-looking statements. All statements made on this call that do not relate to matters of historical facts should be considered forward-looking statements, including statements regarding management's plans, strategies, goals and objectives, our market opportunity, our anticipated financial performance, and the expected impact of COVID-19 on our business. These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, but involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors. These factors may cause our actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements.
Factors discussed in the Risk Factors section of our quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2022, and our other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission could cause actual results to differ materially from those indicated by the forward-looking statements made on this call. Any such forward-looking statements represent management's estimates as of the date of this call, and we disclaim any obligation to update these statements, even if subsequent events cause our views to change. In addition, we may also reference certain non-GAAP metrics, which are reconciled to the nearest GAAP metric in the company's shareholder letter, which can be found on the overview page of our investor relations website at investors.goodrx.com. I'd also like to remind everyone that a replay of this call will become available there shortly as well. With that, I'll turn it over to Doug.
Good afternoon, and thank you all for joining us today. When Trevor and I started GoodRx, our mission was clear. We knew we had to help Americans get the healthcare they need at a price they can afford. To build a strong and sustainable business from the ground up, we knew that both the product and the team would be key to our success. Fast-forward to over a decade later, GoodRx has become a trusted brand that is loved by both consumers and healthcare professionals. GoodRx was also recently named to TIME's list of the 100 most influential companies of 2022. This recognition is a testament to the amazing work and extraordinary impact of our team. It's exciting to think about how far we have come. GoodRx's unique, proprietary and extensible platform has now saved consumers a cumulative $40 billion.
Our curious, passionate and highly motivated team is now, with the addition of vitaCare, almost 1,000 strong, and we have a highly profitable business growing 27% year-over-year. We believe the opportunity ahead is significant, and we're just getting started. That is why I'm thrilled to announce that we're continuing to bolster our leadership team with a number of new hires we've made in the past few months. Raj Beri will be joining GoodRx as Chief Operating Officer later this month, and we've recently welcomed Mark Hull, our Chief Product Officer, Vina Leite, our Chief People Officer, and Scott Paul, our SVP of Healthcare and Consumer Innovation. These innovative, forward-thinking leaders believe in our vision and share our passion to improve the state of healthcare in America. We believe their respective expertise and exceptional experience will be invaluable as we continue to grow and scale our business.
As Chief Operating Officer, Raj will lead continued growth and expansion at GoodRx while helping increase value across the prescriptions business. He brings more than 20 years of operational leadership experience at fast-paced, innovative companies, including Uber, where he most recently served as vice president of Global Grocery and New Verticals. As Chief Product Officer, Mark leads product strategy and management at GoodRx and is focused on building industry-leading solutions for consumers, providers, and pharmacists. With over 25 years of experience in product management at companies including Meta and LinkedIn, he has built world-changing products that have had an incredible impact on billions of people. As Chief People Officer, Vina leads our HR strategy and operations. She is a transformational HR leader who brings her extensive experience at global, fast-growing technology companies, including The Trade Desk, and her passion for employee development engagement to GoodRx.
As SVP of Healthcare and Consumer Innovation, Scott works closely with senior leadership on all areas of healthcare innovation across the ecosystem of consumers, retailers, PBMs, providers, and drug manufacturers, leveraging his substantial healthcare experience and knowledge. Scott previously founded Apex Affinity, where he created and ran many of the large pharmacy discount programs in the market, and most recently served as EVP at MedImpact, where he focused primarily on consumer savings. We are very excited to be adding these exceptional leaders to the team and look forward to accelerating GoodRx's accomplishments together. With that, I'll turn it over to Trevor to address key highlights from the quarter and trends in our business.
Thank you, Doug. Coming into 2022, we set four strategic priorities for the year: increasing consumer awareness and reach, strengthening our healthcare provider relationships, deepening our relationship with consumers, and finally, building or acquiring new platform capabilities that create the foundation for additional services and value we can offer consumers, HCPs, and pharma manufacturers. As our first quarter results show, we've already begun delivering on these priorities as we continue to evolve our solutions to benefit our users and create LTV-enhancing opportunities. Revenue and Adjusted EBITDA were both ahead of our expectations in the first quarter, primarily due to the incredible growth of our pharma manufacturer solutions offering, which was further supported by the continued strength of our prescription-related offerings, both prescription transactions and subscriptions. First quarter performance of our prescription-related offerings was largely in line with the expectations we provided in February.
Prescription transactions revenue increased 16% year-over-year, with an average of over 6.4 million monthly active consumers, and subscription revenue grew 59% year-over-year, with over 1.2 million subscription plans. I wanted to spend a moment discussing an unexpected headwind, though, that impacted us late in the first quarter and is impacting our current and expected performance. Recently, we recognized that a grocery chain had taken actions that impacted acceptance of discounts from most PBMs for a subset of drugs. This impacted the acceptance of many PBM discounts for certain drugs at this grocer's stores, which affected many parties, including GoodRx. As many of the discounts found on GoodRx are provided by PBMs, this issue directly impacted our consumers.
This started happening late in the first quarter and initially impacted a subset of drugs in a subset of their stores. We experienced an immaterial impact on Q1 prescription transactions revenue that we estimate was roughly $1 million-$2 million based on our subsequent quantification. In April, this dynamic intensified, impacting more drugs and more of the grocer's pharmacies, leading to significant lost volume and an expected greater impact on our Q2 and full year prescription transactions revenue. We are still doing significant discount volume with this grocer, but it is currently substantially decreased from typical levels. It's unfortunate that this issue impacts our consumers and financial performance, since PBMs, not GoodRx, negotiate economics with pharmacies. We are not aware of similar PBM pharmacies issues at this time and believe that the scale of the situation is unique.
This is a unique situation because while in the past, a pharmacy has negotiated and changed pricing with one or two PBMs at a time, in this case, this grocer negotiated with almost all PBMs at the same time. This effectively meant that all discount pricing became unavailable to consumers at the same time. The swift action we took in response to this issue, including removing discount prices from our platform for this grocer while PBMs work with this grocer on resolution, protected our new user growth from being impacted. New user counts remain very consistent, and pharmacies other than this one grocer showed strong aggregate new user growth momentum. Many of this grocer's competitors saw new user growth rates up over 20%-30%, offsetting the new user decrease at this grocer.
This issue impacts us, though, because returning users sometimes go directly to the pharmacy without first checking GoodRx. While we expect to reach these users, it will take time, and we may not reach them all. As such, we expect a decrease in returning users at that grocer. We expect this issue to have a material impact on our Q2 and full year prescription transactions revenue. To note, we have not seen any impact to our subscriptions and so expect a limited impact to that revenue, if any, and do not expect any effect on revenue related to our pharma manufacturer solution, both of which continue to make up a larger share of our total revenue. Karsten will provide more detail shortly when he speaks to guidance.
