All right. Thanks everyone for being here. My name is Ryan Tomasello. I am a Research Analyst here at KBW. I cover fintech. Really excited to have up here Dave, including Jason Wilk, Founder and CEO, and Kyle Beilman, CFO. I just wanted to kick it off higher level, just given maybe some folks aren't as familiar with the story. Jason, just the roots of founding the company, what gap you saw in the market, the problem you are trying to solve with your core products, and obviously a lot to get to from there, but let's start there.
Yeah, happy to, and great to be here. The name stands for Dave versus Goliath. We are a small company going up against the large banks, specifically targeting the expensive short duration credit of overdraft fees found at large banks. I found as my own personal pain point that I love the flexibility of overdraft in my account. I just did not like the lack of transparency around how much I was approved for and the significant cost of paying $34 every single instance. Dave was born to really improve that product dramatically. Today, our product ExtraCash is our version of overdraft that customers can link their existing checking account.
We analyze their cash flow data with our own proprietary AI engine called CashAI, which spits out a risk score, approves people for up to $500 of credit that they can use between paychecks for things like gas and groceries. We have no credit check, no interest, no late fees, and the product is charged only on a 5% origination fee. So incredibly fair, very easy to understand, and today we are at over 15 million customers, publicly traded business on the Nasdaq, and we are a 10th quarter in a row of growing revenue over 30%.
You guys have laid out a midterm growth framework that calls for mid-teens member growth, low double-digit ARPU growth. I wanted to start on the former driver, just on the member growth side. I think one of the areas that Dave and several other of your peers have continued to surprise to the upside is how durable the member growth has been for these businesses and how large this opportunity is. As you guys have leaned in even more into customer acquisition this year, I guess what has that data showed you in terms of the durability of this really low CAC that the business thrives on? Just how much durability is there on this underserved customer?
Well, I think the durability is a real sign of how big the market actually is. We think there's 180 million Americans that fall within our TAM that are looking for access to short duration credit, and we're able to acquire over 1 million users per quarter at this point. We acquired 1.1 million new members in the third quarter at a CAC of $22. The speed to value of which we're able to offer consumers short duration credit, our advertising talks about getting credit within five minutes or less if you just link your bank account to us, and that proves to be a very strong message that also is driven by a lot of word of mouth.
30% of our acquisition is from people telling friends and family about the product because it is so fair, it is so inexpensive, and it truly gets people out of some hardship between paychecks. We've shown no slowdown of acquisition in the last 10 years. Our CAC has always been efficient and around that $20 range, and it's just a stark contrast to large banks and fintechs that are going after the direct deposit relationship where their CAC is in the several hundred dollar range, and we're able to achieve something entirely different through a low CAC, direct-to-consumer model.
Even despite how strong the member growth has been, the credit profile of the overall business has been quite strong, 1-2 points of loss rates. How are you balancing credit here as you're continuing to drive such strong user acquisition, and what do you typically see on these new cohorts? Because I know that's caused some noise coming out of the last few quarters that a lot of questions around the new member cohorts being a larger driver of the mix, so just unpack that.
Yeah, well, underwriting's become the secret sauce of the business over the last decade. We started off in 2017 with a pretty simple rules-based model. You could get access to up to $75 of credit with us in the very beginning of the business. Starting in 2019, we were a real pioneer in leveraging AI to start analyzing the cash flow data of our customers to understand the risk, and we've been able to take loss rates from over 5% down to nearly 1% on a 120-day basis. In the meantime, we've been able to grow average origination size in 2017 from $50 per user now to, as of September, $225 per customer. It's been tremendous improvements on loss rate while at the same time growing the average size, which is difficult to do, and we think there's just a lot of durability in what we're doing.
The cash flow data that you have, I think, is underappreciated in that underwriting, gives you great visibility. I guess, just from a broader consumer credit standpoint, what are you seeing in the recent trends across your user base?
We see a pretty healthy consumer. Income is generally up year-over-year about 10%. We're seeing loss rates all-time low, but we sort of sit in a category on our own, where compared to traditional subprime credit, where you have installment lending and subprime credit cards that they're taking on significant duration risk, the average duration of ExtraCash is only about 10 days. Customers that are borrowing from us are having to pay back, reapply, and we get to reassess the validity of their paycheck and their income every single pay period.
