Okay, good morning, everyone. Thank you for coming. My name is Dan Ury. I head up Investor Relations and Strategic Finance on behalf of Dave. Thank you to Needham as well for having us for another excellent conference. We've got a great schedule, presentation, and one-on-one meetings today. So with that, for those who are less familiar with the Dave story, I want to provide a quick overview. We are one of the leading neobanks in the U.S., and in our opinion, the leading neobank as it relates to the provision of short-term liquidity solutions for our customers to what is a large and growing TAM. So we define our TAM as approximately 180 million Americans who are living paycheck to paycheck in some capacity. These customers spend more than they typically make. They overdraft anywhere from a few times a year to up to 20 times per year.
The TAM has grown 8% over the last few years. These customers have been plagued by elevated levels of interest rates and their depleted savings balances, given that the tailwind that they've received from fiscal stimulus measures has largely waned at this point. And they're in dire need of a short-term liquidity solution such as ours. But historically, the way this customer base's need has been served has been through traditional overdraft that's provided by the legacy banks. And so the legacy banks charge this customer base of 180 million members and growing on average about $300-$400 per year in various junk fees. The largest component of that are overdraft fees. And as you can see on the slide, typical overdraft costs are $34-$35 per instance, sometimes up to three times per day.
And sometimes that can be for the typical transaction size that we see in our customer base is very close to $35. Let's call it $30-$40 per transaction. So this customer is being charged by the legacy banks $35 for each overdraft instance to access potentially $35 worth of credit up to three times per day. So it's really exorbitant fees to a customer base that really can't afford this level of expense. So we compare that level of fees to what Dave provides in our flagship short-term liquidity solution, which we call ExtraCash, which is a short-term advance that we provide to customers. We'll get into it in a moment.
Based on the historical fee structure that we've used with our customer base, they actually have the ability to receive this ExtraCash disbursement at no cost if they're willing to wait a couple of days to take it via the ACH rails. It's a substantially lower cost, obviously at zero, relative to $34-$35 that the legacy banks charge. We do charge for speed. So insofar as customers want their ExtraCash disbursement more quickly, they'll pay an instant transfer fee based on the legacy fee structure. And I'll get into the transition we're undergoing at the moment in a couple of slides. But on average, we charge $9.70 is the average revenue or monetization that we derive per advance.
So if you compare the $9.70, which gets access to up to $172, at least on average was the average disbursement in the third quarter, we provide advances between $25 and $500. You can see sort of the financial incentive that customers have to choose an ExtraCash disbursement, paying on average $9.70 for access to $172 versus the incumbent banks charging $34, $35, sometimes up to three times per day for access to less credit. And so therein lies the opportunity that we've been intermediating for the last five or six years. On the banking side, again, the situation is pretty comparable. Banks charge this customer base on average $10-$12 per month, so $120-$144 per year of account maintenance fees just for a basic checking account.
And if these customers don't have $500-$1,500 on average in their bank account, then they're typically charged these exorbitant fees. So it does beg the question as to why do the banks charge these sort of exorbitant fees? And it's because their cost to serve is so much less economic than Dave's. And so the legacy banks' cost to serve is approximately $300 on average to serve this customer base. And it's because they have antiquated systems. They have antiquated mainframe computers, antiquated underwriting. They're largely FICO-based. They've got large, expensive branch networks and large, expensive employee bases. And that's what leads to the $300, and that's what leads to them needing to charge $300-$400 in fees per year in order just to break even on this customer.
If you contrast that with Dave, we've got a much lower and more efficient cost to serve because we're digitally enabled, tech-first. We run a branchless model. So it's a substantially lower cost overhead structure. We serve 2.4 million paying members with only 300 employees. And as a result, our cost to serve on an annual basis is less than $50. So you can see the sort of cost advantage we have on the cost to serve side. You'll also see that on the customer acquisition side. And so the average CAC of a legacy bank is about $500. And that compares to the CAC that we generated in the third quarter of 2024 of $15. And so with those sorts of cost advantages, we're able to pass on a lot of those savings onto this TAM, to this customer base that needs it.