While this grocer represents less than 5% of the pharmacies in GoodRx network, it made up almost a quarter of our prescription transaction revenue in the first quarter. It's over-indexing relative to market share is because they had particularly attractive PBM negotiated pricing. As mentioned earlier, our new users are now going to other stores, and new user volumes remain consistent, even without showing discounts for this grocer. GoodRx is a marketplace for drug pricing and retail. We do not set the price a consumer pays. Instead, we source competitive prices from our broad set of PBM relationships. Prices change over time, but it is because this grocer is negotiating with almost all PBMs at the same time that has caused this impact. While new users are moving to other retailers, we believe the PBMs and this grocer have been working to resolve their issues in a timely way.
It is important to note that while this unusual event is expected to impact prescription transaction revenue, we do not believe this impacts the growth rate of this business in future years or the total market size. We also believe that rising costs in the U.S. put additional strain on consumers, and the needs for savings programs are only going to grow. For any case where prices change, we have excellent abilities to move new users, and our success there is evident in our new user counts remaining constant. Where we want to continue to improve is ensuring our ability to move existing users through our product and marketing very quickly to the retailers that are best for them. Overall, we believe we have strong relationships across the PBM and retail universe. We offer significant benefits to retailers.
When a GoodRx user goes to the pharmacy, they often purchase other items. According to our internal survey data, GoodRx users buy incremental items more than 75% of the time, and they spend on average over $40 on that part of their basket. In addition, over half of people we surveyed are willing to switch pharmacies as a result of using GoodRx in order to take advantage of GoodRx discounts. When they have a good experience using GoodRx at pharmacy, 85% say that makes them want to return more often. Finally, many prescriptions, by some estimates about a third, are not picked up due to cost, often after the pharmacist fulfilled them. We believe GoodRx savings mean that more prescriptions are actually picked up, generating revenue for and reducing the wasted effort at pharmacies.
The strength of our retailer relationships is manifested in the work we do together. We've worked with some of the largest retail pharmacies in the U.S. on advertisements and other strategic initiatives over the last few months. Most recently, we worked with Walgreens to leverage their broad brand recognition amongst consumers and shot an advertisement in one of their stores. In addition, Rite Aid joined our Gold offering in the second half of last year. We're in active discussions with most retailers on a variety of new initiatives and additional ways to drive business. Turning to subscriptions.
As we discussed in our fourth quarter earnings call, we are strategically repositioning Gold, our subscription program, as we tighten our focus on the people we believe we can help the most, members with chronic conditions. In addition to offering Gold members even better pricing on their prescriptions than our prescription transactions offering, we've added more value to the program over the past year with new benefits, including mail order and discounted telehealth visits. To support the repositioning of Gold and to more clearly differentiate it from our prescription transactions offering, we increased prices for new Gold subscribers in January. In March, we also began increasing prices to a subset of existing subscribers. This is the first price change to Gold since we introduced the program five years ago.
Since new subscriber acquisition and existing subscriber retention are both performing at or better than our expectations, we are rolling out the remaining price increases for existing Gold subscribers. We expect this to be completed by the end of the second quarter. The incredible momentum in our pharma manufacturer solutions offering continued during the quarter with 150% year-over-year growth. To help provide more visibility into this offering, we've disclosed pharma manufacturer solutions revenue separately for the first time this quarter. The value and uniqueness of our solution set, more specifically, our unique ability to reach both consumers and providers, is recognized by pharma manufacturers, as evidenced by this rapid growth.
We are rapidly penetrating the $30 billion Pharma Manufacturer Solutions TAM, and we believe we will continue our rapid growth as more and more pharma manufacturer spend shifts to digital and as pharma manufacturers continue to recognize high returns on their marketing investments as they leverage our incredible healthcare provider and consumer constituencies, both of which rate us at a 90 NPS. Even with the rapid growth of this offering, our revenue has not penetrated anywhere close to 1% of the $30 billion Pharma Manufacturer Solutions TAM, and our relationships with 19 of the top 20 pharma manufacturers position us well for future growth. We expect growth to be driven by more partnerships with more pharma manufacturers, more penetration of their brands, and increasing the number of solutions each brand deploys with us.
We are also adding more solutions to our consumer and provider offering and continuing to sell into the HCP opportunity with GoodRx for Providers. GoodRx for Providers create the more customized experience and equips providers with the tools they need to support their patients through their healthcare journey. With over 750,000 prescribers using GoodRx since June 2021 and more than 150,000 HCPs who have opted into the GoodRx for Providers mode so far. To further expand our provider offerings, we recently announced the acquisitions of vitaCare and FlipMD. In April, we closed the acquisition of vitaCare, a pharmacy services platform that expands GoodRx offerings to pharma manufacturers while helping to improve patient access and adherence to affordable brand drugs. Of the over 500 million brand prescriptions that are written per year, only 50% are filled.
vitaCare helps patients understand their coverage, identify available saving opportunities, and facilitates provider communications with payers. It benefits the HCP community by reducing administrative burden and helps improve the likelihood that patients get on their prescribed therapy. The platform also offers prescription fulfillment options and manages ongoing patient adherence. vitaCare will enable GoodRx to help more patients receive their prescriptions in an efficient, affordable, and transparent manner and stay on their prescribed therapies as long as medically appropriate. This acquisition gives us unique capabilities to facilitate the brand medication prescription process from start to finish, expanding our capabilities beyond our digital platform from the physician's office all the way through the patient's pharmacy journey. We look forward to growing our reach across consumers and providers, along with our established relationships with pharma manufacturers, to help more patients access the brand drugs they need.
The acquisition is expected to further strengthen our rapidly growing pharma manufacturer solutions offering. We believe our strong relationships with pharma manufacturers, HCP awareness and loyalty, and consumer traffic will drive more growth and adoption of the vitaCare platform, delivering even more ROI to pharma manufacturers. During the quarter, we also acquired FlipMD, a marketplace connecting practicing physicians with organizations seeking on-demand medical expertise, representing another provider-specific solution we can now offer. FlipMD has exciting capabilities that we expect will expand our engagement with healthcare providers and the services available through our pharma manufacturer solutions offering, continuing to differentiate it and expand the offering's lead. We believe there is an enormous opportunity for us to meet providers' unique needs with innovative solutions while helping them achieve better patient outcomes.
With our incredible opt-in rate to our GoodRx for Providers platform, we believe we are on the path to becoming one of the largest provider platforms in the U.S. With the combination of GoodRx for Providers and our consumer offerings, we have the opportunity to deliver a truly unparalleled digital healthcare platform with a unique ability for us and for our partners, especially pharma manufacturers, to educate and serve providers and patients in a coordinated fashion. We continue to broaden and deeper our competitive moat, which is rooted in the trust we've established with patients, physicians, and companies across all of healthcare. Patients trust us, and our consumer NPS of 90 is a testament to the important role we play in their care. Physicians and healthcare professionals trust us with a very high provider NPS of 90.