We sit in a really great position from a risk perspective that we're never taking on any macro risk. We're just taking on the risk of someone's ability to maintain the durability of their income. That, to me, is the best product for this subprime consumer that doesn't take into effect any macro shocks that could affect us like other forms of credit.
The 10% increase in incomes, is that driven by more income sources coming through that you're seeing?
It's a little bit. We are seeing just general wage increase, but our customer's quite resilient. They tend to have multiple sources of income, and so we track wages per user, and that's up to about 1.4 from 1.2 last year, as our customers will take on gig economy work. We actually have a feature in our app that helps drive people towards gig economy work if they're looking for additional income opportunities, which both supports the customer's income, but also supportive of longer term loss rate performance because we're helping them become more durable on their employment.
I wanted to touch on competition early, just because it ties into the user growth opportunity. Competition comes up a lot in conversations we have with investors, just given several other large providers in the space. What would you pinpoint as the main drivers of differentiation of Dave versus some of these peers?
I'd say we largely compete with a lot of closed ecosystem companies, primarily guys like Chime or Cash App, where they really want to cross-sell short duration credit to their direct deposit members. They're out there marketing themselves as the best bank account for the subprime, under $100,000 income customers. But switching your bank account to access credit is a very high friction proposition for consumers. Switching over all of your bills, waiting 30+ days to access a couple hundred dollars of credit, to us is too high friction. And that's why the CAC for a lot of these neobanks is so much more significant than it is for Dave.
At our company, we take a very different approach of very low friction, open ecosystem, where as long as you have a bank account somewhere in the country and can connect to us via Plaid, we're willing to look at your cash flow data to approve you for some form of credit. Ultimately, I view the TAM of people, TAM to be much larger of those who want to connect an account, therefore a clear sign of why our CAC is so dramatically lower.
Maybe just to jump in and add to that, I mean, the underwriting is really a core point of differentiation for us, and the sophistication that we've built around underwriting, we believe, provides a really solid data moat for the business and drives a really interesting customer flywheel. The better we can get at underwriting, that allows us to create a higher offer for our customers, drives more customer growth, that drives more performance data on the underwriting performance of the models, creates more training data to create then better offers for our customers, and kind of drives the flywheel there.
W e've originated ExtraCash over 230 million unique times to date, and it's all that training data that we have to continue to fine-tune our models that shows up in the form of a stronger value proposition for ExtraCash and the other sort of extensible uses of our underwriting. I'm sure we'll talk about the Flex Card as well, that really sets us apart from our competition.
I'd say another point here is that we know our customers really well. About 98% of originations in any given quarter are going to repeat customers. These are people we know really, really well. It's not like we're like in a comparable installment lender where their entire business is driven by new customer originations from customers they don't know anything about. We're constantly looking and reviewing the same customers, their income profile, noting changes, and a large part of increases in credit per user is just by virtue of us getting to know the customers better.
It's also my understanding that these users care very much about consistency of access to the product, right? But also about the limits that they can get out of these platforms, and I think Dave is on the higher end of some of these other players.
That's right. I think from an average credit per user, we are on the higher end of the scale, if not the highest in the industry. I think part of that is we have the best underwriting, we have the open ecosystem approach, but we also have the benefit of several benefits here.
On the ARPU side of the equation, two exciting things to talk about. Flex, but also on the ExtraCash product, the fee cap changes. The other week, you touted the September stats around the advance sizes at $225. I think the average revenue per advance up 16% versus where you were. I guess, as you think about the runway that those changes unlock on the advance sizes relative to the share of credit utilization you're currently getting, I mean, how much runway do we think is possible here beyond the $225 that you're comfortable extracting?
I think there's certainly a lot of room to run. We look at the customer's total credit wallet share today, which comprises Buy Now, Pay Later, other short duration credit like a subprime credit card and short duration installment. We're actually only about 20% of our customer's credit wallet share today. We think there's a lot of room to run with ExtraCash, and I certainly think that there's room for continuous single-digit improvements within the opportunity for ExtraCash advance sizes to increase. Then with the introduction of higher limits up to ExtraCash $1,000, we think that's another opportunity for us to further get customers up the limit curve and increase originations per user.