We're able to put a little extra money into their pocket. So with that, let me jump into the three main components of our business strategy. So first of all, we acquire customers efficiently at scale by marketing top-of-mind liquidity pain points. Second, we then engage these customers with our short-term liquidity solution, which we call ExtraCash. And then finally, we deepen these member relationships. After establishing that trust and rapport at the outset by addressing their primary need, we then have built up the relationship with them to deepen the relationship into a full-service banking product with no mandatory banking fees in contrast to the legacy banks, which have the exorbitant fees that I described. So I'll get into that in more detail in a moment.
So just to provide a quick overview on our ExtraCash product, we approve customers for between $25 and $500 for an ExtraCash disbursement on average in the third quarter. As I mentioned, the average disbursement was $172 for an ExtraCash disbursement. Again, to think about what the average use case is of an ExtraCash, think gas, groceries, rent are very typical kind of essential expenses that this customer base is using our ExtraCash for. It's much less discretionary items, which we believe provides a sort of recessionary resistance to the product and to the business model. In terms of the term, the average, and this is a really important point that will come up a number of times in today's discussion, the average term on an ExtraCash disbursement is only 10 days. So the terms are typically one to two weeks.
At the far end, we go out to a month. And so the short duration has a number of benefits. First of all, it allows us to have a very capital-efficient balance sheet, capital-light balance sheet. And it allows our AI-based underwriting algorithms (we call our underwriting engine CashAI) to continue to optimize its underwriting with a significant number of iterations. So we've disbursed our ExtraCash product over 115 million times as of the third quarter. And so that's 115 million chances that our AI algorithms have had to learn about credit performance and to do a better job at separating credit risk.
And just to contextualize that 115 million, if you think about one of the major installment lenders publicly traded that's been in business since, I think, 2006, 2007, they've disbursed, I think, less than 10 million installment loans in, call it, 18 or 19 years that we've disbursed 115 million ExtraCash disbursements over six to seven years. So it just gives us much more opportunity to learn and to iterate and to refine the underwriting. And we'll get into the benefits of that over the next coming slides. So to spend a little bit more time on kind of our secret sauce as it relates to how we underwrite these customers, because it's a vast distinction from the way that legacy FIs and legacy banks underwrite customers, which is largely FICO-based. I think, as we know, FICO is heavily lagged.
FICO was, in our view, artificially inflated by the fiscal stimulus impacts coming out of the pandemic. Dave and its CashAI underwriting engine uses linked bank account transaction data, which gives us nearly real-time signals into spending patterns, into income patterns, into employment status that allows us to make a credit decision nearly instantaneously. And so it's a fully automated process. There are no humans. There's no manual component to our underwriting in terms of CashAI because it's fully algorithmic and fully just based on the technology that we've built. In terms of how we make money, so as I may have mentioned, the average revenue that we generate per ExtraCash is $9.70 in the third quarter. Historically, we've monetized through a combination of optional instant transfer fees and optional tips.
And as I mentioned, we maintained a path for customers to actually receive these ExtraCash disbursements at no cost if they're willing to wait one to three business days and take the disbursement via the ACH rails. We announced in conjunction with our third quarter earnings that we are transitioning our fee structure. We started testing a simplified mandatory fee structure, which is just simply the greater of $5 or 5%. No tips, no instant transfer fees. There's no free ACH lane. It's a much clearer fee structure for customers to understand. And as we disclosed a couple of weeks ago in a statement that we made publicly, all new customers, so since the beginning of December, we've acquired all new customers and plan to continue to acquire all new customers on this new fee structure going forward.
In terms of the transition to existing customers, as we made the statement a couple of weeks ago, that process is underway. The early data, as we suggested a couple of weeks ago, is favorable and suggests enhancements to LTV based on this new fee structure. So we're encouraged and we're excited. And as we indicated, we expect to fully transition to this new fee model in early this year. Greater of $5 or 5% per disbursement. Well, it's scale. So 5% would scale up to $5, so in theory, up to $25. So it'd be along the spectrum of between $25 and $100, it'll be $5. And then from $100- $500, it would be the 5% of the corresponding ExtraCash size. So to jump over to our Dave Banking product.