Companies look to us as a way to introduce products and services and provide savings to our large and growing audience. We began the year strong, outperforming our first quarter revenue expectations at attractive margins while growing our user base, including providers. We continue to see tremendous opportunity ahead to continue to revolutionize healthcare for Americans in this massive $4 trillion market as we expand our platform and range of services over time. With that, I'll turn it over to Karsten to discuss our financial results and guidance.
Thank you, Trevor. Revenue for the first quarter grew 27% year-over-year to $203.3 million, exceeding the guidance we provided in February. Prescription transactions revenue grew 16% year-over-year to $155.5 million, driven by a 12% year-over-year increase in our monthly active consumers, which exceeded 6.4 million. This includes the $1 million-$2 million impact related to the grocer issue Trevor spoke to. I'll discuss the expected future impact in more detail in the guidance section. At this point, most of the COVID effect on our business relates to the cumulative 2-year impact of smaller new therapy start cohorts, which is a much longer period than we expected and affects both new and returning users.
We can't make up for these smaller cohorts instantly, even if the market were fully recovered, acute and seasonal trends like cold and flu had been fully on pace, and the availability and effectiveness of the amazing referral engine we've built through physicians and pharmacists had fully rebounded. From a market standpoint, March was stronger than February for both total and new prescriptions, which is a typical seasonal dynamic we see every year. This dynamic was magnified by a weaker than usual January and February due to the January, February COVID spike and some bad weather in February. Flu remained under historical levels. All of these factors were already baked into our guidance. With the exception of the grocer issue we discussed in great detail today, which had an immaterial impact on Q1, performance on the prescription front was in line with our expectations.
As for Q2, it's difficult to evaluate where we stand since our data had quite a bit of noise with this grocer disruption. Based on what we see, macro conditions remain largely consistent with March from a new prescription and new therapy start standpoint. More broadly, if you look at IQVIA's data for new therapy starts, or as they refer to it, new to brand prescriptions or NBRX, we're getting close to the pre-pandemic baseline, but we are not quite there yet, primarily because of acute scripts. Turning to subscriptions, subscription revenue continued to grow rapidly, up 59% year-over-year to $19.1 million. We ended the quarter with over 1.2 million subscription plans and 1.6 million members benefiting from our subscription offerings since our family subscriptions generally serve multiple consumers.
We do not believe the grocer issue impacted our subscription revenue in the first quarter, though it may be impacted in the future. As Trevor mentioned, we started increasing subscription fees to a subset of our existing subscriber base at the end of March after testing higher fees with new subscribers in January. The early results across new and existing subscribers are encouraging and are at or even outperforming our expectations in some cases, which shows that even with higher pricing, the value we deliver to subscribers is compelling, extending from better savings on prescription medication and discounted access to care services to free home delivery. Pharma Manufacturer Solutions revenue grew 150% year-over-year to $23.5 million as we continued to work with more pharma manufacturers and offer more solutions and deliver superior ROIs to those with which we work.
Other revenue grew 5% year-over-year to $5.2 million, driven by the growth in GoodRx Care. Moving down the P&L, cost of revenue is $12.3 million, or 6% of revenue, compared to $10.4 million and 6.5% of revenue in 1Q 2021. Product development and technology expenses were $35 million compared to $26.2 million in the comparable period last year. This increase was primarily due to continued investments in the team and product. Excluding stock-based compensation expense and related tax and other items associated with acquisitions, adjusted product development and technology expense was 13% of revenue compared to 10.6% of revenue in 1Q 2021. Sales and marketing expenses were $93 million compared to $79.7 million in 1Q 2021.
We increased advertising and promotional spend by $6.2 million year-over-year and continued to invest in our incredible team with the goal of increasing our consumer and pharma manufacturer base and building the GoodRx brand. Adjusted sales and marketing expense as a percent of revenue decreased year-over-year, making up 42.8% of our revenue in 1Q 2022 compared to 46.3% last year as we improved some of our marketing efficiency metrics towards the end of the quarter. General and administrative expenses were $31.9 million compared to $43.8 million in 1Q 2021. The decrease was due primarily to stock-based compensation expense relating to the non-recurring co-CEO awards made in connection with our IPO, which was approximately $16.1 million higher in the comparable period last year.
Excluding these and other adjustments, adjusted G&A as a percent of revenue was 6.3% compared to 4.9% in 1Q 2021. Net income was $12.3 million compared to net income of $1.7 million in the first quarter of last year. Net income was impacted by stock-based compensation expense of $30.1 million, $13.9 million of which related to the non-recurring co-CEO awards made at the time of the IPO. The year-over-year increase is driven primarily by business growth as well as a $16.4 million dollar decrease in stock-based compensation expense, primarily related to the non-recurring co-CEO awards made in connection with our IPO.
This was partially offset by an increase to our provision for income taxes, which was a $1.7 million expense in the first quarter of 2022 compared to a $12.6 million benefit in the comparable period last year. As to the co-CEO awards made in connection with the IPO, we have expensed $477.8 million of the total $533.3 million awarded through the end of the first quarter and have $55.5 million remaining to expense over the next ten quarters. The expense schedule for the rest of 2022 includes approximately $11.9 million in Q2, $10.2 million in Q3, and $8.5 million in Q4. Moving on. Adjusted net income grew 30% year-over-year to $41.3 million.
Adjusted EBITDA grew 27% year-over-year to a record $64.7 million. Adjusted EBITDA margin continued to be strong and was above our expectations from February at 31.8%, reflecting our ability to deliver profitable growth due to compelling unit economics of our business. We continued to generate strong cash flow with net cash from operating activities of $30.1 million for the quarter. In Q1, we repurchased $83.8 million of Class A common stock, or approximately 5.6 million shares. At the end of Q1, we had $166.2 million remaining from our $250 million share repurchase authorization approved by our board during the quarter. Moving on to guidance.
At this time, we believe it is unlikely we will be able to achieve the full year 2022 guidance we provided in the fourth quarter earnings call due to the grocer issue we discussed. We will not be providing full year expectations at this time as the full year impact of the grocer issue is difficult to estimate because there are several variables, including, among others, eventual consumer pricing and returning usage levels that have to be determined. We expect Q2 2022 revenue to come in at about $190 million. This assumes the grocer issue, which we believe could have an estimated revenue impact of roughly $30 million, will be ongoing without amelioration through Q2. At this time, we do not have sufficient data to forecast the trajectory of any amelioration because GoodRx usage there has not stabilized sufficiently to be forecastable.