Lastly, we've launched our own credit card called Flex, which is our version of a subprime credit card, but it has the flexibility of a credit card married with the duration of Buy Now, Pay Later, where it's only repaid in your next four installments. That, to us, is the best form of credit for this particular use case, where we're not taking on major macro duration, and gives us the same insights of the cash flow data to make meaningful credit decisions, improve access, and keep delinquencies very low.
Yeah, so let's double-click on Flex. I mean, you've been rolling out test cohorts over the last several quarters. What have been the key learnings coming out of those testing? Then we'll talk about 2027, but maybe just on the test cohorts.
Yeah, I'd say that the testing's gone really well. Certainly, customer acquisition's gone better than expected. Credit cards generally have a very, very high CAC, so pleased to see that CAC has come in well under our expectations there. What's really unique about the go-to-market is that we're seeing all the customers we are turning down for that product are attaching to ExtraCash at a very high rate. Even the customers that are approved for Flex are also utilizing our ExtraCash product at a high rate too. We like the fact that we're seeing these be very compatible products. We also had modeled in some cannibalization of existing ExtraCash users.
Once they were approved for Flex, they may stop using ExtraCash. Not the case. We see people using credit for sort of both utilization, but also it's because there's different use cases. We find that this customer tends to have an envelope system for credit. They use Buy Now, Pay Later for certain purchases. They use ExtraCash for things like gas and groceries, and that's turned out to be, that hypothesis turned out to be quite true with respect to this business line.
If you are able to share for some of these more mature test cohorts, I mean, what type of utilization are you seeing in that mix of Flex versus ExtraCash?
All we can say is, on a cumulative basis, we are certainly seeing more credit consumption. It is ARPU accretive, it is LTV accretive, and I think that was something we had not modeled in, that the cross-consumption is certainly leading to improvements in lifetime value. When we think about our ability to deploy more marketing dollars at scale for years to come, LTV enhancements gives us just so much more room to run on any levels of CAC inflation that we may see from here.
Well, maybe just to jump in there and add a quick point. One of the other things that we have been excited to see is just the retention profile of users that have been cross-sold into Flex being significantly improved relative to these sort of typical baseline of an ExtraCash user. As we think about the sort of implications of that from a user growth perspective over the long term, it is actually quite a nice tailwind for MTM growth.
As we think about Flex becoming more broadly available, how are you thinking about the initial rollout of that next year between cross-sell focus versus net new customer acquisition, given how the data has looked better than you thought on the customer acquisition side?
I'd say it's a little bit of both. I mean, we're seeing positive signs on both dimensions, and so we're excited to continue to spend more money on marketing. I think we've spent over $1 million on Flex advertising at this point, seeing really nice efficiencies there, and excited to keep expanding into more channels there. We're also excited about the ability to get into new distribution channels with Flex, given ExtraCash is not a product we can leverage on external platforms like Credit Karma that are exclusively for credit cards. Those types of channels have huge scale, and so it's a new untapped resource for us to grab more customers.
I would say, the benefits that we see to Flex are that it will create another tip of the spear for us to be out there marketing new customer acquisition behind a sort of new value prop in addition to ExtraCash as well. It's going to be both a cross-sell of the large existing base into Flex, but also the goal is to have a new sort of go-to-market engine behind that product as well.
To the extent that you do decide to lean more heavily into the customer acquisition side of Flex next year, does that limit how accretive Flex might be in full year one to the bottom line, and more of the benefit comes through in 2028?
It's possible, yeah. I mean, look, I think we want to take a returns-driven approach to our user acquisition, and if the returns justify us investing in high LTV, high returning ad dollars going out to acquire new users, I mean, we're absolutely going to do that.
Tying Flex back to your open platform approach, I know a lot of the criticism on a relative basis of Dave versus other players has been not owning that direct deposit relationship. I guess, does Flex solve for that without having to go after that direct deposit relationship where you kind of start to become their daily spend provider? Do you even need checking and savings and direct deposit?