Dave offers a full-service banking solution comparable to the same solution that the legacy banks provide but charge those very high fees for. We give customers a fully functional Dave debit card. We give our customers access to their paychecks two days early. Customers have access to ATM terminals at no cost, 40,000 terminals throughout the U.S. at no cost. Our banking solution provides remote deposit capabilities, instant withdrawal capabilities. We have a 4% high APY savings rate on both DDA and savings balances. Again, there are no minimum balances in the Dave Banking platform, no account maintenance fees. We monetize this product not through the customer, but we monetize this product through the merchants via the interchange that we generate. Now let's jump into the business strategy.
And let's start with the first aspect that we walked through, which is acquiring customers at scale by marketing those top-of-mind liquidity pain points. And so in the third quarter, we were able to continue to efficiently acquire customers at scale while reducing our CAC and at higher levels of customer acquisition. So we reduced our CAC by 14% on a year-over-year basis in the third quarter. And that's actually a 39% reduction in CAC since the third quarter of 2022 over the last two years. And we also reduced our CAC sequentially 2%, over which time we grew acquisition by 19%. Our largest channel is organic. We typically, the organic percentage has maintained relatively stable at 30%-35% over the years, which, again, just supports the efficiency of our CAC and the product-market fit that we think we've achieved.
Given the efficiency of these CACs, we've been actually able to reduce marketing spend. So marketing spend declined by 10% on a year-over-year basis. And just to illustrate that this wasn't just one great quarter we had in terms of CAC, on a year-to-date basis, marketing spend is down 15% on a year-over-year basis compared to the corresponding period in 2023, all while continuing to grow acquisition.
[audio distortion] Is there some seasonality in the journey here?
Because of tax refund season, we typically pull back on marketing spend. We typically see slightly less efficient CACs in the first quarter just by virtue of the government providing the sort of liquidity that ExtraCash otherwise provides. So we typically pull back on marketing spend in the first quarter as a result. Good question. So let's move into MTMs. And so MTMs are Monthly Transacting Members .
Think of these as paying or revenue-generating customers for us. Our base of MTMs grew 23% in the third quarter of 2024 as a result of really four main factors all continuing to go our way. First of all, the growth in acquisition that we just walked through. Second of all is not only the ability to acquire members efficiently, but to convert them into new paying members is a trend that has been favorable through the third quarter of 2024. Another key component, which we'll touch on a number of times throughout today's presentation, is existing member retention. There are a lot of benefits to continuing to improve the retention of the existing members that we've acquired. And then lastly, it is our ability to reactivate dormant members. All four of those coalesced into the 23% growth we achieved in terms of monthly transacting members.
One of the great parts about the last three components here is that we don't need to rely as much on marketing spend. So we've been able, in part, to reduce our marketing spend and continue to hit our at least internal targets for MTMs based on the improvements that we've made in conversion, retention, and reactivation. Retention, as we've previously disclosed, was a major commercial focus of ours in 2024. It's a major commercial focus of ours in 2025. As we'll talk about, retained members or existing members continue to have higher and higher ARPU as they season on our platform. They also have better credit performance as they season on our platform. So it's, again, why we place so much value on retention and the way that that value translates into higher LTV.
Of the 41% top-line growth that we achieved in the third quarter of 2024, just over a majority of it was driven by this 23% growth that we see on our MTM base. Now let's move into the second leg of our business strategy, which is to engage customers in ExtraCash. We achieved another record level of ExtraCash originations in the third quarter, which grew 46% on a year-over-year basis. Originations grew 46% year-over-year. That was driven by the 23% growth in MTMs that we just discussed. It was also based on or due to the phenomenal performance we've had growing our average ExtraCash size over time. We'll spend some time on that on the subsequent slide.