There is the potential for revenue upside in the quarter from Pharma Manufacturer Solutions, depending on when certain larger pipeline deals close and we deliver on them. The guidance includes vitaCare, which is expected to contribute approximately $1 million of revenue in the second quarter. For the quarter, factoring in no amelioration of the grocer issue, we expect prescription transactions revenue to decline approximately 8%-12% year-over-year, subscription revenue to grow 60%-70% year-over-year, Pharma Manufacturer Solutions to approximately double year-over-year with additional upside, as I just discussed, and other revenue to grow 10%-15%.
We expect Adjusted EBITDA to be impacted roughly dollar for dollar by the revenue shortfall as we have historically been an extremely high-margin company and since we do not plan to significantly alter our level of sales and marketing investment, largely due to this grocer issue. This is primarily because the issue generally did not impact our ability to acquire new users and because we have focused on communicating with impacted users so that they are aware of attractive prices available at other retailers convenient to them, ensuring they can continue to use GoodRx and save on their prescription medication. In addition, our vitaCare acquisition has historically had net losses and negative Adjusted EBITDA, which we expect will continue.
As Trevor mentioned, we acquired vitaCare in April for $150 million in cash, with an additional $7 million of contingent consideration payable upon vitaCare's financial performance through 2023. We also established a management incentive plan under which certain continuing employees would be eligible to receive up to $10 million of additional compensation upon achievement of certain performance milestones. The acquisition of this pharma services platform expands our offerings to pharma manufacturers while helping to improve patient access and adherence to affordable brand drugs. vitaCare is expected to contribute more than $8 million of revenue in 2022.
As we look ahead to our multi-year outlook, we continue to be confident in our ability to return to revenue growth rates in the mid-20% range in the next few years, albeit potentially off a smaller base than we expected due to the current grocer issue we've discussed. We expect pharma manufacturer solutions to continue to grow rapidly and become a larger contributor to our revenue. Another driver of this longer-term revenue growth is our belief that as we replenish some of the smaller cohorts from the COVID period with larger ones as we become further removed from COVID over time, our penetration into the huge prescription volume remains low, and we continue to increase our share of the market consistently, giving us confidence in the business.
GoodRx is committed to building the leading consumer-focused digital healthcare platform in the U.S., and we plan to continue investing our strong cash flows in our platform, product, user experience, and our brand with the goal of creating the best consumer experience and improved healthcare affordability and access for all Americans. We're equally committed to driving shareholder value by leveraging our cash and driving our margin growth over the long term. With that, I'll now turn the call back over to Trevor before we open it up for Q&A.
Thank you, Karsten. In summary, we delivered a strong first quarter that exceeded expectations in many ways and we're making good on our strategic priorities for the year. In Q1, we reached a cumulative $40 billion of consumer savings, grew our highly profitable business, and expanded our leadership team to support accelerating innovation. We remain committed to delivering affordable prices so all Americans can access the care they need. We're happy to say that we received positive updates from the grocer and from PBMs over the last few days that indicate progress toward resolution. We are hopeful they will resolve their outstanding issues in a timely way. Looking ahead, we see many opportunities to bring value to more consumers and support more Americans. While we've made amazing progress, we have barely scratched the surface of the opportunity to transform healthcare in the U.S.
Thank you. As a reminder, to ask a question, simply press star one on your telephone. To withdraw the question, press the pound or hash key. We ask that you please limit your questions to one. First question from Justin Post with Bank of America. Your question please.
Great. Thanks for taking my question. Obviously, this is a new issue. Any insights on why the grocer might have made the change and why you believe others won't follow? Maybe part B, you know, any issues with PBM volumes where maybe lower volumes would change any of your relationships with PBMs? Thank you.
Great. Thank you very much for the question. You know, recently, I'll sort of frame the overall issue here. Recently, we recognized a grocery chain had taken actions that impacted acceptance of discounts for most PBMs for a subset of drugs. This impacted the acceptance of many PBM discounts with grocery stores, which affected many parties, including GoodRx. As we said, we are still doing significant discount volume with the grocer, but it's currently substantially decreased from typical levels. It is natural that there is a push and pull between PBMs and pharmacies, and they frequently negotiate prescription drug pricing. Usually, this just results in pricing changing over time, which is common. This negotiation impacting our consumers and financial performance is extremely unusual. We're not aware of any similar PBM-pharmacy issues and believe this scale is unique as we talked about earlier.
We talked about the uniqueness here and the actions we took to help consumers continue to access discount pricing and save. We removed discount prices from our platform for this grocer while PBMs work with grocer on a resolution. This protected our new user growth from being impacted. New user counts remained very consistent. Pharmacies other than this one grocer showed strong aggregate new user growth after we made this change. Many of the grocer's competitors saw new user growth rates up over 20%-30%. However, this has significant impact because returning users sometimes go directly to the pharmacy without first checking GoodRx. While we expect to reach these users, it'll take time and we may not reach them all. As such, we do expect a decrease in returning users at the grocer.
While new users are moving to other retailers, we believe that the PBMs and this grocers have been working to resolve their issues. We've been trying to play an active role in discussion to just ensure that consumers continue to save. As noted, you know, it appears there's positive progress. To your final part of your question about the PBMs, you know, we don't anticipate any particular issue related to PBMs or volumes. Our PBM relationships remain incredibly strong. I'll let Doug speak to sort of the second part of your question in regards to what the broader, sort of broader topics.
Thank you, Trevor. As Trevor mentioned, PBMs and pharmacies maintain complex relationships. While they ultimately need to partner to sustain their businesses, complex contract negotiations can, on rare occasions, impact consumers at the pharmacy counter. You may remember a dispute between a well-known PBM and a large retail pharmacy in 2011. In that instance, the two sides came to terms because ultimately it's really just in everybody's best interest. We do not expect similar issues to materialize at pharmacies with significant volume. These pharmacies value our significant reach with millions of monthly users and continually express interest in deepening their relationship with us. Just some examples. We are working with Walgreens to leverage their broad brand recognition among consumers, and we just shot an advertisement at one of their stores.
We recently worked with CVS on an integration that allows GoodRx users to book many clinic appointments right on the GoodRx platform. Rite Aid joined our Gold network in the second half of last year, and we're in active discussions with most retailers on a variety of new initiatives and additional ways to drive business. It's important to reiterate that our user counts are stable and other pharmacies are seeing significant increases as GoodRx consumers move through a different pharmacy. One of the best ways that we can protect ourselves from future disruptions between PBMs and pharmacies is to continue to strengthen our relationship with the millions of consumers and HCPs who come to GoodRx. That's exactly what we're doing.
With the addition of Raj Beri, who led a large part of Uber's consumer experience, and Mark Hull, who held senior positions with Meta and LinkedIn, we continue to build trust and guide users to the right pharmacy for them. You know, events like these ultimately are fuel for innovation, and we are rising to the challenge.
Thank you. Your next question comes from John Ransom with Raymond James. Please go ahead.