Look, we have checking and savings. You can have direct deposit at Dave. It just tends to not be a big focus area for the business. Ultimately, there's just not a lot of differentiation with respect to core banking. You put money in, you expect to be able to get money out, and most of the guys trying to win market share in that business are having to spend lots of money on incentives to win the business. We think what is a lot harder to do, and what unlocks really a lot of CAC efficiency, is to be really good at short duration and credit underwriting. That's where we feel like leveraging that expertise into credit card can get us a customer that's willing to spend their primary capital on our credit card without the need to win over the direct deposit.
Kyle gives this anecdote a lot, which is, if your direct deposit goes into your Chase account, but you put all your spending on your Amex card, who really has that primacy relationship? I'd say we're much more focused on being that Amex in that situation for the subprime consumer versus being the Chase, because we just have not seen the benefits flow through from focusing on the direct deposit, and all of those resources have been shifted towards winning on top of wallet with other credit products.
Maybe just to wrap up on Flex, if you were to look three to five years out, what's the probability that Flex is actually the larger business than ExtraCash?
Well, starting from a much smaller base, ExtraCash is soon to be $1 billion+ business.
Is there any point in time at which Flex could become?
Look, I certainly think that. The market for credit cards is potentially larger than single pay credit. It's hard to assess the size of single pay credit because we've really invented the category, we've grown the category. It's showing no signs of slowing down with even large players in it, so hard to assess what the dollar size is, but credit card is very quantified at this point, and it's $1 trillion+ market, which we think we can certainly represent a meaningful share, because subprime credit cards are not great products for this consumer in its current form that monetizes off of compound interest and late fees.
Our product, which is monetized off a monthly fee and an origination fee of 3% with no late fees, no compound interest, is the right approach to give to this consumer for both financial health, but also for investors who have seen multiple times credit models get blown up for subprime credit because they're taking on such macro duration risks and susceptible for shocks in employment and/or interest rates. Our duration on Flex Card is on average 45 days, and we are taking equal bites of the apple every time they get paid with high visibility into the validity of their income.
And the next time they go apply for Flex, we are underwriting them every single time. We are, I believe, will be the best subprime credit card in the country within a matter of five years.
Maybe switching to capital, you guys are generating a lot of free cash flow, one of the most profitable among your peers out there. You've been opportunistic on buybacks. You've also had the added tailwind of migrating more of your funding off balance sheet with Coastal. Maybe just talk about how you're thinking about capital allocation priorities from here. I'd also add maybe M&A into that bucket alongside buybacks, reinvestment into the business.
Want to take that?
Sure. Look, we love this business, and we want to own more of it over time. I think we've demonstrated over the last couple of years our ability to drive very attractive returns with the buybacks that we've done. We bought back about 9% of the company earlier this year at around $200 a share. We continue to be pretty active out there in the open market buying our own stock. As you mentioned, the company is substantially free cash flow generative at this point, and with the amount of operating leverage that we have built into the platform, we can launch things like Flex. We have two other new products in the pipeline right now that we're working on that's fully absorbed into the cost structure, and we're still generating this meaningful amount of free cash flow.
I think it just gives us a lot of flexibility to be out there buying back our stock. From an M&A standpoint, we look at things, but we think just given the extensibility of the capabilities that we've built around CashAI and our underwriting advantage, that's going to allow us to target these adjacencies from an organic standpoint pretty effectively. I think we, in any M&A scenario, would be very, very disciplined around a certain capability that we felt like we, maybe much harder to deliver from an organic perspective. But it's certainly a lever, but I think we feel very good about our business prospects as a kind of standalone company, and as a result, view these kind of certain dislocations that happen within the stock price as real opportunities for us to lean heavily into the repurchase.
On the reinvestment component of that, beyond, I guess, leaning more heavily into customer acquisition with Flex, any other potential surprises when it comes to expenses and spend near term that come to mind?