Relative to the second quarter, ExtraCash originations grew 15%, which is the strongest sequential growth that we've seen in originations in two years, at which point the scale of the business was dramatically smaller, as you would anticipate. And we believe that this growth in originations demonstrates a few things. It demonstrates the size and the depth of our TAM. It demonstrates the prevalence and the intensity of this need for short-term liquidity. And it demonstrates our ability to efficiently serve these needs of our customers. And so just to double-click a little bit more into the $1.4 billion that we originated in the third quarter of 2024, just to highlight the sort of efficiency of the product. And the product turns over about 10 times per quarter.
What that translates into is that the $1.4 billion of originations allowed us to end the quarter with only $166 million of net receivables on our balance sheet because of how quickly the product turns over, which also highlights our ability to serve a vast number of customers without having to rely on a capital-intensive balance sheet. Just to kind of further contextualize this compared to traditional consumer finance providers, the major publicly traded installment loan company that I mentioned earlier did $1.9 billion of originations in their third quarter of 2024. Their loan portfolio at the end of the third quarter was $5 billion. So their portfolio was 2.5x as large as their quarterly pace of originations. Again, juxtapose that with the stats I just outlined for you, where our $1.4 billion of originations led us to $166 million.
So basically 1/10 the size of our quarterly pace of originations is what ends up on our balance sheet. So just it's a significantly more capital-light model. It means that we don't take as much credit risk. We certainly take substantially less credit risk exposure at any point in time. And it leaves us a little bit more nimble to make changes and revisions to the credit risk complexion of our portfolio based on our views on economic conditions, where legacy providers are effectively stuck with some of the underwriting decisions they've made six, 12, 24, or 36 months ago, just based on the longer duration of that product. I'm sorry, I was on the wrong slide. Give you a second to digest that. It's obviously up on the website as well if you need it. Okay.
So let's spend a little bit more time on some of the details underlying ExtraCash. So as I mentioned, the ExtraCash advance size has grown pretty consistently over the quarters and over the years. Our average ExtraCash size grew 17% in the third quarter due to two main factors. First of all, as we disclosed in our second and also third quarter earnings release, we implemented what we call our v5.0 underwriting model. Throughout the second quarter, we saw a full quarter's impact in the third quarter. And this v5.0 model has done a number of things for us. First of all, it's just improved our ability to separate credit risk.
It includes approximately over 2x the number of AI data variables in the model relative to the prior generation v4.5 model, which, again, just allows it to do a better job at optimizing the credit risk. Secondly, this v5.0 model just allows us to offer higher limits, higher ExtraCash approval amounts to our customers, which has supported the growth that we see on the left-hand side of this slide. The other dynamic that's at play here is what we call the time-on-book dynamic or the average age or seasoning of the customer base.
As that time-on-book has expanded over time, and I believe in the third quarter, the average time-on-book was about 19 or 20 months, we're typically able to offer higher advance amounts to higher ExtraCash disbursement limits to customers as they season on our platform and as we get to know their spending patterns and income patterns and repayment history. And so that time-on-book dynamic has also supported this increase in average ExtraCash size over time. Also, given that a large part of our monetization structure is percent-based, as you'd anticipate, looking over at the right-hand side of this chart, the average revenue per ExtraCash has grown largely in lockstep with this average advance size over time. Average revenue was $9.70. As I mentioned, that's up 15% on a year-over-year basis and a major driver of ARPU, as we'll get into in a number of slides.
There's no interest. This is a fee structure of optional. The legacy approach that we've pursued is optional instant transfer fees, optional tips, and the optional express lane. But there's no interest. These are fees. Yeah. Thanks, so moving to credit performance, so the 28-day delinquency rate, which is really on a static pool basis, improved 64 basis points or roughly 26% year-over-year, over which time originations grew 46%. I encourage you to compare that to the vast majority of traditional consumer finance providers over the last few years just to see how their results have contrasted with what we're demonstrating on this slide. I think you'll see that a vast majority of them had reduced originations or roughly flatlined their originations, and I think you'd see that their credit metrics deteriorated over a good number of years from kind of late 2022 through the first part of 2024.