Hey, I know you guys are gonna get a million questions on this, but am I just to understand this dispute as the this grocer just blew up all of their contracts all at once, and this eventually, I guess, would have to get resolved? Assuming it does get resolved, what's the scenario under which things don't go back to normal and things do go back to normal? My second part, which is kind of a follow-on, is you guys are ratcheting up your spending and hiring a bunch of people and continuing your great marketing as if the revenue picture was unchanged. Is this implying that you think this is a short-term issue? Or do you think this could be a permanent issue, but you're just gonna run lower margins and profits for the time being? Thanks.
Sure. Yeah, thanks for the questions. We are looking, you know, at this issue. You know, maybe I'll talk first about resolution and then just talk about the current status, and then I'll let Karsten speak about the,
You know, a broader picture. We have heard you know, the grocers and PBMs continue to have constructive advanced conversations. You know, we're a marketplace, so while we don't set prices and are not a party to the agreements, we've been trying to be helpful to ensure consumers can save at as many pharmacies as possible. We've received positive updates from the grocers and PBMs over the last few days that indicate progress toward resolution. In the meantime, and because we continue to put consumers first, we're offering competitive prices at other pharmacies. As mentioned, new users are moving to different pharmacies. The new user counts on GoodRx remain very stable, and competing retailers to this grocer are seeing 20%-30% increases in new users.
We are communicating with existing users, providers through our product and marketing to ensure they're aware of the situation, continue to save at other pharmacies. We believe there's truly positive progress there and anticipate this will be resolved soon. I'll let Karsten speak to other spending and such.
Hey, John, it's Karsten. A couple things. First of all, I think your core assumption going in, I think you phrased it as blowing up relationships with a number of PBMs at the same time. It's, as Trevor said earlier on, it's quite unusual for something like that to happen. That is a reasonably accurate characterization of the situation, I'd say. In terms of impact, yeah, the revenue impact we talked about earlier on is a manifestation of how we expect the situation to potentially evolve. Right now, new user growth should remain largely unaffected, and what we've seen after taking action is that we can be highly effective at moving new users to other pharmacies. In fact, many of the grocer's competitors saw new user growth rates of over 20%-30%, offsetting new user decreases at this grocer.
This specifically goes to your marketing point because with new user growth rates or new user acquisition, more pointedly and specifically continuing to be robust, it means that continuing to market makes a lot of sense. I think the real issue is that we have strong repeat activity, as most folks on this call probably know, which is a good thing, but some of those repeat users don't check GoodRx every time before they go into a pharmacy and hit the point of sale. We have put communications in front of those existing users as well, so they know that they can get great pricing at other pharmacies instead, but it could take more time and be less effective to move the existing users than the new users.
That's why, until the issue is resolved, we'd expect to see a slowdown of returning user activity at this grocer. Given it made up just under a quarter of our prescription transactions revenue, that's a significant amount, which makes it a little tough to estimate the full year impact, since that'll depend on how and when the issue gets resolved. There's decent positive progress, but there's no full resolution, and that's why we're estimating impact, assuming resolution does not happen before the end of the quarter. That's why we said in that case, we may lose up to 75% of the revenue related to this grocer or about $30 million. Again, though, important to note that this is very unusual, as you put it again, blowing up a number of PBM relationships at the same time.
Number two, we think it's gonna impact near term prescription transaction revenue, but given the new user information I shared earlier, we do not believe this impacts the growth rate of the business in future years or the total market size. We're also continuing to see great momentum with our subscriptions and pharma manufacturer solutions businesses as well. From those perspectives too, I think we see strength in the business. Hopefully, that's helpful.
Thank you. Your next question comes from Mark Mahaney with Evercore. Your question please.
Okay, I'm gonna stick with the topic, please. Why would subscription businesses possibly be impacted by this in the future?
Mark, we're losing you.
Sorry, Mark, this is Karsten. Could you repeat, please? It broke up a little bit. We couldn't understand the question.
I'm sorry. Could you explain why this would impact subscription business growth? Then if this situation isn't resolved, will that impact Q3 and Q4 by the same amount, $30 million?
Let me answer the first part in regards to subscription, and then I'll let Karsten speak to Q3 and Q4. We have limited impact on our subscriber base. You know, because this revenue is based on subscription fee, we expect a limited impact to subscription revenue, if any. Gold subscribers have options that are as good or better at other retailers, and mail. We continue to serve them, deliver savings to them. Gold performed better than expected for Q1, and we expect the strong performance of the subscription business to continue. Karsten, do you want to speak to-
Sure. Yeah. Mark, I think you're sort of extrapolating somewhat linearly the impact when you said, "Hey, could this be $60 million in the second half of the year?" I think we're intentionally not guiding for the full year, because again, as Trevor articulated in some of our prepared remarks, when these issues crop up, there's a strong incentive for all the parties involved to resolve them quite rapidly. In that context, while that would potentially imply linearity, it doesn't completely. I think the other piece of it is that the issue itself manifested over time. Given that it manifested over time, not all at once, the impacts even in the quarter aren't completely linear. At the beginning of the quarter, they manifested less, for example.
At this point, it's really tough to estimate the full year impact since that'll really depend on when the issue gets resolved. There is positive progress, but there's no full resolution today.
That's why we're assuming that resolution doesn't happen to provide a two-Q guide that people can use for modeling purposes. Again, could be more progress. Like Trevor said, issues like this don't usually stay around indefinitely.
Thank you. The next question comes from George Hill with Deutsche Bank. Please go ahead.
Yeah, good morning, guys. I'm gonna take PBM relationships for 500. I'm gonna say, can you dig a little bit deeper into, I guess what my questions are, is it with the grocer, is it all PBMs? Can you speak to, can you put any more color on, like, what types of discounts are we talking? Is this regular PBM discounts? Is this DIR fees? Like, I'm trying to figure out what is kind of the source of the frustration between the grocer and the PBMs, and can you talk about which subset of drugs we're talking about? I guess any color that you could provide on those three factors I think would be helpful.
Sure. You win for my favorite phrasing of a question. While we do not have all the facts, based on our understanding, the grocer's, you know, recontracts are related to the contract disputes the grocer's having with certain PBMs related to pharmacy economics. You mentioned DIR fees. You know, there aren't really any DIR fees related to our business, so it's not related to that, but just other parts of the economics. This is limiting acceptance of many programs, you know, at this grocer's pharmacy. This involves, to your point, essentially all PBMs. This is across the vast majority of PBMs. You know, that alone makes it incredibly unique. You know, in the past, we have seen pharmacies negotiate changing pricing with one or two PBMs at a time.
In this case, this grocer is negotiating with almost all PBMs at the same time, and that effectively meant that discount pricing became unavailable to consumers at the same time. As Doug mentioned, this, you know, an issue of this magnitude is very infrequent. You know, it's happened in the PBM pharmacy issue that Doug raised around 2011. In that instance, historically, you know, PBMs and pharmacies do come to terms on how to work together. You know, the indications we have is that parties are making active progress here.