No. Like I said, we've been investing this year. Our headcount has grown, call it by about 20% year-over-year, but we're still going to deliver 45% EBITDA margins in Q4. That's what's embedded in the guidance. With that addition in headcount, like I said, we have two other new products in the pipeline that we haven't yet disclosed publicly. Again, it kind of comes back to the technology platform that we've built and how extensible the underwriting is to start to attack these other adjacencies in a very resource-efficient way. I wouldn't expect that to really change. You wouldn't see any sort of meaningful increases in expenses to target some of these new opportunities.
You kind of just alluded to it, but I was going to ask about, given the attractiveness of the cash flow underwriting that you have access to, what are some of the other applications of that from a product standpoint beyond Flex? Not to get ahead of our skis, with Flex still being a very exciting opportunity, but what could that look like beyond Flex?
There's just a lot of use cases where our underwriting gives us a leg up to help customers just do more in their life, to help them manage more of their expenses. There's categories from rent to paying bills that we think that people could use some extra help with, and those are categories we're paying close attention to that we feel like we can help with.
More of a repackaging of an ExtraCash for a specific purpose, like rent?
Yeah, if you just go back to that envelope system I talked about, where this customer tends to use different forms of credit for different things, and we feel like we can certainly tap into that mindset and build credit products that service different parts of their everyday life, where we think that will increase utilization, even though there may be a lot of overlap in what you could do with those same potential dollars.
On the regulatory front, just given the recent midterms, I think it is raising questions about how the regulatory backdrop evolves over the next several years. Tying that into a lot of your peers exploring banking charters and licenses, Dave, I think, has been one of the minority maybe of that group of how vocal you, I guess, you haven't been about looking at that path. I mean, is that interpretation wrong, or is that something that you guys are still open to, and does the results of the last few weeks change how you are thinking about exploring that route?
Yeah, we haven't spoken a lot about it publicly. Compared to other companies in fintech, we don't gain some massive TAM expansion. We've seen some fintechs out there where once they were to get a charter, it would allow them to operate in states they otherwise would not be able to from a state licensing perspective. Our core product, ExtraCash, is already available in all 50 states, so there wouldn't be a TAM unlock for us, but we do think there's benefits in having one single regulator versus having 50 different state interpretations of your business. From that perspective, there's a lot to like.
I'd say additionally, with respect to the partner bank ecosystem, almost all of them have had some sort of hiccup with respect to one of their partners, and that tends to have compounding effects with respect to our program. It is something we are taking a serious look at. I think there are quite a few benefits, and we will have more to talk about there hopefully soon.
I guess we will stay tuned. Any questions in the audience?
I would say one area of interest for us is just how fast our subscription business is growing. If you look at the beginning of Dave, we just had the ExtraCash product, and today we have financial management tools, we have our checking account, we have our savings account, we have our job board, and because of those additional tools, we have been able to increase our membership fee to $3 per month, and our subscription revenue business is growing 72% year-over-year. Importantly, the Flex Card will come at a higher membership cost of $9 additional per month for access to that product.
Quite soon, subscriptions will be a nine-figure business for the company and growing at a fast clip. Some of these new features we are talking about could also come with the potential with a higher monthly fee, which the monthly recurring revenue is slightly more durable than the transaction-based revenue, which we think investors will appreciate.
As someone that's been in the industry for a long time, Jason, I mean, there's different approaches that different peers are taking in this space, but I think there's a lot of speculation around the long-term consolidation opportunity in this category. I know we touched on M&A appetite, but just more holistically, I mean, how do you think about this industry's ability to maybe the benefits of consolidation longer term, whether or not Dave plays a role in that, but just your general thoughts there.
We've seen some consolidation so far, like the MoneyLions and the Brigit's of the world were consolidated a few years ago. Arguably, those got picked up at cheaper rates than they probably otherwise should have. I think we'll continue to see the private markets consolidate, where companies are not big enough to become public, and they finally realize their 2021 valuations still not going to be a reality. As Kyle said, continuously look at things, but we're very rational on price, and we currently, as of today, don't trade at a multiple that we even like, and so to go pay a premium to other companies that are subscale has not made a lot of sense.
We hope to increase our multiple as we continue to prove the consistency of our earnings and the durability of it, and we can start to take things more seriously once we see more of a resurgence in our market cap. But until then, we'd rather just buy back our own stock because it's cheap.