I think they've largely stabilized, but after a good period of deterioration, over which time we've continued to improve the 28-day delinquency rate, which I mentioned, and then also on a sequential basis, that delinquency rate improved 25 basis points or 12% as originations grew 15%. Same trend exists for our 121-day charge-off rate, which generally tracks, as you can see, the 28-day delinquency rate. The 121-day charge-off rate also hit a record low in this was the first quarter of 2024, which is the most recent quarterly vintage, which is fully seasoned to 121 days, which is why we cut it off at that point, and so there are a number of drivers at play here as to why.
And so a question we get quite often is to what's driving this sort of improvement and this kind of contrasting trend with the deterioration that a lot of legacy financial institutions experienced over the last few years. There are a few dynamics. First of all, it's the CashAI underwriting model that we discussed. It continues to improve as it ingests additional performance data. And this is where the AI, which I know has kind of become a bit in vogue recently, but our model has been AI-based since the beginning of 2020. It also has to do with the short duration. And again, I intimated this earlier in the presentation, but the short duration just allows the underwriting engine to ingest the 115 through the third quarter of 2024 ExtraCash disbursements that it's made to continue to improve its ability to separate credit risk.
Another driver, as again I intimated earlier, is the time-on-book dynamic. And so if you think about credit performance on a cohort basis, typically we see credit performance improve over time as customers season on our platform. And so as our originations go to a higher and higher percentage of originations to existing members, you just naturally and mechanically have seen credit performance improve over time. And one other dynamic is that with the short duration of ExtraCash, we can make underwriting changes and observe the impacts in weeks. And so if we decide that we have a different view on the economic conditions, we can pivot very quickly and seamlessly and see the benefits of that, again, within weeks, where the vast majority of consumer finance products would take one to 2+ years in order to see a change in the credit risk complexion of their portfolio.
[audio distortion] Do customers have to have employment?
They need a source of income, so we underwrite Social Security, for instance. It's not necessarily employment, though that's a big part of the model, as you'd anticipate, but it's really seeing we have income detection algorithms that are just looking for trends as it relates to income flows, and we underwrite based on those. Now let's move into the third and final aspect of our business strategy, which is to deepen, and again, that's deepening into our core banking solution for these customers. The Dave Card spend volumes grew by 19% on a year-over-year basis, and that's driven by growth in banking active customers as well as growth in the Dave Card spend per banking active customer.
Today, and I really encourage you to download our app and kind of dogfood it to get a sense for how slick the application is. But nothing gets better about the Dave Card experience presently as customers achieve primacy or direct deposit or top-of-wallet spending behavior within the Dave Card, Dave Banking experience. And that's something that we plan to work on in 2025. We plan to allocate much more existing resources, again, not looking to add resources in the spirit of fiscal discipline, but really reallocate existing resources to spend more time on elevating the Dave Banking experience to really drive adoption and to drive top-of-wallet spending behavior. We see a 5x-6x ARPU lift when Dave Banking customers go from non-direct deposit to direct deposit.
And so the more incentive that we can put in place to drive that behavior, the more we'll see that 5x-6x unlock in terms of ARPU as customers make that transition. Okay. Let's move and just talk about how this all coalesces into ARPU. So we've talked about the average revenue per advance, which is a big driver of the 14% year-over-year ARPU growth that we experienced in the third quarter. And obviously, the 11% sequential growth is quite impressive as well. It's also due to the growth that we saw in the Dave Card ARPU. And the last leg of our revenue stool is subscription revenue. So we have a $1 monthly subscription, which also factors into this total ARPU calculation.
Just in terms of composition, about 80% of our revenue comes from ExtraCash, about 10% comes from Dave Banking, and just under 10% comes from the subscription product. So now let's move into how this translates into our financials. So we achieved 41% top-line growth in the third quarter. We achieved $92.5 million in revenue in the third quarter of 2024. This was the fourth consecutive quarter of accelerating top-line growth. On a sequential basis, the top-line grew 15%, which again is the fastest sequential growth that we've experienced in the last two years, again, as the business was at a significantly smaller scale at that point. In terms of how much of that revenue translates into variable profit or contribution profit, depending on how you think about it, our variable margin trended also very nicely in the third quarter to record levels.