I just wanna make sure I understand it right. This grocery chain basically just opted out of every PBM network. I know you guys aren't exposed to DIR fees. I used it as an example of, like, could it be an unintended consequence where these guys are opting out because of a problem with X? You know, they opt out because of a problem with X, and the impact is also a problem with Y, which is you guys. I'm trying to kinda understand the, like, the dynamic and whether you guys are part of the problem or collateral damage.
Yeah, I mean, this is largely, you know, this is an issue. We're a marketplace. PBMs and pharmacies have their contracts. We show pricing from the PBM relationships, but your characterization is correct. You know, for the non-funded portion of these PBMs businesses, you know, they've left, you know, they temporarily disrupted, but, you know, progress is being made.
Thank you. Your next question comes from Sean Dodge with RBC Capital Markets. Your question please.
Yeah, thanks. You mentioned communicating with customers impacted by this to educate them on discounts available elsewhere. Just to be clear, these are individuals that have had scripts filled in those grocery stores before, so they have a GoodRx code on file, so they aren't checking the website ahead of time. How much identifying data do you have on those individuals? How good is that identifying data? I guess, how are you engaging them? Is this just as simple as sending them a postcard or are you using other means and methods?
Thank you very much for the question. We have a good ability to contact through different mechanisms, you know, most users who have, you know, filled up at this grocer. In general, we are just trying to make sure across all, you know, all of our business, that people know the best ways to get their prescriptions, to be able to afford their care. You know, we're a consumer first company. We care about people being able to stay on their treatments that physicians prescribe to them. We, you know, use a variety of mechanisms, whether that's through our product, through our app, through marketing. You know, we have significant marketing reach. We have significant ability to run direct mail through phones.
You know, I actually also heard a sort of story this weekend about actually a urologist, a high-volume urologist in Los Angeles, where they had been sending patients, you know, a lot of patients using GoodRx to this particular grocer. You know, they had heard anecdotally from some patients that it's not being accepted, and so they're now sending all of those patients to a competing retailer. You know, because of our strong consumer relationships, because of our strong HCP relationships, because of our super good marketing and ability to target that, we have a lot of different capabilities here. As noted on the new user side, new users are moving pharmacies.
You know, our new user counts remain totally stable and, you know, competing retailers are seeing, a number of them are seeing 20%-30% increase in new users.
Your next question.
Thank you for the question.
Thank you. Your next question comes from Sandy Draper with Guggenheim. Your question please.
Great. Thanks very much. I'm gonna have to stay on this topic. I'm just trying to, when I think about the mechanics of modeling prescription transaction revenue, you've got MAC, and then you've got the monthly contribution per consumer. I'm trying to think about this, the mechanics of does this.
I mean, essentially, I'm trying to understand what you're saying. Does this basically just drop those active consumers essentially because they're showing up at this grocer? Or does it impact the pricing at all in terms of the actual price per action? And then I guess the follow-up to that would be, let's just say magically on at the beginning of the third quarter, this was resolved. Would you essentially get all that revenue back, or is this gonna be a scale type? I'm just trying to understand the mechanics of in the model, but then also, you know, if it is resolved, would it come back as quickly as it the revenue is going away? Thanks.
Sure. Thanks, Sandy. I'll jump in. This is Karsten. First of all, yes, this is not a revenue per MAC issue. This is a MAC count issue to the extent of some of our existing users. As Trevor said, we've been very successful in moving new users, hence the extraordinarily high growth, 20, 30% plus at competing grocers to the one in question. So again, MAC quantum, not revenue per MAC or any other sort of take rate, not dynamic at this point. I think as we mentioned earlier, though, when you're looking at it from sort of a modeling perspective going forward, I think you said if this is resolved at some particular time X, does everything immediately go back to normal?
I think the only part that doesn't go back to normal is that certain users who do not check GoodRx before they go to the pharmacy and just show up at the counter, in their case, if those particular users don't check GoodRx first, and if we're not directing them somewhere else, then in this interim period, that could impact MAC counts. That's the largest area of impact. New users we've been able to successfully move, as Trevor articulated. We're focused very hard at moving our existing users to places they can save more money too, as are our healthcare provider partners.
Your next question comes from Charles Rhyee with Cowen. Please go ahead.
Yeah, thanks for taking the question. Maybe I'll shift away for a little bit here. You know, I think earlier you talked about Rite Aid joining the Gold program. Maybe you can talk a little bit about the impact we should think about for subscriptions in the back half of the year, recognizing you're not providing guidance in the back half. Also you talked about CVS and Walgreens. When we think about users being able to book appointments through the app to a CVS clinic, can you talk about how the economics work there? Because it's not really, you know, taking a take rate from a transaction. Maybe you can talk a little bit more about that. Thanks.
Yeah. Let me start on subscriptions, and then we can cover the other topic. For subscriptions, as I mentioned, we're really excited about the growth of GoodRx Gold over the last couple of years, the opportunity ahead. We think we can deliver a lot of value to consumers through the subscription plan, and it gives us tighter relationships, better communication, better ability to cross-sell, gives higher user satisfaction, higher LTV. The large initiative, you know, or one initiative here around Gold that we talked about is this change we made in the pricing. The early results across new and existing subscribers are encouraging and are at or slightly outperforming volume expectations despite the higher pricing.
This is the reason we delivered subscription revenue growth that exceeded our expectations in the first quarter, 59% year-over-year compared to the 45%-55% range we gave last quarter. We are seeing solid performance there, which I think shows the value we deliver to subscribers, is very compelling, and we keep extending that service. In terms of the rest of the year, our expectations have not materially changed, even, you know, in regards to that, grocer issue. I sort of spoke previously that we've seen, you know, quite limited impact there. The impact, you know, we don't expect an impact to subscriber revenue. You know, it'll be limited, if any. I'm now gonna hand it over to Doug to answer the second part of your question.
Hey there. Thanks. Yeah, I just wanted to chime in for a few minutes. You mentioned CVS MinuteClinic, and you know, it's just a great example of one of the things that I'm most excited about as we continue to extend our platform to help more consumers across more stages of their healthcare journey. You know, it's sometimes we don't realize all these incredible suite of products that we have, right? We help consumers at the research and prevention stage through HealthiNation and GoodRx Health. We help them at the diagnosis stage with GoodRx Care, and we help them at the treatment and adhering stage on both generics and brands through prescription transactions, subscriptions, and pharma manufacturer solutions. You know, in each of these categories, we want to meet consumers' healthcare demands by giving them as many options as possible.