I know it's a bit early here, but anything you're willing to say about 2027 broadly, not specifically to Flex, but just how you're thinking about the durability of this top-line framework, mid-teens user, low double-digit ARPU, how sustainable that is into next year?
I mean, certainly we think that's sustainable in the near term. We talked about mid-teens monthly transacting member growth and low double digits ARPU growth. If you look at the durability of our customer acquisition, that certainly supports the MTM side of the story. If you look at the growth of our ARPU in September that we had on the exit rate, that gives a lot of runway for ARPU into next year, that doesn't even include the uplift of Flex and the subscription opportunity we're talking about. We're not putting out 2027 guidance, but that growth algorithm should produce high 20s, low 30s growth very conservatively for the year.
Maybe just to add to that, sort of how I think about the kind of financial algorithm as a whole, if we can grow top line at that, call it, mid to high 20s. Given the operating leverage that we have in the business, we should be able to grow earnings faster than that. Given our commitment and track record on share repurchase, we should be able to grow EPS even faster than that. I think the equity story is pretty attractive, kind of given the overall kind of financial algorithm that we have in place.
On the buyback, I think you alluded to on the conference call that you had more appetite around that coming out of the quarter into the fourth quarter. Are there any bottlenecks around how chunky you could be with buybacks with the Coastal migration? I know you still have your legacy BaaS part of that.
We have about $90 million of authorization left on the current share repurchase program. Our board is also behind us as it relates to share repurchases. I see no issue as far as increasing that. We've talked about the sort of cash flow profile of the business at this point, and we exited the quarter with over $300 million in cash. We can be quite dynamic and scaled as it relates to our efforts there.
Question?
[audio distortion] Related question. This is Jamal. Now that you have just a Dave checking account, you've got savings goals as well. Does this change what you see as the ideal customer profile that you're targeting, as well as the kind of level of engagement and potentially the economics?
I'd say it's a way to increase engagement with customers. About 30% of all ExtraCash dollars get sent to the Dave Debit Card. That's been a continuously growing part of our business, the transaction volume. Would expect Flex to be a way for us to further enhance the transaction volume for those customers. Ultimately, our focus is on the cash flow-based underwriting to leverage more credit products versus the direct deposit. Our view is that the more we can do for our customers over time with respect to solving their liquidity challenges, the better chance we have at winning that sort of direct deposit checking savings relationship over time. Thank you.
Just a quick question on the macro environment. Sorry. The market's getting increasingly concerned about potentially a slowdown in the consumer finally. It's been very resilient, but looking into next year, will inflation catch up? Will higher interest rates catch up? How do you see your business performing in a slower macro environment?
We think in many respects our business can be seen as quite countercyclical. If there's a much higher rate environment, that higher cost of capital for longer duration lenders and credit card companies, that can tend to have them tighten their credit box. We are not cost of capital constrained or capital constrained whatsoever, given the velocity of our portfolio turns over so quick and the monetization is so healthy. We're happy to take those customers that are otherwise no longer approved for credit in a slower economy and take them into Dave. That will show up as potentially more customers for us, and we're not impacted by that whatsoever.
One of your peers has shown an appetite to actually move more market into near-prime customers. Is that something that longer term could be of interest to apply your cash flow underwriting into a customer segment beyond the lower income consumer?
I do think that the Flex Card is our push not to near-prime customer, but getting closer and closer to that type of user. Cash flow underwriting is certainly not unique just to subprime. There's a lot of people who are making significant amounts of income. I think you're alluding to one of our competitors saying they're targeting over $75,000 of income. We have a lot of customers today that make over $75,000 of income that just happen to live in more expensive cities like New York City, where a paycheck-to-paycheck consumer might be someone making over $100,000 a year, but just needs access to more liquidity. That's where I think Flex and/or even offering EC up to $1,000 is a great opportunity for someone that amount of money might be pretty impactful for them.
Any final questions? All right, I think we'll call it there. Thank you.
Great.
Thanks, Ryan.
Yeah, appreciate it. Thanks.