We expanded our variable margin by 1,300 basis points or 22% on a year-over-year basis to 69%, and that's driven by a few factors. First and foremost is the improvements that we saw in our provision for credit losses as a percentage of revenue, which again is largely tied to the improvements in credit performance that we talked about. Second of all are some optimizations that we've made to our payment and processing costs, and then thirdly, it reflects some of the benefits of two key vendor negotiations, which took place since the third quarter of 2023, one of which took place in the fourth quarter of 2023, and the other of which took place midway through the third quarter of 2024, and so we'll see a full quarter impact of that latter renegotiation going forward.
The combination of the 41% revenue growth that we achieved and the 1,300 basis points of variable margin expansion, that led to 72% growth in variable profit in the third quarter. And that represented a $27 million increase in variable profit on a year-over-year basis. And we'll get into fixed expenses in a moment. But from a flow-through perspective, the incremental variable profit that we generated down to the incremental EBITDA that we generated was 100%. So variable profit grew by $27 million between the third quarter of 2023 and the third quarter of 2024. And adjusted EBITDA as we'll see in a moment, also grew by $27 million between the third quarter of 2023 and the third quarter of 2024. So 100% flow-through, which is some just great results.
To move on to fixed expenses, I think one aspect of our business model that we believe is truly underappreciated is the operating leverage inherent in our business model. Our fixed expenses as a percentage of revenue declined by 1,000 basis points in the third quarter on a year-over-year basis. A large part of that is due to the discipline that we continue to exercise on managing our headcount and really finding and seizing opportunities to employ technology and automation in various business processes across the organization. On an absolute basis, quarterly fixed costs declined, pardon me, increased by about $1.4 million or about 5% on a year-over-year basis, over which time revenue grew again by 41%. And if we look back two years, fixed expenses actually decreased by just under $2 million, over which time revenue grew approximately 60%. So again, significant operating leverage potential in the business model.
Let's talk about how this translates into adjusted EBITDA. Adjusted EBITDA increased $27 million on a year-over-year basis to roughly $25 million of adjusted EBITDA in the third quarter. That's driven by, as you'd expect, the top-line growth that we talked about, the variable margin expansion that we talked about, the marketing efficiency that we've continued to achieve, and the power of operating leverage, just the discipline that we've continued to exercise on our fixed costs. On a sequential basis, adjusted EBITDA increased 63%. All the while, we have a very strong balance sheet. We had $77 million of cash equivalents and liquid instruments. As of the end of the third quarter, we have a $150 million credit facility that expires in December 2026.
We recently renegotiated that, which we announced in conjunction with third quarter earnings, such that we increased our advance rate by 250 basis points. We increased the eligibility criteria, and we improved the concentration limits, which provides us additional financial flexibility to support the business as we continue to grow. Let's move into the guidance that we set. Again, this is guidance as of the third quarter of 2024. In conjunction with the third quarter earnings, we raised our revenue guidance to $340 million-$343 million for the full year of 2024. That represents between 31% and 32% year-over-year growth for the full year. Likewise, we also raised our adjusted EBITDA guidance. It was actually the third time that we increased adjusted EBITDA guidance in the year 2024. We raised that guidance to $71 million-$74 million for the full year.
Again, that represents $81 million-$84 million of adjusted EBITDA improvement. Interesting to note that when we started 2024 and we set our initial guidance for adjusted EBITDA, it was $25 million-$35 million was our initial guidance for the full year. And just as a reminder, we achieved the low end of that full year guidance in just the third quarter alone at the $25 million of adjusted EBITDA that we generated. So with that, I will turn it over to the crowd for any questions. Yes.
What's the biggest driver for the decline in customer acquisition costs? Why is that efficiency getting much better?
Good question. So it's a number of things. It's our ability to continue to maintain the organic channel and build the organic channel over time. It's continuing to optimize our channels, the various channels that we use, and to just have a kind of a surgical view into incrementality on those channels so we can lean into channels where we're seeing great efficiency and we can lean out of channels where we're not seeing as much efficiency.