With the CVS MinuteClinic integration, it's just another way for consumers to schedule and receive care in addition to the virtual options that we provide through GoodRx Care. You know, again, very excited about these partnerships and integrations that we're doing, and we're really excited about this relationship with CVS and to be able to help more consumers navigate their healthcare.
Thank you. Your next question comes from Ricky Goldwasser with Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead.
Yeah. Hi. Good evening. Two questions here. One, just in terms of clarification, is it now that I understand that GoodRx members are not the discounts are not honored at that grocer. Does this mean that now that grocer, basically there's no PBM whose cards are accepted, i.e., that grocer now is only cash payment? I just wanted to kind of, like, understand that. Then the other thing, I think early on in the prepared remarks, you said that that grocer accounts for a quarter of your transactions. I just wanted to confirm that. If that's the case-
Are there any other pharmacies or PBMs or customer groups that account for more than 10% of your transactions?
Thanks. Let me answer the first part, and I'll hand it to Karsten for the second part. You know, for that particular grocer, situation's evolving, can't speculate, you know, about exactly what's happening at the pharmacy counter. What we do know is the grocer's taken action that's impacted acceptance of discounts from most PBMs for a subset of drugs. This acceptance and this impact on the acceptance affects many parties, not just GoodRx. I'll let Karsten answer the other part of your question.
Sure. Yeah. With, I think the best way to answer it is, with respect to other retailers, we don't see significant over-indexing or under-indexing equivalent to the, to the retailer, that we're talking about or the grocer we're talking about here in particular. From that perspective, the remaining retail channels generally approximate their share with GoodRx as they have in the market broadly. With respect to PBMs, our concentration has decreased year-over-year. Back a couple years ago, we were talking about having 3 PBMs that comprise close to half of our volume. That's now shrunk dramatically in our later filings. As you'll see, we've come down to a point where there are a couple PBMs that account for just over 20% of our volume. Significantly less concentration than before.
Yeah, it's reflected in our Q, and there are only two of them that represent more than 10% of volume at this point, with the top one at 13%. Hopefully, that's helpful, Ricky.
Thank you. Your next question comes from Glenn Santangelo with Jefferies. Please go ahead.
Oh, yeah. Maybe if I could just follow up on Ricky's question. I mean, in your 10-K, those two PBMs, they represent 13% and 11% of your revenue. That's $96 million and $82 million. It just seems, you know, crazy to think that those couple PBMs could account for 25% of your transaction volume with one grocery store. I mean, that's like CVS and Walgreens market share numbers. It just seems odd that they kicked all those PBMs out at the same time. I think that's what one of the things we're all struggling with. You know, my two questions are really around the profitability. Let's assume this ultimately does get settled, presumably, right? The PBM may ultimately have to accept some lower profitability.
I guess the question's gonna be, you know, does that roll downhill to GoodRx? Whatever the profit, you know, margins were on this relationship, which seemingly is a quarter of your volumes, I mean, are you gonna have to accept lower profitability going forward? My last question is, you know, does this grocer, do they have their own discount card program in place right now? Thank you.
Sure. Let me answer the question in regards to the maybe economics. When we compare GoodRx to other marketplaces, we believe our take rate is comparable or less than other industries. The economics we have with the PBMs are generally not pharmacy-specific, and our specific economics at this pharmacy are not materially better than at other pharmacies. For this grocer, we can't speculate on the negotiations between the PBMs and this grocer, but at this point, we do not anticipate changes to our economics. Karsten, is there anything else you'd like to add there?
Yeah. I think there is a question around PBM concentration versus pharmacy concentration. Again, on the PBM side, the PBMs and we have had a very symbiotic relationship for years. They're ultimately our customers and the entities whose prices we promote to consumers. From that perspective, I think we've talked in the past about GoodRx never having had a PBM terminate on it. Us having been successful in acquiring incremental PBMs and those PBMs being one of the factors and the economics they give us being one of the factors that's over time increased our take rate to some degree. From those perspectives, we think those relationships are extraordinarily strong. I'm not sure if you had a follow-up or if I wholly addressed the question. If I didn't, please do let us know, Glenn.
Your next question comes from Stephanie Davis with SVB. Please go ahead.
Hey, guys. Thanks for taking my question. I'm sorry, I'm gonna do one more on the PBM ban by them. I understand you're not giving firm numbers, but could you walk us directionally through the path out of this grocery PBM conflict? Is this merely a question of waiting for the grocer and the PBM to resolve the issue, in which case volumes will have a step function back up and they'll automatically be on the GoodRx coupon, so it'll just be kind of an automatic? Or is this more a matter of growing your book of business at other pharmacies and moving these existing customers from the grocer to these other pharmacies, so would be more of a slow build out of this?
Just making a quick follow-up, is there any color you can share on how this grocer got to be such a large concentration of volume?
I think the answer is both. You know, we've talked about the natural migration that occurs in, you know, both, naturally and via any actions, you know, from our marketing and product, that moves users. Regardless of anything else, users do move. You know, we've seen that on the new user side, where our new user counts are constant. You know, people are just filling at different places. Existing is more gradual, but, you know, as we've spoken about, we also believe that, you know, that existing users can move. It's just there's a 30-day and 90-day cadence on prescription fills. We're really focused right now on the product side, on building even stronger product capabilities to move people in an even more timely way in month, for example, and making sure that happens, faster.
That's one side of it, the first side you said. The second side of it is that, yes, you know, we believe that the PBMs and pharmacies are working toward resolution. You know, as I mentioned, you know, we've heard updates in the last, you know, today and the last couple days of just what sounds like substantial progress people are making. That provides a resolution just in place separately. To your second question of over-indexing, you know, it's true that we over-indexed in this grocer. They had very attractive consumer pricing. As a marketplace to put consumers first, we've been presenting these attractive prices, which as mentioned, led to a relatively high volume concentration compared to market share for this party.
As a marketplace, we source and show competitive pricing from our broad set of PBMs relationships. As prices change, we do expect to see consumers change their behavior and move between pharmacies, which is something we already can see, occurring.
Thank you. Your next question comes from Doug Anmuth with JP Morgan. Please go ahead.
Thanks for taking the question. There's obviously just a lot of discussion on resolution here on the grocer issue. I guess just, you know, curious just on your confidence level that this is really all about kind of negotiations and pricing and finding the right economics versus something that could be more of a strategic shift by the grocer. Just to clarify, I know you don't have much competition in the space, but it sounds like this would be impacting all discount cards and programs. Is that correct? Thanks.
Yeah. Again, our understanding is, you know, that this acceptance issue has affected, you know, most PBMs, so affecting a number of parties, including us. You know, there's, you know, we've spoken already that, you know, it's pretty common that prices change. In the course of us running this business for the last decade, we've seen meaningful price changes at retailers where, and there's a pattern, I'd say, of at points, retailers raise prices and, you know, then get less consumers, and then they lower prices to get consumers, and that goes back and forth. That's pretty common pattern.
You know, an actual sort of the nature of this dispute with sort of changing this across lots of, you know, lots of PBMs at one time, this is really unusual, you know, and this is, you know, more similar to the sort of relatively well-known dispute between larger PBM and large retail pharmacy back in 2011. People in that historically do come to terms because access, you know, for consumers is good and letting people. For us, we want people to be able to get their healthcare affordably, but also conveniently. We wanna give them the most options, even if, you know, even if new users will move rapidly to different places, we want the most convenient options for consumers that are possible.
You know, we just care that consumers are getting the best options here.
Thank you. Your next question comes from Steven Valiquette with Barclays. Please go ahead.
Great. Thanks. Good afternoon, everybody. You're not disclosing which grocery chain, which I guess is kind of understandable, but I guess I'm just curious, you know, can you disclose whether or not it's a publicly traded grocery chain versus private? Since GoodRx is intertwined a bit more with Kroger than most other grocery chains, can you confirm that it's not Kroger at this point? You know, given the materiality of the situation, I'm sure we're all gonna figure it out fairly soon, but just any breadcrumbs you wanna throw our way to help figure this out might be helpful. Thanks.
Yeah. I think we just want to say it's a large grocer, but thank you. Sorry.
Okay.
Your next question comes from Jonathan Yong with Credit Suisse.
Hey, thanks for taking my question. You quantified it, the revenue impact at $30 million, but I guess, is this the maximal impact that we should expect, moving forward, or is there a possibility that could be more? Just going to your comment about how the grocer has very good pricing, I guess, how do you prevent yourself from being over-indexed to this one grocer in the future, given your commentary that they do have really good pricing? Because PBM contracts usually come up every three years, so I'm trying to understand how you prevent this kind of moving forward or avoid this situation. Thanks.
Sure. Thanks for the question and great to speak with you. As we mentioned earlier, the new user count's been back to normal and is largely unaffected after we removed the discounts from this grocer while the PBMs and the grocer are working out their issues and come to a resolution. That drove new user counts to be much higher at other places. That's been key to our estimation of what the impacts look like, which means the impacts are largely tied to recurring usage at the grocer, so returning users more than anything else. As we think about that, when we quantify what the potential impact could be, we assume that we do not see us benefiting from the resolutions that the PBM and the grocer might come to during this quarter.
That's why we extrapolate forward and are measuring it as the $30 million estimate that we disclosed earlier on. We think if resolution were to happen in the quarter, and if the prices at the grocer in question
We're attractive, then that potentially creates some upside in our prescription transactions line relative to the 30 million estimate we put out there. From those perspectives, I think that's probably helpful to your question. With regard to over-indexing generally, I think the issue is, as Trevor said, one where as a marketplace and as an entity that wants to provide the best prices to consumers, if someone has very good prices, that is a logical place to drive them to. I think going forward, we continue to also have more and more tools to even once consumers begin working with a given retailer, being able to move them to other retailers.
The other strength we have is the opportunity over time to be able to govern where they land, and you see us doing that with new users, which is why these other retailers, not the one in question, are seeing 20, 30% plus increases in volume. That's one of the tools we can use to make sure that we continue to be able to allocate volume to places where consumers will be best served.
Yeah. What I'll add is, you know, we've laid out our strategic priorities. You know, they are to increase consumer awareness. 70% of consumers still don't know that prices might vary between a pharmacy. Strengthening HCP relationships, deepening the relationships with consumers, and then building and acquiring new platform capabilities. These are what we've been delivering on. In particular, the deepening relationship with consumers. We are, you know, are doing incredibly well at being able to make new consumers aware of where to fill prescriptions, what to do. You know, you can see that in the user counts remaining totally stable. We are doubling down on the product side on making sure we can interact effectively, communicate effectively, make sure we can consumers know exactly, the, you know, what are best options for them mid-month, you know, immediately in timely ways.
That's a big focus. You know, we have these new executives that we're really excited about that we mentioned, including Mark Hull on the product side, Raj. This provides. We'll focus even more on the product side on deepening those relationships with consumers and think there's a lot of things we can do pretty quickly there to add even more capabilities.
Thank you. The last question will be from Stan Berenshteyn with Wells Fargo Securities. Please go ahead.
Oh, great. Thanks, Fl squeezing me in here. Clearly, the grocer has had a big impact on GoodRx. As I think about it from a different perspective, I would presume that GoodRx was driving significant foot traffic to the grocer. Now that you commented, you'll be driving foot traffic elsewhere. Clearly those retailers, pharmacies, they'll be getting the incremental foot traffic. They'll get those knock-on benefits from that foot traffic. My question is: Is there an opportunity for you to monetize driving foot traffic elsewhere in the retail into a different retail location beyond the take rate? As an example, just something that comes to mind for me is maybe they pay you, GoodRx, to offer a flat coupon that can be applied toward, let's say, any drug that they offer, so to get additional volume.
Is that something that can play out?
Yeah. Thank you very much for the question. You know, or maybe I'll take this in two ways. You know, one, I think, yes. You know, we've looked at, for example, helping on specific OTC offerings. You know, we talked in prior quarters about the new efforts we've done around insurance, which is an important part of the consumer journey within healthcare and where we are helping drive people into insurance plans. And Doug spoke about scheduling appointments at CVS MinuteClinic. There's a variety of ways we can drive additional opportunities within those areas. We're also continuing to do a better job cross-selling our different services. As I mentioned, you know, when we look at Q1, it was an excellent quarter.
You know, subscriptions is growing very quickly, doing, you know, very well. The pharma manufacturer solutions business, which we cross sell into, you know, is our fastest growing business. Revenue grew 150% year-over-year. That is incredible momentum in that pharma manufacturer solutions business, and it's doing very well with all of those customers and with providing those solutions. We talked about GoodRx for Providers, which is on the path to becoming one of the largest provider platforms in the U.S. We talked about that opt-in rate, the 90% plus opt-in rate for HCPs, and we've continued that great rate of performance. We have 150K plus HCPs opt into the platform through April. In the last 90 days, over 500,000 prescribers.
You know, while this immediate issue you know, with this one particular grocer is unfortunate, we have millions of people that come to GoodRx every month for help with their healthcare. We see many, many opportunities to help them. That, as your question, I think alludes to, that creates a lot of additional monetization opportunities in the future beyond the already extremely fast-growing businesses of pharma manufacturer solutions, subscriptions, and these other areas of our business that are growing at such quick speeds. You know, also being one of the largest HCP platforms where we are 90 NPS with consumers and providers, all of this provides unique and interesting monetization possibilities which we are delivering on in across these different segments and with different you know parts you know of the ecosystem. Appreciative of the question.
Thank you. With that, ladies and gentlemen, we close our Q&A session and conference for today. Thank you for participating, and you may now disconnect.