And then I'd say lastly, it's just our ability to continue to introduce new channels and to decide which channels we want to build into our mix and which channels don't necessarily work for our customer base. We're not seeing the sort of efficiencies out of it. And so it's just being very nimble. I mean, certainly the marketing team meets on a nearly daily basis. We meet as a management team on a weekly basis to look at trends and to talk about decisions we want to make on the marketing side.
I'm just curious [audio distortion] if you get to the point where the lower tiers of the economy start to struggle economically, what do you think your loss ratios will develop? And what's your plan to handle some of the downturn?
Got it. Well, again, we like to think that our customer is always in a recession. So we're kind of always underwriting to a recession. But again, it's one of the benefits of the CashAI underwriting that we're able to pivot very quickly based on trends that we see within our credit performance and based on views that we take on economic conditions. And so in the event of an economic downturn, again, we can pivot very quickly in terms of underwriting.
And again, we may have to tighten a bit on underwriting, which might touch approval rates and maybe impact be a headwind to growth. But I think the tailwind that we'll see is the TAM will just expand. And I think you'll also see more traditional finance providers pull back, which again will be kind of a tailwind to the TAM. So our view is that the benefits of the increased TAM, of more people living paycheck to paycheck in kind of more deteriorating economic conditions and other consumer finance providers who service this sort of subprime to deep subprime customer base will more of an offset any sort of headwinds we face just from potentially tightening credit.
But again, being able to see the impacts of that tightening very quickly in a matter of weeks compared to the couple of years it takes more legacy providers that provide longer duration products. Yes.
You spoke about reactivating dormant users. What is the total amount of dormant users that you have?
Well, we had 11.6 million total members as of the third quarter. So at 2.4 million monthly transacting members, call it just over 9 million. But again, it's important to think about the ExtraCash product. It's not a daily use case product implicitly because the product, the average term we talked about was 10 days. On average, advance takers take two advances per month. And so it's one of the reasons we actually developed the Dave Banking product was because that is much more of a daily use case.
It's kind of a more frequent opportunity to interface with our customers, but so the monthly transacting member definition is a monthly look back. If we were to take a longer view and say, were they active or revenue generating in the last two months, three months, six months, obviously that 2.4 million monthly transacting members we saw in the third quarter would be much higher, so we obviously have views into dormancy, but in terms of what's publicly available, I mean, in theory, it's the 9 million, but in theory, it's something less than that just by virtue of how you define dormancy.
[audio distortion] The 11 million people that have taken advantage at one point?
Nope. It's not that they've necessarily ever been active. It's that there have been customers on the platform. They've registered and still have an account with us.
[audio distortion] How many have taken money?
It's not something that we disclose. Yeah. Yes.
As I look at sort of the four-year chart, there was a big decline in share price before it turned around. What do you associate with the decline? I mean, it looks like you were losing a lot of money in 2022, 2023, and then there was a big delta in profitability.
So are you asking about stock price or are you asking about stock price?
Was there any other factors that drove it down or?
Yeah. I mean, well, we went public via SPAC in January of 2022. We had a number of headwinds. Obviously, SPACs became out of vogue at that point. We were facing the interest rate cycle at that point. A lot of things fintech and subprime credit related faced some headwind. And the SPAC process is challenged.
We didn't have a big equity syndicate supporting us in the public markets the way that a traditional IPO would. So that caused a lot of the downdraft in our stock price, at which point we were making significant strides, as you intimated, in terms of financial performance.
[audio distortion] And what's your background?
I've been at the company two and a half years. Prior to Dave, I was at a competitor for four years in a similar capacity. Prior to that competitor, I worked in corporate development at a major bank for a few years, and then I worked in private equity and investment banking for 15 or so years in New York. Great. Well, thank you so much, everyone, for joining. Please join us for one-on-one meetings. We have some space within the meeting schedule today, so please join us if you have time. Thanks so much.